Harrier and AIM-9L

I think Creaking Door is correct in that examination of the SHAR kills shows them all to be well within the effective envelop of the 9G. In fact I believe that on at least two occasions the SHAR had head on engagement opportunities but the 9L failed to lock up.

Woodward was a Submariner who by all accounts, pre Falklands had been quite vocal in his views that the SHAR was meerly token seaborne air defence.

I think his views in the first post were him trying to validate or save face given the SHAR/FAA pilots excellence performance compared to his pre Falklands mutterings.

PS I once heard that, right at the start of the Falklands war, somebody in the Navy asked Ferranti if it was possible to integrate Red Top onto the SHAR Blue Fox. The study lasted less than a week but is an interesting what if. Compared to 9L, Red Top was heavy, but did offer a radar slaved IR seeker.

The NATO commitment of the UK Tanker Force was met by deploying extra KC-135s to the UK whilts the Victors were deployed down south.

Thanks for confirming that; I’d assumed that because the RAF tanker and transport fleets were so heavily committed during (and post) Falklands that there must have been some US assistance to fill the NATO commitment. I seem to recall also that the US provided nuclear submarines to release the Royal Navy submarines during the conflict and I believe that New Zealand sent a frigate to the Gulf to release a Royal Navy one.

I still don’t really understand the prominence given to the AIM-9L missiles though; I guess it just requires little journalistic imagination or understanding to state that the US ‘supplied’ the Task Force with Sidewinder missiles. The AGM-45 Shrike missiles used in about half the Vulcan raids get far less prominence, and that was a capability that the RAF really didn’t posses at the time, but again does it matter that these were ‘supplied’ or just purchased by the UK?

Undercurrent in all of this is the suggestion that the UK could not have mounted the operation to recover the Falklands without US assistance; dependent on your point of view there is certainly an argument to be made. Interestingly re-reading the introduction to Sandy Woodward’s book he states that the US allowed the Task Force to use Ascension Island. Some Argentine sources, in a sort of damage-limitation exercise, claim that US pilots (or even US aircraft) flew from the Royal Navy aircraft-carriers during the conflict.

Additionally, was there not some problem with the cockpit switches on various marques of Harrier (and AIM-9). This, I was told, was the problem that resulted in an AIM-9 being fired from a ground taxy-ing Harrier into the remnants of the Welsh Guards Mortar Platoon (ex-Bluff Cove preventable disaster) while they were snow clearing at RAF Stanley?
Or does anyone know (and has read) the results of the CoI?
Just interested. I was there at the time.

The Welsh Guards incident was not down to cockpit switchery. The cause was poor potting (use of silicon sealant) around some launcher wiring allowing the ingress of moisture which resulted in a short circuit). Pics did eventually surface in “Air Clues” albeit much later.

Thanks for that, I thought it was only the French C-135FRs that had that facility, but just crossed my mind that USAF TAC (F-104s etc) aircraft had probes aswel.:o

The 135s had a hose adaptor fitted to the boom to allow probe equipped aircraft to use them.

Commonly known as a donkey d1ck, most of the drivers airframe I know who have used them, actually prefer them as they are much more stable and of course Boom Ops could bend the rules and ‘help’ with positioning.

Wouldn’t they have been useless for British and European aircraft at the time?
I thought the reason why Vulcans were converted to tankers was to ensure British home commitments could still be met, while the new VC-10 tanker was nearing service entry.

CD,

The NATO commitment of the UK Tanker Force was met by deploying extra KC-135s to the UK whilts the Victors were deployed down south.

The fit of AIM-9 was never an original requirement for the RAF Harrier GR3 so the airframes were not wired to accept them; I think that wiring for some other store was adapted but that in doing so some of the usual safeguards were eliminated. Isn’t it usual for weapons systems to be automatically ‘disarmed’ when the undercarriage is locked down on an aircraft?

