Possible RAN-JMSDF sub replacement program?

Exactly, don’t ignore economies of scale. The more you make the lower the unit cost and it allows a little more latitude for a few of those nice to have optional extra’s that a lower production rate might not have justified.

…what could Australia offer Japan that would make co-operation worthwhile?…

Stated reason for policy change: money. If Australia pays shared development costs in proportion to its share of the subs bought, Japanese taxpayers save a worthwhile amount of money.

Japan only loses out if there’s a silly workshare agreement guaranteeing Australia much more work than its abilities merit.

The thing is although Australia and Japan could in theory co-operate, Japan has the greater experience of building submarines. As Distiller implies, what could Australia offer Japan that would make co-operation worthwhile? I’m asking this as a genuine question because Japan doesn’t seem to have the problems Australia did with the C-class.

Experience of submarine operations

The Aussie dolphins operate much closer to the edge than their island neighbours do. (And yes I’m aware that I’m commiting the cardinal sin, and one which I have criticised others for of stating a ‘fact’ and providing no source; I guess you either choose to accept it or treat me as an oaf and this (and my last) post as nonsense)

Al

The thing is although Australia and Japan could in theory co-operate, Japan has the greater experience of building submarines. As Distiller implies, what could Australia offer Japan that would make co-operation worthwhile? I’m asking this as a genuine question because Japan doesn’t seem to have the problems Australia did with the C-class.

This is another golden opportunity for the US to make a financial killing, arm its allies and restrict the transfer of that which it does want to see transfered

A tripartite programme between US, Japan and Aussies (and maybe Kiwis? I don’t know how much they have left in the kitty after their skimmer programmes) could use

Australian experience of conducting aggressive SSK submarine operations
Japanese high tech capacity (as well as capability)
US work on hullforms, opposition signature databases, sensors and weapon systems

I’d love UK to be involved (SSGT take one pace forward) but
a. the perception of the Upholders to Canada programme (and maybe reality?)
b. Japanese and Aus use of US weapons rather than UK
would seem to mitigate against this

Al

… Your ranges are while snorkeling…..

The ratio holds true when surfaced. The Collins has the same range as a 214 at higher speed, & a longer range at the same speed.

That would be the engineering testbed – so its still in Australia?

Australia is after strike missiles (evolved Tactical Tomahawk?), enhanced SOF support (SDV?) – are these Japanese requirements?

The missiles would require a high data rate (HDR) satellite communications mast (already programmed for Collins upgrades) – for receiving targeting imagery and sending/receiving SOF imagery, an interface to the combat system (US sourced).

So theres probably a split on the combat system straight away. Japan already has an evolutionary line of combat systems and sonars.

What I’m hoping will happen is that some of the later Collins equipment ends up in the new class to save costs.

The rolling Collins Improvement Program (CIP) already has:
1) CIP Phase 5B.1 with UHF SATCOM replacement mast – I think already fitted.
2) 2010-12: CIP 5B.2A fitted with HDR SATCOM (2010-12?)
3) CIP Phase 6 with replacement sonars (2012-14?)
4) CIP 5B.2B with improved communications, EW, upgraded periscope.
Class to be struck from 2026.

Personally i was making the assumption that the collins replacement would probably receive whatever combat systems are gong onto new-build US SSN’s at the time on construction, just as the current collins combat system is the same as the ones being fitted to the Virginia’s (is this system # 2 or 3 for the collins class?)

That would be the engineering testbed – so its still in Australia?

Australia is after strike missiles (evolved Tactical Tomahawk?), enhanced SOF support (SDV?) – are these Japanese requirements?

The missiles would require a high data rate (HDR) satellite communications mast (already programmed for Collins upgrades) – for receiving targeting imagery and sending/receiving SOF imagery, an interface to the combat system (US sourced).

So theres probably a split on the combat system straight away. Japan already has an evolutionary line of combat systems and sonars.

What I’m hoping will happen is that some of the later Collins equipment ends up in the new class to save costs.

The rolling Collins Improvement Program (CIP) already has:
1) CIP Phase 5B.1 with UHF SATCOM replacement mast – I think already fitted.
2) 2010-12: CIP 5B.2A fitted with HDR SATCOM (2010-12?)
3) CIP Phase 6 with replacement sonars (2012-14?)
4) CIP 5B.2B with improved communications, EW, upgraded periscope.
Class to be struck from 2026.

