US super carrier drop to 10 in the near futur ?

Its a good bet the USN will cut in Carriers to 10……Yet, that wil be the limited as I don’t think it politically viable with anything less……..

maybe a drop from 11 to 10 in 2012……and 9 by 2020 ? :eek::eek:

extract from
http://informationdissemination.blogspot.com/

Carriers Factor into Gates Decision Monday

The internet is buzzing with Monday’s impending announcement by Gates that will suggest the way ahead for the DoD. Among the rumors with credibility, the F-22 appears to be getting a reprieve from the budget hangman, while Future Combat Systems doesn’t. For the Navy, it is difficult to tell, with some reports suggesting the DDG-1000 is on the list, while other reports are not specifically citing the DDG-1000. The real Navy platform mentioned as part of the rumors flying around is the aircraft carrier.

Representative Gene Taylor, a Democrat from Mississippi and chairman of a House seapower subcommittee, said questions had emerged about whether a new system for catapulting planes off the next generation of carriers would work. If it does not, the Navy would have to return to a traditional system, delaying the new carriers by a year.

Meanwhile, he said, the Navy has been debating whether to spend $1.5 billion to refuel one of the oldest carriers. If it does not, that could lead to a temporary cut in the carriers below the 11 that Congress has required.

I think after we have beat around EMALS in the comments over the last few weeks, because nothing has emerged in the press regarding a showstopping type of problem with the system, the problem is specific to cost and schedule, not technology. There are simply too many reporters beating around on this issue for a technology problem not to be reported, so the technology itself does not appear to be the issue.

The way I read this, the Ford class will be delayed, and the main issues yet to be determined is the cost growth and schedule changes. Given the long term savings of EMALS, if I was the Navy I would stick with the EMALS technology and not revert to steam unless the cost growth is well over $1 billion, which it probably isn’t. As Vice Adm. Barry McCullough alluded to in testimony this week, the cost savings that will be gained long term from the Ford class over the Nimitz class is significant (many, many billions over the life cycle of the aircraft carrier), not just with the aircraft carrier but also for the aircraft that won’t get beat up as badly as the aircraft does with today’s launching and landing technologies.

As the rumor goes, the Navy will drop to 10, potentially 9 aircraft carriers. Well, I look at such a move like this.

With the Ford almost certainly delayed beyond 2015 any case made to extend the life of USS Enterprise (CVN 65) at this point is silly. There is simply no way the nuclear fuel will last on Enterprise until the Ford is built. We just pumped nearly half a billion dollars into Enterprise to get one, maybe two more deployments out of her. If cost is the primary driver here, early retirement for Enterprise makes a lot of sense.

This would reduce the number of aircraft carriers to 10. The question is, how would the number be reduced to 9? Well, most likely it would be done by skipping the nuclear refueling of USS Abraham Lincoln’s (CVN 72), which I believe is set to begin in the 2013 time frame. If the Ford is ready by 2016, and the decision is to keep the number of aircraft carriers at 9 instead of 10, the Navy could opt to skip the refueling of the USS George Washington (CVN 73) in 2016/2017 time frame. If the Navy was to build Ford class aircraft carriers at a rate of one every 5 years, as has been suggested, the Navy could get the number of aircraft carriers back up to 10 by 2020, and the third Ford class would be in position to replace the USS Nimitz (CVN 68) by 2025. The Navy actually has a lot of flexibility in terms of how they can reduce aircraft carriers, and that would actually help with any schedule delays with the Ford class.

My point is this. I don’t think we want to lose the industrial capability to build aircraft carriers. To support a fleet of 10 aircraft carriers, the national commitment is that we would build 20 per century. At this point, I think that is a very reasonable position the Navy can make a good case for with the American public and lawmakers. The advantages to a 10 carrier force are significant, while the impacts of reducing the force below 10 will become very apparent quickly.

