Britain At War – Tanks

Just finished watching Battlefield Mysteries featuring the demise of Michael Wittman the SS Panzer commander in Normandy. No definitive answers regarding the killing of Michael Wittman. There were three possibilities: Rocket firing Typhoon; British tanks or Canadian. Some educated guesswork and measurements point to the Canadians. The British had a rather more evidential claim because the tank gunner who had been credited with removing Wittman from the battlefield, had already destroyed two other Tigers before he claimed a third which was reckoned to be Wittman.

However the Canadian tanks were a lot closer to the Germans than the British and this rather clinched the debate. In the vicinity of Wittman’s ruined tank there was found the casing of a 60lb aircraft underwing rocket such as would be found on a ground attack fighter.

I knew a wireless operator (19 set) on Churchill Mk III and IV AVRE’S. His unit disembarked in Normandy on 17th August 1944 and he experienced his first action on 10th September when they were tasked to drop a fascinating in an anti tank ditch at Octelot and then wait to be called forward should they be required for demolition purposes, which they duly were. He had a fund of interesting and often amusing stories of his time in Europe.

Regards

kev35

E&OE

He hadn’t been promoted when I wrote that piece.

Major General Hobart…

(Standards of education today, tsk tsk. ;))

CD briefly mentioned a significant episode of tank development during WW2. Percy Hobart was responsible for something referred to as: ‘Hobart’s Funnies’.

The beaches of Northern France were heavily mined with both anti tank and anti personnel mines. As part of the strategy of ‘defence in depth’, the sea bed between low water and high water were sown with anti tank obstacles. Further inland were row upon row of deep anti tank ditches all combined to make establishing a beach head a rather daunting task.

Major Hobart came up with a number of proposals to breach these defences. Built onto a tank chassis, they included: tank flamethrowers for use against dug in and fortified positions, flail tanks which had bolted to the front of the tanks an enormous revolving drum equipped with many chains that as the drum was mechanically spun the chains were thrown outwards with one end of the chain secured to the drum the effect was to flail the ground in front of the advancing tank and explode any mines in its path thus clearing a safe passage for advancing infantry. They worked.

Another ‘funny’ was a tank equipped with a huge bundle of what looked like palisade fencing bound together by wire. The idea was that as the tank neared a deep anti tank ditch the tank commander would release the tightly wrapped bundle which would lodge itself into the ditch thus providing a means of bridging the gap over which the tank and subsequent tanks could advance with out fear of getting stuck.

Tanks were developed with the means to enable them to float using a canvas skirt held in position around the tank. The tank landing craft could bring the cargo of tanks as close to the shore as their draft would permit, lower the ramp and the tanks would trundle off, sometimes to float, but others would be swamped by the swell and regrettably sink.

The story goes that the Americans were not enamoured of Hobarts Funnies and did not use them on their Utah and Omaha landing beaches. There is some pictorial evidence existing showing one or two Funnies in use.

Anyway…..back to the tanks…

Like most British designs of the period, Churchill was vastly over complicated, and not very reliable. Coupled with the poor gun, it didn’t make a for a very happy design. It did improve over the years, but it was never great…

No, the Churchill could never be said to be in the same class as the Panther or Tiger…

…but it is a little unfair to say it was ‘vastly over-complicated’.

The Churchill certainly suffered its fair share of reliability problems early on, but that could be said of the Panther too, or almost any other tank; poor reliability is a common symptom of many tanks (and aircraft) rushed into service under the pressures of wartime.

Even the ‘perfect’ (pre-war!) T-34 suffered some reliability problems, particularly with the transmission. I’ve seen inside a T-34 transmission and ‘crude’ doesn’t even begin to describe it! It is basically a big cast-iron box with a few gears in it (and a lot of empty space); the gears aren’t even in constant mesh so it has a proper ‘crash’ gear change. Most tank-drivers would probably have to stop to change gear!

In contrast the Churchill tank’s transmission is far more complicated, but not quite as complicated as the transmission of a Panther or Tiger.

Where the Churchill did fall-down badly was in its rather archaic layout; it can trace its roots back to the tanks of the First World War. The hull side escape-hatches are the remnants of sponson-like machine-gun mountings and the small turret, on a small turret-ring, never could carry a big enough gun.

Still it’s always been my favourite British tank of the war years, and it was in action in 1942, and that, in wartime, is what really counts.

It did not really matter if the Germans knew the codes were taken…

Well, in one sense you are correct; two things that made Enigma very vulnerable was the reluctance of the Germans to believe that it could be broken and the enormous task it would be to replace it with an alternative encryption system if they knew it had been broken. The Germans didn’t want to believe Enigma had been broken!

