The bitter battle between American Airlines and France-based Airbus over a New York crash in 2001 that killed 265 people has escalated as the US government nears its decision tomorrow on the cause of the second-worst air disaster in US history.
The world’s biggest airline has ferociously defended its prestige during a period of unprecedented distress for the industry’s domestic giants.
A draft report on the cause of the Flight 587 crash to be considered by the National Transportation Safety Board will focus heavily on crew performance. American pilot training also has been a key issue, as well as the design of the plane’s flight-control system.
Airbus, the world’s top maker of commercial planes, has aggressively challenged assertions by American Airlines that it concealed design and safety information from the late 1990s that American says might have prevented the Nov. 12, 2001, crash. Airbus also finds itself in the uncomfortable glare of a US crash investigation for the first time, with an advanced design system under scrutiny.
Industry sources say the acrimony between the aviation powerhouses is running unusually high. ”You have a feud going on,” a former NTSB member said.
The 150-ton Airbus A300-600 plunged into a residential area of Queens shortly after takeoff from Kennedy Airport, killing all 260 people aboard and five on the ground. The flight had been bound for the Dominican Republic.
The investigation centers on action by copilot Sten Molin to stabilize the misaligned nose of the wide-body after it was buffeted during its climb by turbulence from a jumbo jet flying ahead.
American and Airbus agree only with the government’s finding that Molin activated multiple full rudder swings to try to control the plane. It fishtailed before sliding sideways, like a car skidding on a slippery road. The unsustainable buildup of side forces snapped off the tail fin.
American says Molin performed as he was trained, but the severity of the rudder movement was unintentional. The airline said the flight-control system was unexpectedly and dangerously sensitive at high speeds, and it now knows pilots could too easily overuse the rudder and lose control.
”If the NTSB says the pilot use of the rudder was the probable cause, we disagree,” said Bruce Hicks, a spokesman for American. ”He’s not the cause of this accident.”
The rudder is primarily used at low speeds to counter crosswinds during landing or to help steer the plane on the ground. Airbus says that Molin should never have used the rudder to try and stabilize the aircraft and that rudder training at American was inadequate. An Airbus spokesman said the claim of flight-control sensitivity is a ”red herring.”
In recent days officials at American also have cited internal Airbus e-mails from a 1997 incident involving another American A300 that indicate certain aerodynamic forces, aggravated by rudder use to regain control of the aircraft, could dangerously stress the tail fin. This information, American says, was never fully disclosed by the manufacturer. But Airbus documents dispute that conclusion as well as renewed assertions by American that Airbus had acted unethically.
”Concerns generated by this incident and the dangers of unnecessary and inappropriate use of rudder were shared by Airbus numerous times in numerous ways with government agencies and American Airlines,” said Clay McConnell, an Airbus spokesman.
The safety board cautioned pilots of all aircraft in 2002 on rudder use during certain stages of flight. American has also updated training practices. Airbus has made no changes to its A300-600 rudder system although the board recommended a modification related to the 1997 incident.
By: Whiskey Delta - 26th October 2004 at 17:46
The NTSB is most likely correct in their findings, it’s just that a modern airliner shouldn’t be capable of shedding control surfaces in the first place.
By: Whiskey Delta - 26th October 2004 at 17:46
The NTSB is most likely correct in their findings, it’s just that a modern airliner shouldn’t be capable of shedding control surfaces in the first place.
By: Whiskey Delta - 26th October 2004 at 16:51
I can’t think of any other aircraft that would shed a control surface like that especially at slow speeds.
When in doubt, blame the pilots.
By: Whiskey Delta - 26th October 2004 at 16:51
I can’t think of any other aircraft that would shed a control surface like that especially at slow speeds.
When in doubt, blame the pilots.
By: Bmused55 - 26th October 2004 at 16:46
Official ruling out: it was the co-pilot’s fault.
hardly surprising.
We haven’t heard the last of this.
