I have been looking into the eternal fight in between RF missiles and Fighters ‘s ECMs .
There is a lot of infos on the open Net , including some rather interesting studies but the problem is to find enough data on the latest ECCM techniques used by missiles like Amraam , Mica , R-77 .
These missiles are all using some kind of mono-static multipulse radar .
Latest ECMs must use some kind of Digital Radio Frequency Memory (DRFM) techniques to try to fool the incoming missile(s) .
From the Net :
Digital Radio Frequency Memory (DRFM) is an electronic method for digitally capturing and retransmitting (reproducing) an RF signal. The DRFM technique ‘snoops’ then digitizes the received signals, stores it in memory, then if needed, replicates and retransmits.
Because it’s a copy of the original signal, the attacking transmitting radar will not be able to distinguish its legitimate original return signal from the DRFM ‘copy’. Neither does DRFM generate and transmit radio ‘noise’ class jamming, so the ‘home-on-noise-jamming’ used by current weopons – is useless.
The real twist with DRFM, is that slight variations in frequency (phase) can be retransmitted (imbedded) by the more powerful DRFM jam signal, to create Doppler (velocity) error in the attackers receiver (seeker) head.
The attacking weapon may not (or can not) resolve these more powerful “false” DRFM signals (in time) – remember – only a fraction of a second of confusion is all that’s required – the weapon will fly wide of the target – and so – is defeated
http://img607.imageshack.us/img607/5578/phaseshift.jpg
Of course , the defender must first detect the missile ‘s radar but this is not a problem nowadays if the RWR is up to speed .
When the missile goes “active” , the fight missile-ECM begins .
Missiles like late Amraams and Mica are using some very clever tricks (ECCM) to try to “resist” the deceptive jamming , but how ?
Here , I wanted to explain by myself how it is done until I found an excellent post from a guy called Gambit . Since his explainations are tip top , I decided to copy/paste what he said . If he ‘s reading , I thank him 🙂
Here is what he said :
The vast majority of radar systems out there are mono-static, meaning a single antenna perform both transmit and receive functions. In order to detect the echoes that a target may produce from the transmission side, the system must periodically be ‘silent’ or non-transmitting. The result is a ‘pulsed’ or ‘pulsing’ system. A series of pulses is called appropriately called a ‘pulse train’. A series of pulse trains make up a transmission, which can be one second or one hour in duration, however capable is the system. So to keep it simple, we will just use the word ‘transmission’.
Inside a transmission are four major basic and important characteristics…
– Pulse width
– Pulse frequency
– Pulse amplitude
– Pulse intervalFrequency and amplitude are self explanatory. Pulse width is the duration of a particular pulse. The ‘pulse repetition freq’ (PRF) is how many pulses per time unit. The PRF is not the operating frequency of the pulse itself. This is a crucial distinction. Interval is the space between a pulse and its brethens, before and after itself. The ‘pulse repetition interval’ (PRI) is that space between the BEGINNING of one pulse to the BEGINING of the next pulse, regardless of the pulse width. Or between the END of one pulse to the END of the next pulse. In other words, the PRI is from leading-to-leading or trailing-to-trailing, not trailing-to-leading or leading-to-trailing. A designer cannot use both perspectives in his work, meaning he cannot define the PRI as leading-leading in one processing section and trailing-trailing in another. He must consistently use either leading edge or trailing edge throughout. The pulse width and possibly its variability will destroy his work.