Even at 10 aircraft carriers, the importance for the Navy to optimize the use of naval vessels for low, medium, and high intensity challenges at sea becomes important. I haven’t really seen anyone discuss operational optimization of forces in the force structure debate, although a real “debate” in public on force structure with the Navy doesn’t actually exist, since they don’t talk about it.

As for the other platforms, lets wait and see what Gates says.

One last thought. It is valid to raise questions regarding the defense priorities of the Obama administration under Gates, and whether they are consistent or not.

For example, how is it the political position of the Obama administration to suggest Sea Basing is a priority, which I actually believe is a legitimate position driven primarily on the idea of reducing political footprints in other countries for military bases, and at the same time he administration wants to reduce the number of aircraft carriers. Think about it. The strategic argument for sea basing supports aircraft carriers, particularly as the sea basing concept evolves without the aviation centric platforms originally called for in the sea basing program. It seems there is some inconsistency in the various decisions Gates is making. There is no question Gates has been good for managing the current wars, but when it comes to force planning, we would be wise to see if the guy is consistent before he is anointed brilliance in his future force decisions.

It is entirely possible Gates has inconsistent visions for forces just like Rumsfeld did, simply based on a different set of priorities. It will be interesting to see if he is making bean counter judgments, or has a real strategic vision guiding his approach consistently to big ticket programs he intends to cut.

Even the 600 ship navy of the 80’s only planned on 15 and they were dealing with forces FAR more capable and deadly than China is going to field in the next 20 years.

Conventional I said. Against the Soviets nuclear was integral part of the equation.

1953: 34 (17 CVA, 17 CVL/CVE)
1965: 26 (16 CVA, 10 CVS)
1973: 15 (14 CVA, 1 CVS)
1985: 26 (14 CV (+1), 12 LHA/LPH)
2009: 20 (11 CVN, 9 LHD/LHA)

If the U.S. wanted to size their fleet for a conventional war against China (not talking about proxy wars, but the real thing) 15 to 18 would be the way to go.

Even the 600 ship navy of the 80’s only planned on 15 and they were dealing with forces FAR more capable and deadly than China is going to field in the next 20 years.

You could use Wasp class LHD’s or America class LHA’s for most of the roles currently carried out using Nimitz class carriers.

For a number of reasons I’m a fan of the medium fleet carrier (~55.000ts), and one aspect I like is that they could double as platform for 3D amphib assault by (preferably Army) helicopter units. Now, before using more Wasps more regularily as auxiliary carriers for low-threat areas (which is already done), the Marines would have to cut their amphib forcible entry forces, otherwise no ships are free. Realistic?
Building more LHDs and LHAs as aux carriers would not be exactly cheap. America is projected at around 3 billion USD, Makin Island was done for 1.5 billion USD (excl Katherina damage). Of course one could say Makin Island is not really expensive, since Hyuga costed 1 billion USD, and Cavour 1.5 billion EUR. But procurement is only one aspect, and life cycle costs of a 40.000ts ship with 700 men core crew are sure staggering.
I would actually see a Garibaldi more as an interesting size and capability for a light “sea control and presence” carrier.

Sadly I think that you are correct.

For any similar role USN ships are significantly larger than RN. (The closest which I can think of are T45 and Arleigh Burkes where the difference in displacement is ‘only’ the displacement of a corvette)

USN ships also tend to have larger manning requirements that RN ships with a similar role (or even similar displacement). DDG1000 is a very big departure from previous USN practice.

Also submarine technology is one of the few areas where the RN has some degree of technical edge and UK may not wish to give that up so easily as USN partners would expect.

Al

This hasn’t always been the case though, there are plenty of cases where USN ships are either smaller or similar in size. For example:

– The American SSNs prior to the Los Angeles class were not all that big, e.g. Skipjack, Permit (/Thresher) and Sturgeon classes. These were all pretty similar in size to their RN contemporaries.