However one of its strengths was that the Enigma code itself consisted of several layers of encryption and some of these layers of encryption could be changed without fundamentally changing the bulk of the hardware or the basic operating procedure; in fact Enigma was built around a code that changed daily and code books that were changed every month.

The British went to enormous lengths to ‘pinch’ Enigma code material but also enormous lengths to hide the fact that Enigma had been broken; convoys to North Africa that were compromised by Enigma decrypts were never attacked until they had been ‘located’ by reconnaissance aircraft (reconnaissance aircraft that knew exactly where to look)!

In actual fact the U-Boat Enigma code, already the most secure Enigma code, was changed quite significantly twice during the war without there being the sort of disruption that you suggest. This was accomplished with the routine monthly change of code books together with new rotors, increasing the number of options on one occasion, form three out of four (?) to three out of five (?), and then on another occasion increasing the number of rotors in use during encryption from three to four to produce the infamous ‘Shark’ U-boat code. (I think!)

I’ll have to look it up but I think the adoption of ‘Shark’ by the U-boats, and the Enigma intelligence blackout that produced, will coincide nicely with the planning and execution with the Dieppe Raid. (Maybe?)

Edit: Timings are interesting; ‘Shark’ introduced in early February 1942.

I recall seeing a huge mountain of Churchills in a scrapyard, somewhere between Sheffield and Doncaster. This was on a rail journey in 1969 or 1970. I was surprised they’d survived so long.

I can’t remember how many Churchill tanks were embarked for the Dieppe Raid but the landings went so disastrously badly that not all the tanks were actually landed.

Just had a look (as part of avoiding something else) and here is what I found.

The units and tanks selected for landing were as follows:
B Squadron, with part of C Squadron and the Regt. HQ would be landed by 10 RN LCT Mk 2, carrying 3 tanks each, and 7 light vehicles i.e. 30 tanks. A Squadron and the rest of C Squadron would remain in reserve, aboard LCT Mk 2’s and 3’s, 28 tanks.

By type; 18 Mk III, 5 Mk II, 7 Mk I Churchills. Of these, 3 of the Mk I’s were flame throwers, 3 Mk III’s and 2 Mk. I’s carried carpet rollers, and 7 tanks were equipped to tow Daimler scout cars. By load, the 3 flamethrowers were in 1 LCT, the rest were loaded with a carpet roller type at the ramp, the towing tank and vehicle last…

…Twenty-eight Churchills remaining aboard their LCTs as a floating reserve, were: A Squadron 18; C Squadron 9; HQ Squadron 1.

http://www.armchairgeneral.com/forums/showthread.php?t=136527

(Interesting site – gives the full run down on the LCT loads and the fate of each tank at Dieppe)
One Churchill did survive – it never left the landing craft when the one in front of it sank into eight feet of water on exit and was lost.

CD It did not really matter if the Germans knew the codes were taken.

However if this raid had been successful and the British had captured the codes, on leaving Dieppe the headquarters where the codes had been, would have been set on fire and explosives set to blow the place apart.

Now when the Germans had regained control how would they know, what had been taken from that building?

Their dilemma.

The British have taken all the codes.

The British have not taken anything just destroyed the building.

If they decide on the second option and carry on sending signals, using same apparatus and codes.
Then a big plus for the British as they are reading all the signals.

If however they take the first option.

It means that they would have to implement a whole new system of signals and codes.
How long would that take to get it set up and running across all the services?

All operations working or in planning, would have to be put on hold as they would assume that the British now knew all about them, and could not risk changing the plans using the old system as they knew the British were listening.

The British would know that the Germans were setting up a new system as all the signaling which had previously gone on, and would have changed or stopped altogether.

So whichever way it went the British were on a win, win situation.

On reflection since Dieppe was just a raid, not an attempt at invasion, there appears to have been little thought gone into the return of any surviving armoured vehicles. Therefore it seems that, damaged or not, all these new Churchill tanks would have been gifted to the Germans…

I seem to remember that the tanks were supposed to ‘re-embark’…

…after heading inland to shoot-up a Luftwaffe airfield!

Did you see that TV documentary that attempted to re-establish the real reason for the Dieppe Raid? The contention was, and the evidence was pretty compelling, that the actual reason for the raid was to capture ‘Enigma’ encoding information from the Kriegsmarine Headquarters.

A British Intelligence ‘pinch team’ of Royal Marine Commandos was off the coast in landing-craft ready to storm the German HQ as soon as the port of Dieppe was taken, but of course, that never happened. The officer tasked to return the captured intelligence material back to Britain, and who was embarked on a Royal Navy Destroyer off-shore, was none other than Ian Fleming.

The only thing I cannot figure out is how the British were supposed to keep the capture of the code material secret from the Germans? I mean, what use is capturing the codes if the Germans know you’ve captured them?

