Macmillan and the Bomb

I’ve read similar before and somehow it was tied into the TSR-2 issue with size of weapon needed/actually used etc. I can’t recall where I read it and I’m about to endure clothes shopping with the Mrs and kids. I’ll and try and remember when I’m out.

I’ve been busy this afternoon trying to find more information, and there are indeed some released papers that confirm that Macmillan (or at least his Cabinet) did make this decision. The in-service date for WE177C looks about right too so maybe it was just my clouded memory that had convinced me that it was slightly earlier (or maybe I confused it with WE177B).

This information on the 10kt limit is certainly very interesting though, particularly the way that it altered the TSR2’s delivery/carriage requirements. The strange aspect of all this is how WE177B was produced primarily for the Vulcan force although it would have obviously been more suitable to TSR2. There doesn’t seem to be any explanation (at least not one that has been released yet) of why there was a 10kt limit on WE177A, but the development of WE177B continued (ostensibly for Vulcans) and the weapon was subsequently used on Vulcans, Buccaneers, Jaguars, Tornado, and so on. This would suggest that if TSR2 has entered service, it too would have carried WE177B which begs the question as to why there was any limit on the yield of WE177A! As ever, it seems to be the continual political confusion over the TSR2’s role which caused so much difficulty. It seems to have flipped-flopped between being a tactical or strategic aircraft almost on a daily basis!

Hmmm

all British tactical nuclear bombs should have a maximum yield of no more than 10kt.

One wonders, could that be the origin of a couple of bits of Weapon Employment Course black humour

[Tasteless mode ON]

Q. Define a tactical nuclear weapon.
A. One that goes off in Germany

Q. What is the average distance between German towns?
A. About 10Kt

[Tasteless mode OFF]

exmpa:diablo:

Indeed, it does have a very direct bearing on TSR2 but I’m just a little intrigued to know more about the reasoning behind the decision (although it looks like most of the story is still classified), and why it was subsequently (but only partially) contradicted in order to produce a “stop gap” pre-Polaris programme.

It evidently did affect TSR2 as the lower-yield bomb inspired the development of stick delivery of up to four WE177’s (in order to ensure that the target would be destroyed) and the inference is that this reduced capability made TSR2 look rather less credible to the incoming labour government… and we all know what happened subsequently… 😉

reduced capability…flip-flopped. I suggest you not give credence to that point re. the chop on TSR.2. I think this is what happened:

4 August,1958: Agreement for Co-operation on Uses of Atomic Energy for Mutual Defense Purposes. Violet Club, UK’s very large fission store, was eroding Air Ministry trust in AWRE, whose fusion Yellow Sun (to be Mk.1), funded June,1954, was slowly hatching (deployed early-1960). MoS instructed AWRE to grasp US Mk.28, to become the fusion warhead for Blue Streak, Blue Steel, Yellow Sun Mk.2.
29 March,1960: US/UK Atomic Collaboration MoU; Skybolt purchased, its W-59 fusion warhead to be licenced into AWRE.
1962: WE.177(to be:A) in hand as UK’s 10kT fission device for several purposes, inc. RAFG TSR.2 gravity bomb and (X-12 Pandora) ASM, dual carriage (whether for two chances at one target, or to hop on from first to a second).
AWRE/ROFs at this point, hopelessly overloaded.
January,1963: the long term Deterrent has become Polaris, AWRE-licenced fusion W-58 with the UK fission Primary; bridge to 1969 supplementing 40 Victor/Vulcan Blue Steel is settled as (not yet delivered) ex-Skybolt Vulcan 2 with a gravity case around AWRE-licenced W-59, plus the UK fission Primary.
AWRE/ROFs overloaded. Macmillan sets their No.1 priority as producing fusion stores for low-level Vulcan (deployed Sept.1966 as WE.177B’s Simon; YS 2 delivery height was vulnerable to SAMs: hence Wilson’s 1964 Election jibe: the Deterrent “does not deter”), then Polaris (deployed July,1968 as Reggie). No.2 priority was the fission device in applications other than as Primary for Simon and Reggie.
So, as WE.177A(N) the fission device is deployed in RN Buccaneer S.2, Jun,1970, as WE.177A in early-1971 (RAFG Bucc.), as WE.177A(NDB), 2/73.

I think that in the timeframe 1/63-4/65 RAF tried to find a role for TSR.2/WE.177B. That confused the investment case: its high cost/long time were caused by its precision nav/attack kit for the iron, then the Theatre nuclear Phases before the Strategic exchange. If Mac said 10kT only he meant: priorities as above please; don’t make a case to prolong Strategic manned platforms beyond SSBN arrival. ROFs were able to supply 48 Vulcan fusion WE.177B before turning to the SSBNs’ needs, then to the fission stores. Part of the attraction of F-4M for RAFG was that AWRE/ROFs were not called upon to arm them.