Battle of Britain – British technology

Hi Niall,
Fascinating stuff, and thanks for the input. If I may just wander off into a complete tangent, to clarify…

Too true, but I would hardly describe Freeman, Dowding, Courtney, Beaverbrook et al as “those that memo”. If they did not shape the RAF’s doctrine and the rationale behind its requirements for aircraft, then who did? … Between [the sources] it is possible to build up both sides of the story (within limits). We are extremely fortunate compared with, for example, someone researching the Japanese airforces, in having such an astonishing array of primary material readily available to authors, researchers or the idly curious.

You are of course, quite right, but “Freeman, Dowding, Courtney, Beaverbrook et al” were certainly “those that memo” as well as being men of action. The had all left pulling triggers behind and their action was committed with pen and instruction. My point is those memos may have been written after the event, that those memos may tell a suitable story and certainly do not document arguments, disagreement or push into prominence political point scoring or defences against that – something that certainly happened but remained undocumented. Dates of actions give you a not-before or not-after date, but in themselves may be a post-hoc tiding of the messy reality.

I’ve worked in the civil service and in business, and one thing I know is the paper trail does not reflect anything like the reality of who made what decision and why, but reflects the prominence of those that made the paper trail and those that filed that bumph. I’d use that paper to help with dates to ‘tell the story’ (and mighty boring it would be) and a researcher using the remnant data 70 years hence would tell quite a different story from that same data – a third, different again, interpretation could be made by another participant at the time – and who is ‘right’?

To come (vaguely) back on the topic and to show the depths of suspicion one can sink to: 😉

As I type I have beside me a copy of the Hawker proposal for what would become the Hurricane. Within its stylish grey, green and gold leaf cover are 14 pages of description, some back-of-fag-packet performance estimates and a basic GA drawing. It is simply an outline proposal on which no real design work had been done.

Any potential anomaly in a ‘gold leaf cover’ around ‘some back-of-fag-packet performance estimates’ perhaps? I’ve put together nice presentations with broad-brush ideas inside, but I must remember to try gold leaf when next trying to sell something to Her Majesty’s Government. 😀

Of course presentation can often outrank content, but it’s an interesting oddity, and is a way of evaluating the data beyond just taking the content as accurate. (No, I’m not disputing the conclusions – just adding another angle on ‘data’.)

Anyone interested in this area might find Tom Stoppard’s play ‘Arcadia’ of interest in how historians can be frolicking up the garden path. (Literally, and literarily in that case.)

To go back to the ‘doctrine’ concept. What those that coin the idea might have in mind undergoes modification in the real world, and the words never keep pace with the death of those initiatives, this being an almost absolute failing of documentation. We’ve all seen the ‘big new idea’ from the boss that changes to ‘something that kind of works’ after a few months, or that might fail an acid test, but at that point there’s never a big announcement about how ‘Initiative Big Idea’ has sunk without trace…

“Let’s get Charlie to write the manual” is often the signal of death for Charlie and the manual’s potential user, but the manual would survive. Pilot’s notes that are given to the squadrons months after the aircraft are a fine example of paperwork not being quite what it seems. In short, ‘Doctrine’ does not equal ‘statement of’.

As for electric kettles, Wikipedia (which I normally trust about as much as an insurance salesman) offers the following: “The first electric kettle was shown at the Chicago World’s Fair, in 1893, using the electrical heat radiator concept devised earlier by R. E. B. Crompton. This was welded to the kettle’s bottom and led to a large waste of heat. In 1923, Arthur L. Large, from Birmingham, England, invented the immersed heating resistor. A safety valve was introduced by kettle maker Walter H. Bullpitt, also from Birmingham, in 1931.”

Now you’ve done it. Anyone know if electric kettles were in common use in Britain in W.W.II? I’ve just nipped off to copyright ‘Kettleology’. That’ll be fivepence. Ker-ching! 😀

The byways are fun, if not very relevant…

One thing that was key that nobody has mentioned yet was the fitting, just in time, of VHF radios to Fighter Command aircraft. Without this the close control pre positioning of their fighters would have been seriously degraded.
There is also no doubt that British tactics were well behind the Luftwaffe initially, and I’m not sure which happened first, the RAF adopting looser and more flexible tactics and formations or the tying down of the Luftwaffe fighters to close bomber defence which seriously hampered their efficiency in fighter v fighter combat.