Radar detection is a stochastical process, fanciful phrasing for statistics. If a transmission of ten pulses produced only one return or ‘echo’, it is statistically insignificant. However, we can set the ‘alert’ threshold to be this low if we want. The ‘alert’ threshold is when the system display a ‘blip’ on the scope. The system is basically saying that there is a ‘valid’ target based upon this one echo out of ten pulses. Another system that has a higher threshold wil dismiss this single echo. May be it is programmed or hard wired to say ‘valid’ or to ‘alert’ with two echoes out of ten pulses. What the human operator does with that information is a different issue but for military purposes, any so-called ‘valid’ target warrant an investigation — voice or visual. For military purposes, the default assumption is ‘hostile’ for all so-called ‘valid’ targets. Guilty until proven innocent and the burden of proof of innocence is upon the target. We can see then that even for civilian air traffic controllers, two echoes out of ten pulses as ‘valid’ would make for a very busy day asking electronic ghosts for indentifications. For military purposes, fuel cost alone in chasing after said ghosts would bankrupt the air force. So we raise the threshold to be five or more echoes out of ten pulses as ‘valid’. At least 50% is reasonable enough.
Enter ECM via DRFM…
http://img189.imageshack.us/img189/4733/basicdrfmarch.jpg
The above is the most basic DRFM architecture for whatever purposes. Everything between the converters, analog (ADC) or digital (DAC), gains increasing importance as we move inward, from either end, into the architecture. Signal acquisition can be with a simple blade antenna but not everyone have equal access to the latest processor, which is downstream of the antenna. Anyway…What the system must do is gain an understanding of the transmission’s pulse characteristics in order to replicate the transmission to the highest possible fidelity or to create not only a new but different signal for its own transmission. This is where processor power and memory capacity gains that increasing importance. The system’s purpose is to create a deceptor signal so it must know as much as possible the details of the transmission. Just like how detection and alert cannot be as simple as one echo out of ten pulses, this DRFM system cannot assume pulse characteristics based upon analyzing just one pulse in that ten. That mean there is a delay between reception and transmission.
These 4 items will affect the overall performance of an ECM system using the DRFM method…
– Processor speed
– Memory (capacity and speed)
– Sampling rate
– Bus speedAssume that the system can create an effective deceptor signal after analyzing 3 pulses out of 10. The goal then is to transmit that deceptor signal as soon as possible. But if bus speed cannot move that deceptor signal to the transmit section by the time the threat transmission complete its impact, the threat radar may have 8 echoes out of 10 pulses, enough to establish some target resolution. Low memory capacity affect sampling rate and will produce the same effect. Remember, the threat radar will not create a ‘valid’ target based upon one echo out of ten pulses, therefore, the ideal situation is to deduce threat transmission characteristics from analyzing just one pulse, create a deceptor signal and transmit that BEFORE receiving the second pulse in the threat transmission. Perfect processor, instant speed memory modules or zero impedance circuit board copper trace lines are not possible.
What if the threat radar is frequency agile? What if the threat radar is capable of altering its pulse repetition freq (PRF)? What if the threat radar is capable of altering ALL transmission characteristics, from pulse train to pulse train? That mean the threat radar usually will have some target resolutions before a pulse train is deceived precisely because of that delay in the DRFM process. For this threat radar, itself is not deceived but a particular pulse train is deceived. It mean the threat radar will assume that the first few pulses in a pulse train will be successful before the rest is analyzed by the defender and a DRFM-ed deceptor signal is created. The threat radar will transmit a ten-pulse pulse train and will ignore any echo produced by the last five because it will assume those last five are compromised. Next…The threat radar will produce another ten-pulse pulse train but with a higher pulse amplitude. The next ten-pulse pulse train may have a longer pulse width. The next ten-pulse pulse train may have a shorter PRF. Or a longer PRF. The next ten-pulse pulse train may have a different pulse width. This is why a designer must be consistent on how he define the pulse repetition interval (PRI) as mentioned several paragraphs above. The combinations are enormous and the time constraint created by a missile traveling at double-digit Mach will not allow the defender much time to analyze and attempt to deceive.
(Thank you again Mr. Gambit)
Now , the DRFM capabilities have increased tenfold the past 10 years to the point that missiles have very little chance against powerful ECMs .
Missile ‘s radar usualy use the X band (8-12 Ghz) , very few are using K (12-18 Ghz) , Ka (18-24 Ghz) or even Ku (24-40 Ghz) bands .
