Latest GBI numbers plans.

The situation regarding the number of GBI silos is more complex than I’d realised. When the decision was taken to limit the Fort Greely deployment of GBI missiles to 26 rounds, this was to have been achieved by reducing the size of the third silo field, which is currently under construction.

Last autumn, a decision was taken to built an additional eight silos in this third field.

There are no plans to buy additional missiles for those eight empty silos; they will be left empty. But if threat developments were to require an increase in the deployed force, up to eight missiles from the batch currently allocated to test flights could be used for this purpose.

MKV was devised as method of dealing with threats incorporating sophisticated countermeasures. This threat now seems unlikely to be fielded by ‘rogue’ nations in the near future, but China and Russia saw it as posing a threat to their ballistic-missile forces.

Testifying before the House Armed Services Committee Strategic Forces Subcommittee on May 21, 2009, Missile Defense Agency Director Lieutenant General Patrick J. O’Reilly described the MKV as “not a necessary capability to defeat rogue threats, and its significant technical challenges and long development timeline warrants review of other capabilities to provide a more near-term hedge against future threats.”

As an alternative approach to dealing with countermeasures, the MDA is now looking at ascent-phase engagements that would achieve an interception early enough in the flight of the threat missile that they would occur before the latter had begun is dispense its countermeasures. Just how much time is available between the end of powered flight and the start of countermeasure release is hard to predict, and is getting into highly-classified areas.

This seems somewhat contradictory. Wouldn’t KEI be an almost ideal ascent-phase weapon? :confused:

Were the reasons for MKV’s cancellation equally compelling?

MKV was devised as method of dealing with threats incorporating sophisticated countermeasures. This threat now seems unlikely to be fielded by ‘rogue’ nations in the near future, but China and Russia saw it as posing a threat to their ballistic-missile forces.

Testifying before the House Armed Services Committee Strategic Forces Subcommittee on May 21, 2009, Missile Defense Agency Director Lieutenant General Patrick J. O’Reilly described the MKV as “not a necessary capability to defeat rogue threats, and its significant technical challenges and long development timeline warrants review of other capabilities to provide a more near-term hedge against future threats.”

As an alternative approach to dealing with countermeasures, the MDA is now looking at ascent-phase engagements that would achieve an interception early enough in the flight of the threat missile that they would occur before the latter had begun is dispense its countermeasures. Just how much time is available between the end of powered flight and the start of countermeasure release is hard to predict, and is getting into highly-classified areas.

It wasn’t the technical problems that ‘sank’ the KEI. The weapon was essentially undeployable given current logistics and the limitations on where it had to be sited with respect of the threat location.

I did some work last year on the reasoning behind KEI and MKV cancellations for a client (whose eventual need for a report on the topic ‘evaporated’). Somewhere in my hard disk ‘farm’ there will be copies of various DoD and other-source reports that I read at that time, and most painted a gloomy picture of KEI’s operational viability. The DoD moved quickly to cancel the programme before significant money had been spent.

Were the reasons for MKV’s cancellation equally compelling?

And I’m not talking about a new plane, I’m talking of hanging a THAAD based interceptor (or a derivate of the upcoming fat version of SM-x) under a plane that would be loitering in the area in any case, like an airliner-based tanker which might well be the almost perfect platform. The crew of the tanker doesn’t even have to be involved in the BMD mission.

Neither is designed for air carriage. Also you wouldn’t have 24/7 coverage like you would with surface-based units unless you devoted aircraft to the task.

A truck is more expensive than a new plane? Put down the pipe man.

Hehehe – wish I had some! Doesn’t grow so well in winter! 😀

On a system level? I think a small-ish airborne boost-phase interceptor, derivate of some existing SAM/BMD system, would be cheaper than a ground-based KEI monster, while giving flexibility, scalability, survivability. The sensor and C3 network remains basically the same.

