No safety on UK nuclear warheads

I think the reporter probably jumped the gun, without being properly informed.

I suspect the bicycle locks is just one layer of security and that like others have said the bicycle locks probably only power up the bomb. There probably are additional levels of security, that hopefully require remote code activation. I suspect a lot of this information is classified and compartmentalized; so the reporter was probably only shown one level of security (a compartment).

It would be the equivalent of driving by a base that has nuclear weapons, and showing a reporter a chain-link fence, and the reporter assuming that the chain-link fence is the only defense, and that people can access nuclear bombs with only a set of wire cutters. Somehow I suspect our nuclear bombs are guarded by more than a chain-link fence, just as I suspect British nuclear bombs require more then a bicycle lock to fully arm them.

As others have said I suspect the bicycle lock is likely only a pre-arm, or power on.

Les,
Didn’t the first B(I)8 weapon lack PAL (too old, too early) and the second have it?

You could be right Jacko, I left all that behind in ’65 so the “B(I)8 Phase II” stuff when they all gathered together at Laarbruch my have had the PAL system. Could find out I suppose from Cranberry pilots of the day I still know (they’re getting fewer every year 🙁 ), but it was all so long ago and seems so uninteresting now. But then when the Buccs and Phants (and Jags) showed up it all took off in a different direction so you’re probably right.

Anyway, doesn’t really matter what you write Jacko, you’ll never convince the likes of plawolf of the truth of those days.

Arthur,
I believe that there were nuke facilities at Bruggen, Geilenkirchen, Laarbruch and Wildenrath – and maybe at Alhorn and Wahn and Gutersloh too…..

The main clutch stations all had nuke facilities, don’t know about Wahn but Alhorn must have had as 123 Sqn started there with their B(I)6s.

.

Les,

Didn’t the first B(I)8 weapon lack PAL (too old, too early) and the second have it?

Arthur,

The RAFG Canberras used US weapons – unlike the MEAF and FEAF aircraft.

I believe that there were nuke facilities at Bruggen, Geilenkirchen, Laarbruch and Wildenrath – and maybe at Alhorn and Wahn and Gutersloh too…..

Arthur
14 Sqn was at Wildenrath with Canberra B(I)8s from 1962 to 1970 and stood nuke QRA. In fact they were there when their numberplate was 88 Sqn (still with B(I)8s) which had been formed there in 1958. 88 Sqn was re-numbered 14 Sqn in December 1962 -I was at their party!

Jacko
Responding to your previous – the B(I)8s didn’t have the PAL system even though the weapon was the US Project E. Did come with a contingent of US “Guardians” though and it was one of these chaps that shot the leccy in the leg.

.

[QUOTE=Jackonicko;1183821]An electrician at Wildenrath was shot for crossing the NLZ line momentarily before the rest of the crew…./QUOTE]
You’re sure it was Wildenrath? I don’t think it ever had a nuclear weapons facility, but i could be wrong. There certainly wasn’t one during the Phantom days. Besides, with only so few UK warheads available and Brüggen so close by, i doubt there was a need for one.

Laarbruch’s nuclear safari park is still in place (but empty, duh). If anyone ever flies into Flughafen Niederrhein or Weeze or whatever it’s called these days; it’s on the other side across the runway from the terminal building.

[color=red]Grow up and quit insulting people for not having pristine spelling habits, will you? Continuing to insult someone who is trying to have a discussion is grossly moronic and will result in some time off for the next offender.[/color]

The issue is that if the WE177s didn’t have PALs, then it stands to reason none of the UK’s other nukes have them either. That is the issue.

Make no mistake, good security has played the overwhelming part in keeping Britian’s nukes safe, but it is also very likely that those seeking nukes assume the UK to have a similar level of security for its warheads as the Americans and Russians, thus they did not even try to breach the security of British facilities. But now that is changed, and ‘bad’ people are going to start taking long hard looks at the current UK security regime and I think you simply can’t be too careful when nukes are concerned.

Wolf,

Why do you persist in doing this?. You’ve been ‘advised’ twice now by two seperate posters that you are commenting on something that, not only, do you not know anything about, but, you arent willing to do the most fundamental research on?.

