I read many passionate arguments 5-10 years ago regarding the decision to terminate F14 operations, and the selection of the Super Hornet over advanced versions of the Tomcat. It has now been over 10 years since the Tomcat was parked.
I’m wondering if the decision looks any better in the rearview mirror?
Specifically:
1. IIRC, about 1/3 of all the Tomcats built were lost due to accidents. Does anyone know how many SH have been lost due to accidents so far?
2. Wasn’t the SH cheaper than new/upgraded Tomcats? If so, wouldn’t the already thin USN squadrons be even thinner due to fewer aircraft being acquired had the SH not been selected?
3. Has the SH been easier to update/upgrade due to modern electronics? I know they got the AESA radar fairly quickly.
4. How has the Growler worked out? (no SH, no new EW platform).
5. Has the standardization across the fleet and the better reliability of the SH led to a higher mission capable rate. (I am aware of the latest propaganda regarding mission capable rates released to the press in order to frame the debate for a new, higher defense budget, that’s not what I am talking about.)
6. I understand their hours are getting used up quite quickly, perhaps buddy tanking exacerbates this problem, how involved is the SLEP to get the airframe out to 9,000FH from the current 6,000? What was the FH limit on the Tomcat?
I’m guessing that, in hindsight, the regrettable decision looks a little better given more aircraft, better reliability, fewer aircraft lost to accidents, and more modern electronics. It would be interesting to see some actual data in lieu of emotionality, if anyone has the data.
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February 28, 2017 at 6:23 pm