And I’m not talking about a new plane, I’m talking of hanging a THAAD based interceptor (or a derivate of the upcoming fat version of SM-x) under a plane that would be loitering in the area in any case, like an airliner-based tanker which might well be the almost perfect platform. The crew of the tanker doesn’t even have to be involved in the BMD mission.
If a launch would be anticipated, a dedicated platform like a B-52, B-1, or even a F-15E or SHornet if need be, could be placed in theatre and on alert.

Of course a dedicated LO UAV (or the B-2) would be better, as it could be placed closer to the potential launch area, but for a start that’s not necessary. Though the same LO UAV could be the basis for a tanker-, sensor-, data relay-, strike-, or even a laser-platform.

At the risk of sounding like a large colorful bird here – using an aircraft as first stage gets around a lot of the kinetic problems. Can’t find it right now, but I posted it here somewhere, if you take e.g. a THAAD-based boost-phase interceptor and use it NCADE-style, you have a tremendous increase of the intercept footprint. And I’m not even talking about the military aspects. Expensive? Certainly not more than a ground-based version, and with much higher user value.

A truck is more expensive than a new plane? Put down the pipe man.

IIt’d be quite depressing if they threw their hands up over problems less difficult than those solved 40 years ago.

It wasn’t the technical problems that ‘sank’ the KEI. The weapon was essentially undeployable given current logistics and the limitations on where it had to be sited with respect of the threat location.

I did some work last year on the reasoning behind KEI and MKV cancellations for a client (whose eventual need for a report on the topic ‘evaporated’). Somewhere in my hard disk ‘farm’ there will be copies of various DoD and other-source reports that I read at that time, and most painted a gloomy picture of KEI’s operational viability. The DoD moved quickly to cancel the programme before significant money had been spent.

At the risk of sounding like a large colorful bird here – using an aircraft as first stage gets around a lot of the kinetic problems. Can’t find it right now, but I posted it here somewhere, if you take e.g. a THAAD-based boost-phase interceptor and use it NCADE-style, you have a tremendous increase of the intercept footprint. And I’m not even talking about the military aspects. Expensive? Certainly not more than a ground-based version, and with much higher user value.

*That* could be the true modern day strategic mission of the AFGSC’s 2nd and 5th Wing, defensive strategic deterence instead of offensive strategic deterrence.

It had yet to fly, but a lot of testing had been done – and thrown up major problems.

KEI was really pushing the state of the art. It relied on a fast burning rocket motor with a high velocity at burnout, advanced boost phase target tracking and prediction algorithms, and the direct downlinking of overhead sensor data to a mobile weapon. One goal was to have a large divert capability that would allow the missile to be launched as early as possible in the engagement sequence.

Begun as a boost-phase weapon, it had ‘grown’ to become a weapon with mid-course capability.

According to DoD documents, the programme was plagued with problems. There had been repeated first and second stage booster case failures, problems with the thrust-nozzle control system, and avionics overheating and failures.

I’d heard bits about the motor problems. I’d like to know what they were as I doubt KEI’s motors were subject to more severe conditions than those of Sprint or Hibex. It’d be quite depressing if they threw their hands up over problems less difficult than those solved 40 years ago.

The whole “proven” thing bugs me. How is something suppose to be proven until it is? …Just the idiotic idea that somehow something is suppose to be “proven” to work BEFORE any testing is done makes me want to smack politicians.

It had yet to fly, but a lot of testing had been done – and thrown up major problems.

KEI was really pushing the state of the art. It relied on a fast burning rocket motor with a high velocity at burnout, advanced boost phase target tracking and prediction algorithms, and the direct downlinking of overhead sensor data to a mobile weapon. One goal was to have a large divert capability that would allow the missile to be launched as early as possible in the engagement sequence.

Begun as a boost-phase weapon, it had ‘grown’ to become a weapon with mid-course capability.

According to DoD documents, the programme was plagued with problems. There had been repeated first and second stage booster case failures, problems with the thrust-nozzle control system, and avionics overheating and failures.

