Rudd Slashes Aussie Defence Goodtimes

He’s advertising. The moderators will probably throw him off as soon as they notice him.

Alternative energy sources are, I think,
and there is that direction which will deduce the world from crisis.
The epoch of oil and gas monopolies will end.

To quote Pauline Hanson “Please Explain” what the hell you are replying to so that is makes sense, and please don’t quote the whole post.

Oh, and thirdly, whats with the sig?

1. Australia has maintained a tank capability ever since they were first invented. When obsolete they require replacement. I doubt you particularly understand how Army uses it’s tank capability, but it isn’t to fight the Soviets in the Fulda Gap…

2. SPH’s, this is a capability that is LONG overdue. Most nations in our region, are equipped with multiple launch rocket systems, towed guns AND self-propelled howitzers. If you expect Army to fight wars in our region, they NEED mobile artillery firepower. A few towed guns do NOT cut it.

3. Attack helicopters. The Tigers are actually replacing the UH-1H Bushranger attack helicopter capability and the Kiowa reconnaisance helicopter. Were these designed to fight “conventional warfare” too?

Look harder…

http://www.defence.gov.au/news/raafnews/EDITIONS/4913/topstories/story5.htm

1. Caribou’s are entirely obsolete. There is not one airfield in Papua New Guinea that RAAF flies into that a C-130 cannot land on. Therefore, why does Army require a STOL aircraft capability?

The Caribou does indeed take off in a remarkably short distance, but then, it carries nothing to do this, so what is the point of it exactly?

The King Air is being used, to keep the 38 Sqn gainfully employed in the operating an aircraft business until a decision is made. Personally, Army needs more Chinooks and RAAF needs more Hercules and C-17’s.

A short ranged airlifter, that can lift ****** all loads is an entirely unnecessary additional platform for RAAF to manage, and one that offers few capability benefits and the only plus is a cost effective benefit that is offset by the need to continually maintain such a diverse range of miniscule sized aircraft fleets, in my opinion.

It was a bad decision alright. RAN proposed new-build vessels to Government and the proposal was rejected. The Keating Government, flush with excitement for “second hand deals” forced RAN into adopting these hulks.

It is a credit to everyone involved, that they are actually providing useful capability and excellent service today, despite the politically mandated acquisition, not because of it.

1x 127mm gun, 8x Harpoon Block II SSM, 32x Evolved Sea Sparrow Missile, 2x triple torpedo launcher for MU-90 torpedos, 2x Mini-typhoon 12.7mm guns and 4x flex 12.7mm guns, plus Nulka electronic decoy systems, chaff and flare launchers, make the ANZAC’s the most heavily armed patrol boats on the planet, in my opinion.

Rubbish. Every single ANZAC operational deployment has seen an S-70B2 Seahawk, deploy with the ship.

Every single member of the RAN, would prefer 32x ESSM level of protection over ANY CIWS system in the world, ANY day of the week.

It is an unfortunate fact that the weight of the 32 ESSM’s, has reduced the top weight margin of the ANZAC’s so as a CIWS cannot be carried as WELL, but there is no doubt, ESSM is far more capable than any point defence or CIWS in existence. RAN’s ANZAC’s are far better protected with 32x ESSM, than the RNZN ANZAC’s which maintain the early Sea Sparrow missile and a Phalanx CIWS.

The RBS-70 has NEVER deployed on board an ANZAC. They deployed on the LPA’s – HMAS Kanimbla, which by the way, DOES have a Phalanx CIWS.

What does THAT tell you about the operational capability of a CIWS, exactly?

So what’s the problem? The current level of capability or the money spent acquiring it?

1. How about starting with the FACT, that the RAN has one of the best conventional submarines in the world and POSSIBLY only bettered by the Oyashios, in Japanese service?

2. RAN trialled a Stirling AIP system on the Collins Class boats. The amount of space they took up, reducing capability in other areas, wasn’t worth the small amount of capability improvement it offered. The Stirling engines, RAN acquired, are still sitting on crates at ASC…

3. Performance since the fitting of the AN-BYG-1 combat systems has been tremendous. Lethality, added to the Mk 48 Mod 7 ADCAP’s is unbelievable.

Try reading this sometime:

http://www.abbeys.com.au/items.asp?id=113675

Absolutely fascinating stuff and a real insight into the Collins, rather than the crap pedalled in the Broadsheet media. Yes they had problems, but they are also just about the best Subs in the world, including Nukes…

This program started in 1994…

Did they stuff up the introduction to service of the Seahawk? What about the Seaking? What about the MRH-90?

The Seasprite should never have existed. Government refused to fund an additional Seahawk order, because the Seahawk’s could not have operated from the OPV project Government was fixated on (because Malaysia had shown interest in a joint project).

OPV was cancelled when Malaysia pulled out and Seasprite had already been approved and funded. It should have been cancelled and new-build Seahawks acquired, but if Government refuses to fund it, RAN can’t do much about it…

1. ABM capability is a growth option for AWD’s. It will NOT be part of baseline capability, so the AWD’s will be in-service before ABM capability is added, if in fact it ever is.

2. The AWD will be carrying 48x strike length Mk 41 VLS cells. These are capable of carrying SM-3 with NO modification required, whatsoever. (Out of interest, they are also capable of carrying Tomahawk CM with NO modification whatsoever…)

3. The remaining ABM capability is a software change to AEGIS combat system. It is a fairly minor, though not inexpensive change at a technical level. On a strategic level it will be a MASSIVE change.

Relax. The Global Economic crisis will rule out the 4th, before ABM capability at a technical level will ever become an issue… :rolleyes:

Not without new wings…

They have a rolling upgrade program, called the Capability Assurance Program.

The most recently announced upgrade is the incorporation fleet-wide of the Star Safire HD EO/IR sensor system and associated solid state recorder and Link 16 transmit/receive capability.

Adding full motion, high definition EO/IR video/still images and an off-platform broadcast system is truly a massive enhancement.

