I have been watching a docu about the shootdown of Iran air 955 and the circumstances that led up to it. It turned my mind to a recently aquired copy of the “Naval Institute Guide to World Naval Systems 1997 – 1998”.
In the introduction to this weighty tome there is a section about the performance of Link 11 and refers to the Iran Air shootdown. Here is the text from this section:
As an example of the way details of link operations now count, it now appears that the USS Vincennes shot down the Iranian Airbus in 1988 partly because two seperate link 11 nets in effect merged, probably due to ducting. When the same track number, originally used for the Airbus , was used by another ship (HMS Manchester) for a different airplane, far away, this data became available on the net used by Vincennes. When the wrong question was asked (what is the altiude of the aircraft with the airbuses original number?), the answer was that it was diving – and that seemed to show that the Airbus was attacking Vincennes, when in fact it was climbing out of it’s takeoff.
This conflicts with the official explanation shown in the program stating that the crewman who said the aircraft was descending was mistaken and somehow made himself see the wrong information on that screen.
I am no conspiracy freak but if the the Link 11 theory was true it would certainly not only exonorate that crewman but also cause embarrasment to the USN and RN.
The question is has the matter been brushed under the carpet?
By: Fedaykin - 2nd September 2006 at 15:03
Isn’t Link 11 slated to be phased out with NATO navies?
P.S. Happy Birthday to Me!
By: Adrian_44 - 1st September 2006 at 21:42
RE: USS Vincennes Iran air 955 shoot down
I also read it was a problem between the participants on the Link 11 system. I read it was another American destroyer that detected the flight #955 and assigned it a tracking number. A very short time later the Vincennes detected flight #955 and it computer also assigned a number along with a “time stamp”. The other ship transmitted data over Link 11 and had an earlier time stamp. Therefore the tracking number of the destroyer was the one that Link 11 used. On the Vincenne’s displays changed to reflect the number but, the crew did not notice the change in number.
IFF challenged the aircraft and due to atmospheric conditions, the signal bounced off the upper atmosphere and reflected to Bandar Abbas where an F-14A’s IFF responded and indicated it was a combat aircraft. Subsequent, challenges with IFF indicated the aircraft indicated it could be both military and or civilian.
I had heard the airliner was at its correct altitude but, was more than an hour behind what its flight plan’s indicated.
The captain of the Vincennes did not want his ship to wind up the same as the USS Stark.
What bothers me the most is the political white-wash job that was done. The crew did not perform well, why was the captain exonerated? Why wasn’t there more communication between the Vincennes and the other ship that also had a radar lock-on to flight #955. The CIC of the other ship did not understand the Vincenne’s concern. This concern should have been voiced.
the Vincennes should not have been where it was, the captain was very aggressive and regarded as looking for a fight and had followed the gun boats into Iranian territorial waters.
The ‘boghammer’ speed boats used by the Iranians were in the area and were in position to attack tanker shipping. The boghammers also fired on the helo from the Vincennes, so engagement with them was in-line with their duty. There is a debate as to whether the Vincennes actually went into Iranian territoral waters unless at some point, Iranian territory waters extends beyond the usual twelve mile limit.
As for whether the captain was to aggressive, you want that sort of aggressiveness in the commanders of aegis ships, helicopters, tanks, etc.
Whether, the Vincennes should have been exonerated is still up for debate -damn politics. I do feel that the US Government should accept some responsibility for the incident. Should the Iranian Air Line accept some responsibility also, yes I feel.
Adrian
By: koxinga - 31st August 2006 at 01:11
You might want to drop a email to Rear Adm. Victor G. Guillory, commander, Amphibious Force, U.S. 7th Fleet. He was the Ops officer on watch in the CIC during the shootdown. His career seem to have survived the incident pretty well.
By: sealordlawrence - 30th August 2006 at 17:19
I have researched this quite thoroughly and it seems that although there were technical issues, the final mistake was made by a member the Vincennes crew. He in effect suffered from a sort of tempory syndrome which makes you think that something which you want or think should happen is happening when it is in fact not. The crew member reported that the airliner (already identified as an F-14) was desending in a typical attack profile when it was in fact climbing. (this is just one of many theorys).
Also since the incident the overall commander of the US naval forces in the Gulf region at the time (I forget his name) has said that the Vincennes should not have been where it was, the captain was very aggressive and regarded as looking for a fight and had followed the gun boats into Iranian territorial waters.
By: Francois5 - 30th August 2006 at 08:23
I don’t think they were any mistake there:
The plane was tentatively identified as an F-14 not from radar but from five other facts:
1. There were reports of 10 F-14’s operating out of Bandar Abbas.
2. The flight took off from Bandar Abbas immediately after the Vincennes fired on the three gunboats.
3. It had no transponder (a requirement for all civil aviation).
4. It was 4 miles outside of the commercial air corridor and 14,000 feet lower than a commercial plane should have been.
5. The plane was broadcasting on a military “mode 2” (I’m not sure whether that’s a radar or a radio). These were the “electronic indications” the Admiral Crowe spoke of in his press conference. (This comes from CNN news Tuesday, July 5).
Also, Flight 655 took off about an hour after it’s scheduled departure time; the captain had requested information about scheduled commercial flights, but this search was not completed before the decision to fire was made. Even if they’d had the time, all they would have found was that it was the wrong time to be a commercial flight.
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August 29, 2006 at 6:13 pm