To Bomb, or not to bomb?

The timing was: August,1942, Dieppe Raid rehearsal for assaulting the Atlantic Wall: v.painful. November,1942, v successful landings in Morocco despite assumed attentions from 70 U-boats…but no real opposition on land. December,42 Allies agree Sicily next, expecting to lose 300 vessels, on way to the next one closer to the Heimat, defended even harder: Casablanca Summit agreed the Combined Bomber Offensive to soften up for these landings – only Harris thought it would replace them. If the enemy guessed the beach it would not be as easy as Torch. So let Harris/Eaker try to detach supply: if so, good, if not, turn Heavies into interdictors – which is what Tedder did either side of Overlord. Before mid-44 we could only hit a big target; from late-44 we had some chance of precision, increasing daily as defences were overwhelmed…because they had run out of skilled men, ammo, fuel, food. This becomes a circular argument.
Opponents of area-bombing of Germany/Japan must produce their alternative:
– wait for the atomic Bomb? Adm Leahy, FDR’s right hand, a gunnery man, said it would be a dud;
– wait for starvation by blockade, like last time? We would have to walk in and they would try to make it hurt very hard ;
– go for Counter-Force only: the King’s Bombers lost 55,000 men, 8/9th USAAF much the same, and that was going in high for big targets. Don’t wish to be politically incorrect, but the quality of these young men was of the very highest – more in Bomber Command than all officers of the King in WW1, which drained the flower of a generation. How many more would you spend?
There Was No Alternative.