As to new wings, we’ll see. RAAF has been studying this very issue over the last 12 months, hiring L-3 and Australian Aviation (who did the Kiwi P-3K re-wing job quite successfully) to conduct the study.

Unfortunately RAAF’s AP-3C’s may require quite a bit more than simply new wings…

No, what is needed are 3 things.

1. Sensor coverage.

2. Response options.

3. Sustainability.

Whether these are provided by a single aircraft type or not is irrelevent.

Agreed. RAAF and DMO most definitely have the capability inherent to introduce this into service, despite the current breadth of acquisition projects.

Government simply won’t fund it and have royally p*ssed off Northrop Grumman and the US Navy in the process.

Any chance of a “deal” on the Global Hawk has evaporated completely.

Rubbish. ADF serves at Government’s directions. Each capability requirement for ADF is generated by the Tri-service Capability Development Group and submitted to the Minister via the heads of each service and ADF head-sheds.

For EACH single capability acquired, multiple capability options, along with ADF’s recommendations are provided to the Minister and he along with the National Security Committee of Cabinet, is the one that makes the final decision.

Look at the recent major acquisitions, I think you’ll find the major “Australianisation” phase has run it’s course:

1. M1A1 – off the shelf acquisition, except for the inclusion of some TUSK elements, themselves off the shelf and minor Australian requirements – a refrigerator for cooling drinks, additional radios able to communicate with legacy Army radio systems and Australian specification camouflage netting.

2. MRH-90 – off the shelf, except for inclusion of additional radios able to communicate with legacy Australian Army radios.

3. Javelin ATGW – off the shelf.

4. F/A-18E/F Super Hornets – off the shelf, except for inclusion of “metric” gauges and ILS/NOS landing functions.

5. Tiger ARH, off the shelf, except inclusion of Hellfire, which has integrated so smoothly, that even France has acquired the system and radios able to integrate with legact systems.

6. AWD’s, off the shelf – Spanish F-105 design except for inclusion of RAN specified Horizon search radar, CIWS and in-service torpedo system. Hull, AEGIS, weapons, propulsion and major sensor systems all standard as per the Spanish specification.

7. C-17A’s, off the shelf.

8. KC-30A refuellers. First of class, admittedly, but the “standard” EADS boom, as already fitted to A310 refuellers, standard pod based system, already fitted to B-707 previously and standard EWSP and communications fit, as fitted to other in-service ADF aircraft, including C-17A’s and C-130J-30’s.

This trend is continuing, witness the cancellation and re-tender of the TUAV capability. The manufacturer of the I-VIEW changed the engine for the UAV, AFTER it had won the tender. Now it is being re-released for MOTS only. No developmental aircraft.

Except Bushmaster. And ALR-2001 radar warning receiver. And Perentie long range patrol vehicles. And M72A6 SRAAW. And…

They are. Government has made ANAO and Defence conduct a FULL audit on EACH program EACH year and report through ANAO to Government…

With who and for what? No-one including China has the slightest reason to be conducting conventional land warfare in SEA in the next 10 years.

I thought you were a realist? 😀

Alternative energy sources are, I think,
and there is that direction which will deduce the world from crisis.
The epoch of oil and gas monopolies will end.

__________________________________________________________
find a quick date

Ah Mr Simonds why is it that I can not but help that you have me bracketed for counter battery fire every time I get on this site and have a say!

As per normal Mr Simonds you have misinterprited (or should I say decided to interprite!) what I was was saying.

So I will not meet your ambush with my own counter ambush drill, as I am on leave, and I choose to save my energy and firepower for my foes!

But I will not go into argument and counter argument with you, as we seem to go on and on………………………………………………………………………………………….

I apologys to all other members of this great forum!

I do not and have not claim to know all and everything regarding the ADF (especialy the RAN and RAAF!)
But as for the Australian Army, I am only serving my 22nd year in Infantry, so I wouldn’t know much after all regarding the Army!:D

Oh and Mr Simonds
Have a pleasant Easter

Regards
Pioneer

Happy Easter mate.

If you are interested in debate, please come back. Some of your previous claims, however were farcical.

It is a bit hard to understand where exactly you are coming from at times.

You complain bitterly that ADF is starved of funds and then criticise when it’s given money and spends it on operational deployments and replacing obsolete capability, in the very same post?

It’s damning ADF for doing and for not doing…

Regards

JS

Ah Mr Simonds why is it that I can not but help that you have me bracketed for counter battery fire every time I get on this site and have a say!

As per normal Mr Simonds you have misinterprited (or should I say decided to interprite!) what I was was saying.

So I will not meet your ambush with my own counter ambush drill, as I am on leave, and I choose to save my energy and firepower for my foes!

But I will not go into argument and counter argument with you, as we seem to go on and on………………………………………………………………………………………….

I apologys to all other members of this great forum!

I do not and have not claim to know all and everything regarding the ADF (especialy the RAN and RAAF!)
But as for the Australian Army, I am only serving my 22nd year in Infantry, so I wouldn’t know much after all regarding the Army!:D

Oh and Mr Simonds
Have a pleasant Easter

Regards
Pioneer

GREAT………….As you bring an insight that many on this very forum lack. 😀 (I’ll keep you mind when I have a question in that regard!)

BTW Ja Worsley served in the RAN as a Officer. He’s very knowledgeable in small surface combatants. He is also a good source on Naval History in the South West Pacific in WWII. (NICE GUY TOO!):D:D:D

Ah Mr Simonds why is it that I can not but help that you have me bracketed for counter battery fire every time I get on this site and have a say!

As per normal Mr Simonds you have misinterprited (or should I say decided to interprite!) what I was was saying.

So I will not meet your ambush with my own counter ambush drill, as I am on leave, and I choose to save my energy and firepower for my foes!

But I will not go into argument and counter argument with you, as we seem to go on and on………………………………………………………………………………………….

I apologys to all other members of this great forum!