(it is the reason why ECM suite like Spectra are going up to 40 Ghz) .
It has been said that some ECM suite like Typhoon ‘s Praetorian are capable to listen simultaneously the whole range of X band while sampling at up to 300-500 Mhz . Spectra sampling seems to be 500-700 Mhz .
Thalès Carbone system does even better and it seems that the sampling is up to 2 Ghz but this is classified .
Sampling rate is usualy 10 to 12 bits with a resolution comprised in between 2 and 0.5 nanoseconds (!) with Up to 4 independent and coordinated range, Doppler, amplitude target returns per DRFM channel .
What I don ‘t know is how many DRFM channels are used in systems like Praetorian and Spectra . Since Spectra is using multiple Bragg cells channelizers which are even faster because it is optical devices and it uses less filtering (more efficient) , it is even harder to guess how fast the system can duplicate the pulse-train and how many pulse-trains can be treated simultaneously .
More I think about it , more I think that missile ‘s radars are easy fooled by such ECM suites .
So , RF (EM) missiles should have a very low pk .
This is the reason why medium to long range IR missile (Mica) are probably the best way to deal with top range fighters , especialy stealthy ones .
As I said many times , it is not because a EM missile has been fired that the target will get destroyed . Even a salvo of said missiles can be fooled .
What do you think ?
Cheers .
By: wolfhound - 20th January 2011 at 04:55
I have been looking into the eternal fight in between RF missiles and Fighters ‘s ECMs .
There is a lot of infos on the open Net , including some rather interesting studies but the problem is to find enough data on the latest ECCM techniques used by missiles like Amraam , Mica , R-77 .
These missiles are all using some kind of mono-static multipulse radar .
Latest ECMs must use some kind of Digital Radio Frequency Memory (DRFM) techniques to try to fool the incoming missile(s) .
From the Net :
http://img607.imageshack.us/img607/5578/phaseshift.jpg
Of course , the defender must first detect the missile ‘s radar but this is not a problem nowadays if the RWR is up to speed .
When the missile goes “active” , the fight missile-ECM begins .
Missiles like late Amraams and Mica are using some very clever tricks (ECCM) to try to “resist” the deceptive jamming , but how ?Here , I wanted to explain by myself how it is done until I found an excellent post from a guy called Gambit . Since his explainations are tip top , I decided to copy/paste what he said . If he ‘s reading , I thank him 🙂
Here is what he said :(Thank you again Mr. Gambit)
Now , the DRFM capabilities have increased tenfold the past 10 years to the point that missiles have very little chance against powerful ECMs .
Missile ‘s radar usualy use the X band (8-12 Ghz) , very few are using K (12-18 Ghz) , Ka (18-24 Ghz) or even Ku (24-40 Ghz) bands .
(it is the reason why ECM suite like Spectra are going up to 40 Ghz) .It has been said that some ECM suite like Typhoon ‘s Praetorian are capable to listen simultaneously the whole range of X band while sampling at up to 300-500 Mhz . Spectra sampling seems to be 500-700 Mhz .
Thalès Carbone system does even better and it seems that the sampling is up to 2 Ghz but this is classified .
Sampling rate is usualy 10 to 12 bits with a resolution comprised in between 2 and 0.5 nanoseconds (!) with Up to 4 independent and coordinated range, Doppler, amplitude target returns per DRFM channel .
What I don ‘t know is how many DRFM channels are used in systems like Praetorian and Spectra . Since Spectra is using multiple Bragg cells channelizers which are even faster because it is optical devices and it uses less filtering (more efficient) , it is even harder to guess how fast the system can duplicate the pulse-train and how many pulse-trains can be treated simultaneously .More I think about it , more I think that missile ‘s radars are easy fooled by such ECM suites .
So , RF (EM) missiles should have a very low pk .
