AirAsia Airbus A320 gone missing

A powerful statement! (Sadly)

————

Here is a more appropriate article published today in the VillagesSunTime

This last sentence is probably the most sensible wording of the events so far:

The crew’s improper control inputs led to a loss of control which this crew were not capable of recovering from.

And a diag extracted from the KNKT report (p27) to illustrate the content*.

[ATTACH=CONFIG]242518[/ATTACH]

Source:
thevillagessuntimes.com

*the RTLU is the faulty circuit board governing the travel limit of the rudder trim

Make no mistake, some companies I flew for in the past did fit the other scenario above.

Everything is driven by profit, not only aviation!
However, I have just done Boeing 737-800 training at British Airway/Comair training facility in Johannesburg and I can say that they place a HIGH emphasis on safety and CRM to the extent that the airline will commend a pilot for any safety action he/she takes regardless of the cost. For instance a go-around or diversion in poor weather.

Obviously the above Press release is controversial. You are right to emphases that many are standing as real professional and safety is what drive them. Be ensured that it’s not my intention to put the discredit on all (and hence none).

WHat this press release show is that something (at least) is happening and gains a certain momentum. We see some moving forward calling cards for the next round.

QZ8501 as a stepping stone?

Everything is driven by profit, not only aviation!
However, I have just done Boeing 737-800 training at British Airway/Comair training facility in Johannesburg and I can say that they place a HIGH emphasis on safety and CRM to the extent that the airline will commend a pilot for any safety action he/she takes regardless of the cost. For instance a go-around or diversion in poor weather.

Engineers warn of repeat of AirAsia crash

In a statement, Aircraft Engineers International [which represents 40,000 aircraft engineers in 30 countries], said: “The public must be made aware that aviation today is driven by cost. Cost, not safety, is paramount.

“Pilots and Engineers are often placed under increasing pressure to accept second best, in order to ensure aircraft meet unrealistic flight schedules.
[…]
With training of pilots and engineers often the bare minimum, spares and manpower levels reduced to unacceptable levels, although workloads increase, the working life of these safety professionals has become centred on lowering costs.

Read the Press release here

Source:
Travelmole.com/

I am fed-up. Here is what we had to read today:

t was a mismanaged technical problem by the crew that caused the AirAsia Airbus A320 crash, almost a year ago (28 December 2014), in the Java Sea.

According to Indonesia’s National Transportation Safety Committee’s final report, it was a a tiny soldered electrical connection in the top of the vertical stabilizer, or tail, that caused the triggering of an alarm, which in turn indicated a failure of the rudder movement control system.

The captain then actuated the on/off button to reset the system (Rudder Travel Limiter Units). The alarm stopped, but was set off again shortly after. Three times the pilot performed the same operation, but when the alarm sounded a fourth time, the captain tried something else. He attempted to reset the Flight Augmentation Computer that controls the aircraft, by removing and re-inserting its circuit breaker, however, in so doing, the captain inadvertently disengaged the autopilot, and the automatic stall protection.

At 38,000 feet, the aircraft stalled. For four minutes, inappropriate and contradictory actions (miscommunication) of both pilots, led to the non-recovery of the plane, and the AirAsia A320 crashing at sea.

The report points to shortcomings in the aircraft’s maintenance and lack of crew stall recovery training. The accident claimed the lives of the 162 people on board the A320.

The chain of events clearly show that at each step, a comprehensive analysis of the inherent fault of the design done long ago would have led to a different outcome.

Let’s review it briefly (all sourced from the very easily and understandable KNKT report linked above):
– The design of the rudder trim induces some divergence in case of a problem instead of being auto-centered in safe mode just like with a basic set of springs and pulley.

– You need both computer to center it correctly ( this is why they experienced 1.4deg rudder offset (see the BEA comment at the end of the report).

– While the crew did pull physically the circuit breakers correctly, you still need to reset the overhead connected display indicator manually by pulling them off then pushed back on ( yes, just our cheap Window OS devoid of any logics).