I do not and have not claim to know all and everything regarding the ADF (especialy the RAN and RAAF!)
But as for the Australian Army, I am only serving my 22nd year in Infantry, so I wouldn’t know much after all regarding the Army!:D

Oh and Mr Simonds
Have a pleasant Easter

Regards
Pioneer

While at the same time it is re-equipping heavily for conventional warfare, in the form of M1 MBT’s, SPH’s, attack helicopters etc……

1. Australia has maintained a tank capability ever since they were first invented. When obsolete they require replacement. I doubt you particularly understand how Army uses it’s tank capability, but it isn’t to fight the Soviets in the Fulda Gap…

2. SPH’s, this is a capability that is LONG overdue. Most nations in our region, are equipped with multiple launch rocket systems, towed guns AND self-propelled howitzers. If you expect Army to fight wars in our region, they NEED mobile artillery firepower. A few towed guns do NOT cut it.

3. Attack helicopters. The Tigers are actually replacing the UH-1H Bushranger attack helicopter capability and the Kiowa reconnaisance helicopter. Were these designed to fight “conventional warfare” too?

Apart from the long over due purchase of the capability likes of the C-17A’s, I have not seen too much in the way of cohesion / inter-service cooperation and operational support between the RAAF and Army

Look harder…

http://www.defence.gov.au/news/raafnews/EDITIONS/4913/topstories/story5.htm

For while the long over due and much needed Caribou replacement program has already been postponed again and again, the army need for a true and versatile STOL transport aircraft (which would be most welcome in Afghanistan!) is to be Band-Aid fixed with the lease of a handful of Beech King aircraft. What a joke!

1. Caribou’s are entirely obsolete. There is not one airfield in Papua New Guinea that RAAF flies into that a C-130 cannot land on. Therefore, why does Army require a STOL aircraft capability?

The Caribou does indeed take off in a remarkably short distance, but then, it carries nothing to do this, so what is the point of it exactly?

The King Air is being used, to keep the 38 Sqn gainfully employed in the operating an aircraft business until a decision is made. Personally, Army needs more Chinooks and RAAF needs more Hercules and C-17’s.

A short ranged airlifter, that can lift ****** all loads is an entirely unnecessary additional platform for RAAF to manage, and one that offers few capability benefits and the only plus is a cost effective benefit that is offset by the need to continually maintain such a diverse range of miniscule sized aircraft fleets, in my opinion.

ex-US Navy Newport Class LST’s – HMAS Kaminbla and Manoora.
After all the RAN history and skills, the purchase of the bargain basement priced ships proved to be an expensive exercise, when it was discovered that they were full of rust, and need extensive and expensive work done to them to make them sea and operational worthy (this was on top of their extensive modifications so as to make them into the LPA’s they are today)

It was a bad decision alright. RAN proposed new-build vessels to Government and the proposal was rejected. The Keating Government, flush with excitement for “second hand deals” forced RAN into adopting these hulks.

It is a credit to everyone involved, that they are actually providing useful capability and excellent service today, despite the politically mandated acquisition, not because of it.

The ANZAC Frigate Program
Possibly the biggest and most expensive patrol bouts ever built!
Based on the West German Meko 200 Frigate design, the RAN agreed (with the Government of the day) to build and operate these potentially good ships in a poor-mans configuration with the fantasy that in time of war, they could be upgraded with the click of a finger.

1x 127mm gun, 8x Harpoon Block II SSM, 32x Evolved Sea Sparrow Missile, 2x triple torpedo launcher for MU-90 torpedos, 2x Mini-typhoon 12.7mm guns and 4x flex 12.7mm guns, plus Nulka electronic decoy systems, chaff and flare launchers, make the ANZAC’s the most heavily armed patrol boats on the planet, in my opinion.

In reality they have operated for almost a decade without a combat effective ship-based helicopter (the helicopter that was to operate from it would be delayed and then canned altogether!).

Rubbish. Every single ANZAC operational deployment has seen an S-70B2 Seahawk, deploy with the ship.

Our service men and woman have been deployed into harms way in a class of ship, which for over a decade lacked an adequate CIWS or Point air defence missile capability – oh that’s if you don’t include the good will of the Australian Army who would be so kind to deploy their very limited number of RBS-70 PDSAM system onboard these ships to give them some form of air defence – but saying this what was defending army units???????????

Every single member of the RAN, would prefer 32x ESSM level of protection over ANY CIWS system in the world, ANY day of the week.

It is an unfortunate fact that the weight of the 32 ESSM’s, has reduced the top weight margin of the ANZAC’s so as a CIWS cannot be carried as WELL, but there is no doubt, ESSM is far more capable than any point defence or CIWS in existence. RAN’s ANZAC’s are far better protected with 32x ESSM, than the RNZN ANZAC’s which maintain the early Sea Sparrow missile and a Phalanx CIWS.

The RBS-70 has NEVER deployed on board an ANZAC. They deployed on the LPA’s – HMAS Kanimbla, which by the way, DOES have a Phalanx CIWS.

What does THAT tell you about the operational capability of a CIWS, exactly?

After all this effort, time and money, the RAN chose to aquire the Huon class minehunter (Based on the Gaeta class minehunters designed for the Italian Navy).

So what’s the problem? The current level of capability or the money spent acquiring it?

Collin’s class diesel-electric submarine program
Hell where does one start with this program????
I think the RAN was way over ambitious about the whole program – from Australia’s ability to construct such an advanced vessel, with no previous sub-building experience, to the RAN’s, want of U.S advanced sensors and electronics, incorporated into the existing Swedish design sensors and electronics systems, which was to become a operational / inter- phasing nightmare.
Compounding this over-ambisouse dream of the RAN, for the want of an SSN in a SS, was the enduring noise problem, which contradicted the entire concept of a modern submarine.
All in all, the RAN’s handling of the Collins class submarines has had a major impact on the RAN/ADF capability, moral, retention and recruiting in the submarine arm.
Way to much time and money have been spent trying to rectify (and save face) these poor management problems, that the ADF, has missed an opportunity of acquiring an additional option of two further hulls, or the opportunity to fit the class with AIP systems, which would have given the Collins class a vast improvement in operational performance.