This is the reason why medium to long range IR missile (Mica) are probably the best way to deal with top range fighters , especialy stealthy ones .As I said many times , it is not because a EM missile has been fired that the target will get destroyed . Even a salvo of said missiles can be fooled .
What do you think ?
Cheers .
Interesting post Bluewings, thanks.
Do you have a link to Gambit’s original post?
By: wrightwing - 8th January 2011 at 16:26
That’s highly speculative on the first 2 counts.
By: Bluewings - 7th January 2011 at 22:26
Mabie :
In my mind, it helps explain the difficulty adversary aircraft have had in dealing with the F-22 it in both BVR and WVR regimes
Your mind is wrong and some adversaries don ‘t have any problem to deal with the F-22 in WVR .
The USAF refused the use of Sidewinder and IR Mica during the F-22/Rafale dogfights because it would have proved that LM and some various pilots blatantly lied .
the famous quote by the Aussie F-15 pilot that he couldn’t lock onto the Raptor when it was clearly visible thru his canopy.
The worse lie I ever heard :diablo:
Spudman :
Modern IIR seekers do not look for simply a heat source, but the entire field of view as an infrared image. Flares would just show up as hot dots falling away from the fighter. The image of the target fighter will not be blocked or obfuscated by the use of any flare.
Very true .
Cheers .
By: mabie - 4th January 2011 at 08:26
The link I posted above describes some technologies intended to provide all-aspect stealth. In my mind, it helps explain the difficulty adversary aircraft have had in dealing with the F-22 it in both BVR and WVR regimes. RF stealth explains the bvR superiority but with all the hundreds if not thousands of WVR exercises conducted to-date vs. legacy jets flown by eagle-eyed pilots and employing JHMCS and the latest model AIM-9, one should expect more victories for the Eagles/Vipers/Hornets/SuperHornets.
I can only speculate but I think there’s a lot more that we need to know about the Raptor’s abilities to counter visual detection. By many accounts, the bird is very hard to acquire visually, even when pilot are told in what direction to look. Often, the F-22 is almost right on top of them before they see it. Funny what you can do with lighted panels.
As for IR, the only counters I can see are the rectangular exhausts, the tails w/c block the nozzles from certain angles and SC w/c reduces the need for AB. But these wouldn’t seem to be enough to counter JHMCS/AIM-9X IMO. Perhaps the flickering skins tech were adopted and are really that good at distorting the aircrafts shape to IR sensors. Maybe his has something to do with the famous quote by the Aussie F-15 pilot that he couldn’t lock onto the Raptor when it was clearly visible thru his canopy.
Its a guessing game because those who know won’t tell.
By: SpudmanWP - 4th January 2011 at 07:25
IMHO CMDS units are still widely used (even on the F-22 and F-35) for two reasons:
1. Most adversary threats are of the older scanning IR based type.
2. IIRC there are no IIR based MANPADS deployed. The only program I know of was the canceled work on a new Stinger seeker.
The latest Stinger development, approved for development in 1996, is the Stinger-RMP Block II, also known as Advanced Stinger. It replaces the IR seeker with an FPA (Focal Plane Array) IIR (Imaging Infrared) seeker, which increases detection range and accuracy especially in high clutter and countermeasures environments. The higher detection range increases the effective range to the Stinger missile’s kinematic range of about 8000 m (26000 ft). The Block II had reached the EMD phase, but U.S. Army funding for production was eventually cancelled around 2002. At that time, the program had already been at least five years behind schedule.
By: ADMK2 - 4th January 2011 at 06:22
While nothing is perfect, the chances of using a flare to decoy a modern IIR seeker is slim to none. The seeker technology and techniques are just too different from the older scanning-type of seeker.
Flares were used to provide a secondary heat source to follow that might throw off the seeker. Modern IIR seekers do not look for simply a heat source, but the entire field of view as an infrared image. Flares would just show up as hot dots falling away from the fighter. The image of the target fighter will not be blocked or obfuscated by the use of any flare.
