IAF Su-30MKI deal

Major General Ashok K Mehta

The IAF is living in a period of tragic-comedy

The IAF has a history of many a slip between the cup and the lip.

Recently, in Nagpur, the chief of air staff, Air Chief Marshal A Y Tipnis,

announced that the decision to acquire an advanced jet trainer would be

taken before the end of the year, but that it would take up to 30 months

for the AJT, whichever it is, to be delivered.

For those of us who have been following the AJT saga, these could be

another set of famous last words. The IAF is living in a period of

tragic-comedy as confirmed by the story of the Sukhoi 30 fighter.

When the advanced multi-role Su-30 was called into the IAF in 1996, the

country was oblivious to what had transpired in the previous three years.

There was no air staff requirement (ASR) for such a class of fighter, as

the chief of air staff had dismissed the Sukhoi as “irrelevant to the

IAF”.

Air Chief Marshal S K Kaul had also criticised Russia for failing to

provide critical product support. But six months later, he reversed his

opinion and the government, without even signing a contract, paid an

advance of Rs 5 billion to Russia’s Irkutsk Aircraft Production

Organisation for developing an aircraft that did not exist.

After the initial order for 40 Su-30MKIs, followed by another 10, India

recently signed a letter of intent to produce, under licence, another 140

aircraft of the same make. The intention is fraught with risks and

uncertainties much more serious than the ones that went with the decision

to acquire the Sukhoi 30 MKI in the first place.

But the idea of licensed production is not new. The secretary for defence

production had suggested that only eight aircraft be purchased and the

remaining be made in the country. The idea was shot down.

The first eight Su-30s arrived in 1997, but were non-operational in the

absence of any matching weapons. Further, the Russians had dumped used

support equipment as new. Only two years later did the Su-30 acquire its

primary profile as SU-30K.

The first prototype of the intermediate version — SU 30MK — with

state-of-the-art aerodynamics was test-flown in Bangalore, but later, on

June 12 this year, crashed at the Le Bourget Paris Air Show.

This confirmed reports about the infighting between the Sukhoi

organisation and Russia’s arms export agency, RosVooruzheniye, and raised

doubts about Sukhoi’s credibility and capability to design and produce a

super-multi-role fighter. A turf battle has been going on between the two

for some time. In December 1999, the IAF took delivery of another 10

Su-30Ks, which were originally meant for Indonesia.

The delivery schedule of the final version, Su 30MKI, is very complicated,

given the rush of conversions and fitting avionics from French, Israeli

and Russian companies. The best-case scenario of the 50 Sukhois becoming

operational is 2006, though the government says 2003.

After India went nuclear in 1998, the IAF went into raptures justifying

the choice of the Su-30 as a strategic long-range deterrent against China.

The air-to-air refuellers that would give the Su-30 the required range and

endurance for this have yet to be ordered.

Further, refuellers have to remain well within Indian airspace, thereby

limiting the range of the Su-30. In any case, by the time these strategic

bombers get operational, Agni III, the primary strategic deterrent, should

be in place, making the Su-30, at best, a backup force.

China is rapidly modernising its air force. It already possesses around 70

to 100 Su-27 single-seaters. It is quite possible it might opt for a few

two-seater, multi-role SU-30MKs.

Some senior Air Force officers are wondering whether the decision to

produce 140 more Su-30MKI under licence is a wise option. While the

detailed project report on establishing a production facility must be

awaited, preliminary estimates on costs are likely to make the IAF have

second thoughts. It is proposed to replace the MiG-21 plant at Nasik,

which is technology of the 1940s, with a modern facility. Experts at

Hindustan Aeronautics Limited, Bangalore, have estimated this cost at

around $1 billion and around four years to set up.

The amortised per unit cost of the Su-30MKI will be a staggering Rs 1.61

billion. The up-front cost of the multi-role aircraft is the avionics and

weapons fit. The 25 tonne Su-30MKI has eight hard points to carry another

eight tonnes of missiles and bombs. This will cost money. That is not all.

The hidden expenditure lies in the ownership or life-cycle cost, which in

Russian aircraft is very high compared to the Western versions. The

life-cycle cost of an Su-30MKI is likely to shoot up to Rs 4.5 billion.

Why is the maintenance and life support to Russian aircraft so expensive

and complicated? First, the engine life is short and the TBO (Time Between

Overhauls) low. After every 300 hours of flying, a lifespan of 3,000

hours, the engine has to be changed. The Su-30MKI has two engines. This

gives it immense power and aerodynamics, which depend on canards and

thrust vectoring for superb agility. After every 300 hours of flying, two

engines, each costing $5 million, will need replacement.

The second problem relates to the IAF’s flight philosophy. To this day, it

has been woven around single-seater planes. By introducing the

twin-cockpit concept, the IAF is arguably revolutionising the flying

philosophy for its pilots, who, for want of an AJT, have been on an

erratic learning curve.

Further, it will need to develop dedicated software for the crew. The IAF

is already short of 400 pilots. If all goes well, the last of the 140

SU-30MKIs will roll out in 2018. By then, an additional 400 pilots would

be required to cope with this.

The Su-30MKI, which the IAF neither asked for nor required, is an

excellent multi-role fighter. In view of the high costs of licensed

production and ownership, the IAF has to decide whether it wants to

produce this aircraft and also if it could do with a mix of single- and

twin-seater versions.

The options are:

to buy outright another 200 Su-30MKIs in a mix of 150 single- and 50

twin-seater versions; or

to buy two to three squadrons of the improved Mirage 2000-5. The earlier

Mirage 2000-H has an excellent flight safety and operational flying

record. Only three out of 49 aircraft have crashed, two from bird-hits.

Another 10 Mirage 2000-H have been ordered, five twin-seater trainers

and five single-seaters, and will be delivered over the next two years.

to include the French offer of the Mirage 2000-5 while evaluating the

option of licensed production. The Mirage overhaul factory at Gwalior,

which is at present underused, could then be maximised. Diversification

will enable the IAF to slowly loosen the Russian stranglehold on its

inventory.

The biggest snag in building air power to bolster India’s security has

been inept and erratic decision-making. Thanks to the whims and fancies

of air chiefs, there has also been no continuity in sustaining its

long-term re-equipment plan. The government has played no mean role in

this. Time and cost overruns have afflicted every project, be it the

LCA, AJT, Su-30MK and even the MiG-21 BiS upgrade.

To a lesser extent, unfortunately, this is the story of the other two

services too. Till an integrated higher defence management system is put

in place, the IAF will not take off, with or without the Su-30 MKI.

Ad-hocism has become integral to defence planning and equipment

acquisition.