1. How about starting with the FACT, that the RAN has one of the best conventional submarines in the world and POSSIBLY only bettered by the Oyashios, in Japanese service?

2. RAN trialled a Stirling AIP system on the Collins Class boats. The amount of space they took up, reducing capability in other areas, wasn’t worth the small amount of capability improvement it offered. The Stirling engines, RAN acquired, are still sitting on crates at ASC…

3. Performance since the fitting of the AN-BYG-1 combat systems has been tremendous. Lethality, added to the Mk 48 Mod 7 ADCAP’s is unbelievable.

Try reading this sometime:

http://www.abbeys.com.au/items.asp?id=113675

Absolutely fascinating stuff and a real insight into the Collins, rather than the crap pedalled in the Broadsheet media. Yes they had problems, but they are also just about the best Subs in the world, including Nukes…

SH-2G(A) Super Seasprites program
This was a program that I knew was to good to be true.
Firstly the bargan basement price of the ex-US Navy Seasprites which we payed raised my eyebrows, followed by the actual age of the design itself made alarm bells start ringing in my head (after all the US Navy retired its last Seasprite in 2001!!!).

This program started in 1994…

Then the bomb shell hit hit me like a train.
The RAN’s ‘Bling Factor’ struck again.
The RAN’s want for a design of the 1960’s to have the sensors and weapons capability of the newer and larger Seahawk fitted and operational was the final staw.
What the hell did they expect to achieve?
Instead in the end long after the New Zealanders had their Super Seasprite operational, the RAN were still hanger queens, in a thousand pieces, and many RAN officials and contractor enginners and technicians scratching their heads.
In the end the so-called cost-effective bargan, became another RAN management nightmare, the project was running six years over schedule, and its cost had blown out to A$1.1 billion, only to be cancelled in the end.
I for one always thought the then and ready to go small and combat efficiant Westland Lynx the design for the RAN’s needs.
Then again with the RAN’s track project management record, they would enevatably stuffed this too!

Did they stuff up the introduction to service of the Seahawk? What about the Seaking? What about the MRH-90?

The Seasprite should never have existed. Government refused to fund an additional Seahawk order, because the Seahawk’s could not have operated from the OPV project Government was fixated on (because Malaysia had shown interest in a joint project).

OPV was cancelled when Malaysia pulled out and Seasprite had already been approved and funded. It should have been cancelled and new-build Seahawks acquired, but if Government refuses to fund it, RAN can’t do much about it…

Hobart Class AAW Destroyer program
I must admit that I was very surprised (but not disappointed!) at the RAN’s selection of the small, lighter and cheaper Spanish based F100 design, over that of the American evolved version of the Arleigh Burke class destroyer.
I for one thought that the RAN, with political consent of ‘Sheriff’ John Howard would have went for the larger, heavier, more expensive and more complicated American design – so hats off to ever was the deciding factor!!!
Although it is still to early to both see and know just how this much needed capability class of ships will go in production and service, my greatest concern is the past governments and RAN’s want for the class to incorporate a Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) capability including carrying the SM-3 Blk1a and Blk2.
My biggest concern is that this ABM ‘Bling Factor’ will add both cost and complication to the design!

1. ABM capability is a growth option for AWD’s. It will NOT be part of baseline capability, so the AWD’s will be in-service before ABM capability is added, if in fact it ever is.

2. The AWD will be carrying 48x strike length Mk 41 VLS cells. These are capable of carrying SM-3 with NO modification required, whatsoever. (Out of interest, they are also capable of carrying Tomahawk CM with NO modification whatsoever…)

3. The remaining ABM capability is a software change to AEGIS combat system. It is a fairly minor, though not inexpensive change at a technical level. On a strategic level it will be a MASSIVE change.

Add to this my concern that due to its ABM capability, the Australian government may divert the classes intended primary role of Fleet Air Defence of a Task Force, to that of operating of the Australian coast to provide ABM duty.
It also worry’s me that with the added cost and complication of adding this ABM factor into the equation, the opportunity and want for the fourth hull of this class will most likely be ruled out as to expensive.

Relax. The Global Economic crisis will rule out the 4th, before ABM capability at a technical level will ever become an issue… :rolleyes:

As for the AP-3C Orion – I think this plane and its capability still has many years of life left in them.

Not without new wings…

I’m all for re-winging them, and if need be upgrading them.

They have a rolling upgrade program, called the Capability Assurance Program.

The most recently announced upgrade is the incorporation fleet-wide of the Star Safire HD EO/IR sensor system and associated solid state recorder and Link 16 transmit/receive capability.

Adding full motion, high definition EO/IR video/still images and an off-platform broadcast system is truly a massive enhancement.

As to new wings, we’ll see. RAAF has been studying this very issue over the last 12 months, hiring L-3 and Australian Aviation (who did the Kiwi P-3K re-wing job quite successfully) to conduct the study.

Unfortunately RAAF’s AP-3C’s may require quite a bit more than simply new wings…

I can just imagine the RAAF and RAN wanting the modern and shiny ‘Bling Factor’ Boeing P-8A, but at the end of the day the RAAF would not be able to replace the P-3 on a one for one with the P-8.
And one thing that the RAAF is going to need is numbers.
When it comes to ASW and MP, numbers will always be needed.

No, what is needed are 3 things.

1. Sensor coverage.

2. Response options.

3. Sustainability.

Whether these are provided by a single aircraft type or not is irrelevent.

The issue of the Global Hawk is a big disappointment – its capability and ability to send it into harms way will be a mistake not to utilize!

Agreed. RAAF and DMO most definitely have the capability inherent to introduce this into service, despite the current breadth of acquisition projects.

Government simply won’t fund it and have royally p*ssed off Northrop Grumman and the US Navy in the process.

Any chance of a “deal” on the Global Hawk has evaporated completely.

Finally at the end of the day I have always been concerned that the ADF as a whole has never really sat down and seriously discussed service-to-service what equipment / weapons systems are really needed to achieve a thorough and decisive defence structure to defend Australia.