Strangely when HMS Ark Royal was retired recently I went to South Shields to see her and ended up chatting to somebody who was in that snow-clearing party; he described a very harrowing experience with a friend of his having a leg cut-off by the missile.

There was (and still is?) a lot of “hidden” goings-on before, during, and after the Falklands War. I believe that Caspar Weinberger was given some fairly high level (honorary) UK ‘gong’* for his part in the shennanigens.
Additionally, was there not some problem with the cockpit switches on various marques of Harrier (and AIM-9). This, I was told, was the problem that resulted in an AIM-9 being fired from a ground taxy-ing Harrier into the remnants of the Welsh Guards Mortar Platoon (ex-Bluff Cove preventable disaster) while they were snow clearing at RAF Stanley?
Or does anyone know (and has read) the results of the CoI?
Just interested. I was there at the time.
HTH
Resmoroh
* GBE no less. And you don’t get many of them to the pound even in UK. Must have been some very “unaccountable” acts of ‘friendship’ towards UK? Even those of us involved in CORPORATE (even before it got its official name) both at home, and in the S Atlantic (and elsewhere), don’t know what was really going on in the political spectrum. A GBE tells me “a very great deal”!!!!!!!!

Ah I see, I don’t know anything about Army or Navy commitments and assets used (I’m guessing Navy was hefty), but overall the RAF one was comparitively small, we still had Bucc, Jag, Phantom, RAFG Harrier, Lightning, Vulcan sqns with their established armaments in place, not to mention Vulcan AAR and Shack AEW support for NATO work, so that wouldn’t be seen as needing extra bolstering.
Maybe as the 9L was still relatively new in NATO Europe that the numbers our forces used for the Falkands made a big enough dent in the total stock pile that it was felt as being urgent enough that the US topped it up?

I think you miss my point; what I’m saying is why was it essential for the US to ‘supply’ AIM-9L missiles to replace the UK AIM-9L missiles taken with the Task Force when NATO didn’t seem to mind the absence of any of the other assets that I mentioned? Weren’t these assets more important to NATO that the small percentage of AIM-9L missiles taken south?

What I’ve never understood is the significance attached to these Sidewinder missiles because surely the despatch of three nuclear submarines, two aircraft carriers plus Sea Harriers and Harriers, most of the Royal Navy surface fleet and almost every auxiliary vessel, both Royal Marine Commandos, both Parachute regiments, an Army brigade, almost every Royal Navy transport and anti-submarine helicopter plus the almost total employment of the RAF tanker and transport fleets for months on end doesn’t seem to have caused anything like the same response.

Were these Sidewinders really that significant to NATO or the Task Force? Or have they just been seized-upon as tangible support from the United States in amongst the general lack of specific knowledge about the level of assistance that was actually supplied?

I would say that your last paragraph answers your first, in that for those land, sea, and air forces to be able work effectively in hostile waters that far from the UK, that air superiority was paramount and the 9L was a big player in achieving this.

I thoroughly enjoyed Woodward’s book and not realising at the time that it had been ghost-written thought that he probably could make a decent career as a thriller writer!

I’ve just re-read portions of ‘The Secret War for The Falklands’ and have the same impression as when I originally read it; I’m not saying that any of it is untrue, it could all be absolutely true, but I’m ill-equipped to judge and my feelings weren’t helped by some glaring technical inaccuracies.

You are correct about the missiles of course…..it made absolute sense to take the best available.

Creaking Door – I would have to reread it to give a measured response. As mentioned it was several years ago and interesting as a supplement to Sandy Woodwards memoirs- which I found more rewarding.

I have wanted to read the other two memoirs that Woodward mentioned at the start – just haven’t got round to them yet.

I suppose at the time – they were not sure what form the combat would take – so without hindsight- the allocation of all aspect missiles would have been considered a benefit.

If you want political savagery – the ghost writer for Woodward was Patrick Robinson who has subsequently written Ghost Force – which is interesting in light of current cut backs.