The UK has NO OTHER nuclear weapon type of which the type of PAL discussed here could be applied. The system used for Trident missiles is completely different and the warheads for those will only function as a component of the Trident system anyway. There are no UK nuclear shells, torpedoes, freefall bombs, TLAM warheads or any kind of nuclear ordnance.

As for challenging of British nuclear weapons security, well, the location of the warhead depot and loading facilities for the Vanguard force is a poorly kept secret, especially in the face of SNP ‘righteous fury’, I’d not advise anyone to try and capitalise on that knowledge though. It would be a one of life’s more unpleasant experiences for anyone attempting the feat without, probably, an armoured brigade behind them!.

I know you are simply attempting to save face with the ‘I think you simply can’t be too careful when nukes are concerned’ empty rhetoric, but, you really have little to be concerned about!

I am quite sure that terrorists will be desperately trying to steal a Trident now, just because of a poorly written BBC piece… Also, I must seriously question your assertions about Russian nuclear weapons security, it wasn’t exactly what could be called secure. There was an expose a few years back, with regard to Russian silo-based and mobile ballistic missiles, where it was revealed that the operators had the option of simply uscrewing the panel, and manually ordering a launch… This is much more worrying, especially given the sheer numbers of Russian missiles out there…

People who actually know about nukes suggest that such a last line of defence is necessary only if your procedures are slipshod and slack (or perhaps if you’re doling out your nukes to less-than-reliable allies).

So, according to you, the Americans have ‘slipshod and slack procedures’ and has a habbit of ‘doling out their nukes to less-than-reliable allies’? And they have PALs because they realise this and decide to add PALs instead of improving their procedures?

Your reasoning simply flies in the face of reality.

An RAF aircraft would NEVER have been accidentally loaded with live nukes, an RAF pilot would never have failed to notice the coloured bands on the weapon that indicate exactly what it had, warhead wise, and he and his aircraft would never have been released to the runway with weapons aboard without proper authorisation, and would have been physically stopped without that authorisation.

I’m sure you would have said the same thing of the Americans a few months back. :rolleyes:

Indeed, proper procedures and safeguards are BETTER than PALs, which have problems all of their own.

Since when has this been a ‘this or that’ choice?

Nor was the lack of a PAL on WE177 a “dirty little secret”, certainly since the weapon was withdrawn, much has been known about the weapon’s characteristics and the procedures surrounding it.

You get as worried as you like, old chap, but do so in the realisation that you’re doing so out of total ignorance, and about a weapon we haven’t had for nearly ten years.

I’m not worried about any one type of bomb, but the culture that places trust in people above proven technology.

Trust is a great thing, but you can’t change human nature, and it is in our nature to error and fail. Mistakes are always made no matter how well designed the system is. Having something to fall back on if and when humans fail is a hell of a lot better then not having it. Especially when we already have an all to similar example when your vaunted procedures have failed so spectacularly.

Wolf

If you are going to get all hysterical and ranty about these things do yourself a favour….check whether or not the weapons are still in service before raising an outcry?. The weapon discussed here is the WE177 freefall nuclear bomb/depth charge – google it.

The decision of not adding PAL’s was, in rare instance, absolutely nothing to do with resources. No more than about 200 WE177 weapons were built in total and the numbers deployed to service units was a fraction of that total. All in all the RN had the massive total of 43 of the NDC variant of the weapon and they werent all deployable at one time. The need for hideously complex PAL’s just simply was not there when correct procedures and some fairly simple and effective technical steps could accomplish the same task.

The issue is that if the WE177s didn’t have PALs, then it stands to reason none of the UK’s other nukes have them either. That is the issue. Besides, the PAL is a ready and available tech, the UK didn’t need to develop one, we could have bought them off the Americans.

Make no mistake, good security has played the overwhelming part in keeping Britian’s nukes safe, but it is also very likely that those seeking nukes assume the UK to have a similar level of security for its warheads as the Americans and Russians, thus they did not even try to breach the security of British facilities. But now that is changed, and ‘bad’ people are going to start taking long hard looks at the current UK security regime and I think you simply can’t be too careful when nukes are concerned.

