I’ve just spent a little over 50 minutes watching a documentary on YouTube, a 2010 BBC production “written and presented by James Holland” on the Battle of Britain “the real story”.
I daresay it was watched on TV by many of you in Great Britain … or you can watch it here (but don’t bother yourself too much with the inane comments).
It is really good IMHO, from my knowledge presents a balanced and unbiased view of the strengths and weaknesses of both sides in the Battle, and concludes essentially that the national myth of a few up against all the might of the German airforces is pretty stretched … if anything an ill prepared and insufficiently supported German force came up against a very professional defence and far from the RAF being on it’s knees by mid September it was as strong as ever.
I know a lot of you have good knowledge of the Battle, what’s your take on that perspective?
By: Smith - 14th June 2013 at 22:57
Yes … good points.
Not the RAF at large, but instead Fighter Command.
For clarity’s sake, the myth (as stated in the documentary) is that England was saved by the German switch in tactics from attacking the RAF to bombing London. I’ve heard similar statements … the RAF (read Fighter Command) was down to it’s last “X” men etc. But the documentary argues that (I shall avoid saying “the RAF’s” and say) England’s defences were by no means exhausted (I think of the approach of Sir Keith Park, in essence a story of marshalling/managing resources) and that had the German tactics not changed, the outcome would have been the same.
For example, the documentary talks of the rotational policy (and actions) in place to rest and recuperate squadrons, bring that together with Park’s approach, and CD’s observation in final para above, and the argument is further supported.
By: Creaking Door - 14th June 2013 at 14:52
What always strikes me when I hear the phrase ‘RAF on its knees’ is that that isn’t what is actually meant…
…if anything it would be RAF Fighter Command ‘on its knees’!
British industry seemed able to produce Spitfires and Hurricanes faster than the Luftwaffe could destroy them, or at least, the part of British industry manufacturing Spitfires and Hurricanes, and was in fact out-producing German industry in fighter production.
I think the widely accepted current view is that it was a shortage of pilots that was the weakness of RAF Fighter Command but this somewhat ignores the number of RAF pilots flying other types of aircraft; how quickly could these pilots have been (re)trained to fill the gaps in the ranks of Fighter Command?
Throughout the Battle-of-Britain there were a few squadrons operating fighter types totally unsuited to the battle as it had developed; Defiants, Blenheims and even a few Gladiators. I often wonder why these squadrons were not quickly converted to Hurricanes; however quick the conversion surely they would have been more effective (and less vulnerable).
As an indicator does the existence of these squadrons indicate that RAF Fighter Command was so stretched it couldn’t spare them…..or not so stretched that it didn’t need to?
By: Trolly Aux - 14th June 2013 at 12:31
I think the myth of the RAF on their knees was from the German prospective.
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June 14, 2013 at 12:23 pm