…it did cover the personal approval by Weingberger of the sidewinders as well as other unofficial support.

The ‘problem’ that the Task Force had with the Sidewinder missiles was that the AIM-9L versions that were taken to the Falklands were from NATO ‘war stocks’ held by the United Kingdom. As I understand it these were not supposed to be used unless NATO officially sanctioned their issue. The United States ‘supplied’ AIM-9L missiles from their own stock to replace the missiles taken with the Task Force (possibly one-hundred missiles but I could be wrong there); I don’t think that this even required any US AIM-9L missiles to be moved, they were just ‘allocated’ to the NATO war stocks.

What I’ve never understood is the significance attached to these Sidewinder missiles because surely the despatch of three nuclear submarines, two aircraft carriers plus Sea Harriers and Harriers, most of the Royal Navy surface fleet and almost every auxiliary vessel, both Royal Marine Commandos, both Parachute regiments, an Army brigade, almost every Royal Navy transport and anti-submarine helicopter plus the almost total employment of the RAF tanker and transport fleets for months on end doesn’t seem to have caused anything like the same response.

Were these Sidewinders really that significant to NATO or the Task Force? Or have they just been seized-upon as tangible support from the United States in amongst the general lack of specific knowledge about the level of assistance that was actually supplied?

Many years ago I read The Secret War for The Falklands by Nigel West…

I’ve read ‘The Secret War for The Falklands’ and although it is interesting enough I found it difficult to attribute significance to much of what he revealed; because of the clandestine nature of much of what it covers it is impossible to verify many of the facts and there were so many detailed descriptions of great missions that were ‘planned’ but never carried-out. Also he made a number of technical gaffs about well-known systems and operations that left me with a feeling of mistrust about things that I wasn’t knowledgeable about and had to take his word for.

He is saying that without the AIM-9L that the Sea Harriers would not have been good enough.

Before the Falklands War the Sea Harrier carried the AIM-9G which wasn’t quite as good as the AIM-9L but to what extent that would have influenced the outcome of the war is uncertain. The AIM-9L had an ‘all-aspect’ ability (could be fired at an aircraft from any angle, even head-on) that the AIM-9G lacked and, I think, slightly better range, and possibly reliability but almost all (if not all) AIM-9L fired during the war were fired from close-range and from the rear, conditions that the AIM-9G would have coped with almost as well.

I think exactly the same. Aim-9G would be a perfect job too.

1Saludo

Many years ago I read ( The Secret War for The Falklands by Nigel West) – although its main story was a sting operation to stop any more French missiles going to the Junta – it did cover the personal approval by Weingberger of the sidewinders as well as other unofficial support.

By itself not the most interesting book – but following on from Sandy Woodwards book – it added some needed detail.

It was vastly different to the Harrier II that has just been withdrawn from the RAF.
The Sea Harrier FRS.1 was a carrier based development of the original Harrier GR.1-3 strike and reconnaissance aircraft, but had an enlarged & raised cockpit position, marinised components and was primarily a radar equipped fighter. The Sea Harrier FA.2 had much improved radar and weapons capablity.
The Harrier II (GR.5 to GR.9) was a completely different airframe which employed great use of carbon fibre composite construction in its structure and having a substantially larger wing (with midspan outrigger U/C), wider fusalage, more powerful engine, and greater weapons load etc. They kind of look similar to each other as most Harriers do but that is it.

My understanding is that the Sea Harrier was AIM-9L capable from almost the start, where as the GR.3 had to be converted for the Falklands?

The most recently withdrawn Harriers were ‘second generation’, developed in the 1980’s and in service from the early 90’s. The ‘first generation’ Harriers went up to T.Mk.4, the GR.5 onward being second generation. The SeaHarrier was very much first generation, and so was closer to the earlier Harriers such as the GR.3. The SeaHarrier FRS.1 in the Fleet Air Arm Museum at Yeovilton is a GR.3 with a SeaHarrier cockpit grafted on.