(Lord Plowden. Report of the Committee of Enquiry into the Aircraft Industry, Cmnd 2853, December 1965, HMSO. Set up by Minister R.Jenkins after Healey’s deletion of HS P.1154/681 and TSR.2, to “shine a light” into an industry perceived, by Labour and its Tory predecessor, as consuming more national value than it created.)

was it capable of remaining a player by itself? In technical competence, certainly; but the Enquiry’s scope was whether it should remain a solo player. International collaboration was not driven by UK capability shortfall, but by capacity excess: e.g after >600 Canberras in 8 years, BAC might have assembled 50 TSR.2 in 6. How was this sector to sustain itself? Firms had feared Plowden would chop all State subsidy and thus destroy them, but by 12/65 it was evident that a Saudi Magic Carpet would give BAC a future. The Collaboration policy was no more than an extension of Concorde: none of the 4 Primes there believed a solo (UK or France) product would have sold other than to the captive. 50% of some sales is better than 100% of a cancellation. RR (Allison/Medway, M.A.N V/STOL) and BSEL (M.45H) had signed up already; the vendor industry never did, so lost its independence.

The thrust of your Q is: does international collaboration leech business from, or add it to UK. Well, every country now does what Plowden proposed: US Primes with competitors and Aerostructures suppliers – Boeing now fabricates zilch on 787 and shares design with its “first tier partners”…inter-State at first, now international. 747 was launched with GD (Convair) nose, DC-10 with GD fuselage barrel.