Iron Dome rocket defense tested Israel

Would i be too simplistic in assuming that the radar for the iron dome is probably a higher resolution lower range version of something like the green pine?

It uses the custom-designed IAI Elta Systems EL/M-2084 multi-mission radar, which is thought to exploit technology developed for the EL/M-2080 Green Pine. The two radars operated in different frequency bands.

Also would it be far fetched to believe that they have not gone for goal keeper or phalanx because of the prospects of having stray bullits in a high density population area?

Used in the land role, gun does not fire the solid depleted-uranium or tungsten projectiles originally developed for naval CIWS use, but an exposive-filled projectile fielded with the self-propelled Vulcan air-defence gun. This self-detonates at maximum range.

Would i be too simplistic in assuming that the radar for the iron dome is probably a higher resolution lower range version of something like the green pine?

Also would it be far fetched to believe that they have not gone for goal keeper or phalanx because of the prospects of having stray bullits in a high density population area?

The Israelis have always insisted that a gun solution would not work for them – I don’t know why. Sderot is not that big. Allegedly they are reconsidering the idea, but it looks like they see Iron Dome as a better solution. But I don’t know their reasoning.

The Israelis did not choose a gun solution because, as Hamas and Hezbollah have increased the range of their rockets over time, the area of Israel under threat has already become quite large, and the number of gun batteries that would be required similarly is very high. In the Gaza War of 2008/2009, Hamas already demonstrated it was capable of hitting Beersheba, Gedera, and Ashdod–about 25 miles from the Gaza border. These three cities alone have a combined population of 500,000 and would require dozens of batteries of Phalanx to defend them.

That said, it is true that Iron Dome has difficulty intercepting rockets launched just a few miles away, and Sderot may ultimately require several batteries of Phalanx for protection against such short range attacks.

It isn’t hard to see the export potential for a cost effective C-RAM that’s been proven in real world conditions. Obviously, it’s easy enough to mount a naval CIWS on a flatbed truck, and that sort of gun based solution might be far more than an interim solution….We’re talking about a huge emerging market!!!

It already been done, and the resulting product in the Ratheon Centurion, which is already in US service (and probably in British service) in SW Asia.

The Israelis have always insisted that a gun solution would not work for them – I don’t know why. Sderot is not that big. Allegedly they are reconsidering the idea, but it looks like they see Iron Dome as a better solution. But I don’t know their reasoning.

It isn’t hard to see the export potential for a cost effective C-RAM that’s been proven in real world conditions. Obviously, it’s easy enough to mount a naval CIWS on a flatbed truck, and that sort of gun based solution might be far more than an interim solution. There’s enough room in this emerging market for both the repurposed gun systems and an innovative, low cost missile based system.

Some posters are choosing to focus on a narrow application for Iron Dome, and it can’t be denied that there must be a domestic demand, driven by the events of recent years and ongoing concerns. That’s shouldn’t suggest that a C-RAM system of this sort wouldn’t be applicable to COIN warfare in larger coalition operations, or even for the point defense of static installations, both major and minor. We’re talking about a huge emerging market!!!

True. An advantage for Iron Dome is probably that the defended area is larger. Cost per kill probably favours a gun-based system, but to protect a given area more guns than missile batteries would be required.

MERCURIUS, may you provide us yor model equations?

I did not use stand-alone equations or algorithms to model the Qassam. This was done using a licenced software package. But I know there are various peformance-prediction programmes for model rockets available via the internet, so they may be suitable for a missile in this class.

Needless to say, all the really decent missile-modelling software is classified. The best package I’m aware of is from the US. It’s tightly licenced, and release to end users is decided on a case-by-case basis.

Some Iron Dome Photos, if not already seen

That defense system will calculate trajectory and only fire on rockets that might land on inhabitated areas.

It isn’t hard to see the export potential for a cost effective C-RAM that’s been proven in real world conditions. Obviously, it’s easy enough to mount a naval CIWS on a flatbed truck, and that sort of gun based solution might be far more than an interim solution. There’s enough room in this emerging market for both the repurposed gun systems and an innovative, low cost missile based system.

Some posters are choosing to focus on a narrow application for Iron Dome, and it can’t be denied that there must be a domestic demand, driven by the events of recent years and ongoing concerns. That’s shouldn’t suggest that a C-RAM system of this sort wouldn’t be applicable to COIN warfare in larger coalition operations, or even for the point defense of static installations, both major and minor. We’re talking about a huge emerging market!!!

goal keeper / phalanx all along the border wouldnt that be easier?

The big question is if this system really will help Israel, or hurt it.

Quassams are cheap to manufacture, but are very inacurate and have so far cauced very little real dammage to Israel. But given this Iron Dome system, Hezbullah has now actually been given a great opportunity to bleed Israel finacially -and thereby causing reall damage.

