START : Russia-US New Treaty Negotiations

From RIAN

On April 8, 2010, Presidents Barack Obama and Dmitry Medvedev signed the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Russian Federation on Measures for the Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms.

The new document replaces the 1991 Soviet-U.S. START-I agreement, which expired on December 5, 2009, 15 years after its entry into force, and the May 2002 Russian-U.S. Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty (SORT).

The media has already reported that the treaty stipulates 1,550 warheads on deployed intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), on deployed submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs), and nuclear warheads counted for deployed heavy bombers.

Under the treaty, “each Party shall reduce and limit its ICBMs and ICBM launchers, SLBMs and SLBM launchers, heavy bombers so that the aggregate numbers do not exceed 700, for deployed ICBMs, deployed SLBMs, and deployed heavy bombers; 800, for deployed and non-deployed ICBM launchers, deployed and non-deployed SLBM launchers, and deployed and non-deployed heavy bombers.”

A study of the treaty’s text makes it possible to single out the following aspects determining the new configuration of the strategic nuclear balance:

1. Unlike the START-I agreement, the new document stipulates no restrictions on the area and number of basing areas of land-mobile ICBM systems of the RT-2PM Topol (SS-25 Sickle), RT-2UTTKh Topol-M (SS-27 Sickle B) and RS-24 Yars (SS-X-29) class.

2. The Treaty sets tough limits on non-deployed launchers of ICBMs, non-deployed ICBMs and non-deployed SLBMs, and seriously reduces overall delivery vehicle ceilings. This largely evens out the difference between U.S. and Russian capabilities for maintaining their respective nuclear potentials.

3. The Treaty sets no limits on the development of U.S. missile defense systems but notes the link between defensive and offensive arms.

Under a special statement signed together with the Treaty, Russia reserves the right to exit from the treaty in case it feels threatened by the development of U.S. missile defense systems. The parties have also agreed that existing missile defense systems do not undermine the effectiveness of strategic offensive arms.

It should also be noted that the lack of restrictions on basing areas of land-mobile ICBM systems virtually rules out the creation of an effective missile defense system capable of intercepting such ICBMs in the foreseeable future.

4. The parties are free to determine the structure of their respective nuclear triads comprising aerial, naval and ground-based delivery vehicles. In this situation, Russia is free to resume construction of ICBM trains.

5. The Treaty sets no limits on the deployment of ground-based ICBMs with multiple independently targetable re-entry vehicles (MIRVs). Consequently, Russia will be able to retain its ICBMs of the RS-20 Voyevoda (SS-18 Satan) and RS-18 (SS-19 Stiletto) type and to develop new types of MIRVed ICBMs.

6. Under the document, strategic offensive arms subject to this Treaty shall not be based outside the national territory of each party. This caveat rules out any incidents similar to the 1962 Cuban missile crisis and considerably simplifies mutual verification of strategic offensive arms.

7. The 1,550 warhead ceiling does not mean that each party will have the same number of nuclear warheads. Under the Treaty, one nuclear warhead will be counted for each deployed heavy bomber which can carry 12-24 missiles or bombs, depending on its type. Consequently, Russia will retain 2,100 warheads and the United States, which has more heavy bombers, will have about 2,400. This gap will be reduced as the United States decommissions B-1B bombers serving with its strategic nuclear forces and converts them into conventional bombers, which are unable to launch nuclear warheads unless subjected to lengthy refitting.

The new START Treaty is organized in three tiers of increasing level of detail. The first tier is the Treaty text itself. The second tier consists of a Protocol to the Treaty, which contains additional rights and obligations associated with the Treaty’s provisions. The basic rights and obligations are contained in these two documents. The third tier consists of Technical Annexes to the Protocol.

These documents define the Treaty’s terms and stipulate new verification procedures for monitoring compliance with the Treaty. Although the voluminous Protocol has to be studied in great detail, the first impression is that Russian and U.S. negotiators have done a good job and have specified mutual positions to the greatest possible extent in order to avoid any uncertainty.

In conclusion, one can agree that both the United States and Russia have benefited from signing the Treaty, which can serve as an example for other nuclear powers now expected to join Russian-U.S. agreements.

The opinions expressed in this article are the author’s and do not necessarily represent those of RIA Novosti

Keep in mind there are several hundred W88s (475kt) out there as well. Before it’s production facility was shut down it was planned to produce that thing in the thousands.

Yes, that’s what I mean. About 60% (guestimate) of the D5 warheads are weakish W76. Putting W78 on it would result in a drastic up-yielding of the Ohio/Trident complex.

