A big day out

PEENEMÜNDE

596 aircraft – 324 Lancasters, 218 Halifaxes, 54 Stirlings.
40 aircraft – 23 Lancasters, 15 Halifaxes, 2 Stirlings – lost, 6.7% of the force.

This was a special raid which Bomber Command had ordered to carry our against the German research establishment on the Baltic coast where V-2 rockets were being built and tested. The raid was carried out in moonlight to increase the chances of success.

There were several novel features. It was the only occasion in the second half of the war when the whole of Bomber Command attempted a precision raid by night on such a small target. For the first time, there was a Master Bomber controlling a full-scale Bomber Command raid; Group Captain J H Searby, of 83 Squadron, 8 Group, carried out this task. There were three aiming points – the scientists’ and workers’ living quarters, the rocket factory and the experimental station – and the Pathfinders employed a special plan with crews designated as “shifters”, who attempted to move the marking from one part of the target to another as the raid progressed. Crews of 5 Group, bombing in the last wave of the attack, had practised the “time-and-distance” bombing method as an alternative method for their part of the raid.
It was also the first raid in which 6 (Canadian) Group operated Lancaster aircraft. 426 Squadron dispatched 9 Mark II Lancasters, losing 2 aircraft including that of the squadron commander, Wing Commander L Crooks, D.S.O., D.F.C., an Englishman, who was killed.

The Pathfinders found Peenemünde without difficulty in the moonlight and the Master Bomber controlled the raid successfully throughout. Unfortunately, the initial marking and bombing fell on a labour camp for forced workers which was situated 1½ miles south of the first aiming point, but the Master Bomber and the Pathfinders quickly brought the bombing back to the main targets, which were all bombed successfully. 560 aircraft dropped nearly 1,800 tons of bombs; 85% of this tonnage was high-explosive. The estimate has appeared in many sources that this raid set back the V-2 experimental programme by at least 2 months and reduced the scale of the eventual attack. Approximately 180 Germans were killed at Peenemünde, nearly all in the workers’ housing estate, 500-600 foreigners, mostly Polish, were killed in the workers’ camp, where there were only flimsy wooden barracks and no proper air-raid shelters.

The 6.7% loss of the force dispatched was judged an acceptable cost for the successful attack on this important target on a moonlit night. Most of the casualties were suffered by the aircraft of the last wave when the German night fighters arrived in force – a Mosquito diversion to Berlin drew off most of the German night-fighters for the first 2 of the raid’s 3 phases. The groups involved in the last wave were 5 Group, which lost 17 of its 109 aircraft (14.5%) and the Canadian 6 Group which lost 12 out of 57 aircraft (19.7%). This was the first night on which the Germans used their new schräge Musik weapons; these were twin upward firing cannons fitted in the cockpit of ME110s. Two schräge Musik aircraft found the bomber stream flying home from Peenemünde and are believed to have shot down 6 of the bombers lost on the raid.

USAAF Schweinfurt-Regensburg

376 aircraft – all B17s
60 aircraft – lost, 16% of the force.

The Schweinfurt-Regensburg Mission flown by B-17 Flying Fortresses of the U.S. Army Air Forces on August 17, 1943, was conceived as an ambitious plan to cripple the German aircraft industry. The mission was also known as the “double-strike mission” because it entailed two large forces of bombers attacking separate targets in order to disperse fighter reaction by the Luftwaffe, and was the first “shuttle” mission, in which all or part of a mission landed at a different field and later bombed another target returning to its base.

The production of ME-109’s and almost half of all German fighters was located in Regensburg and in Wiener Neustadt, Austria, and almost all of the production of ball bearings in Germany was located in Schweinfurt. The 4th Bombardment Wing, using B-17s equipped with “Tokyo (fuel) tanks” for longer range, attacked the fighter manufacturing plants in Regensburg and then flew on to bases in North Africa. The 1st Bombardment Wing, following, bombed the ball-bearing factories of Schweinfurt. Because of limited range, escorting P-47 Thunderbolt fighters would be able to protect the bombers only as far as Eupen, Belgium, and most were assigned to the Regensburg mission.

Regensburg
The Regensburg task force was led by the 4th Bombardment Wing commander, Colonel Curtis E. LeMay. It consisted of seven B-17 Groups totalling 146 aircraft, each group but one flying a 21-aircraft combat box tactical formation. Approximately fifteen minutes after it crossed the coast, the Regensburg force encountered the first German fighter interception, which continued with growing intensity nearly all the way to the target area. After ninety minutes of combat the German fighter force broke off the engagement, low on fuel and ammunition. By then at least 15 bombers had been shot down or fatally damaged, 13 from the trailing formation. However anti-aircraft fire (“flak”) was light over Regensburg and visibility clear, and of the remaining 131 bombers, 126 dropped 298.75 tons of bombs on the fighter aircraft factories with a high degree of accuracy at approximately noon British time.

