Diverted Aircraft Orders

Many thanks once again Ken, as I suspected it really is an interesting and sometimes complex subject. I think any student of UK/US relations of the period would be fascinated by this stuff, it clearly demonstrates how desperate the UK was for support and involvement in the war effort from US and how keen they were to keep US from getting involved with “the bad guys”.

So, why did we buy turkeys like Bermuda and Chesapeake?
G.J.Bailey,The Arsenal of Democracy, Edin.UP,2013,P81 has UK Ambassador (8/39-12/12/40) Ld.Lothian pressing to buy known turkeys to drain UK $, to bounce US off neutrality: “We have no hope of ever repaying the enormous sums which will be involved (for Victory), nor do well-informed Americans ever expect this of us”. I doubt that became Govt.Policy: the process of source selection was there to try to deliver solid kit to our boys (though flawed: was it of Blackburn Botha that Boscombe assessed “entry to this aircraft is difficult. It should be made impossible”, yet Brough+Denny built 580 of them.) UK Aero industry had wailed when GC Harris bought Harvard/Hudson, mid-1938, but wound in their necks when we filled every hut and shed with work…such as Botha.

US Ambassador in UK, J.Winant,Letter fr.Grosvenor Sq,Hodder,47,P136, 4/41: “I (told FDR) Br. a/c (were) superior in combat to (UK’s US) planes”. That was unfair: presumably addressing Buffalo and Mohawk, known at order to be inferior to Bf 109E, but adequate in Africa.

We bought what US would supply, to add quantity to our domestic (presumed/hoped for) quality.

What an interesting thread.

Yes and the reason it was “all or nothing” was to enable Petain to accept Armistice terms that would include “assignment” to Germany of all outstanding French orders in US. There were none when he sought terms.

Many thanks Ken, that’s just the kind of detail I was looking for. The Assignment Agreement in effect consigned French orders over to UK, rather than UK “grabbing” what wasn’t going to reach France?

If your interest is the legal practicalities of transfer to UK of French commitments, see pp.146-155 of Hall. Petain became PM, Weygand Minister of National Defence, 16/6/40. Weygand signed an Assignment Agreement for all commitments and Purvis notified US Contractors, early 17/6. Petain then sought Armistice. It was all or nothing.

(I can’t change previous post to say UK/France paid vast sums…)

By paying. The neutrality deal in 1938/39, when these orders were placed, was that US-own orders took priority…but there were few. FDR took the public position that the best types were reserved for USAAF/USN, and had an embarassing moment when a DB.7 (to be Boston) went down in US with Frenchmen on board.

UK/France paid vast sums to tool up US Aero for high volume. Sacrosant Law of Contract.

Ken,

You answer part of my question regards bothering to take-over non-UK spec stuff, it makes sense and ties in with what I was already thinking. The other part of my question though is a step or two further back in the process, for instance how did those Mohawks get to be in a box at Colerne in the first place? When we read the books and articles about Wildcats, Marylands etc the diversion to UK seems to get a brief mention as though that outcome was to be expected or was somehow a simple process. What was to stop the US from demanding aircraft back that were in process of delivery, and how did UK Gov/BPC go about getting first dibs on orders that were still being processed??

Graham,

Sorry for the misunderstanding, but what I meant by the French being “unable to take delivery” was the possibility that they might change minds based on financial or political reasons etc, rather than France actually collapsing.

Ant: am I missing the thrust of your query? Is it to enquire why UK bothered to pay hard cash for ex-French Mohawks left in boxes at Colerne while we fought BoB on a knife edge of supply? Few or less of the French orders were readily operable by UK, so why did we pay and take delivery? is that it? If so the A, as with diverted Belgian Brewster Buffalos, was to tie US as an arsenal solely to us, the Good Guys, and to deny access to the Axis. US was neutral and, presumably, would have taken anybody’s money.

I reckon we can be absolutely sure that no such eventuality was foreseen.

Many thanks for your reply Ken, it certainly throws some light on the subject. Does this mean there were clauses in the AFPC agreement that meant French orders would automatically be diverted if the French couldn’t take delivery?

You need P.Butler, Air Arsenal N.America,Midland,2004 and if excited, H Duncan Hall,N.American Supply in the WW2/Civil Official History series, HMSO, 1955.

Br. Purchasing Commission (BPC) opened 7/11/39, DG of Purchases(US) underCanadian businessman A.B.Purvis (to be Rt.Hon., Privy Councillor; Chairman, Anglo-French Purchasing Board (AFPC, 23/1/40); Chairman,Br.Supply Council in N.America, 12/40). BPC/AFPC bought 1,320 a/c for UK to 28/2/40, others as contracting Agent for Australia, India, NZ, S.Africa (Canada to 7/40). In Fiscal 1940(1/7/39-30/6/40)UK+France ordered 9,727 US a/c. From 5/40 “a vast armoury” consumed most of UK $. UK took over 1,745 French/1,794 AFPC a/c 22/6/40 (some lapsed), heedless of fighting value or inventory commonality (FAF/FN Yale/Mohawk instruments were metric, throttles opposite sense to UK practice): anyKit NOW!

Purvis died in one of his LB.30s. His Deputy Jean Monnet, to be a Father of the EEC, continued awhile until the Lend/Lease Act was effective 11/3/41 (for UK/Greece).