Originally posted by XN923had the winner of F7.30 been more what the AM was looking for – say a monoplane with flaps, the decision to back the Hurricane and Spitfire might have been made in a more leisurely fashion. As I understand it F5.34 was both written around the ‘Fury Monoplane’, a concept already in existence and offered to the AM, and insurance against the failure of the Fury.

Undoubtedly true. F.10/35 was accelerated because the failings of the F.7/30 proposals were becoming evident. Had one of the contenders for F.7/30 looked slightly more promising F.10/35 might have been F.10/36 or even 37. In which case we might not have had a competent, modern fighter in volume production until, say, 1941. Which doesn’t bear thinking about. The fact that the Supermarine and Hawker experimentals had already been ordered before the issue of 10/35, probably also saved 6 months or so compared with starting with a blank sheet of paper.

Incidentally the ever-enthusiastic Ralph Sorley (and others) wanted the Gladiator ordered with the Perseus sleeve-valve engine rather than the proven, poppet-valve Mercury. If that had happened we wouldn’t even have had Gladiators in quantity.

F.5/34 was a routine replacement for the Fury and not written around any of the various Hawker proposals, none of which could have complied with it anyway – being 25 mph too slow and 6 guns short. Hawker was not even invited to tender. Gloster, Bristol and Westland were with prototypes being ordered from the first two.

The chief weapons – most effective and numerous – Britain had at its disposal were the result of private ventures, springing from Specification F7.30 designs, both of which had later Specs written around them.

The only aircraft used to any effect by the RAF during the war that could vaguely be described as a “Private Venture” is, ironically, the Gladiator. As I type I have beside me a copy of the Hawker proposal for what would become the Hurricane. Within its stylish grey, green and gold leaf cover are 14 pages of description, some back-of-fag-packet performance estimates and a basic GA drawing. It is simply an outline proposal on which no real design work had been done. 10 days later the Air Min ordered it as a one-off high speed research aircraft. In other words the real design work and prototype construction were carried out on Air Ministry contract. The same applies to the Spitfire (and the Mosquito). F.36/34 and F.37/34 were indeed written around the Hawker and Supermarine designs. I wouldn’t call either of them specifications in the accepted sense of the word. They are simply contractual documents in the sense that you have to have a definition of an aircraft before you can order it. Both were for one-off experimental aicraft not operational fighters. When F.10/35 – for a F.7/30 replacement – was issued, the Spitfire and Hurricane were modified to comply with it. In other words the spec was not written around them, but they were brought in line with it. In contrast Gloster carried out the full detailed design and constructed a prototype of the Gladiator at its own expense. That, in my mind, is a genuine Private Venture rather than just an unsolicited brochure. The cynical among us might also note that, by taking this course, a manufacturer would not have to pay the Air Min a royalty on export sales

Incidentally the Air Min did not specify aero-engines in the same way that it did aircraft. All aircraft Specs (and later Operational Requirements when they began to be used) were sent to all the engine manufacturers to keep them abreast of the performance required by the RAF, but the RAF relied on the engine industry keeping in close contact with the aircraft manuafacturers and anticipating future needs. Engine manufacturers would then propose new designs and the Air Min would fund prototype construction and development work for those that seemed promising and for which there would be demand. In this sense all engines were private ventures – the Merlin no more or less so than any other.

Originally posted by JDK
A ‘substantial archival record’ however good, is only a partial record of events – there are those that do, and those that memo

Too true, but I would hardly describe Freeman, Dowding, Courtney, Beaverbrook et al as “those that memo”. If they did not shape the RAF’s doctrine and the rationale behind its requirements for aircraft, then who did? The National Archives is indeed a treasure (and contains an awful lot more than just the Air Mins internal persepctive on things) but not the only game in town. There is also critical archival material at the RAF Museum, within corporate archives, the Parliamentary Archive (particularly the personal papers of those key figures who also happened to be peers), various University collections and all sorts of other unlikely places. Between them it is possible to build up both sides of the story (within limits). We are extremely fortunate compared with, for example, someone researching the Japanese airforces, in having such an astonishing array of primary material readily available to authors, researchers or the idly curious.