– That very low amount of deviation resulted in a 60deg bank in a very short period of time thanks to the inadequate aerodynamic configuration that is not stable in roll (there was no action from the second Pilot during that time).

– The actual “stick” time of that young pilot was so inadequate for him to be in charge of so many life that he over rolled twice attempting to correct with a 60 deg correction on the right and then on the left (~15deg) (Imagine the situation of panic in the cabin after that – poor souls, it is so horrible to think at it). Last time I checked any F16 pilot with half the flight hours and four time the roll rate can manage better (while having no passengers).

– Once it was clear that his second was not able to handle the situation, the Captain tried to maneuver the plane out of the stall. The Airbus dual and un-linked mini-sticks philosophy led to the deep stall and spin (the young pilot kept pulling full aft canceling the action of his captain thanks to the AVERAGING LAW governing the sticks input – this is total madness by the way and similar to AF447 nearly a decade ago showing clearly that nobody care much at Airbus about previous experiences).

– Once in an unrecoverable situation, both pilots were still acting under the LIMITATION of a flight computer that HAD NO VALID CONTROL LAWS to manage the situation since this flight SITUATION is not FLIGHT TESTED. I fail to understand Airbus logic here.

– The Trim circuit fault rooted from an incident report dated from 1993. No proper action were taken by Airbus to successfully tackle the source of the problem despite the relatively basic complexity of it. Could it be the sign of a deliberate choice to keep an outdated process in the loop only to increase the turnover rate of that part and increased its profitability (see cost/year of a typical CN). I wonder if this is specific to this A320 series. What about the A330 or the A380?!?

[ATTACH=CONFIG]242439[/ATTACH]

– The related maintenance manual is a mess with addition being piled up during the years without any deep rewriting. This imparted IMOHO the maintenance crew to have a deep understanding of what proper actions could have been taken before the event (read it by yourself in the annex, it’s full of loop, redundancies and non-specific instructions). At the age of high turnover in many industrial process (part related), any Technical documentation MUST put the emphasis in having a pedagogical content.

– there are some troubling confusion in the teaching material b/w what is a stall and how you might enter a spin during a stall recovery (you certain don’t need to take roll action to get out of a stall even if you are in a bank turn). Coincidentally, the FAA issued a revision of its “Stall Prevention and Recover Training ” on the 24th of November:

[ATTACH=CONFIG]242450[/ATTACH]

To conclude, AirAsia crash reflects a systemic failure (design, SOP, maintenance and formation) and this ONLY should fill the content of a serious news article. Because the doubts raised today makes air traveling really scary…*

A thought for all the dead and their families. Once again, hundreds of people confident in a system that prized itself for its culture of safety died in an horrible agony after having to endure a 3min long terrifying plunges toward the ocean.

Note:

The above news article is extracted from http://www.aeronewstv.com/ but could have been from CNN or some other major media.
It’s a shame for the industry (and journalism perhaps) that we have to read this!

So yes, as we are reaching Christmas, let’s say that an Airbus should make for a nice toy for any fan of simulation with plenty of buttons to click-on with an automatic death sentence to fear in case the right sequence is not entered correctly…but not so much IMOHO in a real flight where the culture of safety is an integral part of performances.

Source:
FAA

*At least with planes designed by this manufacturer. But given the silence of the ICAO and the trend of outsourcing parts with identical subcontractor, this in effect, tarnish other.

Indonesia’s Directorate General for Civil Aviationto Inspect Airbus A320 Planes Following AirAsia Crash Investigation results

Air Transportation Director General Suprasetyo said the inspections of the A320 fleets began Thursday, and that planes would be allowed to continue operations during the inspection. Mohammad Alwi, director of airworthiness and aircraft operations, said inspectors would check maintenance and operation records for any signs of trouble, even beyond the rudder system.

“Our inspectors will physically check the RTLU. We will open the panel, even if the records do not indicate any problem,” he added.

Source:
The Wall street Journal
The Straits Times

Astounding!

NTSC Final Report (KNKT)

Points Of Interest:

The aircraft operator advised the KNKT that the flight crew of PK-AXC had not
received the upset recovery training on Airbus A320 training simulator.

