I sense this is such a hurtful event for so many families. I sense this event affected the very fibre of the RAAF as an organisation, causing an impossible to reconcile conflict between loyalty to its officer class and its obligation to respect that the privelage of command demands honest leadership. So much is left unsaid about this event. How is it possible for a commander to lead subordinates into such a terrible doom? Maybe after half a century there is some space for honest reexamination. One thing that bugs me about this is the crash landing of Mosquito A52-303 in 1951, pilot officer AH Jones. In the court of inquiry for this event, the pilot was injured by striking his head against the rudder trim tab. To do this his body would need to be bent forward, in the same way as the crash test dummy of a car in the usual slow motion video of an air bag deploying. Prior to air bags in cars, the major, non fatal consequence of car crashes was brain injury, as the head struck parts of the car. I wonder how much this trauma may have affected the physical performance of Jones later, whether through spatial reasoning, migraines or whatever. The times called for “never complain, never explain,” in an Air Force officered by men still carrying shrapnel in their bodies. The armed forces generally are a dog once you are injured, abandoning you as a burden on the tax payer. So holding this in the back of the mind, how much did Jones brother officers protect him and push him, by an expectation to not underperform, to that fateful command over Sale ten years later? What do they mean by “condition m”? The report is full of allusions to medical conditions. What were the grumblings in Malaya? Was he fit? The RAAF does a great job in blaming dead pilots. I don’t think this was entirely the Commanders fault. He did it, but what was in the cockpit with him?