As for electric kettles, Wikipedia (which I normally trust about as much as an insurance salesman) offers the following: “The first electric kettle was shown at the Chicago World’s Fair, in 1893, using the electrical heat radiator concept devised earlier by R. E. B. Crompton. This was welded to the kettle’s bottom and led to a large waste of heat. In 1923, Arthur L. Large, from Birmingham, England, invented the immersed heating resistor. A safety valve was introduced by kettle maker Walter H. Bullpitt, also from Birmingham, in 1931.”

NiallC

According to a C47 driver I spoke to at North Weald a couple of weeks ago.

He’d been on the Arnhem drops and was insistent that he’d been much happier to have flown two missions per day, but the plan only scheduled one.

Whether the Market Garden operation would have fared any better had we got airborne strength on the ground more quickly is another of life’s inponderables.

Moggy

From the history I have read, the plan would in an ideal world have got everyone down on the same day. However, all the available aircraft and crews meant the drops could not have been done in less than three days. As it turned out, adverse weather conditions meant that it took more than a week to get everyone down. By the time the third wave was dropped, the Germans had substantially bolstered their defences and overrun many of the drop zones, leading to massive losses with, particularly, the Polish divisions.

I had not heard that more than one drop per day would have been possible, although your C47 driver may well be correct. The accusations of ‘stopping for tea’ were mainly aimed at XXX Corps tanks who parked up and waited for infantry after US airborne units won the bridge at Nijmegen at huge cost. In fact, it was necessary to wait for infantry cover because on the single track raised road from Nijmegen to Arnhem, tanks would have been sitting ducks and it would have only taken one knocked out tank to block the whole road. Though given that a wait was necessary I don’t see what stopped the attempt on the bridge waiting until nightfall. There are a good many ifs and buts about the Arnhem operation.

But now we are seriously off topic!

…Although according to some, the allies might have done better during the Arnhem operation in 1944 if it weren’t for the British insisting on stopping for tea at 3pm every day! According to some…

According to a C47 driver I spoke to at North Weald a couple of weeks ago.

He’d been on the Arnhem drops and was insistent that he’d been much happier to have flown two missions per day, but the plan only scheduled one.

Whether the Market Garden operation would have fared any better had we got airborne strength on the ground more quickly is another of life’s inponderables.

Moggy

…However attractive it may be it does not survive even momentary contact with the – very substantial – archival record.

Excellent posts chaps, thank you. A couple of quick thoughts.

A ‘substantial archival record’ however good, is only a partial record of events – there are those that do, and those that memo, and we’ve all been in meetings where the minutes reflect a much more harmonious progress than the real thing – and sometimes where the minute taker’s view acquires undue prominence after the fact. In this case, I’d agree that the records do tell the tail that Niall has put forward so cogently, but what undocumented discussions also occurred we don’t know. Agreements and deals, tip-offs and promises do happen and often aren’t documented. The TNA is the archive of the bureaucracy of Britain, not the history makers, and valuable but to be regarded with caution in general. (Although not in this case.)

The trick was getting the right performance aircraft in the right place at the right time – given the pace of progress in the 1930s a tough call.

Simplistically, one could say that the Polish Air Force was ready for war in 1937 – the Luftwaffe in 1939, and that was one of the reasons the Germans won the encounter in 1939. The startling success of the German forces in 1939-41 has led us to believe that they were better than they were – in fact earlier they had a lot of window dressing to cover a weak equipment base, and the irreversible decline from 1941 shows that they’d shot their bolt technically. It’s easy to get pulled into the ‘what-if’ of Luftwaffe 46 stuff, and overlook that the Fw190, a mid-late war success was actually a 1939 baby.

There was some concern in Britain about getting enough of the right type of aircraft at the right time – what is not so well known is that there is a view the various expansion schemes put forward until the final one that counted were merely a ‘warm up’ for the treasury by the Air Ministry – see ‘The Paladins’ John James. Secondly, it’s documented that the Air Min placed orders for – get this – Caproni Ca-311 medium bombers and Regianne Re-2000 fighters for the RAF. A few things changed before payment and delivery, but it could have been RAF Regianne’s downing Italian Fiat CR-42s!

If Germany had been attacking Britain across the North Sea, as pre-war expectation had it, Defiants would (probably) have been perfectly satisfactory against He.111s escorted by Bf.110s.

