Stuck on the Drawing Board: Unbuilt British commercial aircraft since 1945, Richard Payne.
Pages 11 and 12
That the majority of aircraft design and production immediately after the war was dedicated to BOAC and BEA (plus BSAAC for a short while) was due to the air transport system that operated in Britain at the time. From 12 April 1947, BOAC became the sole operator of intercontinental services, except for BSAAC services to South America, with the newly set up British European Airways Corporation flying all European and internal scheduled services (although private airlines were later able to operate routes under BEA Associate Agreements). This date signalled the end of privately operated scheduled services in Britain for a number of years. As a consequence of this, all future airliner production would be directed by the two main carriers, firstly under the Brabazon Committee, and then under such specifications as the Medium-Range and Long-Range Empire aircraft and replacements for the Rapide, DC-3 and Viscount.
Several other books and sites note the apparent hostility towards British designs by BOAC. On the other hand BEA seems to have been quite a supporter of British designs.
Would there have been any improvements in British airliner manufacturing fortunes if BOAC didn’t have the monopoly on intercontinental routes but had to share them with BEA (or whatever it would be called)?
By: pogno - 2nd March 2007 at 13:35
I believe BOAC did try and support British industry, it did order the Hermes and I have read that that had huge problems with performance and support.
The York, Halton and Lancastrian were all used immediately post war probably just because they were available, although unsuitable in real terms.
The Tudor could have been a winner but again fell short on payload range I believe.
The Comet and Concorde were real steps into the unknown and any operator was brave to pioneer their use. The Brittania too to a lesser extent.
That only leaves the VC10 which was/still is a good aircraft. I wonder what the operating cost comparison was for it and the 707/DC8.
By: forester - 1st March 2007 at 17:18
Several other books and sites note the apparent hostility towards British designs by BOAC. On the other hand BEA seems to have been quite a supporter of British designs.
Would there have been any improvements in British airliner manufacturing fortunes if BOAC didn’t have the monopoly on intercontinental routes but had to share them with BEA (or whatever it would be called)?
Can we please put away this simplistic attitude and take a look at the task BOAC was set up to do?
In the late Forties and the Fifties Britain still had a vast Empire to service. This required getting large numbers of diplomats and senior military personnel to every corner of the globe and bringing them home again using, initally, modified wartime bombers of very limited capacity. The BOAC network was long, thin and extremely fragile. It was an immensely complex operation. Overseas engineering operations had to be set up, fuel sourced, Rest Houses for accommodation built and managed, telecommunications systems laid and runways built and extended. BOAC was not an airline as we would recognise one today but a Government transport department. Airline managers were not subject to passenger complaints quite as they are today (there was hardly any “leisure” traffic), but instead subject to pressure from very high level military and government officials, who were themselves working to Government deadlines.
In response to this BOAC had a need for new aircraft that would solve some of their problems, not ones that required nursing into service thus creating new problems. It had teams of development pilots available to bring new aircraft into service but simply couldn’t afford to nurse a new aircraft just because it was made in Britain. On the other hand British aircraft manufacturers had come to expect the development work to be lead by the customer – traditionally the RAF. BOAC (and later BEA) didn’t have the capacity to do this unless there was seen to be a very considerable benefit – “Blind Landing” would be a good example where they thought the investment of time and money worthwhile. Remember we are talking years of development here: three years to the first passenger-carrying service of the Britannia, five years or so to the first commercial Autoland with the Trident. The Comet – we all know about.
BOAC was never hostile to British designs. It simply needed aircraft that did what it said on the box – and American designs nearly always did that. The Connies and Strats, the DC7C brought in as a stop-gap, and later the 707 were all reliable workhorses tried-and-tested requiring hardly any modification. The Comet and Britannia introductions proved to be absolute nightmares. The VC10 was a success in that it could go places the 707 could not, but by the time it was in service, airfields all over the world were being extended to allow the 707 to operate and its strong selling point was quickly overtaken by its poorer economics. The Super VC10 was a stretched, but not really a developed i.e. more efficient, version of the Standard VC10, which was what was really needed at the time.
BOAC was not to blame for the failure of the British commercial aircraft industry. BOAC had its own job to do and it used the best equipment it could get its hands on, given the constraints set by the Government, to do that job.
By: Gooney Bird - 1st March 2007 at 14:57
Channel Airways ran mainly British types, although some were second hand.
They did operate DC3s and a DC4, but other than that they were all British:
Puss Moths
Dragon Rapides
Vikings
Viscounts
Bristol Freighters
748
111
Tridents
CometsI’m sure I’ve forgotten some…..
And also………….
Proctors
Austers
Tiger Moth
Aerovan
Doves
Herons
By: wessex boy - 28th February 2007 at 16:44
Channel Airways ran mainly British types, although some were second hand.
They did operate DC3s and a DC4, but other than that they were all British:
Puss Moths
Dragon Rapides
Vikings
Viscounts
Bristol Freighters
748
111
Tridents
Comets
I’m sure I’ve forgotten some…..
By: alertken - 28th February 2007 at 14:36
Monopoly wasn’t the issue, it was access to $, rationed in UK until 1958. BSAAC took Tudor/Princess/Comet 1 because its routes were largely £-area. BEAC worked in revenue-cartels, largely in £ or other soft currencies, and its losses were treated by its owner as cohesion/social expense. When they became exposed to reality, they too yelped for Boeings – after specifying Trident so bespoke as to ruin its prospects. This was no friend-in-need – they imposed hefty subsidies before accepting Comet 4B, Argosy, Herald.
Bring Over American Currency lived in a commercial jungle from Day 1, earning $ provided they delivered a Cunard-like product (no prob), punctually: ah! not on Britcraft then. So they wanted L-749 not Tudor, B.377 not Hermes, 707 not odd DH/Avro/HP fantasies. They took C-4M, not DC-6 only because the engine spared $ and the airframes were set against UK’s 1946 C$ Loan. GRE’s assertion that they caused “the worst blunder of all”, VC7/V.1000, ignores a payload-range issue.
As soon as operators could access $ DC-6A/Bs appeared (Eagle, HCA), then every-US-thing, until Britannia should have changed its name, launching 737-200 to perform like clockwork for nearly 25 years. Freddie Laker at BUA launched 1-11/200, not as patriot but to gain political support to rise above trooping and tramping. That done, when BCal absorbed most of the independents they stuck with inherited types, but only bought 1 new Brit machine, ever: a 1-11/500, reneging on a commitment to more, to sweeten DC10 purchases. Not because they were spring-loaded against the locals: they were in the business of selling a flight for 2% more than its cost. Brit designers never understood that. If the financing basis of (BOAC) had been on risk capital, they would have rejected Tudor, Hermes, Marathon, Apollo…and sought Convairliner, Connie and DCs, just like all other commercial operators did.
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February 27, 2007 at 7:56 pm