Leipzig Raid 3/4th December 1943

With this anniversary looming, I have been helped in researching some aspects of this attack by Pals in many Forums. Thank you all for the additional details.

I had hoped that we would have been able to establish where a 51 Squadron Halifax HR732 (MH-Y) crashed but have not been successful so far.

In the hope that we may still discover what happened, here is a synopsis of the raid.

Extract from Pathfinder Force: A History of 8 Group by Don Musgrove
Leipzig Raid 3rd / 4th December 1943 (Friday/Saturday)

The Bomber Command battle plan for the night was simple, but effective. The Main Force of bombers for the night, 527 aircraft that were detailed to attack Leipzig, were routed as if to attack Berlin. When about 65 km short of the Reich capital, near Stendal, the bomber stream turned sharply south to Leipzig, minus nine Pathfinder Force Mosquitoes which carried straight on and caused a diversion on Berlin.

Inexplicably, the 1st Jagdkorps did not obtain any early H2S plots of the raid; only at 01:02 hours the spearhead of the bomber stream was detected by the Mammuth and Wassermann radars on the Dutch coast, some 150 km west of Bergen op Zoom. In reaction, the Korps was only able to employ 70 twin engine fighters, due to fog pertaining both at low level and at operational height. A few Nachtjager that had been hurriedly scrambled to man the Himmelbett boxes on the Dutch coast were the first to make contact with the stream when it made landfall south of Den Helder. Leutnant Rolland of 12/NJG1 scoring the first Nachtjager kill, over a 35 Sqdn Halifax LW343 under control of Raum Salzhering at 01:09 hours. (Major Streib, Kommodore of NJG/1 later dispatched two Lancasters in box Marder, based on Ten Arlo). Because the Nachtjagd control was still busy organising his freelance fighter defences, the giant bomber stream met little further trouble from Nachtjager whilst crossing the Netherlands. Just three more combats (abschusse) were reported, but no further bombers were shot down, before they flew into Germany proper.

Belatedly, at 02:06 hours the German controllers of the Laufende Reportage started passing plots of the bomber stream when it was flying beyond Quackenbruck, whilst Zahme Saue of 2 and 3 NJD were being fed into the stream. About a dozen SN-2 equipped fighters, which had been sent up from Gutersloh, entered the stream over Twente in eastern Holland, and again an estimated dozen fighters from 2JD which had also been fitted with the new A/1 radar, were directed into the bomber stream south of Bremen. “Swimming” with the bombers from that point onwards en route until the turning point 65 kms west of Berlin, the deadly potential of the Zahme Sau technique was clearly demonstrated by this small fighter force: 24 sharp encounters with Nachtjager occurred and some 16 bombers were shot down. In turn, two Ju88’s were claimed shot down by Halifaxes of 4 Group near Quackenbruck and one Bf110 by a Lancaster of 1 Group in the area of Stendal, near the bombers turning point. The Germans reported the loss of a Bf109G-6 of 1/JG300 (due to icing) and 3 twin engine aircraft of the 1st Jagdkorps. These included a Bf110 of 1/NJG3, in the hands of Oblt Martin. After achieving a victory over a 429 Sqdn Halifax JD374 near Vechta, for his 2nd combat victory, the Nachtjager was hit by “friendly” flak fire. Trying to limp back to base on one engine, Oblt Martin was forced to make a dreaded Nachtaussenlandung (night time belly landing) in a field to the SW of Schleswig. The Nachtjager pilot escaped unharmed but both his crew members were injured in the process.

All but one or two of the abschusse on the leg between Quackenbruck and Stendal were achieved by crews of NJG3. Hptmn Paul Szameitat of the Geschwaders second Gruppe and his crew of Fw Richard Kubler (BF) and Fw Herbert Blockus (BS) were the nights top scoring team with 5 abschusse in just 27 minutes. It remains unclear if all five claims were subsequently confirmed, it is possible that two were rejected by the Abschuss Kommission. (The Szameitat crew was killed in action four weeks later, on 1/2 January 1944).

Typical of the Tame Boar missions flown by the twin engine night fighter force during this period, Oblt Koberich, St.Kpt of 11/NJG3 and his crew of Uffz Heidenreich (BF) and Ofw Kromell (BS) took off from Grove at 01:38 in Ju88 D5+AW, for a freelance Zahme sau Feindflug. The crew found the inbound bomber stream to the north of Hannover, where they shot down their first victim of the night, a 630 Sqdn Lancaster ED920 at 03:00 hours. 35 minutes later, Kolberich dispatched a second Lancaster near Wittenberge, and returned to Grove at 05:05 hours.