And finally that line about the W78 for Trident is interesting. Does it mean an up-yielding of the Tridents, using a modded W78 instead of the W76?

Keep in mind there are several hundred W88s (475kt) out there as well. Before it’s production facility was shut down it was planned to produce that thing in the thousands.

Looked through the final version of Prague Treaty and the Protocols:

[Preamble] … and with a view to expanding this process in the future, including to a multilateral approach, … — GREAT!!! Support it!

[III/7b] — Will we see white B-2 now? According to P2/VIII the “distinguishing features” are observable, under wing/fuselage, and weapons bay.

[V/3] — Too bad! That would have opened a couple of interesting options.

[P9/1] — This confuses me somewhat. Hasn’t the B-1B already been de-nuclearized for many years? Anyway, though the language sounds like the B-1B will remain non-nuclear, but in principal it can go nuclear again. Good I say!

Edit: Additional comments on the NPR.

Quite a bit too much political talk in this version of the paper. Nevertheless a few interesting things:

The LGM-30 will be single warhead only, and together with the Prague Treaty this means that 150 Minutemen-III will go offline. This could also mean the W62 is on the way out.

New modes of ICBM basing to be considered! Ha! Will we see the return of Midgetman?? Hurray!

A lot of language here, plus also in the Prague Treaty, sounds like China will be part of any further START-like processes. Good.

And finally that line about the W78 for Trident is interesting. Does it mean an up-yielding of the Tridents, using a modded W78 instead of the W76?

The future vision of a nuclear weapons free world – nice. Well, without testing and new developments that will just happen naturally with time. These toys will not last forever, no matter how often they are modernized and re-packed. My take on that it’s neither realistic nor desirable (even dangerous), but such statements about a nuclear free world sure makes a certain clientele feel good.

New strategic arms reduction treaty linked to missile defense – Prikhodko

The new strategic arms reduction treaty Russia and the United States will sign in Prague on April 8 will be legally linked to missile defense, although the latter is the subject of another dialog, presidential aide Sergei Prikhodko told Itar-Tass on Friday.

“The new treaty does not mean to limit the development of U.S. missile defense. The Russian and U.S. presidents agreed from the very start that the treaty would focus on strategic offensive armaments, while missile defense would be the subject of another dialog,” he said.

“At the same time, the treaty was elaborated amid the absence of limitations on strategic missile defense systems [the United States unilaterally quit the ABM Treaty in 2002]. Thus, the negotiators had to confirm the inseparable link between strategic offensive armaments and strategic defensive systems, i.e. missile defense. The mission was accomplished successfully – the relationship between strategic offensive armaments and missile defense and its growing importance against the backdrop of strategic offensive reductions were legalized in the new document,” he said.

“Each partner will have the right to quit the treaty if exclusive consequences endanger its supreme interests,” the aide noted.

“This provision applies to the number and quality of U.S. interceptor missiles. Russia will make a statement to the effect while signing the treaty. The statement will be a separate political document. The United States may make a similar statement,” Prikhodko said.

SS-27 production will be 20 missiles this year, basically the factory running at full capacity. Roughly 400 missiles over 20 years, 80 of which used up for test fires in that period, 25-50 more taken away given the odd budget or technical problem that may pop up over those years and you have a fleet of 300 odd SS-27/RS-24’s 20 years from now.

I concur with your math.

Only 367 missiles are operational now so not much more decline ahead.

Tu-95 fleet is shrinking at 1-2 planes a year. By 2030 the Tu-95 fleet is basically gone because the rate of retirement will only increase, but a PAK-DA prototype or two should be making an appearance at that time.

Till ~2020 Russia will have to get a minimum of 300 new missiles operational. Then between 2020 and 2030 production should stabilize at a healthy long-term niveau.

Figuring in test articles, reserve missiles, maintenenance rotation, &c that would come to ~40 missiles per year during the next 10 years.

Is that do-able? I don’t think so, at least not if they try to produce everything at FGUP Votkinsky Zavod. I think Bulava production has to go somewhere else, even with all the problems involved with such a move. Question is, would e.g. NPO Mashinostroyenia still be capable of building such toys? They were talking about moving it last year, but that seems to have been a misinterpretation.

And the bomber fleet should be more or less stable (maybe a little more Tu-160M, and less Tu-95MSM), with the above operational numbers stable till the next generation bomber comes online.

SS-27 production will be 20 missiles this year, basically the factory running at full capacity. Roughly 400 missiles over 20 years, 80 of which used up for test fires in that period, 25-50 more taken away given the odd budget or technical problem that may pop up over those years and you have a fleet of 300 odd SS-27/RS-24’s 20 years from now.