I think it is appauling the blame have been shifted onto the Co-Pilot
By: Bmused55 - 26th October 2004 at 16:46
Official ruling out: it was the co-pilot’s fault.
hardly surprising.
We haven’t heard the last of this.
I think it is appauling the blame have been shifted onto the Co-Pilot
By: 4 engines good - 26th October 2004 at 16:12
Official ruling out: it was the co-pilot’s fault.
By: 4 engines good - 26th October 2004 at 16:12
Official ruling out: it was the co-pilot’s fault.
By: Bmused55 - 26th October 2004 at 11:13
and the argument goes on
By: Bmused55 - 26th October 2004 at 11:13
and the argument goes on
By: steve rowell - 26th October 2004 at 11:05
If the pilot flying American Airlines Flight 587 had taken his foot off the rudder pedal, the jetliner’s tail wouldn’t have broken off, the plane wouldn’t have plunged into a New York City neighborhood and 265 people wouldn’t have died on Nov. 12, 2001.
On those details, the investigators agree.
But the pilot didn’t know he was putting more pressure on the tail than it could bear. Why he didn’t — and who’s to blame for that — is the subject of a bitter fight between Airbus Industrie, which made the plane, and American Airlines, which trained the pilot.
That dispute is expected to play out in public Tuesday when the National Transportation Safety Board meets to discuss its findings.
Flight 587 had just taken off from New York’s John F. Kennedy International Airport for the Dominican Republic when it encountered heavy turbulence caused by a large plane that took off before it.
Sten Molin, the co-pilot who was flying the Airbus A300-600 tried to steady the aircraft using pedals that control the rudder, a large flap on a plane’s tail. When his initial movement failed, Molin tried again and again. His actions placed enormous stress on the tail and it broke off.
The plane crashed into a Queens neighborhood, killing all 260 aboard and five people on the ground. It was the second-deadliest plane crash on U.S. soil.
AMR Corp.’s American, the only U.S. airline to use that type of Airbus plane for passenger service, claims the manufacturer didn’t alert it to the danger of sharp rudder movements until after the crash. The airline also contends the Airbus A300-600 has uniquely sensitive flight controls that can cause more severe rudder movements than the pilot intends.
“Airbus had the ability to truly red-flag the issue,” American spokesman Bruce Hicks said.
Airbus says it told American a number of times and in a number of ways that the airline was improperly training pilots about how to use the rudder.
An Airbus spokesman declined to comment on the investigation before the hearing. However, the company has provided the NTSB with a number of documents to support its claim.
For example, a letter dated Aug. 20, 1997, warned American chief pilot Cecil Ewing that rudders should not be moved abruptly to right a jetliner or when a plane is flown at a sharp angle. The letter was signed by representatives from The Boeing Co., the Federal Aviation Administration and Airbus.
Airbus contends that even people within American Airlines were concerned about how the airline was training its pilots. A letter to Airbus dated May 22, 1997, from American technical pilot David Tribout expressed concern about the airline’s then-new training course on advanced maneuvers.
“I am very concerned that one aspect of the course is inaccurate and potentially hazardous,” Tribout wrote. His concern: Pilots were being taught that the rudder should be used to control a plane’s rolling motion.
Paul Railsback, American’s managing director of flight operations, testified in an April 8, 2003, deposition that he warned airline executives that someone would be killed some day as a result of the training.
Hicks countered that Airbus didn’t share important safety information about the rudder after a problem with American Flight 903 in May 1997. During that incident, pilots used the rudder to steady an Airbus A300-600 plane on approach to West Palm Beach airport. The plane nearly crashed and one person was seriously injured.
Afterward, Airbus told the NTSB that it included a warning that abrupt rudder movement in some circumstances “can lead to rapid loss of controlled flight,” and, in others, could break off the tail.
Hicks said Airbus’ comments didn’t specifically say that the rudder movements on Flight 903 had exposed the tail to so much pressure that it could have been ripped off.