Extract from the NTSC regarding the faulty electronic module regulating the rudder travel:

According to the Airbus information, there were three Technical Follow-Ups (TFUs)
regarding the AUTO FLT RUD TRV LIM 1(2) (SYS) problems that were issued
since 1993. TFU No. 27.23.51.004 was opened in 1993 regarding the problem of
fatigue rupture of solder and closed on 1996. The problem found was “fatigue
rupture of soldering” and the improvement made was “new electronic module”.
Another TFU 27.23.00.004 was opened in 2000 with the same problem of “Rupture
of soldering” and closed in 2014 with the improvement of the “Electronic board
process” which was available since 2002. The third TFU (number 27.23.00.007)
“Mechanical stop failure” was opened in January 2015 following this accident.
Airbus informed that the installed RTLU on PK-AXC had been improved with both
Technical Follow-Ups (TFUs).

I totally agree.

The pilot should be trained to fly and manages “situations”, not to react to an increasingly complex Automated system. Monitoring Software have come a long way from all over the horizon of the tech. It’s now time to to bring all this in an appropriate manner in our planes.

It doesn’t makes sens that a 20+ year old with 6 month training can ctrl a UAS on the other side of the globe and 20+ years experienced Captain standing behind the yoke can’t. Something is wrong.

Then, as praised in the “Stuntman” thread, we see that the pilot range of responsibility will evolve toward coping mainly with “Situations” . As envisioned, candidate profiled and screened for their 3D Space Awareness, trained in a flight simulator… flying and kept proficient throughout in-flight classes (instead of spending their time monitoring the FCS).

It could be something like that

– Level0: FCS as seen today
– level1: FCS Monitoring software (plane maker) – this where the liability and responsibility of the plane maker stop – this to ease the industries dialog toward a more responsible procedure (no more finger pointing b/w companies, Pilots association and Maker) and protect IP.
– Level2:Industry Monitoring Software (FAA) and secured database (open architecture and Mil grade anti hacking, regulations enforcement, flight route coordination etc.. all data refreshed before each flight via a cassette like hardware (security, safety, responsibility) ))
– Man-machine interface (simple) to rapidly de-activate totally or partially the FCS and reset the plane in a Fully controllable state (Frd CG etc…).
– Level3: Pilot

Note: the pilot, does not have to be seated in front, thus providing extra space for increased revenue with a fully exploited floor length. The pilot is alone or backed-up by a second member of the crew as spare.

Over-reliance on automation is certainly an issue.

But we need these systems to fly (economically) in RVSM space. Or perform long haul (17+ hours sometimes) flights. Manually flying over such period would be both dull and exhausting (not to mention the potential for navigation errors).

It is almost impossible to think of everything that one could write into training of failed instrument combinations

I think that one of the issue is that during training and check-rides, crews have to deal with overly complex scenarios. They don’t get a simple single engine failure, they get one combined with ASI going off, a fire alarm and a faulty gear sensor thrown in.

Then when in the real world they get to deal with a “simple” failure, they over-think it or react harshly. IMO, instantly distrusting all your sensors even though most of them are working fine could be a symptom of this kind of training.

Good one Blue Apple – hope it made you smile, but it would be good given the full BEA report (post CVR and FDR recovery)not to make assumptions on the humans on the flight deck.

We must all realise that most of us get very upset when tragedies occur to flight crew, cabin crew and pax hence we all try to justify our arguments.

Unfortunately the biggest problem is that when automation works in support or over the human decision making process, the human brain sort of goes to sleep/hibernates rather than stay at “full adrenaline rush mode, when flying by the seat of one pants”.

Then when the automation fails unexpectedly with no warning the human brain (each one different) does not recover/react from the automations’ mistakes or errors the same way as would have happened if the human brain (including human being) was in full control (as of old).

It is almost impossible to think of everything that one could write into training of failed instrument combinations but by doing it for real the odds get better in flight crew reactions when failures occur.

Then arrange to fly in an A330 over the Atlantic where AF447 was last known to have been before it hit catastrophic problems.

