Harriers and Carriers

Well it appears that our esteemed Prime Minister opted to delete Harrier from the inventory – and impose others cuts, when he ripped up the defence review at the last minute before the SDSR announcement in October.

Source – here:

So any reversal on cuts would have to be balanced with savings elsewhere. In other words, new cuts. And where would those cuts fall? Well, as analysts including Andrew Dorman point out, the Army would have to be prime candidate. Largely shielded from cuts in the SDSR, surely the Army could lose a few more thousand posts to free up some cash for the RAF and Navy? For much of the SDSR process, that was the MoD’s plan, but the Army cuts were scaled back by the PM.

That last-minute decision skewed the rest of the review and its outcomes, with negative consequences for the other services that are still becoming clear. Awareness of that problem is spreading across Whitehall.

Indeed, the annoyingly well-informed Alex Barker of the FT reports today that even the generals now accept that argument. But Mr Cameron, wary of more bad headlines about sacking Our Boys while they fight in Afghanistan, has said No.

We know the First Sea Lord tried to save Harrier – see here.

In a tense meeting, Admiral Sir Mark Stanhope, the First Sea Lord, told Mr Cameron that he “could not endorse as his military advice” the decision to axe the Harriers and considered it a “political, not military decision.”

The early retirement of the Harrier force next year will leave Britain without any aircraft to put on its carriers for at least nine years until 2020.

Senior defence sources said much of the £4.7 billion of cuts in the review was only decided in a series of meetings at 10 Downing Street over the weekend of 16/17 October, two to three days before it was announced

However, at the last minute, in a meeting over that weekend, the Chief of the Defence Staff, Air Chief Marshal Sir Jock Stirrup, an airman, persuaded Mr Cameron to change course and scrap the Harrier instead, even though this will leave Britain with two land-based fast jets and no carrier-based jets.

More recently: Loss of Carrier Strike Capability Top Concern of Royal Navy Chief

Giving evidence alongside the heads of the Army and Air Force on the impact of last year’s defense review, Stanhope said that retaining HMS Ark Royal and its fleet of Harrier strike aircraft would have been his top priority if the government’s strategic defense review and associated four-year defense spending plan could be revisited.

Later…

Withdrawing Ark Royal and the Harriers earlier this year was by far the most controversial element of the defense spending cuts. Stanhope later indicated he would not oppose resurrecting the Harrier force if possible and if money was made available to support the aircraft.

Stanhope and Air Marshal Sir Stephen Dalton, the chief of the Air Staff, were asked by a defense committee member whether returning the Harrier force to service had gone beyond the point of no return.

Dalton said it had. But Stanhope responded that while Dalton’s statement was correct, he would “like to think that should a decision [be made to reassess the Harrier force, we could], look again. It all comes down to money.”

Stanhope said the Royal Navy is faced with the task of regenerating the carrier force in the latter half of the decade as a new aircraft carrier and the F-35C fighter become available. Rebuilding an aircraft carrier force around 2019 could only be done with the assistance of allied carrier operators France and the U.S., he said. Such a program is now being developed, Stanhope said.

The video of the meeting with the Select Commitee is here.

Does the PM understand the issues – particularly with respect to keep skills amongst RN personnel?

If the Royal Navy has no capacity to operate fixed wing aircraft at sea for a decade, then all the skills that are needed will be lost. It is generally reckoned that building these skills up from being non existent to the level we currently have would take approximately ten years – maybe longer. Of course, the pilots can be sent to work with the US Navy or someone else, to build up experience of carrier operations. However, operating fixed wing aircraft (and helicopters to a certain extent) is a whole ship activity. It does not only involve the aircrew and flight deck personnel, but virtually everyone. There is no way we can send hundreds of sailors to work in American carriers, and most of these specialist skills need to be maintained by constant practice. Many are carrier specific.

