The Flanker under the Dragon's Wings v0.9

[updated:LAST EDITED ON 08-11-02 AT 03:20 AM (GMT)]
I expanded my PLAAF SU timeline into a full length essay with some changes. It is still a work in progress and will be subject to more changes as more information becomes available. The purpose of the essay is to provide as much information on China’s Flanker program. No orbats and deployment locations included, and currently I won’t provide any specifications as well since they can be obtained from other sources.

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The Flanker under the Dragon’s wings:

A Timeline of Events

1991 24 SU-27SK and -UBK aircraft. All -SK aircraft are built by KnAAPO, and all -UBK aircraft by IAPO. In addition to No. 25 and 26, No.1, 2, 3 and 4 are UBKs. The cost for the SK is approximately $32 million while the UBK is about $35 million.

1992 June. Delivery of first batch, 8 SU-27SKs and 4 SU-27UBKs.

1992 November. Delivery of 12 SU-27SKs, plus two complementary SU-27UBKs for pilot and technician training (No. 25 and 26.)

1994 The positive experience of the first Flankers may have caused a significant change in requirement that caused the J-10 project to be redrawn, especially around the AL-31F engine.

1995 22 SU-27SK aircraft, 6 of which are SU-27UBK two seaters. There are two complementary aircraft, marked No. 49 and No. 50. This makes a total of 50 aircraft in the first two batches, confirmed by photograph of SU-27SK PLAAF serial number No. 49 and No. 50. One report says a number of these aircraft may have Zhuk-27 radar for testing purposes. These aircraft could be No. 49 and No. 50. Unlike the first order, it now appears the second batch includes Sorbatsya ECM pods, presumably a new version.

1996. License to manufacture 200 planes signed. The cost of the license was $2.5 billion, of which $600 million was for knocked down kits, technical documentation and training. Some reports say 150, others 250, even 300. Currently the most popular quoted number is 200. It should be noted there is no confirmation on the final number of the license. According Jane’s and Chinese website reports, this was said to be the -SMK variant. However, production turned out to be the basic -SK variant, although Chinese websites and internet posters continue to refer to the license as -SMK.. It may have been possible that China bought the SU-27 license at the SMK level for technological headroom for upgrades in the future. Provisions of this license include 70% maximum local content, 30% minimum Russian content. Engines license is not granted and have to be procured from Russia. No second export is not allowed. Any changes in the specification or improvements must be notified to the Sukhoi bureau. If production numbers are not attained, China can exercise an option for Russia to build the SU-27s. China is now allowed to set up maintenance facilities for the engines, where as previously it had to send the planes or engines to Russia for overhaul.

1997 April. 14 SU-27s were seriously damaged in a typhoon. Three were irreparably damaged. One report, needing verification, says that the aircraft was replaced for free, presumably from the Russians’ own inventory, part of an expression of good will between Russia and China.

1998. Two test planes assembled and flew for the first time over Shenyang. But due to poor quality, had to be re-manufactured.

1999. July, a deal for 38 SU-30MKK was signed, with the approximate cost of each plane around $37 million. To be delivered in 2000-2001. Both SU-30MKK 501 and 502 prototypes displayed multirole capability and support for various missiles—R-77, R-27, R-73, Kh-31a, Kh-31p, Kh-59ME and Kh-29T. Many reports say the deal is 40 aircraft (consistent to 38 ordered plus two free), but there are other reports that contend it’s 45, and some even say 48.

1999 July. 28 SU-27UBK deal signed, with each plane about $35 million. All -UBK orders are handled by IAPO, while -SK and -MKK orders are handled by KnAAPO. Delivery began in December 2000, with serial numbers #51 and above, with the completion of order in 2002, which may include two possible additional free aircraft for a total of 30. These aircraft featured an improved N001 variant (N001V?) that can simultaneously engage two targets with R-77s..

2000 Shenyang Aircraft Corporation begins serial assembly of SU-27, a.k.a J-11. 14 were presumably built by the end of the year. It is possible that these planes may be equipped with a modernized N001 radar that enables R-77 compatibility and simultaneous two target engagement.