– The RN’s frigates were generally similar in size to, or larger than, many of their USN equivalents (excluding the huge Spruance class ASW destroyers). Look at the Garcia, Knox and Perry classes; all of these were equivalent in size to, or smaller than, the RN’s Leander, Type 21, Type 22 and Type 23 classes.

– As for the SSBNs, it is not likely to be a common class, but rather two classes with a common mid-section. As I suggested in response to Scooter’s post, it is highly unlikely to be a common hullform, but rather a common missile compartment, probably mated do a Virginia and Astute hull. This returns to the original SSBN designs, where they were essentially an SSN, cut in half, and a missile compartment inserted in the middle, then re-attached. This gave commonality of parts, but there were sufficient orders that follow-on classes of SSBNs were completely individual.

Well, I think that with less carriers than the Navy now operates, the current deployment scheme is unsupportable over a longer time, or in case one of them is damaged.
At the same time I think it’s an overkill and a waste of money to have 50% or so of battle groups deployed at any time in times of peace/colonial war. There is no justification for that. Training in various environments has to be, but deployment is a different thing.

With, say, eight or nine carriers a new deployment scheme would be needed, one that only deploys them in case a shooting war is possible. And then the Navy is not alone, versus Persia for example the Air Force is in a perfect position from bases on the southen shore of the Gulf (500nm) and from Diego Garcia (2000nm). Only politics – to stay “relevant” lets the Navy waste billions by using carrier battle groups on mission that could be done by frigates.

One carrier fleet on each coast, with overseas fleet station. Nine would allow one in RCOH (which takes around 3 years), and four on each coast. Of these one could be in short maintenance, while the other three would be available (training). So two thirds ready at any time. With eight carriers, the fleets would have to borrow during some times.

I also think that more permanent overseas fleet stations are necessary. Yokosuka is not a good location any more, Guam only a fall-back position against China (but especially vulnerable against a pre-emptive nuclear strike).
I see Singapore as the perfect location (and already has a nuclear-capable dry dock), as it can cover both the Indian Ocean/Arabian Gulf and the South and East China Sea.
Homebasing two carriers there (I know! Politics!) would take a lot of pressure off the transit times and increase in-theatre availability even with a smaller fleet.

And then the question of “presence”, especially in the world’s backwaters. Perfect for a few light carriers, no more than 15.000ts fully loaded, maybe built to commercial standards only. Zumwalt’s Sea Control concept is still valid!

You could use Wasp class LHD’s or America class LHA’s for most of the roles currently carried out using Nimitz class carriers.

Regardless 10 or 8, how high is the service prosentage?
How many Carrier would be operating at sea at any given time?
60% 70%?

Thanks

Well, I think that with less carriers than the Navy now operates, the current deployment scheme is unsupportable over a longer time, or in case one of them is damaged.
At the same time I think it’s an overkill and a waste of money to have 50% or so of battle groups deployed at any time in times of peace/colonial war. There is no justification for that. Training in various environments has to be, but deployment is a different thing.

With, say, eight or nine carriers a new deployment scheme would be needed, one that only deploys them in case a shooting war is possible. And then the Navy is not alone, versus Persia for example the Air Force is in a perfect position from bases on the southen shore of the Gulf (500nm) and from Diego Garcia (2000nm). Only politics – to stay “relevant” lets the Navy waste billions by using carrier battle groups on mission that could be done by frigates.

One carrier fleet on each coast, with overseas fleet station. Nine would allow one in RCOH (which takes around 3 years), and four on each coast. Of these one could be in short maintenance, while the other three would be available (training). So two thirds ready at any time. With eight carriers, the fleets would have to borrow during some times.

I also think that more permanent overseas fleet stations are necessary. Yokosuka is not a good location any more, Guam only a fall-back position against China (but especially vulnerable against a pre-emptive nuclear strike).
I see Singapore as the perfect location (and already has a nuclear-capable dry dock), as it can cover both the Indian Ocean/Arabian Gulf and the South and East China Sea.
Homebasing two carriers there (I know! Politics!) would take a lot of pressure off the transit times and increase in-theatre availability even with a smaller fleet.