As to the electric kettle, I wonder how many households and dispersals might have had such a high tech piece of kit in 1940. I know several Britons today who regard an electric kettle as dangerously newfangled. I think research in Kettleology will find that the Battle of Britain model was a stove top gas fired effort, as probably were the NAAFI truck borne jobs.

In ‘Asterix in Britain’ (a reliable historical document) Caesar conquers Britain by attacking during the afternoon tea break when the Britons will not fight.

A comprehensive and convincing response by NiallC, to which I will add a couple of points and clarify some of my earlier ones.

1) The chief point I wished to make was that the relentless development of aircraft, and particularly fighter technology between 1934 and 1940 meant that it was not impossible for any air force to find itself a generation or half-a-generation behind. The Regia Aeronautica started the war with its chief fighter being the Fiat CR42, a fixed-undercarriage, open cockpit biplane. The Armee De l’Air had potent fighters in the form of the Dewoitine D520, but had started too late to get enough of them. The Morane Saulnier 406 was ‘modern’ in concept but outclassed.
2) The chief weapons – most effective and numerous – Britain had at its disposal were the result of private ventures, springing from Specification F7.30 designs, both of which had later Specs written around them. The RR Merlin was also a Private Venture. Far from suggesting that the little men saved Britain from the suits in government, the Air Ministry was very quick to recognise the potential – but had F7.30 succeeded to provide anything more than a tidied up Gauntlet, there might not have been the will or the perceived necessity to invest in large numbers of Hurricanes and Spitfires until it was too late.
3) My apologies if the AM favouring Goshawk was incorrect, it has been quoted so often recently I unwisely took it for fact. However, had the Goshawk succeeded (difficult to see how, the concept was flawed not the execution) or Rolls decided to buttress the failure of the Goshawk with an incremental improvement of the Kestrel instead of a more radical fusion of Kestrel and ‘R’, it’s shocking to consider what 1940 might have looked like.
4) See 2 above, I didn’t mean to suggest that had Mitchell and Camm not seen beyond the potential of the 224 and the Super Fury we would have fought the BofB with Gladiators. I did mean to suggest however that had the winner of F7.30 been more what the AM was looking for – say a monoplane with flaps, the decision to back the Hurricane and Spitfire might have been made in a more leisurely fashion. As I understand it F5.34 was both written around the ‘Fury Monoplane’, a concept already in existence and offered to the AM, and insurance against the failure of the Fury. Even so, the Fury Monoplane had to lose its fixed spatted undercarriage before it became the Hurricane.

The point I was intending to make, in terms of technology, was that Britain had to work incredibly hard to get to a position in 1940 where it had the aircraft to match those of the Luftwaffe – which had been built from the ground up and with worrying determination. Had things not gone entirely to plan instead of the Spitfire and Hurricane, Britain might have fought with Fury Monoplane and Supermarine Type something-between-224-and-300. Or the AM might have been swayed by the development of new concepts and ordered large numbers of Defiants instead of Hurricanes and Spitfires. In conclusion, that Britain was able to keep up with the technological developments of the 1930s enabled it to survive the 1940s, and give it a platform to fight back. The thought that Britain might have had to fight with fighters of the capability of the CR42 or the MS406 makes me go hot and cold. It’s a testament to both design and procurement policies keeping up with technology that we didn’t.

At the time of the issue of F.7/30 in October ’31 to ask for a 4-gun fighter capable of 215 mph was hardly conservative, but somewhat in advance of anything even near to entering service anywhere. The night fighting requirement – and therefore low landing speed – was inevitable: F.7/30 was intended to replace the Bulldog in the “Zone Fighter” Class. i.e. Day and Night operations, radio equipped and with enough endurance to fly standing patrols. This of course needs to be seen in its 1931 context of no radar, no proven sound locators, total reliance on ground observers and therefore no warning of enemy approach prior to its approach to the coast. The Zone fighter class (Siskin, Bulldog etc) was by far the most numerous single seater in the RAF at the time. The Other class, the “Interception Fighter” – day only, visual pursuit, no radio, short endurance – only ever equipped 3 Squadrons (Furies) and was a failure in its intended role.