I concur with your math.

Only 367 missiles are operational now so not much more decline ahead.

Tu-95 fleet is shrinking at 1-2 planes a year. By 2030 the Tu-95 fleet is basically gone because the rate of retirement will only increase, but a PAK-DA prototype or two should be making an appearance at that time.

Technically it could have, but did it? Almost certainly not as Russia was having questionable success getting even the one on the nose of the SA-5 working. That and really, if it had been scramjet powered we’d have heard a lot about it by now. (At least a lot of reference to it.)

Certainly I remember, it was a controversy around the Kholod experimental vehicle. Some scientists claimed it achieved SCRAMJET some other not. Here a little info.

http://pdf.aiaa.org/preview/CDReadyMISPHST05_1136/PV2005_3320.pdf

And on hypersonic programs

http://pdf.aiaa.org/preview/CDReadyMISPHST05_1136/PV2005_3320.pdf

OK Thanks. It was always confussion in the net on the Russian (S)RAMJET projects. So, below Mach 5.5 it is still a RAMJET regimen. OK. We can live with this.

Here a page with some images.

http://www.abovetopsecret.com/forum/thread227983/pg1

We can assume that still there is nothing operational but hypersonic tech is one of the fields where Russians are investing their black-project money.

It’s not so much a missile NEEDS to go faster than Mach 5.5 to be a scramjet. All it needs is supersonic combustion which could be at Mach 2. Ramjets with subsonic combustion will generally work up to 5.5 or so and they’re easier than scramjets so that’s what they use. When they test the X-51 scramjet ignition is suppose to happen somewhere around Mach 4.5. So could Gela have used a scramjet? Technically it could have, but did it? Almost certainly not as Russia was having questionable success getting even the one on the nose of the SA-5 working. That and really, if it had been scramjet powered we’d have heard a lot about it by now. (At least a lot of reference to it.)

But first a few words on the Russian position: Even with the new limits the Russians can’t keep up with the U.S. Nowhere near. Their force level will continue to decline for the next 8 years, and they are clearly launch vehicle limited, not warhead limited. This treaty would give incredible freedom to the U.S., and Congress would be stupid not to ratify it. For the Russians it is more “face saving” than anything else. That’s probably why BMD didn’t make it into the treaty (besides the fact that strategic BMD does not work within reasonable costs limits with current technology!) – the Russian position is just too weak, they don’t have any real leverage on the U.S. (besides the threat of aggressive proliferation). The U.S. wouldn’t need that treaty.

Agreed, but the economic reality impose hard constraints to the Russian size of its strategic arsenal. Nevertheless, an “asymmetrical build-up” can assure an overwhelming retaliatory potential. I mean i.e. complete a redundant LPAR net, continue with the deployment of mobile MIRV ICBM, build the SS-19 size new liquid fueled missile and deploy FOBS and MiMARV on them, deploy point defense ABM on silo fields and so on.

And what I really criticize – again – is that it is a biletral treaty, without even a provision for other nuclear powers to enter into it. I think this is a strategic mistake.

Agreed. The British and French nukes count at such low warhead levels.

> 120 RS-24, each with 4 warheads, the number of reserve launch vehicles very low if any, as production capability is the bottleneck.
= 120 launch vehicles, 480 warheads
They would be organised in 2 silo division, plus 1 mobile division.

According Podvig RS-24 will have 3 400 kT warheads.

Mobility of the ICBMs and high readiness of the bomber/cruise missile force can offset the launch vehicle deficit somewhat. Survivability will remain the prime concern of the Russians. That’s why I think they will keep the SS-18 as long as possible, and at a very high alarm level, to keep the pressure on the U.S. The SS-18 is still a devastating weapon!

100% agreed.

Your article never mentioned scramjets anywhere…

OK Thanks. It was always confussion in the net on the Russian (S)RAMJET projects. So, below Mach 5.5 it is still a RAMJET regimen. OK. We can live with this.

Here a page with some images.

http://www.abovetopsecret.com/forum/thread227983/pg1

We can assume that still there is nothing operational but hypersonic tech is one of the fields where Russians are investing their black-project money.

Thanks Sferrin for the clarification.

Are there any active Russian scramjet programs?