And then the question of “presence”, especially in the world’s backwaters. Perfect for a few light carriers, no more than 15.000ts fully loaded, maybe built to commercial standards only. Zumwalt’s Sea Control concept is still valid!

I can’t see the UK and US working on a common class of SSBN, US Subs are always larger than UK ones, in all likelihood a US design would be too large and costly for the UK Government.

Sadly I think that you are correct.

For any similar role USN ships are significantly larger than RN. (The closest which I can think of are T45 and Arleigh Burkes where the difference in displacement is ‘only’ the displacement of a corvette)

USN ships also tend to have larger manning requirements that RN ships with a similar role (or even similar displacement). DDG1000 is a very big departure from previous USN practice.

Also submarine technology is one of the few areas where the RN has some degree of technical edge and UK may not wish to give that up so easily as USN partners would expect.

Al

Should drop to eight.

Regardless 10 or 8, how high is the service prosentage?
How many Carrier would be operating at sea at any given time?
60% 70%?

Thanks

I can’t see the UK and US working on a common class of SSBN, US Subs are always larger than UK ones, in all likelihood a US design would be too large and costly for the UK Government.

I agree with pretty much all of your points, though I would differ in some specific cases…

– I suspect that the Mk29 Sea Sparrow launcher would require a fair bit of work for fitting in place of the old Mk13. It is still a pretty hefty piece of kit to bolt onto the deck, and I suspect there may be a cheaper (in terms of integration) option, namely the Mk48 (or Mk56) VLS. The Mk48 is pretty well suited to being bolted onto spare deckspace, and though it is not in US Navy service at the moment, it is used reasonably widely, so support efforts shouldn’t be too hard. This option would still give them ESSM capability (as long as they still have working guidance equipment), without needing to install the much larger Mk29.

– Regarding the US and UK need for SSBN replacements, I seem to remember that they are working together on the design for the missile compartment. My hope is that they can re-use the Virginia and Astute designs for the basis hull (with the missile compartment spliced in the middle). It would also offer a ready path for new SSGNs – same design, but with an heir to the Tomahawk rather than ballistic missiles.

Throwing my two cents in…

Retiring the Enterprise to reserve status is probably a good enough idea. As long as there are still ten carriers in service or available (at modest notice). The important thing is to ensure the long-term viability of the fleet, i.e. ensuring the future carriers actually get procured, preferably on time and on budget.

I agree with you here………..The USS Gerald Ford needs to be nearly complete before the USS Enterprise is retired. As the Ford has a lot of new and untested hardware.

As for the Perry class, retirement is an option, but they still have their uses. I would certainly look at adding in a basic defensive missile capability, probably by installing a RAM launcher on the bow, where the old Mk13 sat. It shouldn’t be too much of a stretch, and would at least give them some self defence capability, beyond the limited range of the Phalanx. This could keep them useful for another decade, hopefully, pending a suitable replacement.

Good idea but here’s another possibility. I believe the Sea Sparrow Box launcher (Mk 29) is being adapted to fire the larger and much more capable ESSM. These systems are in plentiful supply and could be substitute for the old Mk 13’s. Note: A Phalanx or RAM could still be mounted above the hanger as a back up…………:cool:

Unfortunately, the replacement for the Perry class is not even on the horizon at the moment. Too much emphasis seems to have been put on littoral combat programs, notably LCS. While I do agree that there is some need for proper littoral warfare capability, I think it has been given too much emphasis, at the cost of genuine fleet capability. The important thing here is to not let it become yet another five year program, pontificating about which hullform, sensors and weapons combination is the best choice.