Oblt Hiendlmayr, a member of Kolberich’s Staffel, claimed two Lancasters destroyed in the Berlin area (probably in the area of the bombers turning point to the west of Berlin near Stendal (52.25N 12.22E) for his 4th and 5th abschusse, both were probably not anerkannt), but his Ju88C-6 sustained damage in return fire. Flying back to Grove airfield, he suffered loss of oil pressure and ordered his crew to bail out, which they did successfully. Oblt Hiendlmayr crashed with his aircraft near Ocshenwerder and was posted missing. Not until September 2003 were his remains found in the wreckage of his Junkers Ju 88C-6 werk nummer. 360283 aircraft code D5+KW from 11/IV/NJG 3, at the time stationed at Grove airfield in Denmark. Crashed due to engine trouble after airbattle. Both his Bordfunker and Bordwart bailed out unhurt. Flugzeugführer Oblt. Johannes (Hans) Hiendlmayr, Bordfunker Uffz. Günther Kulas and Bordwart Ogfr. Rudolf Scholz.

Whilst the Tame Boars battled with the bomber stream on the outward bound route, about 30 to 40 further twin engine fighters of 1 and 2 JGD (none of which had been fitted with the SN2 yet) were assembled over FF Berta, before being directed to proceed to Berlin. At this point, the German air observation system made one vital mistake, as they failed to recognise the turning point of the Main Force west of Berlin, where the heavies headed south for Leipzig and the small Mosquito feint on Berlin carried straight on, dropping window to confuse radar, to the Reich capital. This lured the 1st Jagdkorps controllers into believing that yet another major raid on the capital was pending, and in reaction, they sent all the available freelancing fighters to Berlin at 03:18 hours. Bombs from the small Mosquito force were reported falling on Berlin at 03:45 hours and a firing ceiling for flak over the capital was announced, in anticipation of the arrival of the Main Force.

No reference whatsoever to the Laufende Reportage was made to Leipzig. Consequently, only a few fighters were observed beyond the bomber stream’s turning point at Stendal, only three combats with Nachtjager being recorded on the short final leg into the target. Between 03:50 and 04:25 hours, Leipzig was subjected to a devastatingly successful raid, 41 percent of the city’s housing being destroyed or heavily damaged. The 1st Jagdkorps HQ was only informed on the beginning of the attack on Leipzig by a telephone call from the flak commander of the city. By then it was too late to direct the bulk of the freelance fighters from Berlin area to Leipzig. Over the target, Nachtjager were only present in small numbers, just eight combats taking place and one Lancaster JB291 being shot down by Oblt Wulff, StKpt of 8/NJG5 at 04:13 hours. This was Nachtjagd’s 20th and final abschuss for the night. (Uffz Irmisch of 8/NJG5 claimed a probable kill; due to return fire he was unable to observe the crash of his quarry). 15 Halifaxes and 9 Lancasters from the Leipzig raid failed to return, and 12 others returned damaged.

On the long southerly route between Leipzig and Frankfurt, 11 combats occurred, one last Nachtjager attack being reported just before the bomber stream crossed the French coast in the Pas de Calais at around 06:30 hours. No Abschussmeldungen, however were logged by any Nachtjager and no bombers were claimed by Nachtjagers on the return flight.

Main Force: The bomber stream, directed to the target by Pathfinder aircraft to mark the target and significant turn points with colour coded flares.
H2S British early radar which could pick out significant landmarks only. The Germans could trace these signals to locate the bomber stream.

German defences were radar tracking and homing signals, searchlight and flak belts plus night fighter “boxes” where they could concentrate before being directed (Tame Boar) or finding the bomber stream themselves (Wild Boar). These boxes were blocking the obvious routes to major targets. Some were positioned out over the North sea to intercept early bombers (usually Pathfinders, the loss of which could seriously disrupt the raid successfully finding its target).

Laufende Reportage. I assume this is the German Defence Control.
NJG NachtJager Geschwader Night fighter (Group)
SN2 early German airborne radar
A/1 Later German airborne radar able to track H2S signals
Abschusse combats reported, not always confirmed as victories.

We have a report from another 51 Squadron Halifax whose rear gunner saw an aircraft hit twice by flak and explode in midair. Whilst most aircraft with no further reports are assumed to have crashed into the North Sea, in this case something happened to make us think that it crashed on land.

Some 3 years or so after the end of the war, Mrs Salvage received her husbands wedding ring but no other personal effects. As the ring was engraved with just his initials and their wedding date, other personal effects perhaps too fragile to forward, must have been available to make the correct identification. This should have led to at least the pilots body being identified and buried, but he and the rest of his crew are presumably “Known unto God”.

It is possible that they were on the bombing run and that the explosion destroyed the aircraft so severely that the wreckage did not fall as one unit, but over a wide area with little to link one piece of wreckage to another, or that it crashed into the target area and was destroyed by the bombing. No crew members were identified, so we have no idea as to where they may have been buried, especially if they fell in widely different areas. Nonetheless, in similar situations at least some ID of the crew or aircraft has been possible. In this case we simply have no further details. For the Luftwaffe pilot, this did not happen until his aircraft was discovered in 2003, so it may be that the wreckage of HR732 is also still to be found.

If there is any way of establishing what happened, please add your information.