Just fire of a bunch of cheap and harmless Quassams each day against Sderdot etc and force Israel to react with their expensive interceptor missiles each time. I.e -it doesnt matter if the quassam gets through or not (but if it does its an extra “bonus”), cause the real goal by the barrage is just to trigger the expensive defence system. Eventually it will hurt Israels economy bad. This will be of mouch greater military value to Hezbullah than killing one or two Israelis with their rockets each year.

And politically it will be very hard for the Israeli government to shut down the system for cost/benefit reasons once its up and running.

Isnt it going to be expensive intecepting cheap rockets with expensive missiles?

A Qassam costs about $200 to manufacture, about 0.004% of the reported $45,000 of an Iron Dome round.

But in practice, less than 3% of the rockets fired against Israel land in urban areas (I’ve had time to check my notes on this). So on average, to get a single Qassam impact into a an urban area, the Hamas rocket teams have to fire more than 30 at a cost of around $6,000.

However, the Qassam is being produced by a very poor society – the combined GDP of the Gaza Strip and West Bank is around USD5 billion, less than 3% of Israel’s GDP of about USD185 billion. So in terms of an investment, the cost of a Qassam round is the equivalent of Israel spending $6,000. Building 30 Qassams is the equivalent of Israel spending $180,000.

To this equation you have to add the cost inflicted on the Gaza Strip by the inevitable Israeli counterstrikes which follow Qassam launches, plus the savings that Israel will make by not having to repair the damage caused by a Qassam rocket impact.

Depends on what level you calculate. If people in the border regions sit in their basements for days, and the economy is standing still, it sure is more costly than a couple of dozens of missiles. Plus not to forget the political upheaval every time some Qassams land in some Israeli village, even if the damage is only broken windows.

Would they not have integrated something like the phalanx anti mortor or rocket system into the iron dome for these types of rockets? I guess the range would be very limited however and therefor the protection it would give.

Isnt it going to be expensive intecepting cheap rockets with expensive missiles?

Would they not have integrated something like the phalanx anti mortor or rocket system into the iron dome for these types of rockets? I guess the range would be very limited however and therefor the protection it would give.

Looking at how the Qassam-2/3 and Grads are usually fired (from a ~45° ramp), I bet Hamas targets them by going to Google Earth and drawing a circle.

In Aviation Week last year there was a pretty detailed description of the intercept timing. 15sec I think is the time from detection (about 2-3 sec after firing) till intercept. But I could be wrong here.

Call for assessment: Would they waste a Tamir interceptor on a Qassam-1?

My computer model of the Qassam was created to match the weapon’s known performance.

MERCURIUS, may you provide us yor model equations?

Who is to say if they will not fly a flatter trajectory at cost of range to test Iron Dome or build a bigger rocket that can fly further at flatter flight path.

In theory you can use a lower trajectory – simple ballistics suggest that for a projectile travelling at 200 m/sec, an elevation angle of 15 degrees will have arrange of about 2 km. That is fine of you assume an artillery projectile and ignore drag.

But the situation with a real-world rocket is not so simple. My computer model of the Qassam was created to match the weapon’s known performance. It has a burnout velocity of about 750 m/sec, rapidly dwindling after burnout.

A shot at only five degrees elevation gives a range of more than 4 km. To get a range of 2 km involved an angle of less than three degrees. The computer model I’m using was intended to simulate short-range rockets, so these figures may not be accurate, but they are probably in the correct ballpark. (Forum members who are ‘into’ model rocketry may have access to software better suited to this class of weapon.)

Such flat trajectories are not militarily useful – it my be difficult to find a launch site with no natural or manmade obstructions but which still meets other tactical considerations such as potential launcher and launch crew survivability. The grazing impact angle will pose similar problems at the target end, with the round striking higher ground rather than its intended target. While a tiny error in the approach angle would result in an impact well over or well under the desired range.

Besides that… How many cheap rockets can be destroyed if system is saturated and how much will it cost?

Israeli experience of being under rocket fire has shown that less than 10 percent of all rockets fired pose a potential threat – the remainder crash into fields or open countryside. (I was given a more exact figure by Rafael, but haven’t time to hunt for the appropriate notebook.) So an important task of the Iron Dome system will be to determine the likely impact point of incoming Qassams so that interceptors are fired only that those that would otherwise land in a built-up area.

Besides that… How many cheap rockets can be destroyed if system is saturated and how much will it cost?

I’ve modelled a Qassam rocket and looked at likely trajectories. I won’t bore you with the numbers, but a more realistic Qassam flight time to Sderot is around a minute for a high trajectory, and I’ve seen no evidence that a low trajectory has been used.

Who is to say if they will not fly a flatter trajectory at cost of range to test Iron Dome or build a bigger rocket that can fly further at flatter flight path.