2000 November. An SU-30MKK prototype was said to have been handed over at Zhuhai airshow. This could be “501″

2000 December. China receives the first 10 SU-30MKK from KnAAPO. These are equipped with the N001VE radar. Simultaneously 8 of the third batch IAPO built SU-27UBK with N001V were received and assigned to the Chengdu region.

2001 July. China signs contract for the second order of SU-30MKK, presumably 38 aircraft. Reports vary from 38 or 40. It was originally believed that the deliveries of this order was to begin on the end of 2003. Instead, delivery began on August 2002 with the first ten planes and to be completed by early to mid 2003. Once again, two free planes are possible.

2001 August. 10 more of the SU-30MKK received for the first order, representing the second batch. MAKS2001 held in Russia showing a third SU-30MKK “prototype” called “503″, whose unfinished paint condition suggests a serial production SU-30MKK on loan for publicity purposes as a replacement for “501″. “503″ first appeared along side with 502 in publicity photographs. After the show, presumably, 503 had its paint job completed and shipped as part of the 10 plane shipment in August or the 18 plane shipment in December. It is probable that “503″ may have been used to test the Zhuk-MS radar. “502″ may also have been handed over or currently still being used by KnAAPO as a test bed for improved SU-30MKK versions.

2001 August. Flight International revealed that the radar for the SU-30MKK would be changed to the Zhuk-MS in the third batch. The wording seemed confusing as to “batch” is defined per delivery, or per order. If per delivery, this would refer to the next 18 planes. If per order, this would mean the order next year. Yet sources also collaborate on the radar change after the 20th plane, including an article on the Journal of Electronic Defense and Richard Fisher of the Jamestown Foundation. However, a year later, the announcement on third order was the first to announce to the general public the radar change. Whether this was merely belated news or a final admission, that’s subject to speculation as even the first SU-30MKK already had Kh-31 capability.

2001 December. The last 18 SU-30MKK received from the first order and could be the first SU-30MKKs with the Zhuk-MS radar.

2001 Possibly 20 J-11s were finished by the end of 2001.

2002 March. Annual spring exercises may have showed the most frequent and most intensive use of the Flankers in exercises yet, including use of SU-30MKKs.

2002 May. CCTV held a celebration in honor of the Shenyang Aircraft Company right in TV. It appears to be a show celebrating not just SAC’s anniversary, but also for a job well done. This may imply satisfactory progress in meeting quality and quota standards, probably for the J-11 program—the show featured two newly built SU-27s on stage. Other than a “J-11A” mockup in a Shenyang display stand the year before, this was the first time China acknowledged domestic construction of the SU-27, and the first time such planes were ever seen up close. One report suggests that local content on the J-11 has reached as high as 60%. With increasing domestic content, the flyaway cost of the plane as volume increases, is expected to drop.

2002 June. There was an acceleration of production in SAC, XAC and CAC plants with full 24 hour shifts. This, and the SAC celebration, circumstantially suggests a major effort to increase production rate for J-11 with some success. Prediction—30 aircraft built for the year 2002. Also, rumors suggest J-10 entered serial production by the end of the same month with 54 planes, based on the numbers of AL-31FN engines received from Russia.

2002 July-August, China signs another contract for the third order of SU-30, now SU-30MK2, presumably a new navalized variant for the airborne arm of the Chinese Navy, the PLANAF. Delivery, probably with two complementary aircraft, was to commence in 2003. Reports differ from 28, to 38 or 40 aircraft. Reports also say Kh-31a capability and Zhuk radar, although such news seem belated as such capability already exists with previous aircraft. If following previous patterns of orders, this may be for 38 aircraft, with two possible additional gift/evaluation planes.

2002 July-August. First reported test of R-77s fired from SU-30MKKs, even though R-77 purchase was first reported in 2000.