Then all hell will break loose (to be simulated with as much known about what happened to AF447) by blidfolding you initially.

Then recover the A330 once the blindfold is removed with no use of radio or advice from Left Seat.

Are you up to it?

You do realize that there would be nothing to recover from? Had the PF not touched the sidestick, the plane would have kept flying (mostly) straight and level.

And I find your suggestion of having the PNF not say anything quite ironic. That’s precisely what he did, and doind so he failed in his role according to proper CRM. He should have been trying to diagnose the problem and call for applying UAS procedure (as the ECAM warnings were prompting him to do).

(my personal feeling is that he was pissed of that the captain decided the “junior” pilot would be PF in his absence and he was like “you’re in charge, deal with it now” but that’s just a hunch based on the cockpit conversation transcript)

If that isn’t up your street how about hiring a large luxury limousine and put it on full cruise control and then drive into London or Rome into the worst traffic during rush hour and do not remove the limo from cruise control.

Automated driving is a much tougher (and different) problem than automated flying, try again.

:angel:Hi Blue Apple,

Will you arrange to clear security unless you are already a captain on a reputable Western Airline.

Then ask to be allowed in the right seat (not left seat – leaving a competent person in the Left Seat, wearing full parachute harness (ex Top Gun or RAF pilot), to recover from any mistakes you may make which from your statements there will be NONE).You will have NO parachute harness.

Then arrange to fly in an A330 over the Atlantic where AF447 was last known to have been before it hit catastrophic problems.

Then all hell will break loose (to be simulated with as much known about what happened to AF447) by blindfolding you initially.

Then recover the A330 once the blindfold is removed with no use of radio or advice from Left Seat.

Are you up to it?:angel:

If that isn’t up your street how about hiring a large luxury limousine and put it on full cruise control and then drive into London or Rome into the worst traffic during rush hour and do not remove the limo from cruise control.:angel:

You present an argument that suggests that pilots being slaves to automation when the unatural happens at very short notice would get better results than using human logic and experience along with any real time working systems e.g Radio.

Stop putting words in my mouth. And stop misrepresenting what Airbus planes do.

The entire point of FBW is to make the plane easier to control, including when problems happen.

And that’s what happened on Sully’s flight, his workload was reduced (compared to a non-FBW plane) and saved him at the last minute by preventing a stall due to his flying in a less than optimal way (as demonstrated by the NTSB report – they had nine crews fly the same path in a simulator and they all managed to achieve much low vertical deceleration at “landing”).

Automation is a different thing from FBW, B767 or A300 are highly automated plane with conventional controls.

Granted that the pilots initially could have done a quick calculation to verify why they appeared to have used so much fuel,

They “should have”? Is it normal procedure for a pilot, who has pretty much nothing else to do during cruise to not check regularly the basic parameters of his plane, including fuel levels?

And when the ECAM message popped as the plane detected the difference in fuel tanks that was putting the plane off-balance, they just blindly pushed buttons without using their brain.

Which is kind of funny since you all seem to argue that pilots should be more in the loop and that automation is bad but yet, when a system is putting the pilots back in the loop by asking them to correct an abnormal situation it has detected, you still manage to blame the system.

Looks like you want your cake and eat it too.

Look, an airplane is an enclosed system regarding fuel flows. The only normal output are the engines. A simple check and monitoring code should have been capable to cope with that. Feel free to enlight us about the details of why there is seemingly none.

There is none because instantaneous fuel flow is not measured. Adding such sensors would make the plane more expensive, increase maintenance and create a new source of false alarms.

Measuring instantaneous fuel flow isn’t mission critical in a plane (unlike a pipeline), the pilots have at their disposal an indicator giving them the total fuel in all tanks. Based on their knowledge, they can estimate the usual fuel consumption at cruise (hell, they did it during flight planning…) and regularly check if they’re still within parameters.

Sure it would be possible to ask for the pilots to input in the FMS projected fuel consumption for all phases of flight and perform an automatic check but that would mean more automation and more chance of pilots being totally disconnected with their plane.