“Have a think of why nukes deployed to Germany would need PALs in the first place.”

Um, err. Only the US weapons had them. Because they were US weapons that were built with them, genius! WE177s in Germany didn’t have PALs and didn’t need them.

You say that PALS are “a last line of defence totally independent of anyone who may have physical access to the weapon.”

People who actually know about nukes suggest that such a last line of defence is necessary only if your procedures are slipshod and slack (or perhaps if you’re doling out your nukes to less-than-reliable allies). An RAF aircraft would NEVER have been accidentally loaded with live nukes, an RAF pilot would never have failed to notice the coloured bands on the weapon that indicate exactly what it had, warhead wise, and he and his aircraft would never have been released to the runway with weapons aboard without proper authorisation, and would have been physically stopped without that authorisation.

WE177 already had multiple safeguards (belts and braces) – they didn’t need a frayed bit of string as well.

Indeed, proper procedures and safeguards are BETTER than PALs, which have problems all of their own.

Nor was the lack of a PAL on WE177 a “dirty little secret”, certainly since the weapon was withdrawn, much has been known about the weapon’s characteristics and the procedures surrounding it.

You get as worried as you like, old chap, but do so in the realisation that you’re doing so out of total ignorance, and about a weapon we haven’t had for nearly ten years.

Wolf

every terrorist nutjob and underworld arms dealer is going to be actively seeking out cracks in the system to try and get their hands on these ‘unsafe’ weapons

If you are going to get all hysterical and ranty about these things do yourself a favour….check whether or not the weapons are still in service before raising an outcry?. The weapon discussed here is the WE177 freefall nuclear bomb/depth charge – google it.

Lastly, please do not insult the intellegence of people here by suggesting that the true reason for the MoD’s decision not to employ PALs as anything other then petty penny pinching from politicians who have a damning record of underinvestment in the military.

The decision of not adding PAL’s was, in rare instance, absolutely nothing to do with resources. No more than about 200 WE177 weapons were built in total and the numbers deployed to service units was a fraction of that total. All in all the RN had the massive total of 43 of the NDC variant of the weapon and they werent all deployable at one time. The need for hideously complex PAL’s just simply was not there when correct procedures and some fairly simple and effective technical steps could accomplish the same task.

The sheer breadth of your misunderstanding and ignorance is astonishing.

WE177 was not armed before take off, it was pre-armed. Since the bomb used a thermal battery with a wax-like electrolyte that was virtually inert until it was melted by a tiny pyrotechnic charge, the bomb had to be dropped to be used. (Except in the Jag, release of a weapon also required the active consent of both crew).

Nor was the pre-arming key all that simple. The SEF key was a specially designed and unique key with a million combinations.

The two man principal has nothing to do with numbers of guards. It dictated that anything involving the weapon should involve two authorised and competent persons, familiar with the task in hand. Two men must be present at all times whenever there was access to a nuclear weapon or nuclear component and there should be no situation where one man would be able to make settings on the weapon, or make decisions as to its use, without a second person agreeing.

The two man principle applied even to two aircraft technicians who had nothing to do with the weapon, and if it was necessary to change a component then the fitter AND an overseer, competent in that job, had to be present. An electrician at Wildenrath was shot for crossing the NLZ line momentarily before the rest of the crew…..

Meanwhile the use of NLZs (50 yards around the weapon) ensured that your imaginary ‘traitor pilot’ would have been killed if he tried to even approach a bomb alone, let alone steal one. A yellow line across the mouth of the hangar marked the No Lone Zone. The guards had orders to stop, and if necessary shoot, anyone crossing the line alone. And even if they didn’t, they needed proper authorisation to let the aircraft taxy (the nuclear QRA sheds were always physically blocked off from the runways by barriers).

The idea that one man could have overpowered the guard force and stolen a nuke is risible, and is clearly the product of a fertile imagination unencumbered by any knowledge of UK nuclear practises and procedures.