See this early (10 years ago) use of the Aim-9x Blk1 against 4 aerial targets where several of them used flares to try and decoy the 9x. In each instance not only were they not decoyed, but they made direct impacts with the target QF-4.
Fair enough, but that says nothing against my original point and that is that this is little more than the game of weapons v armour.
I have a significant doubt that the QF-4’s CMDS systems have the benefit of the same level of technological achievement as the weapon being tested in those videos.
Again, CMDS are still the most popular self-defence system in the world, even on the most modern platforms. I have no doubt there are reasons for this and it is not soley to defend against legacy seeker threats. Even if those reasons aren’t publicly broadcast…
By: SpudmanWP - 4th January 2011 at 05:46
While nothing is perfect, the chances of using a flare to decoy a modern IIR seeker is slim to none. The seeker technology and techniques are just too different from the older scanning-type of seeker.
Flares were used to provide a secondary heat source to follow that might throw off the seeker. Modern IIR seekers do not look for simply a heat source, but the entire field of view as an infrared image. Flares would just show up as hot dots falling away from the fighter. The image of the target fighter will not be blocked or obfuscated by the use of any flare.
See this early (10 years ago) use of the Aim-9x Blk1 against 4 aerial targets where several of them used flares to try and decoy the 9x. In each instance not only were they not decoyed, but they made direct impacts with the target QF-4.
By: ADMK2 - 4th January 2011 at 04:56
That link says that the flares are
This technique refers to the older IR missiles such as Aim-9L/M and all current IR MANPADS and IR SAMs that are not using the new IIR seekers.
That link points to their range of ‘Spectral’ flare. There are a variety of different types designed to address different threats shown by that manufacturer and no doubt others.
I was simply pointing out that making blanket statements about what various decoys can and can’t do, seems a tad limited to me. These types of systems continue to be operated by modern forces that have a very good understanding of the capabilities of modern IIR guided weapons often operating them, themselves and facing similar systems as reference threats.
I would just advise a little bit of caution in making such blanket statements. You certainly wouldn’t see operational planners making such sweeping statements…
By: SpudmanWP - 3rd January 2011 at 19:34
I wouldn’t necessarily assume that IR decoy systems haven’t advanced in a similar manner to seeker heads.
Some seem to think they have…
http://www.chemring.com.au/Products/Defence/Countermeasures/Air/Spectral/
It’s why everyone continues to use them.
That link says that the flares are
used in aircraft countermeasures systems to combat advanced heat-seeking missiles employing spectral discrimination techniques.
This technique refers to the older IR missiles such as Aim-9L/M and all current IR MANPADS and IR SAMs that are not using the new IIR seekers.
By: Mercurius - 3rd January 2011 at 14:47
The fact that most air-to-air and surface-to-air missile projects still use radar-based guidance suggests that the battle between radar and countermeasure is less one-sided that BlueWings is suggesting. The modern missile seeker (and particularly the active-radar seeker) will be able to exploit a wide range of ECCM techniques in areas such as the antenna, transmitter, receiver and signal processing. More than 100 such techniques were being described in the unclassified literature by the mid-1970s.
By: ADMK2 - 3rd January 2011 at 09:16
I wouldn’t expect a modern imaging IR seeker to take any notice of flares.
I wouldn’t necessarily assume that IR decoy systems haven’t advanced in a similar manner to seeker heads.
Some seem to think they have…
http://www.chemring.com.au/Products/Defence/Countermeasures/Air/Spectral/
It’s why everyone continues to use them.
By: SpudmanWP - 3rd January 2011 at 04:50
-1) F-35 ‘s EODAS and F-22 ‘s MLD are two very different systems in term of resolution and capabilities .
EODAS beats the crap out of AN/AAR-56 . Sure , F-22 ‘s MLD could be upgraded but so far nothing has been done .
