70 years ago today

Time to move on

Wow reading all these big posts from all of you sitting in arm chairs in leafy Surrey etc…. theres always a few who know more than the rest of us. If they had not dropped the bombs maybe i would not be here, my dad was training in the raf and was pretty sure they were going to be bomber crew and that meant going to the far east. He was there and was glad of the end to the war. In the far east there was more inhuman torture going on than in europe, so cant you except that this deed had to be done.We have all the answers now because it is history ,they at the time had none because the next day was there future. Amen.

I think you may have miss the point. What we are trying to discuss, with the benefit of time, making no morale judgments about the use of the atomic bomb, is how significant the dropping of the bombs were to the timing of the surrender. I think the surrenders was likely within days or a couple of weeks at most anyway due to the state the people were in. Certain elements of the army wanted to continue to the death, but the Navy was no more and had no power, and the Army was very fractured with little cohesion left, and certainly not enough to mount a decent defence. And whilst we can all be thankful the war ended when it did it remember despite the shock and awe suffered by the residents of Hiroshima 6th and Nagasaki 9th it was still the 15th before the Emperor I believe announced the surrender. That he did was because he had become impatient with the prevarication of his own military and as has been mentioned a certain amount of self preservation. I and others who think this way mostly make no comment as to the rights and wrongs of the bombs use. For me it happened and I just like to understand the actual thought processes and what the main players really knew Certainly in the week or more after its use several British pilots lost their lives. Indeed on the 9th a Corsair pilot was shot down pressing home an attach and posthumously awarded a VC for his actions. It is unfortunate that those who are against any use of nuclear weapons will take our side of the discussion and use it to argue that the bomb should not have been used or that its use was unjustified. As with all history there is no right or wrong answer, only an interpretation of the events.

I agree with much of what you have written TempestNut, but August in Japan is towards the end of Summer and is one of its hottest periods with average temps well into the mid 30s Degrees C. It’s very hot and very humid. Yesterday’s high was 35C in Tokyo. Down south it’s even hotter, and even up in Hokkaido it’s in the mid to high 20s.

Yes brain explosion on my part.:stupid: I’m dealing with another matter unrelated on another forum and got my notes mixed up. That’s what happens when you post from an iPhone. 😡 The reason there would have been a delay would have been to allow repair of some of the Aircraft Carriers and to build up the logistics chain to support a prolonged campaign. CV21 Boxer, CV36 Antietam and CV39 Lake Champlain would have also finished their training, not mention they would have got the Bearcat into service along with the F4U-4 Corsair both of which were working up at the time, and both seen as key to keeping the Kamikazes at bay. Even the British fleet was suffering from over work and a couple of the carriers were in desperate need of a refit.

Wow reading all these big posts from all of you sitting in arm chairs in leafy Surrey etc…. theres always a few who know more than the rest of us. If they had not dropped the bombs maybe i would not be here, my dad was training in the raf and was pretty sure they were going to be bomber crew and that meant going to the far east. He was there and was glad of the end to the war. In the far east there was more inhuman torture going on than in europe, so cant you except that this deed had to be done.We have all the answers now because it is history ,they at the time had none because the next day was there future. Amen.

I suggest you do a bit more research and read about Klaus Fuchs, and a good few other American, and British spy’s that were working on the bomb at Los Alamos and sending every thing they could about the Manhatten project back to Russia, who did not know what would happen when these Bombs went off? well the Americans did on the 16 July 1945, so you can bet your house that the Soviets did not long after.

Stalin knew about it before Truman did!!!! Plus Truman told Stalin that the US had the weapon on 17 July 1945 while at Potsdam. There is one thing that almost everybody forgets about the employment of the Bomb. Internal US politics!!! Truman as commander in chief had the option of using the bomb to shock the Japanese into surrendering. Failure to use that option with the deaths of thousands of Allied servicemen in the following period until the Japs actually got around to surrendering would have at best killed any chance of Truman being re-elected in 1948 if it didn’t get him impeached first. Did the bomb cause the Jap’s to surrender??? well the fact that the Emperor mentioned it in no uncertain terms in his broadcast to the Japanese people suggests that it was a major influence in the Japs throwing in the towel.