On May 20, 2009 Gates told the House Appropriations Defense Subcommittee: “A big part of the problem with this program is that it needs to be close to the launch site to be able to be effective… the only potential country where it could have a role with some confidence would be North Korea. It has poor capability against Iran and virtually no capability against either Russia or Chinese launch facilities. And so you have a very limited capability here at considerable cost.”

Another issue was that it was too big to be handled by normal military logistics and fielding methods. This turned out to be a really major issue, but I don’t have the details to hand.

A mere slip of the mouse – I cut & pasted the wrong paragraph from the DoD report.

Let’s try again:

“The Defense Department also terminated the Kinetic Energy Interceptor (KEI) program. The KEI mission was designed to counter advanced ballistic missile threats by intercepting missiles in the boost phase of flight. KEI was neither affordable nor proven, could not be integrated into existing weapons platforms or systems, and did not conform to the strategy of focusing on emerging regional missile threats. As a result, it grew in cost from $4.6 billion to $8.9 billion, the development schedule continued to slip, and the average-unit production cost grew from $25 million to more than $50 million per interceptor. In addition, the KEI’s size meant that any existing operational platform would need significant modifications to host it.”

The bottom line is unchanged; the programme was cancelled as part of the 2009 rethink of BMD.

The whole “proven” thing bugs me. How is something suppose to be proven until it is? They didn’t mind dumping billions into GM depite it not being “proven”. (They’d never dumped billions into GM before so how did they have proof that doing so would work?) Sorry, that’s not aimed at you. Just the idiotic idea that somehow something is suppose to be “proven” to work BEFORE any testing is done makes me want to smack politicians. Metaphorically speaking of course. . .for the most part. 😉

I can believe the cost though. SM-3 was at $17.5 million a pop at one point so I could see KEI (with it’s new KKV, motors, much larger size, new launchers, etc.) breaking $50 million.

I was talking about KEI not MKV.

A mere slip of the mouse – I cut & pasted the wrong paragraph from the DoD report.

Let’s try again:

“The Defense Department also terminated the Kinetic Energy Interceptor (KEI) program. The KEI mission was designed to counter advanced ballistic missile threats by intercepting missiles in the boost phase of flight. KEI was neither affordable nor proven, could not be integrated into existing weapons platforms or systems, and did not conform to the strategy of focusing on emerging regional missile threats. As a result, it grew in cost from $4.6 billion to $8.9 billion, the development schedule continued to slip, and the average-unit production cost grew from $25 million to more than $50 million per interceptor. In addition, the KEI’s size meant that any existing operational platform would need significant modifications to host it.”

The bottom line is unchanged; the programme was cancelled as part of the 2009 rethink of BMD.

Analogue to the old times practice of routing railways outside the reach of enemy heavy artillery I’d say something like 300nm from the nearest coastline is a good idea. Fort Greely is in such a location, but Vandenberg is vulnerable. In the end fixed sites will always remain vulnerable, and land-mobile (or airborne) would be the more flexible and survivable solution for the interceptor.

Which part of the world is out of range of a depressed trajectory SLBM? Not much. Put GBI where it’s most advantageous and then defend it with THAAD or something. GBI is WAY too big for the kind of vehicle Boeing was proposing. If you’re going to launch something that big from it truck it needs to be cold launched like Midgetman or Topol. It wouldn’t even need to be fancy like the Midgetman launcher. Start with one of these babies:

http://www.manitowoccranes.com/MCG_GRO/Products/EN/GMK7550.asp

take the crane off, and put on a launch tube similar in concept to that planned for KEI or Midgetman. The down side of mobility is now you need to design your missile and KKV to be bounced around all the time which likely means redesigning the thing (cha-ching).

Dropping MKV was a severe strategic mistake.

Totally agree with you there. It was suppose to put the odds in the hands of the defender by taking out suspected warheads AND the decoys. Stupid move ^10th

And KEI belongs under a loitering tanker, a strategic bomber, or a HALE UAV, but not on the ground, or a ship.