On the flight deck, aircraft handlers need to be able to speedily and safely move aircraft around the flight deck, both by giving visual cues to pilots and by using vehicles. They also need to be able to deal with any fires or other incidents that might occur. The RN School of Flight Deck Operations at RNAS Culdrose has a dummy deck, dubbed HMS Siskin, where aircraft handlers learn their trade. Real aircraft, including a number of retired Sea Harriers, are used and move under their own power to simulate a carrier deck. However, they cannot simulate the movement of a ship at sea in variable sea conditions, pitching and rolling. Nor can they simulate things such the carrier increasing speed to launch aircraft and the sudden wind over the deck. Getting experience of these things and building experience and confidence requires people to spend time at sea working with aircraft for real. This is a key skill area that will decline very rapidly if we have no flying from carriers.

Other personnel may also need to work on the flight deck, amongst the aircraft. These include the people who maintain the aircraft, and those who fuel and arm them. They too need experience of doing it for real.

Beyond the flight deck, lots of other personnel in different parts of the ship are involved. These include the Navigating Officer and the Officer of the Watch and his/her team on the bridge, who must ensure that the ship is on the right heading for flying operations. The Commander (Air) and his team are responsible for running aviation activities. The marine engineering watchkeepers in the Ship Control Centre are responsible for increasing the speed of the carrier’s engines when needed for launching aircraft, they also carry out adjustments to things such as the ship’s trim, so as to maintain a level deck for flying. There are various sensors, communications systems and landing aids that need to be maintained and operated. All of these are things that demand time spent practising at sea.

Air Traffic Control is of critical importance, as are others who are involved in airspace management. A carrier is unlike any airfield in that she moves. Land based ATC cannot provide the same experience. Her command team must also consider the constraints put on her movements by the maritime environment, by her escorts, and by the need to be aware of the existence of things such as merchant shipping or fishing boats. The aircrew that fly from the deck also need to have an understanding of all these issues. They must also understand how they fit in with the rest of the ship and task group. Finally, no carrier operations mean that in ten years time, there will be no senior naval officers with experience or understanding of these complex issues.

Most of these things cannot be taught on a dummy deck, or in a simulator, but need developing by real flying aboard real decks. The RN has been doing this for many decades, and the experience and expertise, much of it won at great cost, handed down. It seems unlikely that the body of experience would survive a ten year gap of non use. Interestingly, young officers entering the training pipeline to become pilots or observers have been told that to go from scratch to the level of expertise we currently have would take ten years – this is based on the experience of others Navies like those of Spain and Italy who have gained carriers more recently than us.

Some of my comments here are based on what I was fortunate to witness aboard HMS Illustrious in late 2007. Although I had a pretty good idea of what to expect, the number of different parts of ship involved in maintaining safe and effective flying operations took me by surprise. The teamwork was impressive. If a mere [me – a Reservist junior rate] can see this, why does the review turn a blind eye? Whilst in the dinner queue one evening I looked in a magazine I found loafing, there was an article in which a senior aviator (ex Sea Harrier) commented on the danger of future Fleet Air Arm personnel becoming unfamiliar with the shipboard environment and deck operations. My path has crossed with aviation connected personnel at other times, and they have all expressed similar views.

And….I would suggest that basics are basics, regardless of whether the future is V/STOL or involves “Cats and traps”. Will there be exchanges for lots of chockheads – moving live jets on deck 24 hours a day in all weather in rough sea states, the people who fuel, arm and work on aircraft on deck – amongst jet blast (and FOD issues) the OOW and bridge team – who have to put the ship in the right place, direction and speed for aircraft to take off or land, Ops Room personnel – who have to operate sensors/weapons and talk to aircraft, maintainers of this equipment, landing aids maintainers, the ME watchkeepers keeping a nice level deck and increasing speed when needed, ATC types, Fighter Controllers, senior Officers in the carrier (Cdr(Air), Lt Cdr(Flying), Captain, XO) – they need to know how to run things, senior Officers elsewhere (MOD, Navy Command, task group commanders) who need to know how aircraft are used as task group weapons, etc?

See also: Decision to axe Harrier is “bonkers” – PPRuNe