When the RAF used the single-seat Jag there were host of additional precautions that made it impossible for a pilot to get anywhere close to an armed aircraft, let alone get it out of the HAS, without proper authorisation, and there were a number of hurdles to clear before the aircraft was released onto the runway. This included a dual key system for the entry door to the HAS, one key issued to the pilot and one held by the RAFP guard at the HAS. The key was issued with a three digit release code which the pilot had to write on a whiteboard just to get the HAS doors opened to taxy. It would have required the co-operation of the armourers, the HAS team, the RAF Police and the security team at the taxiway gates for a pilot to be able to take off without authorisation.

It almost makes me want to “suicide myself”. (Don’t tell me, that’s a typo too?)

Don’t forget that the RAF had seen and used PALs (on the RAF Germany Canberra B(I)8s and F-4s) so saw the advantages and disadvantages of the technology.

Do you know what happened if the PAL failed? “The crew would call in the custodian who would then dial the digits straight in to the bomb….”

And what makes you think the Americans or Russians or Chinese or any other responsible nuclear power does not employ similar measures? Yet the Russians and Americans also employ PALs.

As the recent American case shows, all those theoretical safeguards and security measures can and have already failed. What is written in textbooks is more often then not not what happens in real life, that is why there are so many safety measures. One thing you have to remember is that even if a system is perfect in theory, if it relies too heavily on humans, then human error could easily undo it. That is the reason behind PALs – it is a last line of defence totally independent of anyone who may have physical access to the weapon. It is something that British weapons lack, and now that this dirty little secret is out, every terrorist nutjob and underworld arms dealer is going to be actively seeking out cracks in the system to try and get their hands on these ‘unsafe’ weapons. If nothing else, that is going to make attacks in this country more likely.

Lastly, please do not insult the intellegence of people here by suggesting that the true reason for the MoD’s decision not to employ PALs as anything other then petty penny pinching from politicians who have a damning record of underinvestment in the military. Have a think of why nukes deployed to Germany would need PALs in the first place.

The sheer breadth of your misunderstanding and ignorance is astonishing.

WE177 was not armed before take off, it was pre-armed. Since the bomb used a thermal battery with a wax-like electrolyte that was virtually inert until it was melted by a tiny pyrotechnic charge, the bomb had to be dropped to be used. (Except in the Jag, release of a weapon also required the active consent of both crew).

Nor was the pre-arming key all that simple. The SEF key was a specially designed and unique key with a million combinations.

The two man principal has nothing to do with numbers of guards. It dictated that anything involving the weapon should involve two authorised and competent persons, familiar with the task in hand. Two men must be present at all times whenever there was access to a nuclear weapon or nuclear component and there should be no situation where one man would be able to make settings on the weapon, or make decisions as to its use, without a second person agreeing.

The two man principle applied even to two aircraft technicians who had nothing to do with the weapon, and if it was necessary to change a component then the fitter AND an overseer, competent in that job, had to be present. An electrician at Wildenrath was shot for crossing the NLZ line momentarily before the rest of the crew…..

Meanwhile the use of NLZs (50 yards around the weapon) ensured that your imaginary ‘traitor pilot’ would have been killed if he tried to even approach a bomb alone, let alone steal one. A yellow line across the mouth of the hangar marked the No Lone Zone. The guards had orders to stop, and if necessary shoot, anyone crossing the line alone. And even if they didn’t, they needed proper authorisation to let the aircraft taxy (the nuclear QRA sheds were always physically blocked off from the runways by barriers).

The idea that one man could have overpowered the guard force and stolen a nuke is risible, and is clearly the product of a fertile imagination unencumbered by any knowledge of UK nuclear practises and procedures.

When the RAF used the single-seat Jag there were host of additional precautions that made it impossible for a pilot to get anywhere close to an armed aircraft, let alone get it out of the HAS, without proper authorisation, and there were a number of hurdles to clear before the aircraft was released onto the runway. This included a dual key system for the entry door to the HAS, one key issued to the pilot and one held by the RAFP guard at the HAS. The key was issued with a three digit release code which the pilot had to write on a whiteboard just to get the HAS doors opened to taxy. It would have required the co-operation of the armourers, the HAS team, the RAF Police and the security team at the taxiway gates for a pilot to be able to take off without authorisation.