The Air Ministry came close to insisting on a monoplane for F.7/30, but were advised not to by their own Technical Directorates on the grounds that the British aircraft industry had thus far been singularly unsuccesful in produing military monoplanes. To require a monoplane would thus mean running the risk of a total failure of the programme. You do not need to read too much of the Air Ministry correspondence of the time to detect its extreme frustration with the conservatism of the aircraft industry. Nonetheless Dowding (then AMSR) was encouraged to spend the Air Mins money only on advanced designs in the sure and certain knowledge that there would be more conservative private ventures to back the programme up if the more advanced designs failed. Which is pretty much what eventually happend when the Gladiator was chosen. The inevitable (for a Zone fighter) requirement for night operation and therefore low landing speed combined with an aggressive (for the day) 215 mph top speed requirement did indeed lead many designers to chose biplanes, but also led the Air Min to ask why on earth the designers (including Mitchell) had not used flaps to meet the requirements. A good question.

As for engine choice, perhaps someone else knows where this notion of some Air Min preference for the Goshawk comes from, but it seems to have been cut and pasted from one book or article to another for time immemorial. The Spec itself (and its 20 or so Corrigenda) left engine choice free to any British engine that had passed its type test by the time of delivery of the prototype. Dowding was inclined to insist on an air-cooled engine, partly because of his long-running interest in the faster warm-up time and lower vulnerability to combat damage of an air-cooled engine, but also because both Bristol and Napier had very thin order books at the time. In the end it was decided to let designers choose whatever engine gave them the best chance of meeting the performance requirement. Of the five preferred designs eventually submitted, four (Supermarine, Blackburn, Parnall and Westland) used the Goshawk, the odd one out being Boulton Paul with its Rapier-powered twin. In the end the three ordered designs (Supermarine, Westland, Blackburn) were all delayed and all failures and the Gauntlet was ordered as an interim measure to fill an increasingly obvious hole in the expansion programme.

I think the notion that the RAF would have had to fight the B of B with the Gladiator were it not for the:

the likes of R J Mitchell and Sydney Camm (and Rolls) being able to see what could be achieved over and above their F7.30 designs

is somewhat wide of the mark. In 34 the RAF drew up F.5/34 for a Fury (ie. Interception Fighter) replacement asking for 275 mph, 8 guns and a service ceiling of 33,000 ft. From that point forward 8 guns was the standard for new service single-seat fighters. Shortly afterwards, and before the Gladiator had even been ordered, F.10/35 was drawn up for a new Zone fighter to replace it: again asking for 8 guns and now 300 mph. Most significantly they also asked for greatly reduced endurance.

Independently of these programmes Dowding ordered Hawker and Supermarine’s speculative designs as a part of the high speed research programme. For those who have watched “First of the Few” too often or otherwise believe the Air Min dragged its feet over ordering these two aircraft, Camm’s proposal for the Hurricane (as we know it) is dated 4 September 1934, Dowding instructed that it should be ordered on the 14th of the same month. Supermarines costed proposal for its Merlin-powered proposal is dated 5 October 1934. Dowding instructed his staff to issue an ITP for it on 8 November.

Ultimately the key decision was that to specify greatly reduced endurance for F10/35. It was that which allowed the Supermarine design to be brought in line with it, at Mitchell’s suggestion, by taking out fuel to compensate for the additional weight of 4 more guns, and the Hawker to be treated likewise, at Sorley’s suggestion, by adding six more guns.

I suspect that there’s a peculiarly British appeal of this notion that British fighter technology of the mid ‘30s was driven forward by the inspired genius of a handful of designers and manufacturers valiantly struggling on in the face of a conservative and slow-witted Air Ministry. However attractive it may be it does not survive even momentary contact with the – very substantial – archival record.

NiallC

You must not forget the electric kettle. Without a spot of tea I suspect the whole battle would have been lost…or at least a lot harder to take. 😀

…Although according to some, the allies might have done better during the Arnhem operation in 1944 if it weren’t for the British insisting on stopping for tea at 3pm every day! According to some…

The question of technology is fascinating, mainly because the pace of development had been so fierce in the preceding decade. The Air Ministry Specification F7.30 called for a combined day/night fighter based on a scenario of fighting a war in 1940. This part was prescient, but many of the terms of the Spec militated against what would eventually be the most successful model of defending aircraft that fought the battle – i.e. a fast, heavily armed point defence day fighter. Insisting on a landing speed of 50mph meant most manufacturers who submitted designs went for a biplane. Similarly, hinting that the Rolls Royce Goshawk would be favoured (instead of more reliable and effective radials available at the time) stymied several efforts including the Supermarine Type 224 that metamorphosed dramatically into the type 300 Spitfire, and the Hawker ‘Super Fury’ that became the Fury monoplane, then the Hurricane.