EODAS can even track ballistic missiles at up to 800 miles (!) with a 10x magnification but it can ‘t be displayed on the current F-35 tactical display .
Well, we do not know what has been done at LM as far as the AAR-56 goes. We do know that they (LM) are continuing work on it’s improvement.
Lockheed Martin continues to advance the modular design of MLD with the development of both high resolution and multi-spectral sensors and an expanded algorithm that incorporates situational awareness and defensive Infrared Search and Track (IRST).
http://www.lockheedmartin.com/data/assets/mfc/PC/MFC_MLD_PC.pdf
btw, the EODAS system does not have any optical zoom capability. Any zoom it has is digital in nature. Anyone familiar with digital zoom knows that when you use it you lose resolution.
-2) Such systems are not capable to provide any range , so using the systems to direct a AIM-9X in LOAL mode is only possible in WVR .
The EODAS can provide accurate ranging through the use of triangulation from 2 or more F-35s. There is an example of this at the 2:15 mark in this Northrup Grumman EODAS YouTube clip.
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=cPKw3RksCcI
Btw , I am the only one here to back up what I say with good links when you and Spudman are only exposing your opinions
Here are two LM videos showing the video capabilities of the AAR-56 and the link above shows LM’s development intentions as far as the AAR-56 goes.
By: wrightwing - 3rd January 2011 at 00:08
Well it’s not really fair to make claims that could only be debunked with sources not available on open source networks, seeing as how both ECM/ECCM are highly sensitive disciplines. You give all the benefit of the doubt to the ECM systems, without considering that the folks that work on ECCM stay busy too. You also ignored the part of my response regarding the missiles getting info not only from their own seekers, but from datalinks, and backed up with INS/GPS to improve accuracy, and HOJ if all else fails.
Now with regard to the F-22’s defensive IR suite, it currently provides excellent capabilities against missiles, and considering- 9X shots will be WVR, I don’t really see the issue with range of the system against jets.
By: Bluewings - 2nd January 2011 at 22:25
Spudman :
It would likely get a similar A2A tracking ability like that of the EODAS, but will still lack in range & resolution.
Wrightwing :
The system already provides this capability against missiles. The upgrade was to provide the capability against other fighters, etc… so that once the -9X was integrated, the F-22 would be able to take advantage of the HOBS/LOAL features.
-1) F-35 ‘s EODAS and F-22 ‘s MLD are two very different systems in term of resolution and capabilities .
EODAS beats the crap out of AN/AAR-56 . Sure , F-22 ‘s MLD could be upgraded but so far nothing has been done .
EODAS can even track ballistic missiles at up to 800 miles (!) with a 10x magnification but it can ‘t be displayed on the current F-35 tactical display . Video :
http://www.es.northropgrumman.com/solutions/f35targeting/assets/missilevideo.html
Quote :
“DAS is an omni-directional infrared system that can simultaneously detect and track aircraft and missiles in every direction, with no practical limit on the number of targets it can track. DAS truly revolutionizes the way we think about situational awareness,” said Dave Bouchard, program director for F-35 sensors at Northrop Grumman’s Electronic Systems sector.
-2) Such systems are not capable to provide any range , so using the systems to direct a AIM-9X in LOAL mode is only possible in WVR .
Russians and French tried it with our respective IRSTs and it only works in WVR , as expected .
When used for a BVR shot , even the IR Mica needs in-flight updates or the help of the LRF , which only works at up to 30km .
Believe me , we all wish to fire passively an IR missile at over 50km but it is so far impossible unless to use data from an excellent RWR , or from an external source like AWAC or ground radar or another fighter illuminating the target .
=================
Wrightwing :
I think that article you posted answered your question on the challenges an ECM system has vs an agile radar, and missile.
Not really .
Mr. Gambit was probably not aware of the progress made these recent years wrt ECMs . I admit that it is more difficult to jam an Aesa radar than a mono-static multipulse missile radar , the later not even being LPI .
