Turkish Airlines Flight 1951 pilots not at fault

If the faulty unit is on the MEL list it could be anything from 1-15 days to get replaced, but the crew should be aware of it and procedures may need to be changed because of it. Depending on the number of airlines reporting the fault, it may be high or low on Boeing’s ‘to do’ list.

Sod the three year degree course, i’ve learnt everything I need to know about Aviation Management and Operations from this forum mate 😀

I think that this forum is very conservative compared with others like Avcom who can produce a full accident report within a few hours of the accident.:diablo:

Sod the three year degree course, i’ve learnt everything I need to know about Aviation Management and Operations from this forum mate 😀

Of course you knew that!;)

Some are brighter than others.

It has taken me many years on the line to fit all the pieces of the puzzle, and I still don´t have a complete picture. Quess I never will. If I get a complete picture I´ll quit this game;):D

Sandy, the following is NOT aimed at you (just to avoid possible misunderstanding).

I just have to say that this thread (and many others) gives me a warm feeling! It tells me all I need know about flying, and that is coming from guys that have never even set their foot into the cockpit of a real aeroplane, or tried to maintain one:rolleyes: Wish I could be so very clever:rolleyes: The warm feeling comes from knowing what I´ve yet to learn!

It’s been a long day.. of course I knew that, d’oh.

Perhaps, if anything, this accident warns on crews over reliance on the auto pilot?
At 2000ft and within 2nm of the runway why wasn’t someone hand flying it?

Your first sentance is correct. No matter if the aircraft is being flown using the automation, the pilots primary responsibility SHOULD be to monitor flightpath and speed. In recent years there seems to be steady decline in pilots ability to do so, as evident from numerous accidents and incidents where flightpath and speed deviations have been at blame.

Your second sentence is a little screwed;):D If any aircraft is at 2000 ft within 2 NM of the runway, it is surely doing a fly-by not a landing;)
To explain a little. A standard descent profile on approach has a gradient of approximately 3°. A very handy rule of thumb is that you will descent about 300 feet each nautical mile you travel. So, at 10 NM from the end of the runway the aircraft should be at about 3000 feet altitude AGL. 2000 feet AGL will give you just short of 7 NM from the threshold. With regards to the accident in AMS, that is where the ball started rolling really fast when the A/T went to idle. The aircraft did not, however, crash until it was within 2 NM from the threshold. I do not remember the speed profiles for AMS anymore, but if they are standard, aircraft would be expected to maintain 160 kts on the ILS until 4 NM and at that speed the aircraft is traveling a little over 2.5 NM a minute (given no head wind). So the whole thing was over and done in a little over 2 min 😮
Regarding your comment on hand flying, the short answer is no. There is nothing that absolutely says you have to hand fly the aircraft at 2 NM. Company procedures vary a lot, and even individual pilots have their own personal opinion regarding hand flying. Some companies (particulary in the Far East, I´m told), actually ban all manual landings!! For them it is autoland every time on the line, and manual landings are only done in the SIM.

Is there any evidence that this was the case?

with the report saying this has happened twice before , then I would guess that the fault has been entered into the maintenance log of the aircraft and that should have been checked out by engineers
The airline should have followed procedure laid down in the maintenance manual provided by Boeing or contacted a engineer at Boeing for advice

Its not the first time that information provided by a manufacture has been incorrect

Not Knowing the ins and out I’m only suggesting why the finger is being pointed at Boeing

And how likely is that, given the numbers of the type in service around the world?

It has not stopped them before. The more of one type that is flying the less likely it is to ground the entire fleet. It is why it was easy to ground the Concorde.

I believe their is an issue whereby there is only one RA input into the AT during a coupled approach. There could well be a case were the RA fails or gives erroneous data to the AT system which would then give problems.

And how likely is that, given the numbers of the type in service around the world?

Not very, hence why I find it hard to believe.

Perhaps, if anything, this accident warns on crews over reliance on the auto pilot?
At 2000ft and within 2nm of the runway why wasn’t someone hand flying it?

From the Boeing 737NG Briefings Manual

Situational awareness in relation to the vertical profile and required path is essential:
– Height versus Distance checks must still be used and called out as per Jeppesen chart.
– Verify crossing altitude and crosscheck altimeters at the FAF (i.e. at FD02 PF Calls ‘FAF, 2500
feet, no flags’) (PM Responds ‘Altitude checks, No Flags’).

If a component is faulty and the airline has reported that to Boeing,and Boeing has allowed it to continue flying , then they could well be the firing line

Is there any evidence that this was the case?

It seems more than a little perverse to point the finger at Boeing.

Surely maintenance of electronic components and the replacement of malfunctioning units is the responsibility of the operator, not the manufacturer?

If a component is faulty and the airline has reported that to Boeing,and Boeing has allowed it to continue flying , then they could well be the firing line

Unless of course, what they are trying to say is there is a generic fault with the Rad Alt. that Boeing knows about and has has done nothing about it, which I find hard to beleive.

And how likely is that, given the numbers of the type in service around the world?

The real report is not out, and the Telegraaf is not the best source of information. It’s kind a like “The Sun” for the Netherlands.

That figures. :rolleyes:

The real report is not out, and the Telegraaf is not the best source of information. It’s kind a like “The Sun” for the Netherlands.

Indeed.
Unless of course, what they are trying to say is there is a generic fault with the Rad Alt. that Boeing knows about and has has done nothing about it, which I find hard to beleive.

It seems more than a little perverse to point the finger at Boeing.

Surely maintenance of electronic components and the replacement of malfunctioning units is the responsibility of the operator, not the manufacturer?

I would like to see the actual report because that article is rather unclear about the faulty Radio Altimeter. In one sentence it is inferred Boeing knew of it before the accident. In another it seems Boeing knew of it after the accident.
There is no clear “Boeing knew of the faulty equipment for a while” statement.
What is clear is, the Rad Alt on that 737 was known by the airline to be faulty.

That is very, very interesting to say the least.