The Regensburg force then turned south to cross the Alps, confronted by only a few twin-engined fighters soon forced to disengage by lack of range. The German force had not been prepared for this contingency, but they were also in the process of re-arming to meet the Schweinfurt force, then forming over East Anglia. Even so, two damaged B-17s turned away from the Regensburg task force and landed in neutral Switzerland, where their crews were interned and the bombers confiscated. Another crash-landed in Italy and five more were forced down by lack of fuel into the Mediterranean Sea. In all 24 bombers were lost and more than 60 of the 122 survivors landing in Tunisia had suffered battle damage.

Schweinfurt
The 1st Bombardment Wing, commanded by Brigadier General Robert B. Williams, was made up of nine B-17 groups totalling 230 aircraft. The Schweinfurt task forces followed the same route as the Regensburg force. The field order for the mission specified that the B-17s would fly at altitudes between 23,000 and 26,500 feet, but approaching the coast of the Netherlands at 1330, it was confronted with developing cloud masses not present earlier in the day and the commander of the task force, estimating that the bombers would not be able to climb over the clouds, elected to fly under them at 17,000 feet, increasing the vulnerability of the bombers to fighter attacks. The first German attacks began almost immediately and employed different tactics from the morning mission. The lead wing was attacked continuously in head-on attacks by both ME-109s and FW-190s, and although RAF escorts claimed eight victories they were forced to return to base early in the engagement. Two groups of P-47s (88 aircraft) arrived a few minutes late and despite some individual combats, they too were forced to break off virtually as soon as they arrived. Inside German airspace rocket-launching twin-engined fighters, including night fighters, joined the battle as more than 300 fighters from 24 bases opposed the raid. The force diverged from the morning’s route at Mannheim, alerting the German defenders that the target was Schweinfurt. Losses among the 57 B-17’s of the lead wing were so severe that many among its airmen considered the possibility that the wing might be annihilated before reaching the target. However fifteen miles from Schweinfurt the opposing fighters, after shooting down 22 bombers, disengaged and landed to refuel and re-arm in order to attack the force on its way out.

At approximately 1500 the lead wing commenced bombing the target followed over a 24-minute span by the remainder of the force. Each wing found increasingly heavy smoke from preceding bomb explosions a hindrance to accuracy. 183 bombers dropped 424.3 tons of bombs, including 125 tons of incendiary bombs.

Three B-17s were shot down by flak over Schweinfurt. Fifteen minutes after leaving the target each task force circled over the town of Meiningen to reassemble its formations, then continued west toward Brussels. At approximately 1530 German fighters renewed their attacks, concentrating now on damaged bombers. Between 1630 and 1700 a covering force of 93 P-47s and 85 Spitfires arrived to provide withdrawal support, claiming 20 fighters shot down, but eight more bombers were lost before the force reached the North Sea, where three more crash-landed. The Schweinfurt force lost a total of 36 bombers.

Results and losses
55 crews with 552 crewmen were listed as missing as a result of the August 17 double-target mission. Approximately half of those became prisoners-of-war, and twenty were interned. 60 aircraft were lost over German-controlled territory, in Switzerland, or ditched at sea, with five crews rescued. 7 aircrew were killed aboard bombers safely returning to base, and 21 wounded. The 60 aircraft lost on a single mission more than doubled the highest previous loss at that time. 87 additional aircraft were damaged beyond economical repair, or had to be left behind in North Africa because of a lack of repair facilities, for a total loss of equipment to the Eighth Air Force of 147 B-17’s (many of the 60 left behind in Africa were repaired and continued service with the Twelfth Air Force). 95 additional aircraft were damaged. Three P-47 Thunderbolts and two RAF Spitfires were shot down attempting to protect the Schweinfurt force.

Spitfire pilots claimed 14 German fighters shot down and P-47 pilots claimed 16. Gunners on the bombers claimed 288 fighters shot down. Luftwaffe records showed only 27 lost.

Destruction of both targets was severe. In Regensburg all six main workshops of the Messerschmitt factory were destroyed or severely damaged, as were many supporting structures including the final assembly shop. In Schweinfurt the destruction was less severe but still extensive. The two largest factories, Kugelfischer & Company and Vereinigte Kugellager Fabrik I, suffered 80 direct hits. All the factories except Kugelfischer had extensive fire damage to machinery when incendiaries ignited the machine oil used in the manufacturing process. Albert Speer reported an immediate 34 per cent loss of production, but both the production shortfall and the actual loss of bearings were made up by extensive surpluses found throughout Germany in the aftermath of the raid.

203 civilians were killed in the strike.