2002 August. The first 10 of the second batch of SU-30MKK delivered, assumably based on Series 2.

2002 September, the last 6 SU-27UBK of the third batch is expected to be delivered by IAPO.

2002 October. All weapons of the SU-30MKK were successfully fired and tested.

2002 November. Zhuhai air show. Interview with Sukhoi chief designer spoke of an upgraded version, the SU-30MKK2. Sukhoi also annonces intention to create an office in Beijing, working to improve support and looking for ward for more sales. Putin will visit China later in the month, and procuring more arms sales are probably part of the agenda. Chinese reports indicate that local content of J-11 production has now reached 60% and trying to attain the pure 100%. It is likely that the content restriction may have been lifted to allow the entire plane made from indigenous components.

2003 (All Year) Delivery of second SU-30MKK expected to be completed and third order delivery to begin, ending in 2004. Local production of J-11/SU-27SK may end on the 80th aircraft, which can occur sometime in the year, giving way to a more advanced variant. Some reports presumed it may be SU-30MKK (J-11B? JH-11?), others an improved single seater variant (J-11A?) with SD-10 compatibility, multirole and midflight refueling capability that can serve as an interim version either to a fully domestic SU-27 or SU-30MKK license. Reports suggest SU-30MKK license could entail as much as 250 aircraft.

Notes on weapons and complementary purchases:

R-73 Possibly over 3200 of these have been delivered.

R-27 144 R-27R/Ts were ordered in 1991 and delivered the year after. 144 R-27ET/ERs ordered in 1994 and delivered the year after. A long term deal was signed with 1860 R-27R/Ts and 1860 R-27ER/ETs on 1995. By 2001, 600 R-27R/Ts and 600 R-27ER/ETs were delivered. Presumably, the deliveries had stopped.

R-77 100 R-77s were ordered in 2000 and presumably received in 2001. There was another report for 400 orders but cannot be verified. The low numbers suggest a try out phase, or simply a stop gap to the PL-12/SD-10.

Kh-31 Both -a and -p versions were said to have been licensed for production in China as YJ-91.

Kh-29T Ordered and tested but no verifiable quantities known. Possibly 2000 ordered.

KH-29L China is also said to have bought this, but the user of this missile is not likely to be any of the Flankers.

KAB-500kr Probably licensed.

KAB-500L Laser guided. Probably licensed but Flankers are not the end users of this weapon.

KH-59ME Ordered and tested. .

Kh-35 Order for air launched versions signed in deal signed around October 2001. This order may have be as a result of the failure to integrate the C801K to the SU-30MKK.

Zhuk 100 Zhuk radars were presumably ordered, and widely assumed to be for the J-8II. However it is in the author’s suspicion that one cannot count out if these radars are actually for the J-10, or for the J-11, or a mix for different planes.

Sokol Armstrade also reported the sale and shipment of 20 sets of Sokol radar sometime in 2001, presumably for the J-10, but another report saying it’s for the JH-7A. This indicates the unsureness of the final destination of the radars. As the radar seems fairly hefty for the J-10 and JH-7A, one cannot rule out possibility that these may be used in some upgraded SU-30MKKs for testing and evaluation purposes.

C-801K Attempts to integrate this antiship missile on the SU-30MKK so far has been a failure.

C-802K Integration attempts still unknown but this missile should be high in the priority list.

PL-12 Also known as the SD-10, this missile appears to be a Chinese-Russian joint venture with the R-77 seeker mated to a PL-11 body. Combining Russian and Chinese technologies may be an attempt to create a uniform standard missile that can be used on both Russian and Chinese made aircraft. The deployment of this missile is strategically important for the PLA, and emphasis may be made on the next variant of the J-11 to be compatible with this missile.

PL-5/8/9 Standard IR AAMs of the PLAAF. While no SU-27/30 has been seen carrying these missiles, compatibility is possible as demonstrated by the F-8IIM prototype, where these missiles were slaved to a Russian made Zhuk radar.

