Blue Steel et al performance?

Wynn’s Official History (0117727784),1994,P.441 has May,1967 BS launches at 35-47 miles, impact errors 515/640/1,065yds. He never states that CA Release in dispersed QRA was unrestricted; if not, JN’s comment (undeclared first use policy) would have been true.

JN’s opening Q was how good were inertial guidance standoff weapons. See AGM-28 Hound Dog, AGM-69A SRAM, AGM-86B ALCM, but they had turbojet/solid rocket/turbofan. We funded Blue Steel in 1954, despairing to fill the Blue Boar task of 1946. Kearfott gyros had been accessed by MoS/Sandys, MoS had started stainless steel work (to be T.188), RPE’s liquid motor expertise (all those Screamer boosters) infused ASM Stentor: so 1960 deployment seemed poss. Solid fuel would be for a long-legged substitute, c.1965. It went so wrong from your choice from: new-hire team, many ex-RAE, not Avro-Aero-origin; MoS (non-)co-ordination of (not yet recognised as) Weapon System; debilitating effect of a sense of a short-run project, so low priority, despite the implications of our own SAM work.

The concept of Blue Steel was sound enough. In theory, the round would be released at about 35,000ft, would climb to about 59,000ft for a Mach 2.3 cruise phase, climb to a final height of just over 70,000ft, then fly a steep bunt manoeuvre to dive on its target.

In practice Blue Steel had more than its share of problems. The task of developing what was essentially a Mach 2.5+ unmanned aircraft had been badly underestimated, as had Avro’s ability to handle the development task. Planned to be in service by 1960, the missile was not ready for unrestricted service until 1964.

An engineer who had worked on the programme once told me that when the production configuration of the electronics were being prepared, some long-forgotten genius objected to the untidy layout of the vacuum tubes (valves for UK readers) so changed the layout to have them lined up neatly like soldiers on parade – largest in the back row, middle sized in a middle row, and smallest in the front row. This played havoc with the signal paths between the valves, since the original ‘untidy’ layout had been devised to keep the signal paths as short as possible. With the new valve layout, the paths were too long and the system didn’t work. A hasty rethink of the need for tidiness ensued…

The basic operational problem was the propellants. Deciding when to fuel the rounds during a military crisis would have been difficult. Although HTP oxidiser was not cryogenic, it was not suitable for long-term storage in the missile’s tanks. Once loaded into the missile, the HTP could only remain there for a maximum of seven days. Then it had to be drained, and the tank dried out. This drying equipment was in short supply, so only one round could be drained and dried at a time.

After a week on alert, a squadron that had fuelled all its missiles would be out of commission for about a fortnight.

HTP was nasty stuff, and only in late 1964 did someone realise that it would explode if it came into contact with the then-standard airframe re-icing fluid. Since Blue Steel was prone to propellant leaks, careful procedures had to be devised for de-icing an aircraft with a fuelled missile.

Another problem was that the nuclear warhead had to be fitted with thermal batteries, and no-one wanted to install these in weapons on QRA until combat operations seemed imminent. A scheme was eventually devised in which the batteries were placed almost in position, and could be fully inserted very quickly.

Reliability was another problem. In 1963 the RAF concluded that by the time a Blue Steel had been carried to its launch point, it only had a 40% chance of being fit for launch, while the failure rate of those remaining missiles was estimated at 25%. Those unfit for launch would have been released as free-falling bombs, as would the missiles that had not been fuelled when the V-force was scrambled to go on its war mission. It is a matter of speculation as to what the ballistic properties of a fuelled or unfuelled round would have been when released as a free-falling bomb.

The only accuracy figure I’ve seen was for a round tested at the UK’s Aberporth missile range. It landed 1,000 yards from the aiming point.

Mercurius Cantabrigiensis

Which ‘wrong way’ would that be?

You’re right, of course, about the real deterrence being U.S. provided. That was a matter of sheer numbers.

As far as the U.K. and France were concerned, the word was strangely applied from start to finish. The scenario being contemplated was one in which 1. the Soviets launched a ‘conventional’ invasion of Western Europe 2. Nato land forces surrendering or being overwhelmed and 3. the U.S. president then not having the gonads to threaten the nuclear (NOT pronounced noo-kew-lurr, thanks) option.

We would then have had the option to threaten a nuclear response of our own… without any word of demur from a U.S. which feared, quite rightly, escalation to global level… as if!

So far from being a ‘deterrent’ to any nuclear attack by the Soviets, it was an undeclared first use policy, designed to offer a cheaper option to that of maintaining massively greater conventional forces. ERWs (neutron bombs) and SRBMs then made their appearance and rendered the whole scenario a laughing stock.

There were two seperate Scenarios as far as Nato/UK was concerned.