Making it airborne just jacked your costs up sky high. You either have to purchase dedicated launch aircraft (and enough of them for 24/7 coverage) or pull aircraft from other missions that they’re already filling and shorting yourself somewhere else. Surface basing them at sea would require new VLSs, bigger ships, and so forth so that’s not a great idea either. ATK at one point put forward the idea of a KEI-based IRBM. Develop a quad-cell launcher for the launch tube on the Ohios and maybe dedicate 8 of the 22 launch tubes on the SSGNs to combinations of KEI and KEI-based IRBMs. That’d give you potentially 128 KEIs available (depending on SSGN deployment obviously).

King George III had no part in the decision – it came a bit too late for him to have had a voice in the matter!

To quote the recently published Ballistic Missile Defense Review) “the MKV technology was not maturing at a reasonable rate. Since continuing to develop those technologies required to demonstrate MKV effectiveness would have been time-consuming and costly, the Department [of Defense] chose to terminate the MKV program and invest in other approaches. “

So it was a DoD decision taken in the light of a rethink that had been under way since mid-2009, if not earlier. By the time of the Huntsville meeting, it was clear that a shakeup in BMD was on the way.

I was talking about KEI not MKV.

Would it have been “militarily useful” 20 miles inland? :rolleyes:

Analogue to the old times practice of routing railways outside the reach of enemy heavy artillery I’d say something like 300nm from the nearest coastline is a good idea. Fort Greely is in such a location, but Vandenberg is vulnerable. In the end fixed sites will always remain vulnerable, and land-mobile (or airborne) would be the more flexible and survivable solution for the interceptor.

Dropping MKV was a severe strategic mistake.
And the rough equality in launch weight of a Midgetman-like single-warhead ICBM, a strategic MKV mid-course interceptor, and a small satellite launcher would have opened a wonderful field of opportunities.

And KEI belongs under a loitering tanker, a strategic bomber, or a HALE UAV, but not on the ground, or a ship.

My “remark” was more aimed at the fact that I never regarded the fixed-based GBI installation – especially one near the coast – as militarily useful, and also mindful of Obama’s turn towards the Navy’s SM-x system.

Since the third posting contained a graphic and no text, it seemed reasonable to assume the purpose of the graphic was to comment on the first two postings.

The location of the current GBI silos seems to be optimised for missile arriving from North Korea. Missiles from Iran would fly over the extreme North Atlantic or Greenland then over Canada and the north or northest USA. A GBI launched from Alaska would have to fly some 5,000 km across Canada to attempt a sideways-on engagement of an Iranian RV heading for Washington. I don’t think the GBI has that much range.

Although a model of a mobile GBI launcher was displayed at last year’s Huntsville conference, I know almost nothing about it. (None of my clients was prepared to fund me to go there, and in any case I’m getting too old to put up with the indignity of US entry procedures.) Boeing were being very coy about the mobile launcher concept last time I queried them on the subject.

I’d love to know what size of diplomatic ‘flap’ the reported 38-silo plan caused.

KEI would have been the way to go but the His Highness cancelled it.

King George III had no part in the decision – it came a bit too late for him to have had a voice in the matter!

To quote the recently published Ballistic Missile Defense Review) “the MKV technology was not maturing at a reasonable rate. Since continuing to develop those technologies required to demonstrate MKV effectiveness would have been time-consuming and costly, the Department [of Defense] chose to terminate the MKV program and invest in other approaches. “

So it was a DoD decision taken in the light of a rethink that had been under way since mid-2009, if not earlier. By the time of the Huntsville meeting, it was clear that a shakeup in BMD was on the way.

🙂

My “remark” was more aimed at the fact that I never regarded the fixed-based GBI installation – especially one near the coast – as militarily useful, and also mindful of Obama’s turn towards the Navy’s SM-x system.

Would it have been “militarily useful” 20 miles inland? :rolleyes:

Distiller had a post some while ago about a semi-mobile GBI, i share his view that is way superior.

Boeing’s take on it was a pethetic joke. KEI would have been the way to go but the His Highness cancelled it.

_

If you don’t want to read about GBI then don’t. Or do you have somebody there making you read it?