On Russian scramjeting projects

Your article never mentioned scramjets anywhere. And Mach 4.5 wouldn’t require them anyway. An ASALM test vehicle went Mach 5.4 (that’s not a typo) with a conventional ramjet as well. It sounds like the person writing the article may have got a few things mixed up as “AS-19” is usually associated with Meteorite (which had several launch configurations under developement). I’ve heard dual warheads being associated with Meteorite but AFAIK that one being described in this article was just a ramjet powered test vehicle built by Raduga. Where the author really misses the mark is referring to it as an equivalent to the AGM-129. The AGM-129 is a subsonic stealth cruise missile with a dinky warhead (it doesn’t need to be big because it’s nuclear). The only thing the two missile have in common is they’re launched from aircraft, have a 3000km range, and a nuclear warhead. Everything else about them is different.

The one the article refers to is on the left with Meteorite on the right.

On Russian scramjeting projects

“AS-X-19 `Koala’ (Kh-90/BL10)
Type

Intermediate-range, air-launched, turbojet-powered, single-warhead
cruise missile.

Development

The existence of the AS-X-19 `Koala’ had been reported by the US
Department of Defense (DoD) in 1986, but was confirmed by the Russians
in 1988, when the US Secretary of Defense was shown around a Tu-160
`Blackjack’ bomber at an airbase near Moscow. The AS-X-19 was believed
to have the Russian designator Kh-90 or BL10, and was reported to be a
high-altitude supersonic cruise missile with air-launched, ship-launched
and ground-launched versions, developed from 1976 and believed to have
started flight trials in 1980. The AS-X-19 must therefore be considered
as equivalent to the US AGM-129 advanced cruise missile programme,
though probably several years behind. The programme was terminated in
1992, and it is reported that there were in excess of twenty flight
trials. It is believed that AS-X-19 was a dual design for the Russian
Air Force and Russian Navy, similar to the AS-15/SS-N-21 programme, with
the SS-NX-24 `Scorpion’ (P-750 Grom) variant to be launched from
submarines. The AS-X-19 was expected to be cleared for carriage by Tu-95
`Bear-H’ and Tu-160 `Blackjack’ aircraft although it was reported that
the Tu-95 could only carry two missiles. It is believed that Raduga NPO
used the AS-X-19 design as a hypersonic test vehicle, known as GELA, and
this has been used for research since 1994. In 1998, it was reported
that the AS-X-19, or a lower cost variant, had been redesigned and might
still be put into production for the Russian Air Force.

Description

From reports in 1996, it appears that the AS-X-19 had two delta canard
foreplanes at the nose, delta fins and tailplanes at the rear body and a
long pointed slender nose. It is believed that the AS-X-19 was 10.5 m
long, had a body diameter of 1.2 m and a wing span of 4.5 m. The larger
delta-wings fold for aircraft carriage, and there was a vertical folding
tail fin. The missile weight was 2,800 kg, and it was ramjet powered.
The ramjet inlet was circular with a conical centrebody, and then a long
slender nose section was shaped from the upper half of the body.
Conventional flight control elevators and rudders were mounted on the
wings and fin. It is believed that the AS-X-19 could cruise at altitudes
between 7 and 20 km at M4.5, and then made a steep dive onto the target.
Unconfirmed reports suggest that the missile had two independently
targeted warheads, capable of attacking separate targets 100 km apart.
It is assumed that these warheads were to have been nuclear, but that
any redesigned missile would have an HE warhead. The maximum range of
AS-X-19 is reported to have been 3,000 km.

Operational status

The AS-X-19 was in development and some 20 or more flight tests had been
made by1992, when Russia indicated that the programme would be
terminated. There are, however, indications that this AS-X-19 design has
been retained, with the GELA hypersonic research vehicle, and that
smaller missiles with turbojet or ramjet engines are being developed as
possible lower cost replacements.

Specifications

Length: 10.5 m
Body diameter: 1.2 m
Launch weight: 2,800 kg
Payload: 450 kg
Warhead: Nuclear or HE
Guidance: Inertial
Propulsion: Ramjet
Range: 3,000 km
Accuracy: n/k

Contractor

It is believed that the AS-X-19 `Koala’ missile was designed by the
Chelomei and Raduga NPO design bureau. “

Follow on Borei class subs (from the 3rd unit) are rumored to have 20 Bulava missiles. Remains to be confirmed. Anyways, that will affect overall numbers only slightly.

New START treaty in numbers

…

Ah! Funny! They come up with the same numbers as I did for the American side. (Though we differ in details).

For the Russian side I’m somewhat more optimistic than they are – see below.