A50U Since the Phalcon deal was aborted, the PLAAF has ordered the A50U instead. It is felt however that the Russian systems are inferior to the Israeli Phalcon, a reason why India is also acquiring the Israeli system. As a plane that can equal the Phalcon is still in development, Russia will be leasing existing A50s as a stopgap until the final product is released. China is also creating their own domestic AWACS, ELINT, and EWS systems based on YE-8 transports, H-5 and H-6 bombers.

IL-76 The PRC has began negotiations to purchase as many as 40 IL-76 tankers, perhaps with an initial order of 6 to 7. Previously the PLAAF used H-6 as their tankers. The large number of tankers may indicate that a large fleet of aircraft with midair refueling is being projected.

Others Various cruise missiles. A “YJ-12″, a supersonic ramjet missile appeared in mockup form in a JH-7 display and could be planned as the standard land and ship attack cruise missile for the PLAAF and PLANAF. JDW also mentioned the likelihood of Flankers to be launching indigenous land attack cruise missiles.

Notes:

Evaluation, Gift or Complementary Aircraft—

It should be noted that the free “gift” or spare aircraft, which may either be brand new, prototypes or used aircraft from the existing RuAF inventory, seems to be a practice with every new order and can be quite an indication how the Russians value these deals. It is possible that these “free aircraft” may have their own changes from the rest of the batch used for testing purposes, in effect using the PLAAF as a free and willing test lab.

Attrition rates—

As for attrition, Jane’s reported the lost of two aircraft, in addition to the three by the typhoon. One of these losses appear to be a two seater SU-27UBK No. 2, which has been replaced by an SK. There are rumors of other losses, one that may include one SU-30 in April of 2002 after, but currently such reports cannot be verified. One thing for certain, all attritional loses appear to be replaced or rebuilt. At least six of the SU-27s have much higher serial numbers than the rest of the serial early batch. They include #3, #10, #11, #12, #13, and #24.

Pilot Training—

This has been one of the hardest obstacles. The first SU-27 pilots were taken from the ranks of J-8II pilots. The Russians reported the pilots had a basic distrust in the use of radar, mainly due to the unreliability of earlier Chinese equipment. RAND also reported that in the early to mid nineties, arresting cables were used in runaways to prevent and catch aircraft from overshooting during landing. The frequent change in PLAAF leadership has often been blamed due to higher than acceptable accident rates. The lack of sufficient simulators, and the observation that Flankers spend more on the ground than on the air due to insufficient maintenance all seemed to contribute to the troubles. Add to that is a policy of “babying” the aircraft, where commanders are fearful of training their aircraft to the limits in case of an accident. Despite the increase of 200 and over flight hours for the Chinese SU pilots, a portion of their flight time is still done on J-7s and J-8IIs.

Yet these problems seemed to be attacked vigorously. China spent millions of dollars in contracts with the Ukraine and Belarus to help set up an organization doing the maintenance of these planes. Exercises with Flankers indicated an increase in frequency and a greater willingness to push the planes to their limits, often in mock dogfights with J-7s and J-8s. If there are more news on more Flanker accidents, these could be the result of increasingly aggressive training. An interview with the Sukhoi general designer suggests that the SU-27s have frequent flight times, although total flight hours seem to be short.

One interesting development is the formation of an elite “Blue Flag” aggressor formations following the model of the USAF Aggressor formations. The “Blue Flag” formation would use Flankers to mimic a Western style airforce to “attack” regular PLAAF formations, airbases, test air defenses and other SU formations. Sometimes they would use J-7s to dogfight with Flankers just as the Americans used F-5s against F-15s in aggressor training. One pilot, actually the commander of a Blue Flag formation himself, even wrote an article how to shoot down an SU-27 with a J-7. The “Blue Flag” training has a profound significance in the overall training, doctrinal and tactical evolution in the PLAAF.