Immediately after the Flight 903 incident, an inspection found no damage to the tail. But five years later, the plane was inspected more closely because of concerns aroused by the crash of Flight 587. Cracks were found and it was replaced.
John David, a spokesman for American Airlines’ pilots union, said pilots had always thought that they could use rudders to the full extent without hurting the airplane. He also believes Airbus didn’t properly communicate what it knew.
American now gives its pilots specialized training on the rudder control system based on information learned during the investigation.
By: steve rowell - 26th October 2004 at 11:05
If the pilot flying American Airlines Flight 587 had taken his foot off the rudder pedal, the jetliner’s tail wouldn’t have broken off, the plane wouldn’t have plunged into a New York City neighborhood and 265 people wouldn’t have died on Nov. 12, 2001.
On those details, the investigators agree.
But the pilot didn’t know he was putting more pressure on the tail than it could bear. Why he didn’t — and who’s to blame for that — is the subject of a bitter fight between Airbus Industrie, which made the plane, and American Airlines, which trained the pilot.
That dispute is expected to play out in public Tuesday when the National Transportation Safety Board meets to discuss its findings.
Flight 587 had just taken off from New York’s John F. Kennedy International Airport for the Dominican Republic when it encountered heavy turbulence caused by a large plane that took off before it.
Sten Molin, the co-pilot who was flying the Airbus A300-600 tried to steady the aircraft using pedals that control the rudder, a large flap on a plane’s tail. When his initial movement failed, Molin tried again and again. His actions placed enormous stress on the tail and it broke off.
The plane crashed into a Queens neighborhood, killing all 260 aboard and five people on the ground. It was the second-deadliest plane crash on U.S. soil.
AMR Corp.’s American, the only U.S. airline to use that type of Airbus plane for passenger service, claims the manufacturer didn’t alert it to the danger of sharp rudder movements until after the crash. The airline also contends the Airbus A300-600 has uniquely sensitive flight controls that can cause more severe rudder movements than the pilot intends.
“Airbus had the ability to truly red-flag the issue,” American spokesman Bruce Hicks said.
Airbus says it told American a number of times and in a number of ways that the airline was improperly training pilots about how to use the rudder.
An Airbus spokesman declined to comment on the investigation before the hearing. However, the company has provided the NTSB with a number of documents to support its claim.
For example, a letter dated Aug. 20, 1997, warned American chief pilot Cecil Ewing that rudders should not be moved abruptly to right a jetliner or when a plane is flown at a sharp angle. The letter was signed by representatives from The Boeing Co., the Federal Aviation Administration and Airbus.
Airbus contends that even people within American Airlines were concerned about how the airline was training its pilots. A letter to Airbus dated May 22, 1997, from American technical pilot David Tribout expressed concern about the airline’s then-new training course on advanced maneuvers.
“I am very concerned that one aspect of the course is inaccurate and potentially hazardous,” Tribout wrote. His concern: Pilots were being taught that the rudder should be used to control a plane’s rolling motion.
Paul Railsback, American’s managing director of flight operations, testified in an April 8, 2003, deposition that he warned airline executives that someone would be killed some day as a result of the training.
Hicks countered that Airbus didn’t share important safety information about the rudder after a problem with American Flight 903 in May 1997. During that incident, pilots used the rudder to steady an Airbus A300-600 plane on approach to West Palm Beach airport. The plane nearly crashed and one person was seriously injured.
Afterward, Airbus told the NTSB that it included a warning that abrupt rudder movement in some circumstances “can lead to rapid loss of controlled flight,” and, in others, could break off the tail.
Hicks said Airbus’ comments didn’t specifically say that the rudder movements on Flight 903 had exposed the tail to so much pressure that it could have been ripped off.
Immediately after the Flight 903 incident, an inspection found no damage to the tail. But five years later, the plane was inspected more closely because of concerns aroused by the crash of Flight 587. Cracks were found and it was replaced.
John David, a spokesman for American Airlines’ pilots union, said pilots had always thought that they could use rudders to the full extent without hurting the airplane. He also believes Airbus didn’t properly communicate what it knew.