If it weren’t for the results of this Spec being so obviously lacking in many areas, and the likes of R J Mitchell and Sydney Camm (and Rolls) being able to see what could be achieved over and above their F7.30 designs, Britain might well have found itself in 1940 a small but significant step – effectively a yawning gap – below Germany in the design of its fighters. Had F7.30 been just a bit more successful in itself, we might have ended up trying to fight the battle with 600-800hp 250mph stick and wire biplanes or monoplanes with fixed undercart armed with four Vickers .303 MGs rather than the 1000hp 320mph stressed skin or partially stressed skin monoplanes with retractable undercart and eight Brownings. The results might have been rather different.

You must not forget the electric kettle. Without a spot of tea I suspect the whole battle would have been lost…or at least a lot harder to take. 😀

Dave Homewood’s suggestion of the import of broadcast radio to the civil populace is a fascinating field, and can be contrasted with the pamphleteering in the Napolionic era and the use of rumour in the Spanish Armada period. Likewise in 1940, both sides used radio ‘white’ propaganda (putting their view forward – exaggerated but based on the truth) and ‘black propaganda’ where they broadcast what was apparently coming from their enemy, but undermining them. For instance the Germans had a fake BBC style radio broadcast to seem to be coming from the UK and telling how badly Britain was doing. How much effect it had, if any, is unknown. As these factor are unquantifiable, they may be best left out.

I missed your post the other day James, so am catching up. Was this BBC-style propaganda station you mention the one with Lord Haw Haw (Joyce) on it? Or was it separate again?

I think wireless radio, and the newspapers too I guess, were hugely successful in pulling the British people together, focussing their direction and encouraging them to stand and fight an invasion, rather than run away like the French and other civilian populations had. Sure, the Brits had nowhere to run to, but that’s beside the point. No-one wanted to throw in the towel like the Europeans had. Wireless broadcasts and other media forms generated that communal spirit that they’d all, civilians and military alike, band together and repel an invasion force. Yes, the Home Guard had been done before in the form of Yeomanry, etc, but never on a national scale with every man, woman and child doing their bit. It was the inspiration of hearing through wireless the speeches of Churchill and other inspiring leaders I think which helped to galvanise the determination to stand and fight, rather than run for Scotland or a ship.

Cheers, just bought ‘Fighter’ and ‘The Most Dangerous Enemy : A History of the Battle of Britain’, i’ve also found quite a lot on the internet as well. As well as covering how useful the technology was, i’m also covering what would have happened if the technology was not there (for example, patrols and observer corps if radar wasn’t around), how this technology compared with the Luftwaffe and their resources (Spitfire vs. Me 109), and also other important factors that influenced the battle such as tactics, especially that of the Germans switch from bombing airfields to cities, and things such as the fact a downed pilot of the RAF could be returned to the battle, whereas a Luftwaffe pilot was now a POW and out of the battle etc. Many cheers for all your help, helped me open up my options and showed me other factors I hadn’t thought of.

If you what to touch on what would have happened had the RAF been defeated, and for the best analysis of the sea and land war of the period, get ‘Operation SeaLion’ by Peter Fleming. It’s discussed here in this rather trivial thread, which contains some great examples of how to get distracted by non-events.

You don’t need to buy all the books. Your local library will have some, and be able to order the others, although they may not be able to be quick enough. Likewise your school library may be of some use.

The Channel was a decisive factor, but isn’t ‘technology’. The Germans difficulty in finding the right gear to cross the channel with is technology, but isn’t ‘British technology’. Watch out you stick to your topic. As soon as you go off the theme, you should, and probably will, get no points. Likewise, the quality of the leadership is not what you are discussing. Their ability to use the technology available effectively is on topic, and is vital.

Dave Homewood’s suggestion of the import of broadcast radio to the civil populace is a fascinating field, and can be contrasted with the pamphleteering in the Napolionic era and the use of rumour in the Spanish Armada period. Likewise in 1940, both sides used radio ‘white’ propaganda (putting their view forward – exaggerated but based on the truth) and ‘black propaganda’ where they broadcast what was apparently coming from their enemy, but undermining them. For instance the Germans had a fake BBC style radio broadcast to seem to be coming from the UK and telling how badly Britain was doing. How much effect it had, if any, is unknown. As these factor are unquantifiable, they may be best left out.

