BAe.146/RJ

This design was initiated to follow-up CAAC’s Trident order. More than 2 engines were required to serve Lhasa, but demand/runway did not support Trident. Start/stop, 1971-77, then funded by PM Callaghan as make-work for the newly Nationalised BAe. AVCO took a risk-sharing (deferrred start-up expense) role in wing+power; so did SAAB on the back end (later taken in as make-work at Prestwick), all salivating for a China bunfest. China did come good with an order for 10 146-100 (later 8 -300), but the context was sweetening their intransigence over recovering HK (Foreign Office had mooted a leaseback). So, launching this was a political step, largely funded on Civil Launch Aid, UK’s riskshare wholly underwritten by the State owner, 1977-1981.

As for profit…well, we all know of the creativity of the accountancy trade. What was published was that in 1998 BAe. Commercial A/c Divn. reported its first ever profit, £12Mn., but that was gross of £51Mn. to unload balance sheet exposure to the 146 fleet. Sales contracts had included a Residual Value Guarantee…before Gulf War 1 sent used a/c values down the gurglehole. Most 146/Avro RJs were sold by BAe. to BAe.; only last month did BAE finally unload its residual ATP/Jetstream/146/RJ exposure.

For me, p01, 11/10 has it: Sir Fred, for example, much preferred to deal with the Man in Whitehall. Johnny Foreigner was just too difficult. That is a cause for 48 Herald sales, Home and Away, cf. 786 F-27, almost all Away. In ’95 a ’71-built F-27 was bought by a UK Operator for $1.2Mn. to replace his last Herald whose ’63 price was less. Illustrated Parts Catalogue…who he? Guaranteed maintenance cost per flight hour…who he? 707 structure was agricultural cf., say, VC10. Average folk could build/repair it, not proud former craft apprentices.