A2A UCAV by LEG

I’ve long been an advocate of A2A UCAVs, even using prop engined Reapers or a subsonic X-47b/nEuron/Taranis/Skat derivative
here’s a an excerpt from a reply by ch1466 (aka LEG) from back in 2007, where he explains what I’m thinking of better than I can ever hope to
http://www.abovetopsecret.com/forum/thread261344/pg1#pid2855878

>>
Also, even with Sidewinders, do you really expect the Reaper to have any survivability in an A2A situation?
>>

Sure. If you fit it with AIM-120D or AIM-160 and use _their_ range extension to fly the missile past the point at which external carriage overcomes a natively lower frontal signature. Say 25-35nm downrange using shooter-illuminator handing from an F-22 (or RQ-4) ADAAM fire control source.

Does a lack of MQ-9 maneuverability mean that the F-22 wouldn’t have to be there if the platform was an F-16? No. The Raptor would be assigned based on the _theater perception_ of an air threat, not whether either the drone or the F-jet could ‘handle the problem’ by interrupting their primary mission. That’s the basis of mission specialization and hi/lo force modeling: delegation of taskings.

Similarly, does a lack of MQ-9 maneuverability mean that the fight is any more likely to proceed to the distance at which the Sidewinder (and a maneuvering fight) becomes probabilistically determinative? No. Because if the threat can see the drone at the same distance it sees an F-16, it is going to go with the longest lance available /simply because/ it is aware of the NCW threat and the potential for an F-22 that it does not and indeed _cannot_ see as either director or hunter.

A different way to come at matters for a TRUE UCAV is to instead think this way: Put an F-117 up against an F-16 with all target allocation handled offboard and the Blackjet driver ONLY required to point his jet in the right general direction and give trigger consent as everything else comes in via L16. If BVR is 70% of the game and the AIM-120D has an SSPK of .8 against an ‘unaware, RNE, target’; _and the F-117 can get to that RNE without being detected while the F-16 cannot_, firing 2 of those weapons from a stealth enclosure, in-envelope, should result in a 140% kill probability.

Now pull the pilot so that the ‘30%’ wherein the missile mechanically fails and/or a surviving wingman presses to visual rather than extend and escape.

And a TRUE UCAV becomes a very viable.

As a 450-500 knot, all-aspect LO, platform. Because, like the F-117, it has the basic performance to extend neutrally and try to escape. Because, unlike the 117, it will probably risk a two-into-two solution, even if both subsequently miss. And also unlike the 117, it is one of 1,000 other manufactured jets of which at least 1 ‘on this mission’ other will likely /also/ be configured for longrange A2A. Even as the sheer number of aircraft also ups the likelihood of the force receiving direct escort from dedicated A2A platforms.

While you are clearly baiting the conversation, it is YOU who are being suckered here.

First by overweighting the relevance of A2A combat. Then by assuming that there are no other platforms around to do the mission if the UCAV is unable to. And finally by allowing the USAF to set the WWI airframe configuration by which a robotic platforms ability to survive A2A is fixed to an existing, faulted, design.

Rather than one which, through simple optimization for the STRIKE role, is equally made better as an air to air missile carrier.

>>
How likely is all of this?
>>

As likely as it takes to get a new president into office and ‘change their minds’. J-UCAS was the chance to tilt the world on it’s ear. Both by program economics and massive force structure changes (shared squadrons in the naval and air services means a _common not joint_ basing mode capability to flex-up to a larger warfighting mode than you deploy with in peace).

And the USAF cancelled it as soon as they could ‘to pay for Iraq’. And to preserve the 276 billion dollar farce that is their One Ring Precious JSF.