The Most Dangerous Enemy

Plus, if you think this is anywhere close to everything or even a significant amount of the interesting stuff in this book, you are very wrong.

Hope you enjoyed.

Buy the book and read a few pages before bedtime.

Fair point. Agreed. Books rule!

Ah yes but, the forum moves on. If the title is on your shelf, you’ve got it forever ! In its entirety. Giving you a complete picture at the turn of a page.

Don’t need to buy it now. It’s all been quoted on here!

Bungay’s book is on my shelf and is one of my most valued references. Thanks to ‘buzzbeurling’ for continuing to remind us all of what a gem we have to hand.

I look forward to more revelations.

OK, I strongly suggest that people purchase this book for Christmas, perhaps next year if it is too late for this year or to hand over to someone in the family so they can give it to you for your birthday. It is definitely worth a read.

Thanks for sharing – it’s an interesting read. However, it’s getting to the point where soon the author will potentially start losing income because the key parts of the text are available for free here. Even if not, there’s a principle involved here. It’s great reading, but that’s the point – it was undoubtedly a lot of work, and if it was mine I wouldn’t be to happy to see it literally devalued.

It is maybe time to give your thoughts on all of this, and more in the spirit of a dicussion forum?

“The largest of the German Airfleets, Airfleet 2, was commanded by Albert Kesselring. He was born in 1885, the son of an academic and scion of one of Bavaria’s oldest families. Given a classical education, he joined the army in 1904, in part to assert his independence from his father, and was commissioned in the artillery. During World War I he served in France, distinguishing himself through his coolness and professionalism during the period of the Allied offensive in Artois in 1917. In 1918 he was given a General Staff appointment, and noted the value of control of the air.

In the chaos of post-war Germany, he helped to suppress the Communist revolution in Bavaria, and was amongst those officers selected to remain in Germany’s 100,000 man army. In 1933, he was singled out, despite his protests, to head the administrative office of the clandestine Luftwaffe, and quickly decided to make the best of the inevitable by learning to fly at the age of forty-eight. His energy and organisational talents were invaluable. He became Chief of Air Staff, and finally, on the outbreak of war, was given an operational command as Head of Luftflotte 1 for the invasion of Poland. In 1940 whilst he was engaged in organising Poland’s air defences, the Commander of Luftflotte 2 in France, Hellmuth Felmy, was sacked after one of his planes forced-landed in Belgium, carrying full details of the Wehrmacht’s invasion plans. Kesselring was appointed to succeed him.

Kesselring was one of Germany’s ablest field commanders, as he was to prove when he took over command of the Wehrmacht in Italy, and tied down superior allied forces in that tough and scaly underbelly of Europe until the war’s end. His commanding general in 1917 had written a glowing report of him, commenting on his intellectual power, his sound grasp of tactics, communication skills, tireless industry, his loyalty to his superiors, and his ability to inspire those below. He was in many ways, the model of a German soldier.

As an Air force leader, Kesselring’s intellect alone secured for him a reputation for competence. Theo Osterkamp met him on Nordeney in 1933, just after he had taken up his new post. Kesselring came over as a ‘chevalier of the old-school’, modest, eager to learn and with a charming smile. Despite his modesty, Osterkamp wrote, Kesselring had deep knowledge and a clear vision of the Luftwaffe’s future. ‘What a delight it must be to work with a man of such calibre’.

Yet despite the enormous amount of effort that he put into the Luftwaffe from 1933 onwards, he remained a soldier rather than an airman. In Poland and in France the Luftwaffe operated in support of the army, a role in which Kesselring felt quite at home. The Battle of Britain was something which had never been tried, and he was facing men who spent the best part of their careers working out how to defeat an enemy attack by an enemy air force.

As a man, however, he was a leader of high distinction. He was courageous, independent-minded and unusually amiable. He earned the sobriquet of ‘der lachelnde Albert’(‘smiling Albert’) and his organisational skills were matched by an understanding of human nature and a sure touch with his men. In the crisis he faced in 1917 he had restored his troops shattered confidence when they faced defeat. Easy-going on the outside, he was tough as nails on the inside and incisive in his decision-making. It is doubtful whether, the Germans could have found a better man anywhere in their armed forces to carry out the role allotted to Kesselring in 1940.”

According to the book, fateful consequences “were narrowly averted by the presence of mind of one of Dowding’s pilots who came, by a curious set of circumstances, to be taking a Gladiator to France.