It almost makes me want to “suicide myself”. (Don’t tell me, that’s a typo too?)

Don’t forget that the RAF had seen and used PALs (on the RAF Germany Canberra B(I)8s and F-4s) so saw the advantages and disadvantages of the technology.

Do you know what happened if the PAL failed? “The crew would call in the custodian who would then dial the digits straight in to the bomb….”

Like a lot of journalist’s endeavours, the is irresponsible rubbish and only tells a small part of the story. Yes, the WE177 did have a key but it did not ‘ARM’ the bomb as this article suggests. Anyone who knows anything about air-dropped weapons knows that on some weapons it may be necessary to remove some safety interlocks and set up various release, arming and functioning parameters before take-off to ensure that the weapon does what you intend it to when you drop it. That is what is happening here. The key – which was under two-man principle control at all times – was only one part of the release sequence – like most air-dropped weapons, the bomb had to be released before arming commenced. To suggest that as soon as the key is turned, the bomb is armed is complete rubbish, as is the suggestion that the RAF ‘vetoed’ the designer’s inclusion of a fancy lock and that the security of the bombs could rest on some ‘gentleman’s agreement’. Whoever wrote this story obviously doesn’t know anything about the design approval procedure for weapon safety. This is just sensationalist rubbish.

How exactly do you remotely arm a nuclear free-fall bomb after your have released it?

There might be a safety switch to prevant the weapon exploding by accident before release, but that is almost always a very low-tech mechanical device. Nothing that could not be by-passed with easy by anyone who knows what they are doing. That is exactly what PALs are designed to stop.

With the two-man principal, armed guards and NLZ (No Lone Zone) procedures, the nature of the key (which was pretty sophisticated by the standards of the day) is irrelevant.

So its impossible to overpower two guards instead of one?

And PALs don’t appear to have stopped some of the US atomic screw-ups – most recently accidentally flying six from Minot to Barksdale.

Apples and oranges. The recent US case was merely real weapons were carried instead of mock-ups. None of the weapons were armed and so could not have been used.

If a screw up on that magnitude is possible, imagine what could have happened if someone ‘in the know’ and also in a position of power and responsibility really put their minds to it. That is precisely why the Americans and Russians have PALs on their warheads – even if someone managed to get their hands on them, the weapons are essentually harmless without the right codes, which you can’t obtain by knocking out/killing a couple of guards who may well know you and hence not be on their guard.

What would have happened if the same thing happened here? Real bombs were loaded instead of fake ones. What if the pilot arranged it and has some high bidders waiting for the weapons? What if he had a mental break down and decided to suicide himself with a nuke? Remote possibilities these might be, but when the end result might be an atomic warhead mushrooming somewhere near me or my loved ones, then even a remote possibility is way too much.

With the two-man principal, armed guards and NLZ (No Lone Zone) procedures, the nature of the key (which was pretty sophisticated by the standards of the day) is irrelevant.

And PALs don’t appear to have stopped some of the US atomic screw-ups – most recently accidentally flying six from Minot to Barksdale.

Like a lot of journalist’s endeavours, the is irresponsible rubbish and only tells a small part of the story. Yes, the WE177 did have a key but it did not ‘ARM’ the bomb as this article suggests. Anyone who knows anything about air-dropped weapons knows that on some weapons it may be necessary to remove some safety interlocks and set up various release, arming and functioning parameters before take-off to ensure that the weapon does what you intend it to when you drop it. That is what is happening here. The key – which was under two-man principle control at all times – was only one part of the release sequence – like most air-dropped weapons, the bomb had to be released before arming commenced. To suggest that as soon as the key is turned, the bomb is armed is complete rubbish, as is the suggestion that the RAF ‘vetoed’ the designer’s inclusion of a fancy lock and that the security of the bombs could rest on some ‘gentleman’s agreement’. Whoever wrote this story obviously doesn’t know anything about the design approval procedure for weapon safety. This is just sensationalist rubbish.

Looks like it. Its a miracle one hasn’t been set off yet, and now that the news is out, it would be grossly moronic for the UK not of have PALs instealled immediately.