Flanker Numbers—-

As many as over 150 Flankers may be delivered or operational by the end of 2002, possibly reaching by 250 by the end of 2003. We’re looking at least over a solid projected 400 once the 200 plane license is completed. Assuming the target of 40 per year is reached, that would be around 2005-2006 time frame. Any license extension or any new additional off the shelf purchases in the coming years can push this number over 500 within that time period. The chances of additional orders—both direct purchases from Russia or license extensions—are high within the 2003-2008 period where modernization efforts should reach their peak. The mood in such plants like KnAAPO and Saturn Lyulka seem quite optimistic about future orders, and Sukhoi has plans to open an office in Beijing.

License Production—

When the Russians first toured Shenyang AC’s facilities, they lamented on the condition and backwardness of the plants. Although the first two assembled aircraft flew, they encountered quality problems and had to be rebuilt back in Russia. Although production was supposed to commence in 1997-98 time period, it wasn’t until the year 2000 when production actually began, and with only 14 aircraft allegedly finished far from 40 a year the plans originally envisioned.

Yet in a short time, SAC has nearly magically transformed itself. Now equipped with modern precision tooling that the Russians themselves envy in having, the locally manufactured J-11s are being built in quality standards and finish nearly comparable to Western aircraft, and visibly superior to Russian examples. This metamorphosis came from the acquisition of Western tooling, but most importantly from learning Western management and quality control methods coming from foreign joint ventures especially in the rapidly growing civilian aircraft industry, where contractors for example, manufacture Boeing 737 cross sections. In May of 2002, SAC celebrated its anniversary, ran shows to reward its employees, and for the first time ever, showed two examples of the domestically made J-11 in TV.

Despite making high quality and beautifully finished Flankers, production remained slow, if only 20 planes were probably made in 2001. During the Soviet Union era, KnAAPO used to pump out 100 Flankers per month. In June of 2002, production speed ramped up with 24 hour shifts. There remains a question mark if SAC could attain the production target of 40 aircraft per year, and would be fortunate if 30 were made.. This also comes from heavy competition with Chengdu AC, which may have begun production of the J-10 with as many as 54 planes in its first batch.

It is also probable that the 70/30 content restriction may have been lifted, to allow for a 100% indigenous content as a goal. Before a 100% Chinese Flanker will be developed, it is in the author’s view that a multirole SU-27 will appear first based on Zhuk multirole radar with SD-10 missile capability and upgraded airframe.

License Direction—

The logical direction of the license would be to eventually shift away from the SU-27SK to the SU-30MKK production. It is not clear whether China has already obtained this license but some reports already indicated as this being a done deal . The Russians would required a very large order as a prerequisite for a license, and the three direct SU-30MKK purchases may have been part of such conditions. This could be a long term pact that may have been worked before the first SU-30MKK order, and with the completion of the third order (or maybe even a fourth), production will shift to Shenyang. It is assumed that this shift will begin after the 80th SU-27SK was built in Shenyang after all the shipped kits were used up.

While the SU-27SK remains a formidable dog fighter, and with updates, a serious BVR interceptor, PLAAF doctrine has changed significantly since the year the license was signed. The shift was a clear direction toward multirole capability, to the point that it is almost a vital requirement for any new Chinese fighter, that even J-8IIs were being upgraded to this direction. The SU-27SK no longer fits current and projected Chinese requirements, leaving questions about the justification for its continued production.

There is a question however, if this shift will be for the SU-30MKK itself, or a single seater multirole version like the SU-27SMK or SU-30KI, which was also marketed to the PLAAF. A single seater would provide lower cost, and take advantage of the momentum already present in the SAC factories, with the least disruption in the production and preserve domestic content already established with the SK production. Shenyang AC has previously displayed a mockup of an SU-27 with Kh-29 and Kh-31 air to surface missiles. The use of the long range Kh-59ME ASM would have required a second officer however, so this missile cannot be used on a single seater. Yet we must be reminded that the shift to the SU-30MKK was because in the first place, a two person crew allows for a superior workload distribution, especially for a bomber or ground attack role.