In early 1939, the celebrated Harry Broadhurst had taken over 111 squadron from John Gillan. In common with most of the squadron, ‘Sandy’ Sanders took a dislike to his new C/O, whom he regarded as a prima donna, and having spent his childhood fighting for his rights against four beautiful sisters and his mother, all of whom he considered to be prima donnas, fighting prima donnas had become a bit of a habit. Broadhurst was an extremely good pilot, but his men disliked the way he would talk about his aerobatic skills, especially by doing a roll off the top of a loop after takeoff, as he had done at the 1938 Hendon Air Display, in a machine with the guns removed to make it lighter. So one grey Sunday morning in September, Sandy took off in a Gauntlet with the guns still in it to do the same thing, just to show that anyone could do it. Unfortunately, the war had just started and a number of senior officers were arriving at Northolt for an important conference just as Sandy was carrying out his stunt. Himself a very experienced pilot, he completed an immaculate roll off the top of his loop in the unmodified airplane. When he landed, in recognition of his skill and sense of timing, Broadhurst put him under arrest.

He took him the then 11 AOC Group, Air Vice-Marshall Gossage, to decide what to do with him. Gossage knew Sandy’s mother, so he just asked the young pilot what he would like to do. Sandy replied that he would like to go to France. ‘Off you go then’, the AOC replied. So, on 4 October 1939, Sanders was posted to 615 Squadron, which was earmarked for duty in France.

His punishment was what he had asked for, but it was in fact a double insult. Though an RAF regular, he had been posted to fly with auxiliaries. Also, despite being one of the most experienced pilots in the RAF, this meant he had to fly Gladiators. However, he did go to France, and on 15 November 1939, 615 lined up at Croydon along with 607 Squadron to head for Merville. There was an official inspection before they left, and, appropriately enough, 615’s Honorary Air Commodore, the First Lord of the Admiralty, Winston Churchill, turned up with his wife to see the boys off.

Gladiators were armed with two machine guns at the sides of the cockpit and one under each wing, at about waist height. These guns could only be cocked for action on the ground. The pneumatic system that operated them was unreliable and even rocking the wings could set them off. As 615 were escorting their ground crews in two Ensign aircraft, and were expecting to fly into action, they had their guns cocked.

Sandy was leading the flight, so Churchill and Clementine naturally chose his machine for a close inspection. Churchill being Churchill, he showed a particular interest in the guns. His wife being a woman she sat in the cockpit asking ‘what is this?’ and ‘what is that?’ and as Churchill was bending over in front of the machine gun under the wing, she started fiddling with the firing mechanism. Fighter pilots need to have fast reactions, and Sandy was a very good fighter pilot. So it was that he may have saved the future Prime Minister from a premature demise at the hands of his spouse, and thereby changed the course of world history. The squadron took off and landed at Merville without further incident.”

Concerning Spitfire manufacturing versus the Me-109 it took…..

“……13,000 man-hours needed to make a Mk. V airframe with the 4,000 for the ME-109G. The Spitfire also took two-and-a-half times as long to make as a Hurricane……”.

“…….Willy Messerschmidt took production needs into account in his design. Mitchell took nothing except performance into account. This was one of the consequences. Maybe Mitchell would have done better to do so, but the advantages of his designs over the 109 also have to be considered. Even German engineers would have had trouble with the wing, which allowed every Spitfire pilot to outturn any 109, and despite all the incompetence it could muster, the British industry finally managed to make 22,000 Spitfires. Heinkel had rejected the elliptical wing after his experience with the He-70 because it was so difficult to manufacture in quantity.”

Relations with the trades unions seemed to take on a rosier hue when Uncle Joe joined the fray ! I wonder why ?

Concerning “squabbles between the car unions and management over money” at Castle Bromwich…..

“Workers at Castle Bromwich ended up being paid far more than those at Southampton. This was not an isolated case of unions putting their interests before the war effort. In the period of Dunkirk there was a strike at a colliery and another at the A.V. Roe aircraft factory. In August 1940, the de Havilland aircraft factory at Edgeware lost 4,426 days over ‘the transfer of four capstan fitters from the firm to other work of national importance’”

“The British aircraft industry in 1940 was in fact more productive and more efficient than the German one, outproducing it with smaller numbers of workers until 1944. However, attaining that efficiency took a great deal of effort. The Air Ministry placed its first order for 400 Hurricanes in June 1936, but the first production Hurricane did not roll out of the assembly sheds at Brooklands in Surrey until 12 October 1937, which was almost two years after the prototype had flown. The ministry had expected to have its first fifty by September. The production capacity of the British aircraft industry had been allowed to decline so far over the previous twenty years that it could barely cope. Similarly, it was only due to the energies of Ernest Hives, who became General Works Manager in 1938, that Rolls-Royce could manage to meet an order for 3,350 Merlins.”

