A what if – no or reduced problems with the RB211

From Bill Gunston’s ‘The development of jet and turbine aero engines’…

In Rolls Royce case while Griffiths rightly kept thinking of BPR around 20, a study was made to find optimum BPR for an engine in an external pod and, because of incorrect assumptions of nacelle drag, came up with the answer that it should not exceed 1.0.’

Anyone know when this study was done?

I assume you mean by-pass ratio, but I’m not sure what you are trying to point out.
One thing I can tell you is that a high BPR does not neccessarily mean a better propulsive efficiency. The BPR can be varied depending on a/c range, number of engines, a/c mach number, even noise emission.

How did Hyfil compare to today’s composites?

From Bill Gunston’s ‘The development of jet and turbine aero engines’…

In Rolls Royce case while Griffiths rightly kept thinking of BPR around 20, a study was made to find optimum BPR for an engine in an external pod and, because of incorrect assumptions of nacelle drag, came up with the answer that it should not exceed 1.0.’

Anyone know when this study was done?

Would the RB211 have attracted the Lockheed interest if the design planned to use titanium blades from the start rather than Hyfil?

Alertken,

Interesting point of view.. but the financial aspect is a sideshow to the real issue.. RR was encountering a technical problem that for possibly the first time it was unable to map out a solution to…at one point, certainly if I read Hooker’s bio they were unsure they could find a solution with the design concpet they had.

This was a far greater crisis of confidence to the aviation world… in addition to the financial one..

The issues of the C-141 and C-5 are separate as the USAF clearly stated they required a ‘civilian aircraft’ already certified and in service to provide the required airframe.. limiting it to the 747/ L1011 and the DC-10. This was precisely to avoid the risk of a bespoke airframe. The 747 was the ‘rational’ choice, capacity etc etc, but in order to ‘spread’ the dollars it was only going to be A.N. Other. The problems with the RB211 made it clear that Lockheed were not going to continue in the civil airliner market…whereas McAir were looking set to do so.

I disagree on the Airbus issue…if BAC had been provided with the financial aid rather than RR, the British Airbus (3-11) would have been a possibility. The in-roads into the US, Commonwealth and Asian markets that were open to a British design took many years for the essentially ‘French’ (at least in perception) Airbus to match…like the Mercure; the A300 aould have fought against both US and UK compeition and the numbers would have been against it. As it turned out the A300 became the ‘only game’ in the European industry and recieved default support. Jobs both in airframe and engines were at stake.

The SP would have benefitted indeed…but not necessarily for long..Its success ironically may have brought forward the rise of the ‘big fans’ as the economics of quads (as opposed to tris) may have instigated the desire for 2 engined /2 crew intercontinentals earlier….

(Almost everything I post has to do with money, not equipment, but that’s because $ drive kit).

RR’s problems were triggered, but not caused by RAE’s Hyfil composite’s vulnerability to FOD on T1 blades. The key quote on RB211 cost runaway is from a hagiography: P.Pugh,The Magic of a Name/II,Icon,2001,P156: “we had promised a bit more than we could perform (we) never got cash-flow into our heads” 1999, Sir D.Huddie,1970 RR MD. Lockheed had done the same to win (C-5A) and, like RR, was bailed out by Govt. in the National Interest. Even if RB211 had then been OK, DoD could not have added the big K to a firm underperforming on C-141A, not performing on C-5A, so MDC would still have owned USAF scale economy, which was to tip many a bid v.L1011.

I disagree with any link to A300B’s success or otherwise. (Original, ex-HBN-100) A300 was baseline RB207, which RR ditched before their RB211 problems, because they doubted it would sell (they also then owned 20% of BAC, and thus of 2-11/3-11 notions).

The true beneficiary of early RB211 Certification would have been…Boeing.
747SP was a disaster: it should have destroyed TriJet market just as 720B had dished CV880/990, but JT9D-7F was the wrong engine. 3-shaft RB211 was heavier than US 2-shafts, a burden on shorter sectors, but its payoff, ultimately as RB211-524D4, was 15hr. sectors from c.1984, not then matched by JT9D-7Q/CF-6-50. Saudia/QF RR/SPs could do the advertised job: if that product had been plying 2 years earlier, TriJets would have been confined to medium haul: no L1011-500, DC-10/30ER, no MD11, more LR 747-200B whose extra capacity was “free”. There was a period around 1984 where Boeing Commercial Airplane was in dire financial straits, Warren Buffett was prowling to asset-strip, deterred only by the pension overhang. The 747 line would dry below 6 p.a, so the 6th. sale was almost given away just to keep Everett alive. None of the above if just a couple of DC-10/30 orders had gone to 747SP/RR.

Simply put…

If RR had not gone bust we would probably not have Airbus..but a Civil Airliner production in the UK (probably building aircraft that look very similar…) and Lockheed would still be active in the Airliner market…as the Tristar would have entered service earlier and overall in greater numbers.

The USAF may well have operated it in favour of KC-10s…as they were not going the 747 route regardless and the McAir were deemed to be more stable in the civil market than Lockheed. Based on that McAir may have been purchased by Lockheed earlier.. as opposed to going to Boeing, and the C-17 would have worn a Lockheed title.

In Uk terms I think that BAC would have been able to develop a range of products not dissimilar to the range of Airbus rpoducts today, possibly more focussed but the influence of early 70s UK design vision is still clear.. look thro that book and you will see how much was already there in ideas and concepts….

Certainly the thinking in France was along very different lines at the time as it was in Germany….Airbus adopted may of the concepts and turned them into reality, and a business.. not necessarily a skill the UK had…