We have the potential to rebuild the Navy, and shape it’s future. However, every penny needs to be spent wisely. Using off the shelf designs is an excellent way to save money – as long as it is done properly. Even ships like the LHA-5 America class are examples of how the most expensive options are favoured. Rather than simply following on from the turbine-engined LHD-8 Makin Island (for which a lot of development money was spent), they go back to the drawing board, because it gives the shipyards lots of development money!

True, I believe this re-inventing the wheel is costly and many cases offers little improvement in capability……..

Ideally, I would encourage Austal USA and others to set up as a proper entity, to encourage competition with the current monopoly firms. Take the LCS-2, and enlarge it, with more bunkerage, and fit it out properly, with a good radar, e.g. SPY-1F, or possibly the excellent Aussie CEAFAR radar. Add in a few Mk41 cells, and a bigger gun, and you have a pretty capable ship!

Personally, I think the Austral LCS Design is far more flexable……….Ideally, I would like to see it enlarged a little and replace both the current LCS and Perry Class Frigates.:diablo:

The same thing may work for submarines. Rather than making the Virginia class another Seawolf, sign larger contracts, getting the production rate up, to reduce unit costs. Multi-year large procurements may be expensive, but given the projected ‘submarine gap’ between op taskings and available units in the future, it is the only option. The Los Angeles class will need to be retired in the near future, and the current production rate will not see anything like one-for-one replacement.

Well, the whole plan was increase production to two Virginia Class SSN’s per year. Yet, the Obama Administration is back peddling……..So, I am crossing my fingers.:o

We can probably do the same for the Trident replacement subs, going back to the days of taking an attack sub hull, and splicing in a missile compartment. Taking the Virginia class, and putting in sixteen missile tubes is likely to be viable, and would surely save a lot of money.

Well, maybe the US and UK should consider a joint SSBN replacement………:)

Basically, if you want to renew the fleet, you need to get new, affordable ships, not a repeat of DD-X, LCS, and the Ford class. Baby steps may not sound like the best option, but frankly, it may be the only real option.

Really, I think the US Fleet is doing very well and is extremely capable. It just needs to get economical Frigate Replacement……….Which, can be produced in large numbers at a reasonable price.:D

I agree wholeheartedly with the thrust of your argument (‘Quantity has a Quality all of its own‘ and all that jazz)

My only concern with some of your suggestions is that (a la Nimrod MR4 and F/A-18E/F) some mod jobs ‘just add X’ can be more expensive than one expects.

The Dutch firm (Damen Schelde) producing Indonesia’s rather groovy Sigma Corvettes quote a “90:10 rule” of shipbuilding: Changing 10% of the ship requires changes to 90% of the drawings. Now Schelde want to push their modular design so this may have to be taken with a pinch of salt. But I would say that any programme to ‘simply add X‘ would need to very carefully managed.

Slightly tangentally I would love military procurement to be fixed-price contracts. But that does rely on decision makers agreeing to stop meddling with the specs or platform numbers mid-contract to find some illusory savings (Eurofighter programme take one pace forward).

Al

Throwing my two cents in…

Retiring the Enterprise to reserve status is probably a good enough idea. As long as there are still ten carriers in service or available (at modest notice). The important thing is to ensure the long-term viability of the fleet, i.e. ensuring the future carriers actually get procured, preferably on time and on budget.

As for the Perry class, retirement is an option, but they still have their uses. I would certainly look at adding in a basic defensive missile capability, probably by installing a RAM launcher on the bow, where the old Mk13 sat. It shouldn’t be too much of a stretch, and would at least give them some self defence capability, beyond the limited range of the Phalanx. This could keep them useful for another decade, hopefully, pending a suitable replacement.

Unfortunately, the replacement for the Perry class is not even on the horizon at the moment. Too much emphasis seems to have been put on littoral combat programs, notably LCS. While I do agree that there is some need for proper littoral warfare capability, I think it has been given too much emphasis, at the cost of genuine fleet capability. The important thing here is to not let it become yet another five year program, pontificating about which hullform, sensors and weapons combination is the best choice.