Those of you on this forum, and many others for that matter that keep criticising those who have done some extra research and bring another opinion to the table need to engage your brains and think a little rather that keep talking about “revisionist BS” The bombs were as much of a shock to Russia as to Japan and the rest of humanity. Remember they didn’t even know what would happen when these bombs went off.

I suggest you do a bit more research and read about Klaus Fuchs, and a good few other American, and British spy’s that were working on the bomb at Los Alamos and sending every thing they could about the Manhatten project back to Russia, who did not know what would happen when these Bombs went off? well the Americans did on the 16 July 1945, so you can bet your house that the Soviets did not long after.

D1566, have you not read my earlier post about Project Hula and ships supplied to the Soviets from USA specifically for their use in a Russian invasion of Japan?

So you think they swam to Sakhalin?

I think you should have another look at a good map.

Fair comment.

Did the Russians have the capability of crossing anything wider than a river with their forces? I don’t believe that they did at that time, thus were not a credible threat to the home islands.

So you think they swam to Sakhalin?

I think you should have another look at a good map.

Did the Russians have the capability of crossing anything wider than a river with their forces? I don’t believe that they did at that time, thus were not a credible threat to the home islands.

Operation Downfall was in two parts.
The first was Operation Olympic planned for Sept/Oct 1945, was intended to capture the Japanese home island of Kyūshu.
Operation Coronet was the planned for March 1946 and was the invasion of the Japanese home island of Honshū.

Very few on the ground would have fought like zealots as they were all starving, had no fuel and were cold wet and miserable. Given August was the depth of winter any invasion of Japan may not have happened until November or December. Japan is not a tropical Pacific Island.

I agree with much of what you have written TempestNut, but August in Japan is towards the end of Summer and is one of its hottest periods with average temps well into the mid 30s Degrees C. It’s very hot and very humid. Yesterday’s high was 35C in Tokyo. Down south it’s even hotter, and even up in Hokkaido it’s in the mid to high 20s.

Those of you on this forum, and many others for that matter that keep criticising those who have done some extra research and bring another opinion to the table need to engage your brains and think a little rather that keep talking about “revisionist BS” History is about interpretation and analysis. It’s not engineering, and the information we have continuously changes and we need to alter our thoughts and opinions accordingly. If I have offended you, then good, because that means at least some of your grey cells are still working.

I don’t think anyone thinks or has stated the 2 Atomic bombs played no part in Japans surrender. I stated that the further in time we got from the event and the more we learn the less significant the bombs become in the overall story. Or put another way the reason they were dropped changes. None of the naysayers on this forum have offered a single microscopic piece of new information to refute that assertion or to justify what I read as being the story to “justify the use of the Atomic bombs” that shocked the world and garnered criticism from many quarters around the world. In the immediate aftermath the Americans were very defensive.

My position today and that of most of those I have read who have examined both sides of the issue is that the Allies would not have needed to invade Japan to force surrender. Did the bombs hasten the surrender? Perhaps and this is where the role of Russia is critical. The Japanese thought they were doing one thing with Russia, whilst Russia was manoeuvring to gain as much advantage so as to be able to occupy some of Japan. The bombs were as much of a shock to Russia as to Japan and the rest of humanity.

I have made no comment about the rights and/or wrongs of using the bomb. I believe it was used when it was used because Truman rightly didn’t trust Stalin and wanted Japan to surrender immediately, rather than by slow negotiation. I don’t think they sat down at the time and worked out how many allied lives it was going to save. That was the story constructed after the event to justify the horror. Remember they didn’t even know what would happen when these bombs went off.

Certainly fewer Japanese died as a result of the use of the bombs. Even one further month of B29 raids would have destroyed much more of Japan and killed countless more civilians than the 2 Atomic bombs. Then you had the carrier strike force that was facing little opposition to its activities.