American now gives its pilots specialized training on the rudder control system based on information learned during the investigation.
By: Bmused55 - 26th October 2004 at 07:36
In our ERJ-145’s (and all ERJ’s for that matter) there is a cap on the yoke stamped with the Embraer logo. It didn’t take to long for some pilot to realize that you can “pop” off the cap and write your own words of wisdom inside the cap for the next pilot to read. It’s ususally some comment aimed at our current company additude so there have been a lot of contract words left there lately. So far my favorite words of wisdom to find under the cap as we blast along at 31,000 feet?
“Rome wasn’t built in a day, but this jet was.” 🙂
Man, that makes me laugh everytime I read that. 😀
LMAO!
By: Bmused55 - 26th October 2004 at 07:36
In our ERJ-145’s (and all ERJ’s for that matter) there is a cap on the yoke stamped with the Embraer logo. It didn’t take to long for some pilot to realize that you can “pop” off the cap and write your own words of wisdom inside the cap for the next pilot to read. It’s ususally some comment aimed at our current company additude so there have been a lot of contract words left there lately. So far my favorite words of wisdom to find under the cap as we blast along at 31,000 feet?
“Rome wasn’t built in a day, but this jet was.” 🙂
Man, that makes me laugh everytime I read that. 😀
LMAO!
By: Whiskey Delta - 26th October 2004 at 02:10
In our ERJ-145’s (and all ERJ’s for that matter) there is a cap on the yoke stamped with the Embraer logo. It didn’t take to long for some pilot to realize that you can “pop” off the cap and write your own words of wisdom inside the cap for the next pilot to read. It’s ususally some comment aimed at our current company additude so there have been a lot of contract words left there lately. So far my favorite words of wisdom to find under the cap as we blast along at 31,000 feet?
“Rome wasn’t built in a day, but this jet was.” 🙂
Man, that makes me laugh everytime I read that. 😀
By: Whiskey Delta - 26th October 2004 at 02:10
In our ERJ-145’s (and all ERJ’s for that matter) there is a cap on the yoke stamped with the Embraer logo. It didn’t take to long for some pilot to realize that you can “pop” off the cap and write your own words of wisdom inside the cap for the next pilot to read. It’s ususally some comment aimed at our current company additude so there have been a lot of contract words left there lately. So far my favorite words of wisdom to find under the cap as we blast along at 31,000 feet?
“Rome wasn’t built in a day, but this jet was.” 🙂
Man, that makes me laugh everytime I read that. 😀
By: steve rowell - 26th October 2004 at 01:54
Lovely. I’ll be flying on an American A300-600 in a couple of months exactly.
You’ll be fine lad, just remember when your at 35 thousand feet, every part of that aircraft was built by the lowest bidder, by the way, do you have insurance?????
By: steve rowell - 26th October 2004 at 01:54
Lovely. I’ll be flying on an American A300-600 in a couple of months exactly.
You’ll be fine lad, just remember when your at 35 thousand feet, every part of that aircraft was built by the lowest bidder, by the way, do you have insurance?????
By: Grey Area - 25th October 2004 at 20:01
Or you could phone AA and tell em “If it ain’t boeing, I ain’t going”
Blimey – that was unexpected, Sandy! 😉
Consistent as always……. 🙂
The A300 is still in production after all these years, DashQ, and has a very good safety record indeed.
You’re just as safe in one of them as you are in any well-maintained and well-flown airliner.
Nothing to worry about at all. 😎
By: Grey Area - 25th October 2004 at 20:01
Or you could phone AA and tell em “If it ain’t boeing, I ain’t going”
Blimey – that was unexpected, Sandy! 😉
Consistent as always……. 🙂
The A300 is still in production after all these years, DashQ, and has a very good safety record indeed.
You’re just as safe in one of them as you are in any well-maintained and well-flown airliner.
Nothing to worry about at all. 😎
Sign In
October 25, 2004 at 10:17 am