Lifters, Strikers, Engines and the Industrial Base

So now even the blockheads in the Pentagon admitt that they need more strategic airlifter.

http://www.govexec.com/dailyfed/0307/032007cdpm2.htm

Couple of days ago there was an article somewhere about Boeing possibly ending its military airframing business, due to C-17 and F/A-18 programmes ending and no replacement set in ink. That would leave Lockheed in a sole supplier situation. Lockheed dominates the U.S. manned tactical scene, Boeing’s (well, St.Louis’) capabilities being nursed by building and improving the Super Hornet, but that programme has its end date already set. So far no new C-17s are ordered, but reading the article above the USAF needs about 80 to 100 more, as I doubt that in the end more than 70 C-5 will be upgraded. And one strategic airlifter line should be kept alive for attrition.

Similar situation on the engine side, where GE is basically out of fighters for now. The F136 engine can only be justified with maintaining a wider industrial base. Which really questions the concept of private companies in defense biz.

And I wonder how fast the UCAV crowd manages to get their toys to the frontlines. One thing seems pretty clear: Those UCAVs replacing/sublimenting the current manned assets will *not* be cheaper than the manned toys. At the same time it kind of opens up the manufacturing base again to companies which have dropped from complete systems to sections and components, like Northrop or even Vought.

The CCCP approach with seperating the design bureau and the manufacturing outfit might be a good solution for the U.S. Otherwise they will end up with a single manned airframer, a single UCAV airframer and a single engine maker (that is Pratt). And at that point even pretending that these (esp LMCO and PW) are commercial entities is a farce.

And airframe numbers will *not* grow; USAF will end up with something like 1700 shooter airframes, USN/USMC with maybe 600 more, support assets all across the services maybe another 1500 airframes, so the whole U.S. aerial assets at around 4000 airframes.

By shifting the actual manufacturing to government facilities (more than just a “rented” air force plant like Ft.Worth or other locations) and using the commercial companies only as design bureaus it might be possible to keep a larger capability base than with the current monopolistic system. And it would also act as a damper to the spasmic procurement rythm the Congress still requires.

Another option would be to open up the system to suppliers from abroad far more than already currently (with VXX, JSF, LUH, KC-X, MEADS, …) and enable the U.S. military to buy whole systems from abroad. And not even try to maintain a full capability base in all areas, but go for real industrial cooperation with allies in Western Europe and the Western Pacific far beyond the current scope.

After all the country wouldn’t work without PCBs from Taiwan and RAM from South Korea, so why not expand it to the military side as well? That would open up the manufacturing and brain-base again and just follow the commercial realisties.

Any thoughts?