Ironically, the most recent research into his death seems to point to Michael Wittmann’s Tiger falling victim to a ‘standard’ Sherman tank armed with the original 75mm gun.

There is an excellent book by the ‘After the Battle’ team called ‘Villers-Bocage Through the Lens’. It is an absolutely forensic examination of the engagement, virtually shot-by-shot, and uses, primarily, German propaganda photographs to detail almost every vehicle lost. It doesn’t pull any punches; it has fascinating first-hand accounts but also some pretty sobering photographs of British war dead.

There is also an equally excellent ‘Dieppe Through the Lens’ book that has comprehensive German propaganda photographs of the aftermath of the Dieppe Raid and details the fate of every tank, and every tank crew member, that took part in the raid.

Which brings me back to…

Some may not know the story of Michael Wittman a German commander of a number of Tiger tanks during the Battle of Normandy. Lieutenant Wittman – I use the British ranking system – was by many accounts a quite extraordinary individual. He alone, was responsible for the destruction of about 140 tanks of various types and a similar number of anti tank guns during the Battle.

At one notable location; Villers Bocage, he was able, by his single actions to frustrate the advance of British tanks threatening to outflank German forces trying to stem a developing Allied breakout into Normandy.

Altho’ there is some dispute as to how he met his end, it is believed that he, his crew and tank were killed by a single hit from a Sherman Firefly – the one with the big gun ! Whatever his end, he was a remarkable soldier and tank man.

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Andy,

That sounds pretty serious ! I should ask for honourable terms before running up the white flag.

I’m pretty sure the above breaches the strict ‘no advertising’ rule. I shall consult with the Webmaster on Monday before deciding if the poster has his account closed.

Moggy
Moderator

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Interesting, thank you. But I had actually used the trailed artillery piece, rather than the vehicle-mounted one as my reason for suggesting it.

And you were quite right to do so; as a piece of towed artillery it had few equals.

Thinking about the 88mm gun always makes me wonder about one ‘side-effect’ of the Bomber Command offensive against Germany; image what effect the thousands of 88mm guns, and millions of rounds of ammunition, would have had on the war in the Western Desert or on the Eastern Front if those guns had not been defending Germany against the RAF?

One surprising omission to the list of weapons used in more than one role is the British 3.7 inch anti aircraft artillery piece with a muzzle velocity better than 3000 ft. per second and firing a shell weighing in around 29 pounds. It was used on the battlefield, in its anti aircraft role with shells using proximity fusing but, I can find no mention of its use in the anti tank role.

You’ve hit the nail on the head there…..the 3.7″ anti-aircraft gun was a better weapon than the German 88mm!

It would have be absolutely devastating in the anti-tank role and it is one of the great mysteries of the war as to why it was never used in that role (its carriage is a little less ‘portable’ than the 88mm). It wasn’t as if these weapons weren’t available; it has been said that when Tobruk fell the British had more 3.7″ guns in Tobruk than the Germans had in the whole Western Desert. Anti-tank ammunition was even produced (in Britain anyway).

My own guess is that it was something like bureaucratic jealousy; the anti-aircraft guns were under the command of the Royal Artillery or even the Royal Air Force, so shooting at German tanks wasn’t their responsibility, they were there to shoot at German high-level bombers…..even if there weren’t any to shoot at.

Rommel would never have stood for that crap!

Any guesses what the 20-pounder gun that the first Centurion tanks carried was?

Edit: Actually the 20-pounder was a separate gun; I was confusing this with the 3.7″ in the Tortoise project!

I can’t remember how many Churchill tanks were embarked for the Dieppe Raid but the landings went so disastrously badly that not all the tanks were actually landed.

For the 14th Canadian Tank Regiment, 27 of the 30 tanks that had embarked in
England made it ashore.46 Early reports from survivors were that none but three of these tanks
ever made it off of the beach; however, it was later determined that 15 tanks made it across the
seawall and onto the esplanade. Of these 15 tanks, none made it into the town of Dieppe.
Instead, shortly after achieving the esplanade most ran into obstacles blocking their advance.

http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a491502.pdf

Moggy

One surprising omission to the list of weapons used in more than one role is the British 3.7 inch anti aircraft artillery piece with a muzzle velocity better than 3000 ft. per second and firing a shell weighing in around 29 pounds. It was used on the battlefield, in its anti aircraft role with shells using proximity fusing but, I can find no mention of its use in the anti tank role.

Does anyone know differently ? One huge advantage possessed by the 88 was its effective killing range exceeding 2500 yards. Thus it could stand off outside the killing range of most British tanks that had to deliver their shot at ranges of about 3,4 or 500 yards depending upon which German tanks they were engaging.