“In 1936, the government had conceived the idea of building dedicated factories to “shadow” production at existing works. On 15 July 1938 work began on building an entirely new works at Castle Bromwich near Birmingham under the supervision of Lord Nuffield`s Morris Motor Works. Lord Nuffield and his men knew how to mass produce cars, but knew nothing about aeroplanes. The project was plagued by changes to the production specification from the Air Ministry, the management`s ignorance of aerospace technology and squabbles between the car unions and management over money. Delays continued into 1940…….. To meet the June target of ten Spitfires, machines were surreptitiously transferred from Eastleigh.”

“The British innovation of shadow factories, whilst difficult to get started, gave it a major advantage as the war continued and was copied in the United States.”

Need to get this.
Thanks for heads up!

Favourite aviation historian of mine that he is, I guess that Mr. Bungay would be pleased to be so extensively and informatively quoted.

I think it might be time to start being careful before overly extensive quoting breaches copyright.

Thanks for the suggestion, but we are happy that what is posted falls within the limits of what is acceptable, particularly as the source is well credited.

Moggy
Moderator

Oh, oh. I don’t know how that works. Any suggestions would be welcome.

I have been hoping to encourage people to buy the book.

I think it might be time to start being careful before overly extensive quoting breaches copyright.

Adding to my earlier post where it was stated that …It turns out that Goering was addicted to morphine as a result of treatment from a gunshot wound at the beer hall putsch. Apparently this can have serious side effects like making an honest person completely untrustworthy and delusional resulting in criminal actions.

Added text…

“Goering was quite prepared to pursue petty feuds to the detriment of morale. He disapproved of the Kommodore of JG53, Hans-Jurgen von Cramon-Taubadel, because he had married into a family whose Aryan credentials were less than perfect. So in July, he ordered the unit to paint out its “Ace of Spades” insignia, of which it was very proud. They painted red bands around their cowlings instead. In retaliation, when Wolf-Deitrich Wilcke took over III./JG53 in August, he had the swastikas on the tails of his Bf 109s painted out, which was both an expression of solidarity with his Kommodore and a signal to Goering. His standing was very low in JG53.”

“Goering was first and foremost a Nazi politician, skilled at scheming and using people. He ran the Air Ministry on a divide-and-rule basis and did nothing to improve the ruinously bad relationships Milch, Jeschonnek, and Udet had with each other and with him………..The Luftwaffe was not run by a team but by a set of isolated individuals who had to look out for themselves and tried, if anything, not to co-operate.”

“When Hitler provoked the Czech crisis in 1938, raising the real prospect of war with Britain, Goering was shocked to receive a report from General Felmy that an exercise had shown that the Luftwaffe was in no condition to take on the RAF. After the invasion of Poland, Hitler’s eagerness to attack France provoked similar anxiety within the Luftwaffe High Command. They were not ready, but by that time Goering’s boasting had made it impossible to tell Hitler the truth without losing face or worse.”

As an interesting sidenote….

“III./ZG 76 were under strict instructions to protect the Stukas whatever the cost. And this they did, paying a heavy price. Between them, the British pilots shot down four of them. One of them was flown by Oberleutnant Hans-Joachim Goering, the Reichsmarschall’s nephew, described by one of his colleagues as ‘a boisterous young man’ who ‘stupidly tried to take on the whole RAF’. His aircraft plunged out of the sky in a screaming dive and hit the ground on the Verne heights overlooking Portland Harbour……..Uncle Hermann was not amused and ‘stirred up quite a fuss’ having been assuming that the Gruppenkommandeur, Hauptmenn Dickore would be taking special care of his nephew”

“The nazis did not understand the economics of war, and, like the Japanese, relied on the superior skill and the warrior ethos of their fighting men to win. Their propaganda efforts backfired, for the British expected German production to be far higher than it was and so planned for higher numbers themselves”