Your test is a) is it British technology, or to do with British technology. b) If it is removed from the scenario, what would the effect be? c) If it wasn’t used, was it really available / viable?

Stay focussed!

Stupid me. I have just realised something else that may be relevant to your project. Namely, the intuition used to decieve technology. I refer to the utilisation of more natural elements to overcome the technological advances. Specifically, the use of Navajo Indians (or more correctly, First Nation) radio operators for the Americians and Welsh radio operators for the RAF etc to prevent the opposition, with, at the time, high quality radio listening devices, from knowing what was being said in the air. And it worked.

A valid point (and seriously devious :D), but I’m not sure it’s relevant to the BofB period.

Over here in the West it is also REALLY SLOW tonight.

Stupid me. I have just realised something else that may be relevant to your project. Namely, the intuition used to decieve technology. I refer to the utilisation of more natural elements to overcome the technological advances. Specifically, the use of Navajo Indians (or more correctly, First Nation) radio operators for the Americians and Welsh radio operators for the RAF etc to prevent the opposition, with, at the time, high quality radio listening devices, from knowing what was being said in the air. And it worked.

If memory serves me correctly Dowding was in receipt of Ultra decrypts during the Battle of Britain, these with many other factors helped shape fighter commands strategy for the Battle.

The early work on the German enigma ciphers had been carried out by code breakers in Poland prior to the German invasion in 1939, this pioneering work was destined to be continued at Bletchley Park.

A point you should remember is that versions of the Enigma coding machine were in use by all branches of German armed forces, not just the navy!

It’s been quite a while since I’ve read any books about Ultra, so I can’t be precise but, I don’t think it was of any major importance at that time.

IIRC, the BofB period was at the beginning of the decrypt successes. There was no guarantee the signals could be read in time to be of any use, rather than later in the war when there was a steady flow of intelligence from Ultra.

The naval signals in particular were more of a problem as the Kreigsmarine Enigma machines had an extra encoding wheel.

The contribution of the Poles was hugely important. They were the first to acquire a complete Enigma and copy it. Without referring to various books, I can’t remember now how far they got with decrypting the signals before Poland was overrun.

I’ve just re-read your original post while waiting for the forum to refresh. Is it me or is it REALLY SLOW tonight?

In my personal opinion, the biggest blunder the Luftwaffe (Goering) made was switching from attacking the airfields to cities. Although they (he) didn’t know, it was on the verge of bringing Fighter Command to its knees.

Good choice of subject and my son did the same subject for his A level at the beginning of this school year. My advice if you wish to get a good grade is to firstly read “The Most Dangerous Enemy” by Steven Bungay from cover to cover. Then read it again and then again before you ask us any questions. It contains all the detail you will need and is widely acknowledged as the most definitive account of the Battle of Britain. It is very readable and written in a modern way that will enhance your understanding of this subject. It’s available on Amazon for about a tenner and will be the best tenner you will spend.

Your opening post contains a misconception that this account puts to rest. Don’t concentrate all your efforts on the aircraft and radar. It was the conduct (leadership from both sides) of the battle and some of the geographical factors that had an over-riding effect on the outcome.

I suspect that your conclusion will be that Technology did not win the battle, as both side had the same “Tools” available to them, but one side used them to greater effect. And do not ignore the political factors. (Here you must read the book) Churchill’s decisive leadership vs Hitler’s indecision and the makeup of the Nazi leadership. Goering vs Dowding and Park vs Kesselring.

And remember, those marking the finished product will not have any idea what’s in front of them if you put in to much technical detail (they are history teachers not engineers)

And remember although this book contains everything you will need, you will have to research other material for a bibliography (my son used the bibliography from Bungay’s book though) It’s important to give the appearance of having in-depth research. Send us a PM if you want a plan to help get you started after reading the book (have I mentioned how important this book is yet?)

Good luck

Peter

i suppose you could argue that mcIndoe’s pioneering burns surgery helped in its own way. returning pilots to the front line after surviving their injuries, where before, they would have been crippled or not able to carry on.
i know its not exactly technology, but it is another example of allied innovation in difficult times.

You are very welcome. I feel very privelaged to have been of asistance.