So its an SSK, thats 7000tons, but it wont go aground like the 7000 ton SSN’s do because its an SSK…that right Chaffers?.

You have to develop a conventional power plant capable of providing propulsion and all of the, considerable, hotel loads that a boat that size requires….spread those costs over just 4 hulls and you think you are getting a cheap boat?.

Then you have an SSK that, on-station, has to be indiscreet because of the need to keep a comms mast up to receive the calls for fire that are the whole reason for it being there in the first place. This immediately wipes out the ships usefulness for any tasking other than periscope recon…how does it stalk an opposing sub or surface vessel if it has to be ready to respond to a fire request at any time?!.

Your problem is that all you want is a stealthy, unreachable, 6″ howitzer battery that can be omnipresent and rain down shells from seemingly nowhere at seconds from the call. The rest of it you’re trying to fudge in is just half-arsed justification. As I said from the outset the concept is flawed by the fact that its target set doesn’t warrant the costs of developing the platform. There are far better ways to do the job than lobbing guided 155 shells in with 50m CEP’s and no need for a 7000ton SSK to dismantle insurgent Toyota’s, donkeys and unhardened compounds a few miles behind the beachhead.

We do need a platform to operate in the littoral and provide coverage for deployed forces. It was identified as the C2 Stabilisation Escort in the S2C2 study before we seemed to slip back to the old FSC concept for T26. C2 needed to perform a lot more roles than could be undertaken by a 7000ton SSK with or without guns though.