Rubbish. ADF serves at Government’s directions. Each capability requirement for ADF is generated by the Tri-service Capability Development Group and submitted to the Minister via the heads of each service and ADF head-sheds.

For EACH single capability acquired, multiple capability options, along with ADF’s recommendations are provided to the Minister and he along with the National Security Committee of Cabinet, is the one that makes the final decision.

In many cases would like to see more of the ADF operation needs being evaluated more thoroughly and this need being put out as Request For Proposal (RFP) for tenders to meet this requirement, as opposed to the ADF’s tradition of adopting an existing weapons system / platform, which has to be modified extensively (which more time than not leads to delays, added expense and operational restrictions in the field!) to meet the ADF’s requirement.

Look at the recent major acquisitions, I think you’ll find the major “Australianisation” phase has run it’s course:

1. M1A1 – off the shelf acquisition, except for the inclusion of some TUSK elements, themselves off the shelf and minor Australian requirements – a refrigerator for cooling drinks, additional radios able to communicate with legacy Army radio systems and Australian specification camouflage netting.

2. MRH-90 – off the shelf, except for inclusion of additional radios able to communicate with legacy Australian Army radios.

3. Javelin ATGW – off the shelf.

4. F/A-18E/F Super Hornets – off the shelf, except for inclusion of “metric” gauges and ILS/NOS landing functions.

5. Tiger ARH, off the shelf, except inclusion of Hellfire, which has integrated so smoothly, that even France has acquired the system and radios able to integrate with legact systems.

6. AWD’s, off the shelf – Spanish F-105 design except for inclusion of RAN specified Horizon search radar, CIWS and in-service torpedo system. Hull, AEGIS, weapons, propulsion and major sensor systems all standard as per the Spanish specification.

7. C-17A’s, off the shelf.

8. KC-30A refuellers. First of class, admittedly, but the “standard” EADS boom, as already fitted to A310 refuellers, standard pod based system, already fitted to B-707 previously and standard EWSP and communications fit, as fitted to other in-service ADF aircraft, including C-17A’s and C-130J-30’s.

This trend is continuing, witness the cancellation and re-tender of the TUAV capability. The manufacturer of the I-VIEW changed the engine for the UAV, AFTER it had won the tender. Now it is being re-released for MOTS only. No developmental aircraft.

But I am a realist!
Not now or in the past (since WWII) has the Australian Government had the ‘balls’ or will to commit to such a way of thinking or supporting and encouraging an indigenous military industry, which could design and build tailor made equipment and weapons systems for the ADF.

Except Bushmaster. And ALR-2001 radar warning receiver. And Perentie long range patrol vehicles. And M72A6 SRAAW. And…

I’m sorry, as I thought I would never say it, but the ADF and its weapons acquisition programs must be scrutinized much closer and made accountable to keep the ADF on the tracks.

They are. Government has made ANAO and Defence conduct a FULL audit on EACH program EACH year and report through ANAO to Government…

This is especially more important now than ever with the giant rise and fast building and expanding conventional military forces (with the consent of their so-called political leaders!) within the Pacific region.
For I think that within the next 10-years the ADF will discover first hand conventional warfare on a scale it has not seen since WWII in the Pacific.

With who and for what? No-one including China has the slightest reason to be conducting conventional land warfare in SEA in the next 10 years.

One other thing I would like to see would be a bipartisan agreement by both major political parties (past and binding in legislation) in Australian to structure the ADF in a way that allows the ADF to concentrate on its primary task of defending Australia and its interests, instead of continuously shock upside down and forced to restructure and re-train every time one of the two major political party’s get into power!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!

Regards
Pioneer

I thought you were a realist? 😀

Pioneer, it seems like in a lot of countries. Big military ego, and good pinch of tribalism, and a total lack of coherent political leadership with orgasmic blazes of grossmannssucht. (Plus the pork factor in countries with a defense industry worth mentioning).

On the Hobards: We had a discussion here about the lack of range. Basically, with all the important stuff on that ship coming from the U.S., it wouldn’t have mattered if the hardware around it would also have come from there.

I hate to say it, but the Australian DOD / ADF (with much support of the previous Federal Government – as self-declared ‘Sheriff’s’ of the region!) has been off the rails for almost a decade.
I can not but help seeing the ADF like the proverbial underprivileged child who has for so many years (decades) gone without and had to make do with the thread bare equipment.
Then after the East Timor incident (and more so 9/11), the child is then let lose in a confectionery shop with the family’s scarce mortgage money.
I call it the modern ADF ‘Bling Factor’
For whilst it has been a very useful operational experience working with the likes of the US and British military for the past 10-years, the ADF has become some what entranced with the desire to acquire some of these allies very high tech and equally expensive weapons and weapons systems, without truly thinking it out, or what is truly needed!
The Army has been forced (by government commitment!) to predominantly gear up, train, deploy and fight a war on terrorism / COIN in Afghanistan and Iraq, while carrying out more and more peacekeeping in the likes of East Timor and the Solomon’s.
While at the same time it is re-equipping heavily for conventional warfare, in the form of M1 MBT’s, SPH’s, attack helicopters etc……
The Air Force has some grandeurs want of equipping for a high tech conventional war of Cold War proportions, with its ‘balls-and-all’ approach and wet dream desire to be one of the big boys in the F-35/JSF program, which has been continuously to be delayed, incurred massive cost blow outs, and no guarantee that they will be able to get the top of the range variant (full sensor and stealth capability), and the need to purchase an expensive stop-gap measure in the form of the F/A-18E/F Super Hornet.
Apart from the long over due purchase of the capability likes of the C-17A’s, I have not seen too much in the way of cohesion / inter-service cooperation and operational support between the RAAF and Army
For while the long over due and much needed Caribou replacement program has already been postponed again and again, the army need for a true and versatile STOL transport aircraft (which would be most welcome in Afghanistan!) is to be Band-Aid fixed with the lease of a handful of Beech King aircraft. What a joke!
The RAAF may as well outsource the Caribou replacement to Qantas airlines (Sh*t – I better not give them ideas…….)
Now for the RAN
What the hell is going on there????????
I am of the firm belief that the RAN should be slapped around the office some what.
For they are without doubt the biggest integrator and perpetrator of the ‘Bling Factor’
Let’s look at what they have had the opportunity to do and what they have bungled.