1) Tripwire, As soon as Russian forces cross the Elbe the war becomes a Nuclear affair and everyone gets torched, this soon gave way to……

2)Escalated response, the idea being that only Germany gets nuked as everyone gets together and talks about their issues. You may be able to guess that I have little regard for that one.

When you take into account the Soviet belief that Nukes should be used in the same way as conventional ones it soon becomes apparent that any war would have been nuclear very rapidly. There was no concept of limited war between western European countries and the Soviet Union.

Dont take this the wrong way or anything but I think the real deterring was done by the US. Sure the UK played its part but until the arrival Polaris the UK lacked a credible nuclear capability. Partly though economics and partly through geography.

Which ‘wrong way’ would that be?

You’re right, of course, about the real deterrence being U.S. provided. That was a matter of sheer numbers.

As far as the U.K. and France were concerned, the word was strangely applied from start to finish. The scenario being contemplated was one in which 1. the Soviets launched a ‘conventional’ invasion of Western Europe 2. Nato land forces surrendering or being overwhelmed and 3. the U.S. president then not having the gonads to threaten the nuclear (NOT pronounced noo-kew-lurr, thanks) option.

We would then have had the option to threaten a nuclear response of our own… without any word of demur from a U.S. which feared, quite rightly, escalation to global level… as if!

So far from being a ‘deterrent’ to any nuclear attack by the Soviets, it was an undeclared first use policy, designed to offer a cheaper option to that of maintaining massively greater conventional forces. ERWs (neutron bombs) and SRBMs then made their appearance and rendered the whole scenario a laughing stock.

At the end of the day, if the Soviets didn’t know that and it deterred them, then it was doing its job. i.e. Deterring. Soviets never really thought much of the British or French nukes, not with number of US weapons behind them. In fact there was a lot of Spin at the time in the capabilities of British weapons in public at least. H-Bombs that were really boosted A-bombs and alike.

Dont take this the wrong way or anything but I think the real deterring was done by the US. Sure the UK played its part but until the arrival Polaris the UK lacked a credible nuclear capability. Partly though economics and partly through geography.

That would have to be the least survivable configuration imaginable for an already vulnerable aircraft.

At the end of the day, if the Soviets didn’t know that and it deterred them, then it was doing its job. i.e. Deterring. Soviets never really thought much of the British or French nukes, not with number of US weapons behind them. In fact there was a lot of Spin at the time in the capabilities of British weapons in public at least. H-Bombs that were really boosted A-bombs and alike.

Which from what I read somewhere is just what would have happened in real life, I recall reading that Blue Steel armed aircraft never did QRA duties with a fuelled weapon, due to the fact that somebody relised that keeping a nuclear armed missile containing a large amount of HTP was a very dangerous idea that was not worth the risk in normal peace time conditions. Had the ballon gone up with no warning, the aircraft would have launched and the missile was albe to be dropped as a free fall weapon.

That would have to be the least survivable configuration imaginable for an already vulnerable aircraft.

The missile wont go anywhere quickly if the launch aircraft gets hit before the release.;)

Which from what I read somewhere is just what would have happened in real life, I recall reading that Blue Steel armed aircraft never did QRA duties with a fuelled weapon, due to the fact that somebody relised that keeping a nuclear armed missile containing a large amount of HTP was a very dangerous idea that was not worth the risk in normal peace time conditions. Had the ballon gone up with no warning, the aircraft would have launched and the missile was albe to be dropped as a free fall weapon.

Absolutely – but this gives rise to an interesting thought. Wikipedia gives the performance as max 2.3 Mach and max 150 mile range. Back of a fag packet maths gives me an initial TTT (time to target) of 6 mins. Of course, this doesn’t allow for acceleration etc but, even if doubled, makes for scant time for defensive measures.

To me it looks interesting but, as you say, the planners eventually gave up on the Vulcans getting within firing range, even at low level.

The missile wont go anywhere quickly if the launch aircraft gets hit before the release.;)

The problem with Blue Steel was its range, or rather lack off.

Absolutely – but this gives rise to an interesting thought. Wikipedia gives the performance as max 2.3 Mach and max 150 mile range. Back of a fag packet maths gives me an initial TTT (time to target) of 6 mins. Of course, this doesn’t allow for acceleration etc but, even if doubled, makes for scant time for defensive measures.

To me it looks interesting but, as you say, the planners eventually gave up on the Vulcans getting within firing range, even at low level.

The problem with Blue Steel was its range, or rather lack off.

Good in what way? Accuracy? Reliability? Ability to make it through defenses?

Yep, that about sums up ‘good’. Bravo.

I thought that information might be a bit thin on the ground so left the exact criteria open… as one does…

A thought was provoked by the ‘Skybolt thread’.

I realise that inertial guidance standoff weapons were eventually superseded by ‘smarter’ technology… but just how good were they? Does anyone have any info or tales to tell on test firing results etc?

Good in what way? Accuracy? Reliability? Ability to make it through defenses?