How insulting is that…

If they fail at a basic task and then end up successfully gliding over the Atlantic, they’re not heroes, they’re just plain lucky.

having a pilot trained more specifically to get out of a dangerous situation is a necessity

Training them to avoid dangerous situations has been proved to be much more effective as demonstrated by the current level of safety reached by the industry.

Do you realize that a simple actuated stick with force feedback from left to right could have saved their life ?

It could have, yet it didn’t save numerous planes with yokes that stalled when their airspeed system malfunctioned (Aeroperú Flight 603, Birgenair Flight 301…).

Following the UAS procedure would have saved them like it did in all the cases listed in the BEA report.

How much those would have costed to Airbus for a retrofit? Nothing

Firstly, nothing costs nothing in the aviation industry, especially when it comes to flight deck changes.

Secondly, a moving stick would introduce new failure modes (what happens if the feedback is malfunctioning?). KISS is one of the basis of the Airbus philosophy. For example, firewalling the throttles will always get you TOGA thrust, no button to press – Turkish Airlines Flight 1951 is a good example of why such design is much better/simpler.

Thirdly, one of the most fundamental principle of modern CRM is that only one person should be controlling the plane at one time. The PNF has no business holding the sidestick or second-guessing the PF movements, his job is to monitor plane parameters and call for the correct procedure.

let’s step out of that muddy mess. It would need an all thread by itself.

Pilots believed they could perform at an airshow with no preparation. The plane was too low, too slow and the pilots ordered full thrust too late.

But I guess by the logic of some people on this board, if they had managed to clear the trees they would have become “heroes”.

Departures from ctrld flight, as noted in the “Stuntman” thread, are going to be increasingly complex due to the sophistication of FCS and their increasingly rare occurrences (measn that they will surface in the most daring situation). Reverting to conventional flying laws and having a pilot trained more specifically to get out of a dangerous situation is a necessity IMOHO.

Has a departure from controlled flight due to a FCS issue ever occurred?

In the past decades, I can see only two incidents with FCS malfunctions. One is Qantas Flight 72 where an ADIRU failure fed spiky inputs to the FCS which resulted in pitch that was not commanded. The other happened to a Falcon 7X that experienced a trim runaway on its way to Malaysia.

These are the only cases where a FCS malfunction resulted in the plane doing something that the pilots did not command (and neither resulted in a crash).

So I find this obsession about FCS and FBW quite puzzling, Airbus (and Boeing) planes just do what the pilots ask them to do. And you’re attacking a non-issue and are willing to throw away decades of improvement in safety in chasing this red herring.

The last thing I want is stuntmen in command, they get bored and try new things like on Pinnacle Airlines Flight 3701.

For all the sceptics that think good experienced pilot skills can be replaced by FBW/automation with training on primarily SIMs just let it be clear that it’s all about Strengths and Weaknesses. Excellent team work keeps all souls alive in the commercial airline business.

The pilot needs to know the strengths and weaknesses of his/her aircraft, it’s manufacturer and engine manufacturer, and that is by getting used to the foibles of each one of the aircraft in the fleet that he/she is certified/licensed to fly. He/she needs to know the strengths and weaknesses of his/her flight crew and cabin crew. He needs to gain and have the confidence of engineering teams who may/should share essential information that can be vital as aircraft get older.

He needs to know his/her airports and alternative fields en-route.

A good pilot must be prepared to be even reprimanded/dismissed by his bureacratic airline management if he/she declares an emergency or even a Mayday early, when instruments fail, as then someone in the sky around him/her is likely to help. (it is a bond between pilots). The result is that he/she and all souls may walk away alive rather than be RIP status.

Also think if this FBW/automation is so perfect why aren’t rally cars completely automated (they tried pit controlled automation in F1 and a fatality brought them to their senses) and the driver and navigator go along for the ride; given that everyone is on terra firma and not in a tube up in the air at over 30,000 ft?
(Albeit DARPA have and are doing research into driverless vehicles in Nevada they still aren’t through the testing stages, and this is primarily for military purposes.)