But first a few words on the Russian position: Even with the new limits the Russians can’t keep up with the U.S. Nowhere near. Their force level will continue to decline for the next 8 years, and they are clearly launch vehicle limited, not warhead limited. This treaty would give incredible freedom to the U.S., and Congress would be stupid not to ratify it. For the Russians it is more “face saving” than anything else. That’s probably why BMD didn’t make it into the treaty (besides the fact that strategic BMD does not work within reasonable costs limits with current technology!) – the Russian position is just too weak, they don’t have any real leverage on the U.S. (besides the threat of aggressive proliferation). The U.S. wouldn’t need that treaty.

And what I really criticize – again – is that it is a biletral treaty, without even a provision for other nuclear powers to enter into it. I think this is a strategic mistake.

Ok, so now my draft RUSFOR 2020/25 (quite different from the link above, and maybe a little optimistic):

> 6+2 Borei, with 16 Bulava, with 6 warheads each
= 96 active launch vehicles, 32 reserve launch vehicles, 576 warheads
Maybe one or two Borei will still be Delta IV boats, but it wouldn’t really change the basic numbers. I think the weakness of the Russian submarine force will limit the role of the Russian SSBNs – there are just too many USN SSNs out there and not enough Russian SSNs to counter them, so the freedom of movement of the Russian SSBNs will be severly limited (even if they just float around in the White Sea).

For the land based forces we know the desire for 4 silo divisions and 5 mobile divisions. Though the number of missiles within the divisions is very variable, the average in 2020 should be around 30.

> 30+10 SS-18, each with a load of 10 warheads and a whole cloud of decoys
= 30 active launch vehicles, 10 reserve launch vehicles, 300 warheads
I think they will try everything to keep the SS-18 in service as long as possible. Organised in 1 silo division.

> 150 SS-27, each with 1 warhead, the number of reserve launch vehicles very low if any, as production capability is the bottleneck.
= 150 launch vehicles, 150 warheads
They would be organised in 1 silo division, plus 4 mobile division.

> 120 RS-24, each with 4 warheads, the number of reserve launch vehicles very low if any, as production capability is the bottleneck.
= 120 launch vehicles, 480 warheads
They would be organised in 2 silo division, plus 1 mobile division.

The manned bomber and their ultra-long range cruise missiles are still important for Russia, and they are also good for load-balancing the force.
> 20 Tu-160 with 12 cruise missiles each, plus a certain (one-digit) number of reserves
= 20 treaty-warheads

> 40 Tu-95 with 6 cruise missiles each, plus a certain number of reserves
= 40 treaty-warheads

The cruise missile count and the effective warhead count would be 480+.

All that would bring them to the warhead limit (actually a little over it – easy to balance with the bombers), even though the launch vehicle count would be as low as 450 plus a few reserves. In comparison to the link above I see about 50 launch vehicles more. Iinsofar I trust in an increase of the Russian production capability, and I’m actually a lot more optimistic about the MIRV capability, bringing the active treaty-warhead count to the same level as for the U.S., even though the effective active warhead count could be around 300 lower than the U.S., in case the U.S. keeps the strategic bomber force.

Mobility of the ICBMs and high readiness of the bomber/cruise missile force can offset the launch vehicle deficit somewhat. Survivability will remain the prime concern of the Russians. That’s why I think they will keep the SS-18 as long as possible, and at a very high alarm level, to keep the pressure on the U.S. The SS-18 is still a devastating weapon!

New START treaty in numbers

New START Treaty deal reached

One can read parts of the Yengst book (Lightning Bolts) here:

http://books.google.se/books?id=lN0w6X0PG3QC&lpg=PA1&ots=DxFF2iH8tz&dq=lightning%20bolts%20%20william%20yengst&pg=PA1#v=onepage&q=&f=false

Looks like it could be interesting….

There was this Russian-French Scramjet project that had some success to its credit.

Barely enough that people occassionaly refer to it but that’s about it. Read a paper on it written by some of the engineers on the project and overall they seemed fairly disappointed.

Do you have any specific information on this? Was it an actual scramjet or a ramjet? Did it produce net thrust or was it just along for the ride? Was it simply a model? (The X-15 flew with one of those.)

Specific Information on one of the closely guarded secret of the trade , are you serious ?

Lightning Bolts by the American author William Yengst has some information on the subject , it seems Topol-M has some kind of Ramjet based propulsion and the link I provided is equally confirmed by William , I am waiting to put my hands on the book , some one who has read mentions its worth every penny.

A scramjet project is a far cry from a flying scramjet. The X-30 was one of those.

There was this Russian-French Scramjet project that had some success to its credit.

The only non-classified program that confirms Scramjet usage is the Indo-Russian Brahmos-2