Very few on the ground would have fought like zealots as they were all starving, had no fuel and were cold wet and miserable. Given August was the depth of winter any invasion of Japan may not have happened until November or December. Japan is not a tropical Pacific Island.

Anybody who thinks that the Atom Bomb didn’t play a major part in Japan surrendering is reading to much revisionist BS. Yes, There was a peace faction within the Jap government, but they couldn’t push the surrender option too hard if they wanted to keep their heads. A sizeable majority of the Army were totally against surrender and those in the army who were for a conditional surrender were looking for conditions that the Allies would never have accepted. The army’s surrender faction were only going to support those terms to the Allies after the first landings on Operation Olympic, where the Japs planned to hit the invasion force with everything they had in as short a period as possible with the hope that the allied losses would open up the chance of an armistice. The Russian entry into the Pacific war also had an effect which complemented the A-bomb in the fact that the Japs were now faced invasion by an enemy who didn’t really give too hoots about losses as long as the objective was taken. By the way, it wasn’t just Truman who decided to use the A-bomb, as the Manhattan project did have UK and Canadian input and both the British and Canadians OK’ed the weapon’s use. As for the Jap army not having a major say in the matter, why was there an attempted coup on the night that the Emperor recorded the message to the Japanese people saying that they were going to met the terms of the Potsdam deceleration when a number of army officers found out that they were going to surrender (which of course is how the whole thing started from 1931 onwards due to the fact that the Government couldn’t control the army and anybody who tried to oppose them risked assassination). As for keeping the Emperor after the Allies walked in, that was using a bit of common sense.

Yes, it was being pursued…..so that Japan could continue the war!

No. You seem to be confusing the Army’s options with the options of others. You’re ignoring Foreign Minister Togo’s longstanding efforts – through Japan’s ambassador Sato and with the blessing of the Emperor – to get Prince Konoe and his delegation accepted by the Soviets as a ‘Special Envoy’. Konoe had effectively started his mission back in February 1945, and had long been an advocate of peace.

…where is the ‘we end the war’ option?

In the hands of the people responsible for making such decisions (the Prime Minister and – ultimately – the Emperor). It wasn’t the Army’s decision to make.

I don’t doubt that there were many opposing views within the cabinet, individual ministers and the emperor, it would be astonishing if there weren’t, but what matters is what your enemy believes your intentions are and whether you’ll agree to his terms…..his terms, since you’re losing the war.

In which case it was worth (the Allies – all of them…) having diplomatic channels open and some form of dialogue going on, however distasteful it may have been. “Jaw jaw” and all that. Truman apparently didn’t want to know.

…so that’s the General Staff and the Army. It’s not the Cabinet and individual ministers with their individual and often opposing views, and it’s not the view of the Emperor himself. Surely anyone who looks into the subject in depth can see that there were many opposing views amongst the people who were party to making the decisions? Japan still had a non-aggression pact with the Soviets, so it was seen as a possible avenue for negotiation and it was being pursued…

Yes, it was being pursued…..so that Japan could continue the war!

Tanemura’s view may be different from the views that I quoted but even his view was basically that the Soviets will not attack yet…..and then what?

You’ll have noticed the glaring omission from any of the options following a Soviet attack I quoted above…

…where is the ‘we end the war’ option?

(1) The war continues against Soviet Union, Britain and the United States.
(2) The war continues against Soviet Union with Britain and the United States neutral.
(3) The war continues against Britain and the United States with the Soviet Union neutral.
(4) The war continues between Japan and the Soviet Union against Britain and the United States. (!!!)

I don’t doubt that there were many opposing views within the cabinet, individual ministers and the emperor, it would be astonishing if there weren’t, but what matters is what your enemy believes your intentions are and whether you’ll agree to his terms…..his terms, since you’re losing the war.

Hhmm open minds and all that. It seems to me that you are rather too ready to accept a version of Japanese thinking that in all probability was constructed post events.

You mean, after examining as much evidence as possible? Would you advocate a version of thinking constructed prior to the events in question? How about a little period propaganda thrown into the mix too?