Experienced and good human logic is still better when things go “t.ts up” in the air.

[…]

The common point? Excellent CRM and an ability to keep calm under high stress and not make harsh decisions. No “seat of the pants” flying there, if you want “seat of the pants”, just look at AF447…

You are right. Of course. But you focus too much on what being able to fly “by the seat of the pants” might project as an image on you.
Obviously CRM and an ability to keep calm under high stress is needed. But that what all good flyer have been prone too. Re-read the literature (Lindbergh / Mermoz and blablabla).

Armchair engineering at its best.

Obviously – 4am I’ve to say. 😮

How do you measure fuel flow? There are multiple interconnected tanks and several fuel pumps, fuel is constantly shifted around. You need to integrate these values over time any faulty sensor will lead to lots and lots of spurious alarms.

Look, an airplane is an enclosed system regarding fuel flows. The only normal output are the engines. A simple check and monitoring code should have been capable to cope with that. Feel free to enlight us about the details of why there is seemingly none.
In the gas industry they are able to monitor fuel flows and detect leaks on with hundreds of kilometers of piping and vastly superior rate.

Regularly checking fuel levels is basic airmanship, frankly these pilots should not be praised for getting out of a hole they dug themselves.

How insulting is that…

read nJAYM post

A physical solution? Are you for real? If it flies, it can be stalled, that’s basic physics.

That’s exactly what the purpose of my message is: if it flies, one day or another it will stall and spin. There a flyable plane should be a minimum granted to their pilots. You don’t come out of the spin by trying to pull out the breaker somewhere around your cockpit.
Departures from ctrld flight, as noted in the “Stuntman” thread, are going to be increasingly complex due to the sophistication of FCS and their increasingly rare occurrences (measn that they will surface in the most daring situation). Reverting to conventional flying laws and having a pilot trained more specifically to get out of a dangerous situation is a necessity IMOHO.

The solution for AF447 was (and still is): when faced with unreliable airspeed, apply the unreliable airspeed procedure. It happened dozen of times before without any plane loss and it will happen again in the future.

Do you realize that a simple actuated stick with force feedback from left to right could have saved their life ? Or a simple screen with both stick position displayed at eyes level?
How much those would have costed to Airbus for a retrofit? Nothing

And there were no FCS changes after the Habsheim crash, stop making things up.

let’s step out of that muddy mess. It would need an all thread by itself.

Hi Blue Apple

Sully mismanaged his plane energy by not flying best glide speed and chose a less than optimal flaps configration. He was very lucky that switching the APU on prevented the plane to revert to alternate law so when he pulled his stick all the way back when he came in with way too little energy, the plane ignored his commands and refused to let the “hero” at the command stall the plane and kill everyone.

Sully having seen the birdstrike that caused both his engines to fail, used his skills to their fullest and brought that aircraft down. All souls including Sully lived to tell the tale.
I do not believe that everything Airbus put into their automation could have achieved that result. You present an argument that suggests that pilots being slaves to automation when the unatural happens at very short notice would get better results than using human logic and experience along with any real time working systems e.g Radio.

I think I shall put my money on the human logic and experience of real pilots (not FBW/autopilot jockeys). Sully may not be a hero to you but he is to all the pax and crew on his flight and to me.

The guys who couldn’t bother to check their fuel level, let one tank empty itself in the air through a huge leak (caused by improper maintenance operations) and when the plane told them they had oone tank much heavier than the other proceeded to open the crossfeed valve without wondering why that would be the case.

I accept the reality of an over zealous engineer who correctly replaced the RR engine but used a fuel pipe that wasn’t for that model of engine which caused the problem of the extensive fuel leak.
Granted that the pilots initially could have done a quick calculation to verify why they appeared to have used so much fuel, and possibly turned back.
The Airbus manual for the A330 told them to open the fuel transfer valve. They did. But did the Airbus manual tell them to shut off the fuel transfer valve? No it did not.
The two pilots achieved the longest unpowered glide any aircraft with passengers has made, and 12 burst tyres later on the airfield at Azores all souls walked away including the pilots.
Blue Angel may think they weren’t heroes but after a few mistakes encouraged by the flawed airbus manual their seat of the pants flying kicked in.
In my estimation they are heroes.