I found it ironic that you simulataneously praised it, and dismissed the issues it addressed.
I praised Mr. Gambit ‘s ability to describe the system in lenght but I indeed dismissed the fact that it is impossible to jam late missiles . Mr. Gambit even finished his post with , I quote :
So is it possible to deceive a threat radar via DRFM? Absolutely. Is it possible for a threat radar to successfully counter the DRFM method? Absolutely. The issue for both sides is always — money.
Wrightwing :
As for the missile’s ECCM techniques, you can be assured that the types of filtering methodologies discussed, are part of their bag of tricks.
It is not a part of their bag of tricks , it is their only trick .
You give missiles more credit than they deserve , Wrightwing 😎
Btw , I am the only one here to back up what I say with good links when you and Spudman are only exposing your opinions :rolleyes:
Sorry to say …
Cheers .
By: SpudmanWP - 2nd January 2011 at 19:06
The system already provides this capability against missiles. The upgrade was to provide the capability against other fighters, etc… so that once the -9X was integrated, the F-22 would be able to take advantage of the HOBS/LOAL features.
That is what I meant by A2A. Sorry for not being clear enough.
By: wrightwing - 2nd January 2011 at 17:46
@Bluewings- I think that article you posted answered your question on the challenges an ECM system has vs an agile radar, and missile. I found it ironic that you simulataneously praised it, and dismissed the issues it addressed. One reason why AESA radars are the wave of the future is their resistance to jamming techniques(which is why every new fighter design has that as part of their features). As for the missile’s ECCM techniques, you can be assured that the types of filtering methodologies discussed, are part of their bag of tricks. Additionally, when a missile doesn’t go active until the terminal phase, it doesn’t give the DRFM system much time to analyze its waveforms, in order to create deception signals. Then you factor in the missile receiving datalink updates from either the launching fighter(or some third party), along with HOJ, INS/GPS. It all adds up to the situation not being quite as hopeless as you’re trying to frame it. This isn’t to say that there aren’t degradations in performance, but it would be imprudent for a pilot to believe that self protection jammers render missiles completely ineffective.
By: wrightwing - 2nd January 2011 at 17:24
It would likely get a similar A2A tracking ability like that of the EODAS, but will still lack in range & resolution. This would likely only require some extra CPU power in the units and extra software in the F-22’s avionics.
No news as to when it could be done as it all depends on development $$$ which as we all know is real tight for the F-22 program.
The system already provides this capability against missiles. The upgrade was to provide the capability against other fighters, etc… so that once the -9X was integrated, the F-22 would be able to take advantage of the HOBS/LOAL features.
By: wrightwing - 2nd January 2011 at 17:18
Spudman :
True .
A F-35 might survive such attack but a F-22 will get shot …Cheers .
You are aware that the F-22 has 360deg spherical defensive IR coverage as well, right?
By: Bluewings - 2nd January 2011 at 13:11
ppp :
Ah very convenient how France comes out tops in every aspect of your analysis.
In every aspect ? :confused:
I only compared some features of Praetorian and Spectra . If you don ‘t like it , write to BAE system and SELEX Galileo and tell them to get in touch with Thalès .
Regarding Thalès AIRBORNE ELECTRONIC ATTACK (AEA + Carbone) ,
http://www.thalesgroup.com/Workarea/DownloadAsset.aspx?id=2752&LangType=2057
I know only one comparable (?) system : the EA-18G Growler .
I would like to know what Company in the UK (if there is one) who works and builds ECM systems designed for aircraft or for testing purpose like the ones used in anechoic chambers . I know one US Company who is doing some top systems : Micro system Inc. (Herley)
http://herley-msi.com/products/rf-simulation-products/
Cheers .
By: mabie - 2nd January 2011 at 07:47
Here’s a nice read from Popular Science circa 1997 which discusses some techniques for achieving stealth – RF, Optical, IR.
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January 1, 2011 at 8:21 pm