ASW/GP Escorts

Cost always enters into such decisions… even for the USN… which, contrary to many posters’ opinions, does NOT have an unlimited budget.

“As ASW ships, they were intended to always be with an air-defense ship that DID have it.”

Yes I considered that and that has been my understanding to some extent.

But I didnt want to bias any responses by stating it.

Of course that left me open to seeming to have missed the possible obvious explanations.

I was wondering if there was more to it as many other ASW ships have it including the USN Garcia/Knox/Spruance classes which I understand from reading of their histories: “were intended always to be with an air-defense ship”.

And the Type 22s and 23s have quite often operated alone.

And the first four G. Leygues have it.

However it is true that the Whitby/Rothsay classes didnt but the Tribal & Leanders did.:

“The advances made in the Tribal class pointed the way to a return to the concept of a general-purpose escort instead of the prevailing idea of specialised escorts operating in a group.”

“…managed to incorporate the long-range air warning radar.”

Of course when the Leanders were converted in the 1970s the Ikara conversions deleted it but the Exocet conversions kept it.

The new Amazon class didnt although they were the nominal replacements of the 1950’s built AA/AD figates of the Salisbury and Leopard classes.

The Leander Seawolf conversions and the Broadswords,also outfitted with Seawolf, had 967/968 which was for use with that missile system.

Maybe that also partially explains it?

And of course the Type 23s have the 3-D 996 radar.

Still.

Then again the Netherlands Kortenaer and K. Doorman classes had it and they were intenede to be operated in mixed escort groups. Plus the Doormans also have the Smart-S 3-D radar.

So I guess that leaves me still wondering if there was more to it.

Cost/weight perhaps or other reasonings that………..

As ASW ships, they were intended to always be with an air-defense ship that DID have it.

Even the T22 & T23 were only secondary AAW ships… they were to be under the operational/tactical control of a primary AAW ship… which would have that capability.

Thanks gentlemen for the clarification on radars.

Another question:

The Type 22s and 23s dont have a long range early-warning radar.

Why?

Also the last three French G.Leugues class ASW destroyers dispensed with a long-range early-warning radar.

Same reasoning?

Yep, just checked that one. The ADAWS 4 ships with the 992 did rely on the 909 for height information. Bit before my time – it was all 996 and ADIMP when I was going through Collingwood in 92.

As Peter states 909 can provide elevation data as necessary for the engagement cycle. I dont think that Rick was asking that question though.

TI is provided by the 996, a 3D set, that feeds range, bearing and altitude into ADAWS. GWS30 gets its initial steer from ADAWS and the operator lays the 909 to target track based on that data. The 996 is therefore the height finder in the system.

Fairly sure the early units had 992Q which is 2D, hence 909 did its own HF. Later (late 80s to early 90s) the 3D 996 replaced the 992Q.

The Type-42 never really fulfilled its maximum potential, had it have got the Type-1030 STIR, Sea Dart Mark-2 and the four round sea wolf launchers they would have been even better at their job.

As Peter states 909 can provide elevation data as necessary for the engagement cycle. I dont think that Rick was asking that question though.

TI is provided by the 996, a 3D set, that feeds range, bearing and altitude into ADAWS. GWS30 gets its initial steer from ADAWS and the operator lays the 909 to target track based on that data. The 996 is therefore the height finder in the system.

BTW can anybody clue me in on the the RN 992Q/996 radars vice the USN SPS 39/52 and SPS 48? Or put another way: What radar did the height-finding for the Type 42 DDGs? Or did the 909 missile-guidance radars serve this function also?

Thanks
Rick

909 nods up and down providing height finder info- this does increase the time between engagements….

The GP escort frigate concept is still very much alive. It is just a case that they have become even more multi-role. With the ever increasing power and range of missiles and radar has resulted in these vessels becoming mini destroyers rather than true Frigates. From the USN perspective the LCS is a psychological OHP replacement and I have no doubt that as missions re-orientate in the coming decades that the LCS will get modules that make it an ASW frigate.

“The Sea Sparrow Basic Point Defense Missile System (BPDMS) was installed after commissioning, but it was more commonly referred to as the Basically Pointless Defense….., as it relied on a optical aimed director (a optical 40mm director, with illuminating radar equipment hung on – the ultimate in cheap air defense.”

Thanks for your post John!!!

And in particular the above.

LERX:

I like the MEKO 200 and judging by the # of navies that procured them I would say they are very successful.

BTW can anybody clue me in on the the RN 992Q/996 radars vice the USN SPS 39/52 and SPS 48? Or put another way: What radar did the height-finding for the Type 42 DDGs? Or did the 909 missile-guidance radars serve this function also?

Thanks
Rick

I recall seeing plans for a stretched OHP derivative – I think it was a planned version for Taiwan, with heavier armament.