A version that conveniently makes Western Allied actions appear flawed in todays light.

Why do you say “conveniently”? Your stance seems to be one of a closed mind. If you believe that we have nothing more to learn about the machinations of those final days, then there’s no point in you getting into any kind of debate about it. Are you saying that we know all there is to know about the subject and there’s nothing more to know? Nothing to learn?

Even if it is not a post event construction pray tell how exactly the Western Allies were supposed to be aware of such intentions on the part of the Japanese?

Which intentions are you talking about? The intention to use the Soviets as a conduit to negotiation, or the terms of negotiation themselves? Either way, the Japanese codes had been broken. I think the simplest answer to your question is by keeping lines of communication open.

Pray tell why the Western Allies would feel comfortable parlaying via the Soviets at the exact time trust was commencing to break down as the Soviets made their post war intentions clear?

Now you’re really riding on hindsight. The Soviets were at Potsdam. Months before they were important allies. If the USA, Great Britain and China were not interested in any dialogue with Imperial Japan, what other credible option did they have? You ask why the Western Allies would “feel comfortable parlaying via the Soviets”, but that was not Imperial Japan’s problem.

To now be trying to construct an argument that the Western Allies overstepped in response is at best ridiculous and at worst insulting.

I’m not doing that, so don’t be insulted.

I’m simply trying to get you, and others, to see that it was not solely Little Boy and Fat Man which caused Imperial Japan to cease fighting and accept the terms of surrender. Like almost anything else relating to that period, it bears further scrutiny. Some people like to paint that further scrutiny as “Revisionism”. To me, that seems at best unscholarly and at worst rather stupid.

Well, as an example of what I mean by ‘delusional’ let me quote from the paper you linked from Professor Tsuyoshi Hasegawa:

Despite mentioning the previous paragraphs, you don’t seem to have taken into account the fact that:

The General Staff was not unanimous in its assessment of Soviet intentions. The Fifth Division of the Strategy Guidance Department of the General Staff was in charge of intelligence regarding the Soviet Army, and it was the conclusions of this division that resulted in the portion of the General Staff’s assessment that predicted the possibility of a Soviet attack in August–September. The assessment of the Fifth Division met opposition from the Twelfth Division (War Guidance Division), headed by Colonel Tanemura Suetaka. Tanemura was one of the staunch advocates who insisted upon the need to keep the Soviet Union neutral. At one meeting at the end of July, Tanemura strenuously objected to Colonel Shiraki Suenari’s assessment that the Soviet attack might come as early as August 10. Tanemura assailed this assessment, stating: “This assessment overexaggerates the danger. Stalin is not so stupid as to attack Japan hastily. He will wait until Japan’s power and military become weakened, and after the American landing on the homeland begins.” Since the Twelfth Division was closely connected with the Bureau of Military Affairs, the nerve center of the General Staff, Tanemura’s view became the prevailing policy of the General Staff, and hence of the Army as a whole.

…so that’s the General Staff and the Army. It’s not the Cabinet and individual ministers with their individual and often opposing views, and it’s not the view of the Emperor himself. Surely anyone who looks into the subject in depth can see that there were many opposing views amongst the people who were party to making the decisions? Japan still had a non-aggression pact with the Soviets, so it was seen as a possible avenue for negotiation and it was being pursued. You’re looking at this from the perspective of 70 years of hindsight of course (as are we all) so I don’t expect it was all so clear to them back then.

One could argue that it was “delusional” to expect Japan to accept the full terms of the Potsdam Declaration (Unconditional Surrender) when, to the Japanese powers, that promised the dismantling of the Imperial Household and the possibility that the Emperor would be imprisoned and finally executed. In the end that didn’t come to pass, so Japan had been holding out against something that wasn’t going to happen. That seems like a failure to me.