We have the potential to rebuild the Navy, and shape it’s future. However, every penny needs to be spent wisely. Using off the shelf designs is an excellent way to save money – as long as it is done properly. Even ships like the LHA-5 America class are examples of how the most expensive options are favoured. Rather than simply following on from the turbine-engined LHD-8 Makin Island (for which a lot of development money was spent), they go back to the drawing board, because it gives the shipyards lots of development money!

Ideally, I would encourage Austal USA and others to set up as a proper entity, to encourage competition with the current monopoly firms. Take the LCS-2, and enlarge it, with more bunkerage, and fit it out properly, with a good radar, e.g. SPY-1F, or possibly the excellent Aussie CEAFAR radar. Add in a few Mk41 cells, and a bigger gun, and you have a pretty capable ship!

The same thing may work for submarines. Rather than making the Virginia class another Seawolf, sign larger contracts, getting the production rate up, to reduce unit costs. Multi-year large procurements may be expensive, but given the projected ‘submarine gap’ between op taskings and available units in the future, it is the only option. The Los Angeles class will need to be retired in the near future, and the current production rate will not see anything like one-for-one replacement.

We can probably do the same for the Trident replacement subs, going back to the days of taking an attack sub hull, and splicing in a missile compartment. Taking the Virginia class, and putting in sixteen missile tubes is likely to be viable, and would surely save a lot of money.

Basically, if you want to renew the fleet, you need to get new, affordable ships, not a repeat of DD-X, LCS, and the Ford class. Baby steps may not sound like the best option, but frankly, it may be the only real option.

Hmmm… a new design is more expensive than one designed & first built ~25 years ago.

And this is surprising/noteworthy how?

You know the word “inflation”?

Sure, sure

But T23s are chock full of expensive electronics and weapon systems whilst NSCs are not.

T23s have plenty of flaws (and wouldn’t do the NSC role) but their very nature and role calls for an expensive solution. NSC’s does not.

Al

Hmmm… a new design is more expensive than one designed & first built ~25 years ago.

And this is surprising/noteworthy how?

You know the word “inflation”?

T23 # 16 which was built around 9 years ago cost about half the price of the NSC.

Hmmm… a new design is more expensive than one designed & first built ~25 years ago.

And this is surprising/noteworthy how?

You know the word “inflation”?

Honestly, with the exception of the early removal from service of Enterprise, none of the other suggestions i’ve made would impact the USN’s war readiness. The perry’s are not capable of being sent into a hot war zone as they have no means of self defense (phalanx doesnt count) from enemy air attack and their 3″ gun isnt anywhere near as effective as the 5″ guns on the Destroyers and Cruisers for NGFS.

As for the NSC, they cost more then a T23 frigate.

Well, with the removal of the Standard Missiles on the Oliver H. Perry Class. They clearly have limited Air Defense Capabilities. Yet, they would likely operate as part of a task force equipped with Aegis Destroyers and/or Cruisers. So, that much less of a issue. Further, there primary role would be ASW nonetheless.

In short they are better than nothing until a replacement can be found……….

As for the USCG NSC cost……….Hopefully, a naval version produced in great Numbers would be much cheaper. Especially, considering most of the development work is already done. Regardless, I was making a endorsment……Just stating what has been discussed as possible options.

Sorry, all you are proposing is cut after cut. In reality the size of the USN continues to shrink every year! Also, the size on the USN is not based on just being the largest or even most powerful. Its based on the providing enough resources to handle two major conflicts (WARS) in opposite parts of the world simultaneously……….

Honestly, with the exception of the early removal from service of Enterprise, none of the other suggestions i’ve made would impact the USN’s war readiness. The perry’s are not capable of being sent into a hot war zone as they have no means of self defense (phalanx doesnt count) from enemy air attack and their 3″ gun isnt anywhere near as effective as the 5″ guns on the Destroyers and Cruisers for NGFS.

As for the NSC, they cost more then a T23 frigate.