ex-US Navy Newport Class LST’s – HMAS Kaminbla and Manoora.
After all the RAN history and skills, the purchase of the bargain basement priced ships proved to be an expensive exercise, when it was discovered that they were full of rust, and need extensive and expensive work done to them to make them sea and operational worthy (this was on top of their extensive modifications so as to make them into the LPA’s they are today)

The ANZAC Frigate Program
Possibly the biggest and most expensive patrol bouts ever built!
Based on the West German Meko 200 Frigate design, the RAN agreed (with the Government of the day) to build and operate these potentially good ships in a poor-mans configuration with the fantasy that in time of war, they could be upgraded with the click of a finger.
In reality they have operated for almost a decade without a combat effective ship-based helicopter (the helicopter that was to operate from it would be delayed and then canned altogether!).
Our service men and woman have been deployed into harms way in a class of ship, which for over a decade lacked an adequate CIWS or Point air defence missile capability – oh that’s if you don’t include the good will of the Australian Army who would be so kind to deploy their very limited number of RBS-70 PDSAM system onboard these ships to give them some form of air defence – but saying this what was defending army units???????????

Bay class Minehunter Inshores
This was a creat opertunity for the RAN to develop and operate a taylored design inshore minehunter, which was credited by many to be an exceptional design.
And what happened to this advanced class in the end?
The RAN got cold feet (or was it the case that this advanced design was seen as being to small and did not offer enough ‘Bling’)
Two prototype ships were ordered in 1981, with the first ship, HMAS Rushcutter, commissioned in November 1986. The two ships experienced delays in construction, and the RAN resorted to acquiring six minesweeper auxiliaries (MSA) to provide an interim mine-warfare capability, while also keeping Ton class minesweeper in service until 1990, well beyond her intended decommissioning date.
After all this effort, time and money, the RAN chose to aquire the Huon class minehunter (Based on the Gaeta class minehunters designed for the Italian Navy).

Collin’s class diesel-electric submarine program
Hell where does one start with this program????
I think the RAN was way over ambitious about the whole program – from Australia’s ability to construct such an advanced vessel, with no previous sub-building experience, to the RAN’s, want of U.S advanced sensors and electronics, incorporated into the existing Swedish design sensors and electronics systems, which was to become a operational / inter- phasing nightmare.
Compounding this over-ambisouse dream of the RAN, for the want of an SSN in a SS, was the enduring noise problem, which contradicted the entire concept of a modern submarine.
All in all, the RAN’s handling of the Collins class submarines has had a major impact on the RAN/ADF capability, moral, retention and recruiting in the submarine arm.
Way to much time and money have been spent trying to rectify (and save face) these poor management problems, that the ADF, has missed an opportunity of acquiring an additional option of two further hulls, or the opportunity to fit the class with AIP systems, which would have given the Collins class a vast improvement in operational performance.

SH-2G(A) Super Seasprites program
This was a program that I knew was to good to be true.
Firstly the bargan basement price of the ex-US Navy Seasprites which we payed raised my eyebrows, followed by the actual age of the design itself made alarm bells start ringing in my head (after all the US Navy retired its last Seasprite in 2001!!!).
Then the bomb shell hit hit me like a train.
The RAN’s ‘Bling Factor’ struck again.
The RAN’s want for a design of the 1960’s to have the sensors and weapons capability of the newer and larger Seahawk fitted and operational was the final staw.
What the hell did they expect to achieve?
Instead in the end long after the New Zealanders had their Super Seasprite operational, the RAN were still hanger queens, in a thousand pieces, and many RAN officials and contractor enginners and technicians scratching their heads.
In the end the so-called cost-effective bargan, became another RAN management nightmare, the project was running six years over schedule, and its cost had blown out to A$1.1 billion, only to be cancelled in the end.
I for one always thought the then and ready to go small and combat efficiant Westland Lynx the design for the RAN’s needs.
Then again with the RAN’s track project management record, they would enevatably stuffed this too!

Hobart Class AAW Destroyer program
I must admit that I was very surprised (but not disappointed!) at the RAN’s selection of the small, lighter and cheaper Spanish based F100 design, over that of the American evolved version of the Arleigh Burke class destroyer.
I for one thought that the RAN, with political consent of ‘Sheriff’ John Howard would have went for the larger, heavier, more expensive and more complicated American design – so hats off to ever was the deciding factor!!!
Although it is still to early to both see and know just how this much needed capability class of ships will go in production and service, my greatest concern is the past governments and RAN’s want for the class to incorporate a Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) capability including carrying the SM-3 Blk1a and Blk2.
My biggest concern is that this ABM ‘Bling Factor’ will add both cost and complication to the design!
Add to this my concern that due to its ABM capability, the Australian government may divert the classes intended primary role of Fleet Air Defence of a Task Force, to that of operating of the Australian coast to provide ABM duty.
It also worry’s me that with the added cost and complication of adding this ABM factor into the equation, the opportunity and want for the fourth hull of this class will most likely be ruled out as to expensive.

As for the AP-3C Orion – I think this plane and its capability still has many years of life left in them.
I’m all for re-winging them, and if need be upgrading them.
I can just imagine the RAAF and RAN wanting the modern and shiny ‘Bling Factor’ Boeing P-8A, but at the end of the day the RAAF would not be able to replace the P-3 on a one for one with the P-8.
And one thing that the RAAF is going to need is numbers.
When it comes to ASW and MP, numbers will always be needed.

The issue of the Global Hawk is a big disappointment – its capability and ability to send it into harms way will be a mistake not to utilize!