I could now say that the German XIc boats had 1200ts and a range of 25.000nm, and that size and range are not … (But I’m aware of the difference in tank construction).

AUD25G is enormous for six SSKs. They could buy Astutes for that money. Makes me believe that number is 2.5 times 10G, with those 10G as acquisition price. Would still almost buy Astutes.

You are aware that a Collins and a 214 have about the same endurance, only Collins being faster? Your ranges are while snorkeling.

Regarding the crew size: Not sure about the 214, but the 212A are built for a combat duty cycle of 24hrs-day/6-6-6-6 (the same as the British subs), meaning double crew. Does the RAN operate on the USN 18hrs-day/6-6-6 cycle with tripple crews or the RN cycle?

You know this here?
http://www.aph.gov.au/library/Pubs/rp/2001-02/02RP04.pdf
Things Google finds …

Threshold spec seems to have been for 10.000nm and 70 days at sea.
Also interesting, they say 250% of the acquisition cost (new) as 25 years LCC.
And they also say that the building location and the deep maintenance location should be idential.

Funny how the Australian govt went to extra length to keep the Krauts out. 😀 (slide 26 et seq of the pdf — didn’t work, AMT is still there!), and later to get GD in.
That is actually interesting, in case the USN ever jumps its shadow and goes for a handful of SSKs. The AUS-USA-JAP boat.
Yip, maybe it’s true. After buidling a whole industry for just six boats, having it nationalized, they are hankering for more work.
But now the Germans are much stronger and consolidated.

Anyway. Question again: Is the labyrinth of Islands to the northwest open ocean? Last time they chose a company with extensive littoral experience, and no open ocean experience. Doesn’t seem to matter much.

Why they were chosen at the time is irrelivent, what is relevent is that they stuffed up big time with the program and wont get another chance. Besides, i have a vague memory that they got bought out by one of the german shipyards.

The decision was made in July 1996 to not retrofit AIP as the indiscretion ratio was so low due to higher powered diesels:

Upholder has two 2035 bhp diesels (4070 total) driving two 2500 kW alternators (5000 kW).
Collins has three diesels (6000 bhp total).
Oyashio has two 1700 bhp diesels (3400 total) driving two 1850 kW alternators (3700 kW).
Yuushio has two 1700 bhp diesels (3400 total) driving two alternators (2840 kW total).
Kilo has two 1825 bhp diesels (3650 total).
Walrus has three 2300 bhp diesels (6900 total) driving three alternators (2940 kW total).

AIP was looked at, and may have even had a small testbed, but ‘pallets sitting at ASC’ – where does info this come from?

http://www.defencetalk.com/forums/navy-maritime/new-submarines-now-australias-biggest-ever-military-project-8810-2/#post168109

make that ‘pallet’, singular

I could now say that the German XIc boats had 1200ts and a range of 25.000nm, and that size and range are not … (But I’m aware of the difference in tank construction).

AUD25G is enormous for six SSKs. They could buy Astutes for that money. Makes me believe that number is 2.5 times 10G, with those 10G as acquisition price. Would still almost buy Astutes.

You are aware that a Collins and a 214 have about the same endurance, only Collins being faster? Your ranges are while snorkeling.

Regarding the crew size: Not sure about the 214, but the 212A are built for a combat duty cycle of 24hrs-day/6-6-6-6 (the same as the British subs), meaning double crew. Does the RAN operate on the USN 18hrs-day/6-6-6 cycle with tripple crews or the RN cycle?

You know this here?
http://www.aph.gov.au/library/Pubs/rp/2001-02/02RP04.pdf
Things Google finds …

Threshold spec seems to have been for 10.000nm and 70 days at sea.
Also interesting, they say 250% of the acquisition cost (new) as 25 years LCC.
And they also say that the building location and the deep maintenance location should be idential.

Funny how the Australian govt went to extra length to keep the Krauts out. 😀 (slide 26 et seq of the pdf — didn’t work, AMT is still there!), and later to get GD in.
That is actually interesting, in case the USN ever jumps its shadow and goes for a handful of SSKs. The AUS-USA-JAP boat.
Yip, maybe it’s true. After buidling a whole industry for just six boats, having it nationalized, they are hankering for more work.
But now the Germans are much stronger and consolidated.