If this had come to fruition, I think it would have rejuvenated the OHP & increased the potential for further sales.

In terms of cost/effectiveness, how do people rate the modular MEKO ships?

While in the USN I had the opportunity to serve on one of the Garcia class (Bradley DE/FF-1041) and one of the Knox class (Cook DE/FF-1083) as plankowners.
They were interesting ships to say the least.

The Bradley was originaly planned to be part of an Escort Squadron but soon got reasigned to a Destroyer Squadron. We had the same electronics & better sonar than most of the other units in the squadron, although we were a few knots slower. The main issue was the boilers – they were a unique, high pressure design. For the most part they operated fairly well, but there was one instance where the Bradley had to be towed into port due to boiler failure (Part of the problem with boiler operation, was that there were only a few ships with this installation, so new crew members had no previous experience with the design, and there were limited training opportunties – compared to the more standard engineering plants) Another downside to the Garcia class was the use of the single 5″/38 mounts. They required more manpower than the 5″/54 installations. During the early years of service in the Pacific, the Bradley had little opportunity to serve in the ASW role, for which it was designed, but rather was used as a plane guard and shore bombardment unit in Vietnam. This design was originally intended to operate the DASH unit, but the helo hanger was enlarged and the flight deck reinforced to handle the LAMPS2

The Knox class was larger (434′) than most contemporary destroyers, even though it had only a single 5″/54 gun. The Sea Sparrow Basic Point Defense Missile System (BPDMS) was installed after commissioning, but it was more commonly referred to as the Basically Pointless Defense….., as it relied on a optical aimed director (a optical 40mm director, with illuminating radar equipment hung on – the ultimate in cheap air defense.
The ship’s CIC was large and could have easily accomodated NTDS, but plotting & tracking was grease pencil era. The ship had extra accomodations for squadron flagship personnel. The Cook, along with other of the Knox class were assigned to Destroyer Squadrons. They had substantial potential but were underequiped with ‘to be installed later’ the mantra.

One issue that effected all the Garcia/Knox family was that they had only a single screw so they lacked the reliability through redundancy factor and maneuverability that smaller DD types had. They also had a large bow mounted sonar that added 10′ to their draft.

Considering that most of the Garcia & Knox class have been transfered to foreign navies and they are still in active service, means the USN did not realize full value. In the case of the Knox class there was considerable potential for upgrading their original equipment.

“Which is why I believe that for all it’s faults, a successor design is far more appropriate to the future USN than the LCS. That said, any such ship is a lower end companion to vessels like the Tico and Burke classes.”

I couldnt agree more.

But the USN is very stubborn.

In 1986 when they stated emphatically that they would never again build a frigate type ship they meant it.

Although LCS…..

In any event I have it on very good authority the USN will fight for LCS to the last admiral.

I proposed a ship of nominally 5000 tons full load to replace the OHPSs for Western Hemisphere ops and other contingenices as neccessary.

I was told point-blank that this would never happen.

So………..

“but for in service they’ve done remarkably well and I believe they’d have served well as Atlantic convoy escorts. “

Absolutely.

“To get a comparison it may be better to compare the FFG7 with other non US designs,….

That is where I wanted to go with this thread albeit the place I wanted to start the discussion was with the 1960’s/early 1970s classes both USN and other navies.

Interesting comments, this is one of the greatest problems in naval (and Army and air force) procurement, how to try and achieve both capability and affordability, and each new generation of technology is making the argument ever more difficult. Modern high capability warships are hideously expensive but also incredibly capable, to maintain fleet numbers is getting harder all of the time, the main options seem to be;
-a high/low force mix
-accept a smaller fleet
-cut costs by using the “fitted for but not with” principle
None of these are ideal, but the high/low force mix is probably the better one, as even using fitted for but not with it has proved too hard to maintain good hull numbers (see T45 amongst others) which is where a relatively affordable down spec warship comes in. The big debate is where to make the compromise between cost and affordability and this depends on the intended role. If we want a Policing vessel for anti-smuggling, anti-piracy, flying the flag, UN support type ops then a large sea going OPV with minimal true war capability and a basic self defence fit is all that is needed (eg. the large USCG cutters, the RN helicopter carrying River class OPV). Such ships however have no real military use and so are still a dilution of the fleet and reduction in force, although freeing up the true warships for other missions. If we want a vessel capable of filling a front line duty then it will not be cheap however we do it and many believe the best way to do it is a single role ship, and I mean single role, a pure ASW vessel for instance with no other equipment, in the 80’s the British seriously considered a pure towed array sonar ship with nothing other than a 30mm cannon beyond it’s ASW systems. This gives a vessel of true utility in a front line role, but at the expense of all else. The alternative is a vessel which does a bit of most things reasonably well but far from matching the best, and I believe this was what the FFG7 attempted and achieved with some success, they were decent ASW platforms, had a decent AAW capability and have proved good GP platforms. Obviously they fall a long way short of the bigger USN destroyers, but for in service they’ve done remarkably well and I believe they’d have served well as Atlantic convoy escorts. To get a comparison it may be better to compare the FFG7 with other non US designs, and when compared with most non USN designs they look pretty capable vessels and quite a few navies still depend on the class as first line combatants, it has also been an excellent basic platform. Which is why I believe that for all it’s faults, a successor design is far more appropriate to the future USN than the LCS. That said, any such ship is a lower end companion to vessels like the Tico and Burke classes.