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Hhmm open minds and all that. It seems to me that you are rather too ready to accept a version of Japanese thinking that in all probability was constructed post events. A version that conveniently makes Western Allied actions appear flawed in todays light. Even if it is not a post event construction pray tell how exactly the Western Allies were supposed to be aware of such intentions on the part of the Japanese? Pray tell why the Western Allies would feel comfortable parlaying via the Soviets at the exact time trust was commencing to break down as the Soviets made their post war intentions clear?
It was wartime, a war started by the Germans and the Japanese. Many terrible things were done by both sides during the war but one side started it and committed by far the worst atrocities knowingly as part of state policy. To now be trying to construct an argument that the Western Allies overstepped in response is at best ridiculous and at worst insulting.

Well, as an example of what I mean by ‘delusional’ let me quote from the paper you linked from Professor Tsuyoshi Hasegawa:

Are any of those four alternatives not completely delusional? Also, given the analysis of Soviet intentions in the preceding paragraphs of the same paper why would anybody think that the Soviets would make a suitable intermediary for any form of peace negotiation?

The Soviets wanted war with Japan and the Japanese knew this. The Soviets were preparing for war with Japan and the Japanese knew this. The Soviets had just concluded war with Germany and the Japanese knew this. The Soviets were Allies of the United States and Britain and the Japanese knew this.

In fact, from the Soviet point of view, the worst thing that could possibly happen was that the Japanese would conclude peace with the United States (and Britain) before the Soviets had had a chance for a land-grab against the Japanese on the Asian continent. So why would anybody think that the Soviets would make a good intermediary? The Soviets wanted the war to continue for as long as possible!

And I still maintain, from a United States perspective (because that is what matters), that no capitulation or negotiated peace was imminent or even likely. Had the Soviets communicated Japan’s peace overtones to the United States? Well, why would they? Had the Japanese communicated their peace overtones to the United States through any other intermediary? No? Why not? Almost any other intermediary would have been better than the Soviet Union and, frankly, if Japan was serious about a negotiated peace, what harm could it have possibly done?

What CD says.

Why “delusional”?

Well, as an example of what I mean by ‘delusional’ let me quote from the paper you linked from Professor Tsuyoshi Hasegawa:

On August 8, one day before the Soviet invasion, the General Staff’s Bureau of Military Affairs produced a study outlining what Japan should do if the Soviet Union issued an ultimatum demanding Japan’s total withdrawal from the Asian continent. According to this plan, the following alternatives were suggested: (1) reject the Soviet demand and carry out the war against the Soviet Union in addition to the United States and Britain; (2) conclude peace with the United States and Britain immediately and concentrate on the war against the Soviet Union; (3) accept the Soviet demand and seek Moscow’s neutrality, while carrying on the war against the United States and Britain; and (4) accept the Soviet demand and involve the Soviet Union in the Greater East Asian War. Of these alternatives, the army preferred to accept the Soviet demand and either keep the Soviet Union neutral or, if possible, involve the Soviet Union in the war against the United States and Britain.

Are any of those four alternatives not completely delusional? Also, given the analysis of Soviet intentions in the preceding paragraphs of the same paper why would anybody think that the Soviets would make a suitable intermediary for any form of peace negotiation?

The Soviets wanted war with Japan and the Japanese knew this. The Soviets were preparing for war with Japan and the Japanese knew this. The Soviets had just concluded war with Germany and the Japanese knew this. The Soviets were Allies of the United States and Britain and the Japanese knew this.

In fact, from the Soviet point of view, the worst thing that could possibly happen was that the Japanese would conclude peace with the United States (and Britain) before the Soviets had had a chance for a land-grab against the Japanese on the Asian continent. So why would anybody think that the Soviets would make a good intermediary? The Soviets wanted the war to continue for as long as possible!

And I still maintain, from a United States perspective (because that is what matters), that no capitulation or negotiated peace was imminent or even likely. Had the Soviets communicated Japan’s peace overtones to the United States? Well, why would they? Had the Japanese communicated their peace overtones to the United States through any other intermediary? No? Why not? Almost any other intermediary would have been better than the Soviet Union and, frankly, if Japan was serious about a negotiated peace, what harm could it have possibly done?