Finally at the end of the day I have always been concerned that the ADF as a whole has never really sat down and seriously discussed service-to-service what equipment / weapons systems are really needed to achieve a thorough and decisive defence structure to defend Australia.
For like the late South African military discovered, even if it was able to obtain weapon systems from other country’s during the Apartheid era, not all this equipment would have been effective to the South African’s way of fighting, let alone have the ability to survive its harsh climate.
In many cases would like to see more of the ADF operation needs being evaluated more thoroughly and this need being put out as Request For Proposal (RFP) for tenders to meet this requirement, as opposed to the ADF’s tradition of adopting an existing weapons system / platform, which has to be modified extensively (which more time than not leads to delays, added expense and operational restrictions in the field!) to meet the ADF’s requirement.
But I am a realist!
Not now or in the past (since WWII) has the Australian Government had the ‘balls’ or will to commit to such a way of thinking or supporting and encouraging an indigenous military industry, which could design and build tailor made equipment and weapons systems for the ADF.

I’m sorry, as I thought I would never say it, but the ADF and its weapons acquisition programs must be scrutinized much closer and made accountable to keep the ADF on the tracks.
This is especially more important now than ever with the giant rise and fast building and expanding conventional military forces (with the consent of their so-called political leaders!) within the Pacific region.
For I think that within the next 10-years the ADF will discover first hand conventional warfare on a scale it has not seen since WWII in the Pacific.

One other thing I would like to see would be a bipartisan agreement by both major political parties (past and binding in legislation) in Australian to structure the ADF in a way that allows the ADF to concentrate on its primary task of defending Australia and its interests, instead of continuously shock upside down and forced to restructure and re-train every time one of the two major political party’s get into power!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!

Regards
Pioneer

The original article to me looks like a deliberate leak, so that when the actual savings are announced the public will say “Not as bad as I thought it was going to be”. This is a typical ploy used by governments here for years.

Not really…… 10 year contracts? people will sign up. and we might find they actually enjoyit!

why is it that defence spending is not being further increased? the caribous need replacement, we need more than 5 KC-30A, more C-17s and 25 P-8s, another AWD and another 30 MRH-90s, and 8 more CH-47s. this in creased spending will create more jobs all round. staffing should be no problem in a recession and should produce the first steps to recovery.-If on unemployment for six months, looking at losing your house, doesn’t a paid job sound good?

And when the economy recovers, you are faced with the same problems again…..

why is it that defence spending is not being further increased? the caribous need replacement, we need more than 5 KC-30A, more C-17s and 25 P-8s, another AWD and another 30 MRH-90s, and 8 more CH-47s. this in creased spending will create more jobs all round. staffing should be no problem in a recession and should produce the first steps to recovery.-If on unemployment for six months, looking at losing your house, doesn’t a paid job sound good?

I see your point. And in my first line I said there is not a lot of air in the ADF.

Most money to be saved is still in ambitions.
Territorial Defense vs Expeditionary Warfare.
And Tiger for example speaks of expeditionary ambitions.

I disagree with that. The project to acquire Tiger, AIR-87 wasn’t given the 87 tag, because it was “next in line”. It was called 87 because that’s when the project was originally initiated and was a recommendation of the Defence of Australia, plan devised by Paul Dibb.

An armed reconaissance helicopter, is in fact perfect for finding and destroying small bands of special operations forces, who managed to insert themselves onto Australia’s mainland.

A word on the tank issue: Abrams is a logistic drag, the ADF not capable of combined weapons maneuver warfare anyway.

Moreso than CV-90? Not much, except in fuel…

ADF is every bit as capable of deploying Abrams as it would be CV-90.

A CV-90 family with Spikes, 40mm, AMOS, SPYDER would be a much better choice – for a lot of countries, not only for AUS.

ADF evaluated Spike and ended up going with Javelin…

Spyder might get a look in some day, if Government ever allows ADF to buy a new SAM. Things aren’t looking too good on that front.

And they would actually be deployable w/o breaking any Ro/Ro ramps and floors.
But again, as I also said, not a lot of money in that, and no instant money, only longer term.

How many Ro/Ro ramps and floors have Abrams broken in Australia?

The trainer & pilot thing: RAAF will have about a hundred fastmovers, most of them single-seater. Makes, say, 300 pilots. The Hawk is good and can download a lot of hours from the fastmovers (for that even a few more could be wise), but stats also show over 60 PC-9. Now, they might have a secondary light CAS (don’t know), otherwise they are just three times too many. Also replacing them by PC-21 could save money in the training syllabus in the longer term.

As to the HAwks, you are right. They are absolutely stretched to the limit and 33x aircraft is the bare minimum with which RAAF can meet it’s training requirements. Another 7-10 airframes are needed at the least, but it won’t happen. RAAF pilots will be sent overseas to do LIFT before more Hawks are bought.

As to the PC-9’s, it ain’t only the fast movers who need to be trained on fix wing aircraft. Orion, Herc and C-17 drivers all need the training too. On top of this, the PC-9’s are getting worked extra hard, because of the choke point in the training stream, due to the shortage of Hawk jets. The trainee pilots are doing more time than planned on the PC-9’s until they can get a slot at 76 or 79 Squadron….

Then the PC-9’s have to provide the Roulette capability and the FACDU capability as well. The PC-9 capability is due to be replaced within the next 5 years or so. I would be my hat, that a similar number of replacement aircraft is acquired.

And end user certs are a political question. (I’m in that business, btw.)

Yep, but you can’t even donate the equipment to an RSL or a museum, without authority from the originating nation, let alone selling them…

It took 2 years, to get permission from the German Government to donate the Leo 1’s to museums and RSL’s…

Good old chairman Rudd…. maybe we could donate our stupid stimulus package to the RAAF…. or we could take back the ridiculus handout to the third world…. when sudan sells it Hinds and Migs, then donations might be in order

…
A word on the tank issue: Abrams is a logistic drag, the ADF not capable of combined weapons maneuver warfare anyway. A CV-90 family with Spikes, 40mm, AMOS, SPYDER would be a much better choice – for a lot of countries, not only for AUS. And they would actually be deployable w/o breaking any Ro/Ro ramps and floors….