Anyway. Question again: Is the labyrinth of Islands to the northwest open ocean? Last time they chose a company with extensive littoral experience, and no open ocean experience. Doesn’t seem to matter much.

The US has close Military ties with both Australia and Japan. Further, the USN does not want nor need an SSK. So, I see no reason why the US would not support such a collaboration…………Further, it would likely provide Sensors and Weapons for such an Australian/Japanese Venture.

In short the US would support both in jointly developing a future SSK……

No, Australia signed up with the USN for a lot of technology – one of the conditions was not passing it to anybody.

The is includes combat system, Mk 48 CBASS torpedoes, etc. No way could we pass this along without US approval.

The decision was made in July 1996 to not retrofit AIP as the indiscretion ratio was so low due to higher powered diesels:

Upholder has two 2035 bhp diesels (4070 total) driving two 2500 kW alternators (5000 kW).
Collins has three diesels (6000 bhp total).
Oyashio has two 1700 bhp diesels (3400 total) driving two 1850 kW alternators (3700 kW).
Yuushio has two 1700 bhp diesels (3400 total) driving two alternators (2840 kW total).
Kilo has two 1825 bhp diesels (3650 total).
Walrus has three 2300 bhp diesels (6900 total) driving three alternators (2940 kW total).

AIP was looked at, and may have even had a small testbed, but ‘pallets sitting at ASC’ – where does info this come from?

Collins started around 82/83, was launched in 1990, commissioned in 1996, and reached FOC in 1999 (which is ok, the first German 212A also took 3 years from commissioning to FOC). The flotilla reached FOC in 2004. Makes more than 20 years from programme launch to flotilla FOC (compare: the German 212A flotilla will also take around the same time — 1994 to 2013/4; or 13 years till FOC of the first boat — 1994 to 2007). 2025 is not so far away for such a programme. Australia starting in 2010 would be about on curve.

Japan is just starting Soryu production. Do you see a chance they might cooperate with Australia on a new one? They have roughly a ten years cycle for submarine classes and build one annually (quite fast actually, four years from keel to commission). I have no idea how long they take designing one, but I guess five to seven years, meaning around ten+ years from design start to commissioning of the first boat. If they build again around 10 Soryus, they will lay down the last one in 2016 and commission it in 2020. Design work for the next class thus would have to start next year. Everything under the assumption that they stick to their usual cycle, +/- two years or so. Meaning Australia’s requirement falls in the middle of such a cycle. Not good for a cooperation.

What do you see as Collins class replacement requirements, and why are the 214 boats insufficient? Have even a flank sonar and the same range as a Collins. The future ops area is probable all the islands to the north, the Chinese coast and around Malaya. Sounds like a 214 playground to me. Opinion?

EDIT: Those 25 billion AUD – that is flotilla life cycle budget in current AUD? Otherwise you could buy six+ Astute for that amount. All the other toys Australia is planning to/buying abroad doesn’t make one confident that any money is left for an own one-off sub programme.

As far as i am aware, that 25 billion is for design and production of six submarines.

Collins class is twice the size of the type 214 and assuming the T214 carries 12 weapons like the type 212, then it also carries twice as many weapons. Collins has a bigger crew allowing a different watch keeping cycle and allowing the boats to spend more time at sea. And no, the Type 212 does not have the same range as the collins, the T212/214 can do 8000nm @ 8 knots surfaced compared to the 9,000 @ 10 knots of the Collins. I’m assuming the difference in submerged range would be proportional, except collins doesnt have its AIP fitted (i’ve read in forums that the AIP systems are sitting on pallets at ASC in adelaide as they offer no true tactical advantage).

swerve: maybe you could drag gf0012-aust over here? 😛

Not sure Australia has enough technology to offer for a cooperation.
And possibly not enough financial and human resources for it either.
A one-off programme wouldn’t pay without follow on work – which would be what?

Guess local production of an adapted 214, like the Koreans did and the Turks will do, is their best bet…..

Type 214 is far smaller than Australias current submarines, with correspondingly less range (comparisons which show the same range assume a lower speed) & endurance. Any replacement will be expected to match, at least, the Collins. Australia has exactly the same requirement as Japan, i.e. an oceanic SSK, the nearest thing to an SSN which it can get without nuclear propulsion. Compare a Collins, or even more Soryu, with the Type 214. Very different beasts indeed, the latter being 20 metres longer & 50% fatter than a Type 214, & twice the tonnage.