Reports suggest that the SU-30MKK license would be for 240-250 aircraft. It is not clear if this is the total requirement of SU-30MKKs, which is the unused balance of 120 planes plus the 120 aircraft already bought from Russia. Or it could be 120 planes from the unused balance, plus another 130 planes to extend the license. If Chinese production of the SU-30MKK has indeed been approved, production could likely begin at the end of 2003 or 2004.

The main directions of license negotiations appear to be as follows:

1. Obtaining the right for making multirole SU-30s.

2. Obtaining right for increased domestic content.

3. Obtaining upgrades for SU-30s and SU-27s including future planes.

4. Obtaining more technical information necessary to increase domestic content and improve maintainability.

Future Directions—

At the same time, without a strong domestic military budget, the Russian arms industry remain highly dependent on exports. This dependence is most critical in the Russian Far East, in the plant of KnAAPO, which is the main source of jobs in the town of Komsomolsk un Amur. Sukhoi, requiring more funds for its PAK-FA development, would require the sale of a few hundred more Flankers to gather the budget needed. It is expected that the Russians will intensify marketing efforts in order to sell more planes to the Chinese market, as Rossoboronexport has expressed concerns about the tapering off of Chinese arms purchases. The Chinese might make purchases for political reasons, especially if Putin comes to visit and lobby for more arms sales. If Russia continues to borrow money from China that it could not pay, chances are weapons would be traded for debt.

After the 2003-2008 period, it is likely that license production will taper off, but not cease completely, as the leadership is known to loathe closing down plants, which serve as a job subsidy. Depending on the political climate with Taiwan, production may slow down to 15 or 20 aircraft per year, without any more direct plane purchases—or it may intensify. Given that it may take a decade or more just to develop a new fifth generation fighter—at least—we can expect to see a continued low rate prodution of Flankers, albeit with continuos evolutionary improvements, until a new design can serve as replacement in the Shenyang AC production line. Such improvements will not only encompass better radars, but also more powerful engines as well, such as the AL-31FM series or domestic equivalents.

It is expected that the technology level of the newer planes will gradually improve to a “Super Flanker” status, on a batch by batch basis, and the SU-35UB represents a serious model of what the future SU-30MKK would be like. As Phazotron appears to be a favored supplier, chances are China will stick to using the Zhuk line, such as the Sokol phased array radar, rather than the NIIP’s N011M radars like those used by the Indian Air Force’ SU-30MKI’s. A long term carrier effort may find China interested in the SU-33UB as combat trainer and naval striker, albeit customized to Chinese requirements, such as use of Zhuk radar similar to those used in the SU-30MKK. With the emphasis on strike, the SU-32FN also represents an attractive option.

Conclusion—

It is not the aircrafts themselves, or that their paper numbers represent a threat to neighboring airforces. Far too much credit has been given to the threatening symbolism of the Flankers and the dependence of the PLAAF to the Russians, especially by the US right wing media in order to stir up their own defense sales. At the same time, critics and cynics alike try to paint a picture of incompetence by magnifying and even exaggerating faults, perhaps for their own nationalistic propaganda.

The truth is neither. Like every new acquisition, there will be sizable teething problems, but that is inevitable. It truly takes far more than a platform to win a war, even if the number of potential Flankers outnumber the total number of planes in the ROCAF. It takes software and a system—from the pilot to the network of situational awareness to the logistical organizations. And that, the PLAAF seems acutely aware of its current shortcomings.

The SU program has been in effect, a hard core, cold water introduction for the PLAAF to the world of being a modern air force. Like any student, they will make mistakes, and fail some tests, but they will come back at it and they will be much richer for the experience. It is this experience, and not the planes themselves, that is most valuable. The planes themselves were just a sign, and perhaps most importantly, a catalyst igniting all the profound and internal changes undergoing in the PLAAF, changes that itself mirrors in a microcosm, the much larger epic changes happening in Chinese society. The changes may occur in the slow gradualistic manner the way the economy has undertaken, and yet like the economy, may yield surprisingly strong results in the end.