About Sully, teh 320 and teh Hudson river:

How about reading the NTSB report? (including the BEA comments)

The Hudson river “landing” is the perfect example that validates the Airbus philosophy. The pilots found themselves in a complicated solution and the aircraft made sure that their workload was as low as possible by keeping the plane controllable (and automatically trimmed) all the way down and preventing them from stalling in the final seconds. With a B737, there’s a good chance there would have been (lots of) fatalities.

Interestingly the great skills displayed by Sully were a quick decision speed and excellent management of the system (including his decision to immediately turn on the APU) . His piloting on the other hand was to be honest average at best.

In other words, Sully should be praised for not being “a stuntman” but rather an excellent system operator. As were the pilots of the Qantas A380 that suffered an uncontained engine failure. Or the DHL plane that got hit by a missile over Baghdad.

The common point? Excellent CRM and an ability to keep calm under high stress and not make harsh decisions. No “seat of the pants” flying there, if you want “seat of the pants”, just look at AF447…

On single line of code could have prevented the tank to come dry

Armchair engineering at its best. How do you measure fuel flow? There are multiple interconnected tanks and several fuel pumps, fuel is constantly shifted around. You need to integrate these values over time any faulty sensor will lead to lots and lots of spurious alarms.

Regularly checking fuel levels is basic airmanship, frankly these pilots should not be praised for getting out of a hole they dug themselves.

Airbus had largely the time to come ard a physical solution after AF447.

A physical solution? Are you for real? If it flies, it can be stalled, that’s basic physics.

The solution for AF447 was (and still is): when faced with unreliable airspeed, apply the unreliable airspeed procedure. It happened dozen of times before without any plane loss and it will happen again in the future.

Just like the old teams had build a modified ctrl law in a very short time after the first A320 crashed (forest during a meeting).

And there were no FCS changes after the Habsheim crash, stop making things up.

Sully mismanaged his plane energy by not flying best glide speed and chose a less than optimal flaps configration. He was very lucky that switching the APU on prevented the plane to revert to alternate law so when he pulled his stick all the way back when he came in with way too little energy, the plane ignored his commands and refused to let the “hero” at the command stall the plane and kill everyone.

The guys who couldn’t bother to check their fuel level, let one tank empty itself in the air through a huge leak (caused by improper maintenance operations) and when the plane told them they had oone tank much heavier than the other proceeded to open the crossfeed valve without wondering why that would be the case.

Great examples…

Already officially denied by the NTSC.

About Sully, teh 320 and teh Hudson river:
Hve you ever land a Sailplane ? Those spoiler on the wings are airbrakes that let you manage your E by adding drag to your airframe. That way, if you miss your approach, find yourself too low or too slow, retracting the airbrakes give you a supplement of energy. See it as an overboost in your Fav Video game. By overextending the flaps, he might have had that intention. What would have been fairly logical. For the flare and the alternate law, I am sorry but this, if true, look simply as a pure coincidence.

A330 turned glider:
If FuelFlow> CheckEngFlow then Alert=”You are in trouble, we’ve got a leak”

On single line of code could have prevented the tank to come dry. The pilot reacted normally to what was an unvelivable situation. Software Systems are there for that: monitoring the details. Not to turn themselves into Semi Gods at the expense of thousands of life.

Spin and Thunderstorm:
Remember your CPL? Stall, spin and basic IFR are taught to junior pilots. I wonder why a 20000hr Pilot is not authorized to do so by the GodOfAllM*F FCS. Unplugged = unplugged. Airbus had largely the time to come ard a physical solution after AF447. Just like the old teams had build a modified ctrl law in a very short time after the first A320 crashed (forest during a meeting). One solution would have been a retractable mustache. Another a trailing chute…. And so and so on . But of course, when you spend several years doing NOTHING, you can be vehement after those who took the bull by the horns and managed to make their crew and passenger survived against unbelievable odds.