I see no reason why Japan would not want to take some Australian money & technical resources, to reduce the cost of its next submarine, if policy changes as suggested. It is, after all, the stated purpose of the policy change.

Collins started around 82/83, was launched in 1990, commissioned in 1996, and reached FOC in 1999 (which is ok, the first German 212A also took 3 years from commissioning to FOC). The flotilla reached FOC in 2004. Makes more than 20 years from programme launch to flotilla FOC (compare: the German 212A flotilla will also take around the same time — 1994 to 2013/4; or 13 years till FOC of the first boat — 1994 to 2007). 2025 is not so far away for such a programme. Australia starting in 2010 would be about on curve.

Japan is just starting Soryu production. Do you see a chance they might cooperate with Australia on a new one? They have roughly a ten years cycle for submarine classes and build one annually (quite fast actually, four years from keel to commission). I have no idea how long they take designing one, but I guess five to seven years, meaning around ten+ years from design start to commissioning of the first boat. If they build again around 10 Soryus, they will lay down the last one in 2016 and commission it in 2020. Design work for the next class thus would have to start next year. Everything under the assumption that they stick to their usual cycle, +/- two years or so. Meaning Australia’s requirement falls in the middle of such a cycle. Not good for a cooperation.

What do you see as Collins class replacement requirements, and why are the 214 boats insufficient? Have even a flank sonar and the same range as a Collins. The future ops area is probable all the islands to the north, the Chinese coast and around Malaya. Sounds like a 214 playground to me. Opinion?

EDIT: Those 25 billion AUD – that is flotilla life cycle budget in current AUD? Otherwise you could buy six+ Astute for that amount. All the other toys Australia is planning to/buying abroad doesn’t make one confident that any money is left for an own one-off sub programme.

Not sure Australia has enough technology to offer for a cooperation.
And possibly not enough financial and human resources for it either.
A one-off programme wouldn’t pay without follow on work – which would be what?

Guess local production of an adapted 214, like the Koreans did and the Turks will do, is their best bet.

But time is a factor. Needs to be decided fast. From order to service entry five years is low, if some local stuff should go in two years more are realistic. Even when started in 2010 with one per year it would be 2025 before the flotilla has any real combat capability.

What are you going on about? 214 goes nowhere near reaching the requirements of the RAN. If there is not cooperation with Japan (the only nation with similar conventional sub requirements) then the collins class replacements would likely be entirely home grown, possibly with some american input.

First Replacement sub is to enter service in 2025. Last budget i heard for the subs was along the lines of $25 billion AUD for 6 subs, they’ve now increased the requirement to 12 subs though, so that number will be going up.

Collins class were designed with Swedish help, however the swedish input in the design, plus in the welding of the bow of the first sub (sweden built the first bow) left little to be desired, thus the replacement boat program will be kept as far from the swedes as possible.

As for the financial resources of Australia, we’ve just purchased 24 Super Hornets and will be buying ~100 F35’s. Not to mention that the RAAF is currently receiving its new AWAC’s and Tankers (the same tanker that airbus won the USAF competition with). Orders for the AWAC’s aircraft have since been placed by several nations including Turkey and South Korea.

Navy is currently already getting a pair of 30,000t LHD’s and 3, possibly 4 Aegis Destroyers.

Not sure Australia has enough technology to offer for a cooperation.
And possibly not enough financial and human resources for it either.
A one-off programme wouldn’t pay without follow on work – which would be what?

Guess local production of an adapted 214, like the Koreans did and the Turks will do, is their best bet.

But time is a factor. Needs to be decided fast. From order to service entry five years is low, if some local stuff should go in two years more are realistic. Even when started in 2010 with one per year it would be 2025 before the flotilla has any real combat capability.

Probably not. The RAN has access to much USN submarine technology – does the US want to pass these to Japan?

The US has close Military ties with both Australia and Japan. Further, the USN does not want nor need an SSK. So, I see no reason why the US would not support such a collaboration…………Further, it would likely provide Sensors and Weapons for such an Australian/Japanese Venture.

In short the US would support both in jointly developing a future SSK……

Probably not. The RAN has access to much USN submarine technology – does the US want to pass these to Japan?