Small point – Abrams shouldn’t break ro-ro ramps or floors unless you’re careless, e.g. you pack them nose to tail, or drive them off in convoy instead of one at a time – but a ro-ro or two with enough reinforcement to remove the risk is not exactly difficult to get hold of. The UK has 6, for example, & beefing up a secondhand ro-ro (which can probably be picked up cheap at the moment) wouldn’t be hard.

Canada & Denmark have deployed tanks the same weight to Afghanistan, & are finding them useful. They have more uses than combined weapons manoeuvre warfare.

1. We can’t retire 34 Sqn, (VIP fleet) because they transport the Prime Minister and other senior politicians around. Let’s TRY and be realistic here…

2. F-111 is being retired. It’s final years of funding has already been paid for, the last pilot/nav course was held in 2007 and the support elements are winding down. You could stop flying them tomorrow, but what are all the pilots, navs, maintainers going to do? Play cards for 12 months, until they start getting on Super Hornet courses?

3. You could cut the Hawks and PC-9’s, but then the RAAF wouldn’t have pilots. You could save more money simply by cutting RAAF. You’d achieve the same outcome. No pilots = no RAAF.

4. Cut the Abrams. So there are no Chinese in Darwin (well, actually there are, but they didn’t invade), hence why we don’t need Abrams, but we DO need a less capable, tank? The Americans who were kind enough to give up production slots on their own M1A1 AIM re-builds, so that we could acquire our Abrams quickly, would be terribly chuffed. Then of course, 1 Armoured Regiment would have to develop completely new tactics and doctrine, new courses, trainers and simulators would have to be acquired, as well as the CV-90 tanks themselves. I don’t see a real lot of money being saved there…

As to selling the Abrams, do you know ANYTHING about end-user certificates? Here’s a hint. Look at how well NZ has gone selling her Skyhawks, after they cancelled their F-16 lease deal…

It’d cost a lot too. RAAF’s ability to maintain air combat overmatch for one thing…

Stupid or not – BAMS, (which is the USN project name for Globalhawk AND P-8) has already been “postponed”. I posted the link above.

1. The MRH-90’s and Tigers were BOTH chosen in favour of Blackhawks and Battlehawks. How exactly are we going to SAVE money by canceling them? Again, end-user certificates my friend…

Again, we still have to buy the new capability. I don’t see how the money is saved. Buying slowly? Do you want capability or not? How slowly should we buy? What is Army and Navy meant to do for airlift in the meantime? Continue operating Seaking and Blackhawks, that are costing a FORTUNE to maintain, are undeployable in any serious conflict and are starting to fail at an alarming rate?

Here’s a better idea. Cut ADF all together. That’ll save $22b a year. Under your plan, ADF will be absolutely uselss anyway.

No modern fighter jets. Only jets whose FLEI will expire before your plan will provide new jets.

No trainers.

No tanks, only upgraded light armour. Apparently we don’t need a tank, only a pseudo-tank?

No dedicated gunship or tactical helicopter capability….

Good grief…

I see your point. And in my first line I said there is not a lot of air in the ADF.

Most money to be saved is still in ambitions.
Territorial Defense vs Expeditionary Warfare.
And Tiger for example speaks of expeditionary ambitions.

A word on the tank issue: Abrams is a logistic drag, the ADF not capable of combined weapons maneuver warfare anyway. A CV-90 family with Spikes, 40mm, AMOS, SPYDER would be a much better choice – for a lot of countries, not only for AUS. And they would actually be deployable w/o breaking any Ro/Ro ramps and floors.
But again, as I also said, not a lot of money in that, and no instant money, only longer term.

The trainer & pilot thing: RAAF will have about a hundred fastmovers, most of them single-seater. Makes, say, 300 pilots. The Hawk is good and can download a lot of hours from the fastmovers (for that even a few more could be wise), but stats also show over 60 PC-9. Now, they might have a secondary light CAS (don’t know), otherwise they are just three times too many. Also replacing them by PC-21 could save money in the training syllabus in the longer term.

And end user certs are a political question. (I’m in that business, btw.)

I have to say I am very suspect of the whole article……………:confused:

Each Collins Class sub has a maximum manning complement of 58, and RAN maintains a shore crew of 36, who work on behalf of the entire submarine squadron.

RAN currently has 440 qualified submariners. It has a full wartime requirement of 660, which would allow for crews to be properly rotated.

Thus, if ALL the boats were somehow in the water, they could be crewed at present. What RAN does NOT have in it’s submarine squadron, is the “sustain” capability, inherent in the military mantra: “raise, train, sustain”. These crews cannot operate indefinitely.

However in saying all that, in a 6 sub fleet, at any one time;

1 sub will be in extended maintenance/upgrades (2 years or so in dry dock).

1-2 subs will be undergoing less extensive upgrades/maintenance, meaning that 3-4 subs is all that will EVER be operational, except perhaps for short-duration surge operations.

Our submarine squadron, like most other RAN FEG’s are mostly meeting the requirements placed on them by Government. What they can’t do is “surge” as they would need to do for full on warlike or warfighting duties, nor operate their boats for extended periods and bring in relief crews.

Sailors must have recreational leave. They must attend training courses, to keep their skills and capabilities up to date. They must have a posting cycle, to ensure they are professional military personnel, with a variety of operational experience.

The argument that we can “only put 3 to sea” is a fallacy and reducing the number of boats, might alleviate the crewing situation somewhat and save some coin, but it will massively affect our capability.

The remaining 3 or 4 boats, still need maintenance and upgrades, just as much as 6 boats do…

I see, thanks for the info; I should’ve considered downtime really. Nevertheless, it would seem to me to be better to postpone operations with some of the Collins-class for long enough to allow the budget to recover a little, even if it did mean a capability gap in the intervening few years, and build ‘sustainable’ crews for them.

I cant see any point in any cuts on programs that do not require money spent in the next two years. Who knows what the situation is going to be two years down the track. By all means mothball one or two Collins class subs if we cant crew them all anyway and save some money that way. Most of the other suggested savings are irrelevant as they wont save money from this or next years budgets. They are too far down the track.