“the FFG7 has been much maligned but it’s been an outstanding success story and found an excellent balance between performance, capability and affordability “

Well yes and no.

Its been maligned for some pretty good reasons.

They werent derided as “Hellen Keller” ships by their crews for sh-ts and giggles. Many units were ill-equipped for most forms of warfare at sea as commissioned. Despite this its cost grew so dramatically the program was terminated far early. Many of the class never even lived up to the originally limited potential. And in fact many were relegated to the NRF as soon as practical beginning in early 1984 and then decommissioned as soon as practical beginning in 1995. Many never even receiving LAMPS III capability among other important systems.

But the shortcomings and cost escalations were mostly overshadowed by the World Events of the late 1970’s and the massive influx of funding of the early 1980’s.

In the mid-1990s it was a forgone cunclusion that the class would likely be completely decommissioned by the year 2000. Even the twelve “hideously” expensive CORT updated units.

However they were very cheap to operate, man and maintain as compared to other USN surface combatants. So far more capable ship classes were decommissioned early.

By early 2003 though they were thoroughly outdated even the CORT ships so recently and expensively updated. In order to reduce costs further the ineffective MK 13 launcher/SM1 missile and SPG-60 FCradar was removed. Which also removed the Harpoon AshM capability. They received a paltry HM&E update of approx $5m per ship just to get them to 2010 and hopefully some to 2015. Their only real purpose beginning in the late 1990’s and that for only 14 units was to provide helos to an accompanying Burke I/II DDG but even that role is and will soon be totally supplanted as enough Burke IIA ships enter service.

The use of the others as primarilly narcotics patrol ships in the Caribbean was always a specious use although it has maintained force structure at a level that would otherwise be much smaller than it already is.

OTOH in a period of relative peace they have in fact given good service but it was and also remains a very risky use of this platform in missions it has never been adequately equipped for.

I hate to come off as a detractor because a warship of approx. this size and as you so cogently state,

“balance between performance, capability and affordability that many navies desperately need “

,has been an ongoing requirement for the USN for many decades now.

Just mostly unrealized IMHO.

And its engineering plant with the exception of the single screw solved the quandry caused by earlier classes even this shortcoming was mitigated by the addition of drop down propulsors.

They were not ever really inherently good at anything with most of their capability and usefulness derived from the ships eqiuipped with two LAMPS III helos.

And this is very true (along with the rest of your post) and has been for the USN since the 1950s.:

“One of the biggest problems, which remains a huge problem despite some hype, is combining truly effective and capable AAW and ASW types into a single hull, it’s very expensive to do..”

Although the Burke IIAs themselves a compromise of the Flight III designs it was derived from have been a relative success.

I greatly appreciate your response.

Although I wasnt really looking to discuss the OHPs so soon it certainly is an appropriate topic.

IMO, the USN would be far better served using the money that the LCS program has been allocated in a FFG7 replacement, the FFG7 has been much maligned but it’s been an outstanding success story and found an excellent balance between performance, capability and affordability that many navies desperately need to emulate today in the face of soaring military hardware inflation. Ultimately, for all the original LCS concept was valid, it now looks like the USN will get a stealthy fast vessel of very limited capabilities once you look beyond speed and stealth, and will get it as it looks like naval priorities will revert back to a more conventional stance after the asymetric littoral doctrine of the last decade. Like the vaunted Visby, look beyond the admittedly impressive stealth and it’s little more than a hideously expensive OPV.
On ASW frigates, one of the big myths in some circles is that the ASW frigate is a “cheap” and easy to design companion to the AAW destroyer, when actually truly effective ASW sensors and equipment are hideously expensive and the ships to deploy them are anything but easy alternatives to AAW destroyers. The T22’s came out pretty similar in price to the T42’s and the T23 (arguably the best ASW ship of it’s era) used a lot of novel and innovative engineering to optimise it for sub hunting. One of the biggest problems, which remains a huge problem despite some hype, is combining truly effective and capable AAW and ASW types into a single hull, it’s very expensive to do and many still believe a two platform approach is the better solution.