HARRIS, out in 1944 ?

Chaps,

A question that I’m sure any true researcher of Bomber Command will be interested in, “should AM Harris have been replaced in 1944”
His blatant refusal to cooperate with Portal and his reluctance to change from area to precision bombing, (something that RAF Bomber Command was capable of doing and well) his blinkered obsession with the area bombing German cities, and his stubbornness to attack in numbers oil and transportation targets and other “panacea” targets.

Should he have been replaced, and if so by who, Bennett, Cochrane, Rice ???

Over to you. 😮

Shortsbro I think your caricature of Harris is an over simplification of the facts and if it were entirely true it would be hard to see why Portal did not replace him. It would also reflect poorly on Portal for the fact that he did not. I think you need to understand the politics of the time, and how that Harris was possibly used by Churchill and how this relationship with Churchill may have given him the confidence to do things that would have otherwise needed higher authorisation or broader agreement. This relationship may also have inhibited Portal in his relationship and direction of Harris. Harris may have been determined and dogmatic, but I am certain that if He had not had the confidence of his Group commanders and headquarters staff Bomber Command would not have been as effective as it was. They weren’t all wrong!!!

Changing the Leader would not have lead to an immediate change in tactics, as there would have been a long period of retraining. Remember that 5 Group under Cochrane was operating as an independent command in the last year of the war with its own path-finder force, its own target selection and building on some of the Tactics that had been pioneered by 617 squadron. So I think the change of leader was not an option for change of tactics as they were changing anyway.

Another point to remember is that Britain needed to retain influence with the US and Russia and in the Politics of War a strong Bomber Command was an important tool, and sacking the leader would not have sent the correct message to the US or the Russians.

And it’s often portrayed that Bomber Command did not attack transport targets, oil plants or any of the Panacea targets. The fact is that they did, and often with a far greater weight and accuracy than the 8th Air Force. When the eighth flew in cloud they were no more effective than flying at night and scattered bombs in all directions. 100 group confused and bamboozled the Germans every night, as well as intruding night fighter stations. 8 group kept the residents of Germany awake every night, many intricate and complicated operations were flown that were more than a group of bombers taking off, flying to a city and dropping bombs aimlessly into the centre.

Hopefully some food for thought.

facts=-===============

COORDINATES ??

Hi,

Help please.

Carrying out research into No.3 Group RAF Bomber Commands daylight G-H attacks throughout 1944 until May 1945.

Recently obtained documents from the national archives are puzzling me, any help or advice will be appreciated on the following. The details are via the Daylight bombing Summaries….

Sample No.1

Target G.G 1818A A/P
040H 017V on 14US 32/7 (?)

The target was a Benzol plant at Dortmund.

Sample No.2

GH 472A Target A
055H 005V on 13/10 (/)
Munster Railway Yard

Sample 3

G.F 2250 ‘A’ A/P 05H
083V on Illus 57/10 (?)
Saltgitter Benzol Plant

Any help most welcome. 😉

Max Hastings, who has written on of the best histories of Bomber Command, certainly thinks so.