RN invented Naval Aviation. In 1936 won funds for (to be 6) big Power Projectors, and after a waffling period, chose to put Roc and Barracuda on them. Official History, WW2 Weapons, has the first as a “melancholy story”; Winkle Brown, aviator extraordinary, has “loathing” for the second. Only when Ark had Bucc 2+F-4K did FAA have fit (nearly-)Brit kit.
Some blame A.M. neglect before RN took on procurement. Others, multi-tasking for the few units on deck (torpedo-fighter!), thus, master-of-none. I had UK aero firms chasing land volume, leaving dreg also-rans (Blackburn, Fairey) to drift and fail on modest RN business. Well, yes, in hindsight, but in 1936 the resources assigned to blue water RN far exceeded those for limited-liability land, or to port-assault and Empire-pacifying RAF (no Strategic Bombing Campaign, no BEF to support). RN, inc. its Air, was to bottle up any Japanese or German upstart, thus avoiding trench troubles. As the Vickers powerhouse had some hulls, would they not want the Air component, too? Maybe RN was happy with its choice of Air kit and suppliers, whose futures were not yet behind.
Tom Philips, 1938 Plans/policy-maker, went down with PoW, so became fall guy for Big Guns can/fluttering Air can’t hit anything. JDK on here, after researching Skua, has their Lordships as simply incompetent. Well, they had to present KGVs as bastions; but the melancholy story continued until…well, it endures.
Why?
By: alertken - 28th November 2007 at 19:07
G: thanks for the link – people moan at my syntax: try that. (Declinist historian Corelli Barnett has a comment on Brabazon Committee types, that UK would have done better spending the money on garden gnomes. Doubtless you agree).
CV as offense, as Fleet defence. It’s punch and parry, isn’t it; the striker and the sweeper. CDS Mountbatten got into a terrible tizzle hyping invulnerability…of both Valiant SSNs and CVA-01, which is doubtless why SSNs’ anti-SSBN role was emphasised. CV asset value justifies great sacrifice to sink it, or to preserve it – Spruance DD case in your link. Jellicoe at Jutland could lose the War at a stroke, and Philips did so, for UK in SE Asia, with PoW/Repulse (Alan Clark: “the day the Empire was lost forever”).
Isn’t cypherus right on abysmal Brit FAA types? CVEs, convoy protection, ASW: done well, expendable ex-merchant hulls, Swordfish. Boring; pawns. CVs too valuable to be risked; air complement must preserve the Queen before sallying forth. So we sought a team of midfielders, all-rounders. Jack of all, master of none. G’s link has USN as 3-planes, which I take to imply role-specific quality.
By: Smith - 27th November 2007 at 04:18
As always, an interesting challenge alertken.
I have boiled your query down to what appears to me to be the essential question/s.
When did the carrier (or Fleet Carrier) rise into ascendancy vis-a-vis the fast battleship?
And an associated sub-question, why did the UK nor align to that paradigm in the late 20th century – reflect on Falklands 1982 and a hastily convened array of weaponry – compare that to the US carrier battle-fleets to this day.
This book touches on the question … read the whole chapter commencing p.211
http://books.google.com/books?id=CW43xkKbkEwC&pg=PA212&lpg=PA212&dq=ascendancy+of+the+aircraft+carrier&source=web&ots=UlPWcftk5K&sig=tXH7Oz5QY2-8h9eyI_5Evs4zUyU#PPA211,M1
The interesting points in there, to my mind, are …
– the observations around ship-borne defence against aircraft, in 1924 hitting 75% of targets ~ making naval air-power a second cousin to pure sea power (ie. the fast battleship)
– the later (cold-war) perception that an air-force, and then ballistic missiles etc., could carry the fight to the enemy and naval air-power ~ reinforcing that perception of naval air-power as the second cousin
All this in regard to the US Navy, never-mind the UK.
Don
By: cypherus - 26th November 2007 at 22:45
melancholy story indeed, and so near the truth one wonders what crystal ball was in use back then, must have revealed the equation, ‘No one to threaten = no requirement’ as the wholesale disposal of the UK armed forces capacity by various means…all non accountable oddly, has left us in a dire situation.
My guess is current Whitehall thinking runs along the lines of “If we move all the former threats here, we will not have to expend monies sailing off too fight them with large ships and air planes.”
Multitasking, something the Brits have always done so very badly, but never seem to tire of trying.
By: Seafuryfan - 26th November 2007 at 13:37
Alertken, sorry I don’t know enough about this topic to comment, other than to say that your posts are priceless for:
a) Thier use of English, and the fun I have in deciphering them
b) For the replies generated by the resident forum experts on your topics which are fascinating.
Keep ’em coming 🙂
By: XN923 - 25th November 2007 at 19:40
I got about one word in five, but here’s what I think.
1) Austerity. Churchill as Chancellor of the Exchequer resists further spending and seems to think that because we have Furious, Courageous, Glorious, Eagle, Argus and Hermes we are equal to US and Japan. (First three are compromises and elderley, last three are experimental and too small for modern purposes).
2) RAF control of men and machines. Skua partly result of RN wanting a dive bomber, RAF thought they should have a fighter, they couldn’t have both so they got a two-in-one. RAF thought the turret fighter was the best thing since sliced bread and persuaded the Admiralty that they were a good idea, hence Roc.
3) Even their Lordships didn’t think that dive bombing was as essential as torpedo bombing (Luftwaffe and USN thought otherwise) so neglected dive bombing development and defences against it. But torpedo bombers were slow and could easily be chased down by a multi purpose reconaissance fighters, so Skua was thought to be good enough.
4) In the 30s the RN got to love its multi role aircraft. Limited hangar space, money for airframes and bods to fly them meant combining roles, and the FAA dearly loved its Ospreys and Swordfish so why change?
5) Painful lessons (Norway, Med) were being learned but with the result that specifications were being written and rewritten and aircraft roled and re-roled so we had the saga of the Firebrand (interceptor to torpedo bomber in many, difficult steps), Firefly (turret fleet defence fighter to long range recon-strike aircraft) and Barracuda (torpedo bomber/spotter/reconaissance to massively overloaded torpedo bomber/spotter/reconaissance). By the time they got it right with the Sea Fury and Sea Hornet the war was over and the game had moved on.
6) Swept wings on a carrier? You must be joking. Rubber deck? What a good idea. Prevarication over Sea Vixen and ‘Swept Wing Venom’ meant years lost and the SV, while a fine aircraft was not the world beater in 1958 that it would have been in 1955.
7) Buccaneer – OK, you can go. But can we have a bit more thrust please?
8) What was the question again?
By: Papa Lima - 25th November 2007 at 19:39
No failure for Uncle Sam carrier-wise in the Cold War – but was the 1982 Harrier triumph RN’s last throw of the flat-top dice?
The FAA was always a Cinderella, however.
Sorry, Alertken, it’s impossible to emulate your pithy brevity 🙂
By: Der - 25th November 2007 at 19:16
What?
By: ZRX61 - 25th November 2007 at 19:14
eh?:confused:
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November 25, 2007 at 11:47 am