Akrotiri U2 accident on 7 December 1977

Reference JB’s post at #64.

There is indeed a file with the MoD and, following a FOI inquiry by Jack’s family, it is to be forwarded to the National Archives for public viewing – albeit with certain sections removed. Time-frame not given.

Brian

Having started this thread back in 2006 I somehow seemed to have missed Dragonflyer’s comprehensive answer to my original query. For this I apologise, and am extremely grateful as it provides all the information Peter (Resmorah) and myself were initially seeking. Thank you.

To be honest I’d basically given up on the thread around #16 as I have an intense dislike of reading posts that claim to know what happened – but refusing to give the source.

While I can understand the reasons why the whole of the Safety Board report could not be published, the fact that the powers that be do not appear to have released a summary seems to be a PR error which led to the misleading accounts that appeared over the years.

I know Jack Flawn’s family, and they had been given no information about what happened, in fact they were sent back to the UK very quickly after the accident. That was the situation when I last spoke to them a couple of years ago when they were still asking “Why?”. One would have hoped (expected) that some information would have been given to them.

Jack Flawn rests, with his wife, in at llanina Church, just north of New Quay, Ceredigion, overlooking Cardigan Bay on which he loved to sail.

Brian

[ATTACH=CONFIG]242463[/ATTACH][ATTACH=CONFIG]242464[/ATTACH]

I am aware you felt a need to provide the facts , but I would like to say thanks for a very informative and interesting read .

Thank you dragonflyer, very comprehensive and informative.

The actual Safety Board report is classified because of the amount of non-releasable mission and systems information laced throughout the text, as well as personal information about the pilot and other people involved. I imagine it would be heavily redacted if released, and would do a reader little good. The question is what information do you seek? If the question is what happened, the answer is simple: the aircraft appeared to take off normally, then climbed to an excessively high pitch attitude, stalled, rotated to the left, and powered into the ground with the left wingtip impacting on the slope between the taxiway and the Met office. It then continued up the hill with the left wing shredding, the nose impacting on and into the south wall of the Met building, and the right wing shearing off and falling into the courtyard and onto the command center building. That’s the “what”. It’s the why that was never clearly identified, although as noted I have my own opinion.

Dragonflyer

Thanks for a very interesting and informative reply. If it does not put the rumours to bed now, at least anyone looking for info may find themselves son this thread for the story

Paul

I noted an old post here bemoaning the quality of the copy of the report they received.

Did you ask the MOD for any information they have on the mishap?
Because it occurred at a RAF base and involved UK fatalities, I’m certain the MOD would have received a copy of one of the reports.

As I mentioned in my earlier post, the rumors surrounding the Akrotiri crash are simply wrong. The reason is because there were actually two separate investigations at the nearly the same time, into two separate sets of actions. First, I need to stop for a bit to explain something about how the USAF addresses an accident because it’s central to a lot of the confusion. As soon as the word of an accident reaches the Major Command Headquarters (Strategic Air Command in this case) a “Safety Investigation Board” (or “SIB”) is established and tasked to investigate the accident, and the accident only. The SIB does not address other issues that do not directly concern the mishap. Witnesses and other participants are interviewed, but as part of the USAF safety policy, their testimony is confidential and not shared with any other activities; this is done so that witnesses and others involved can feel free to answer questions for the accident board without fear of personal retribution. However, if the Commander has any reason to think there may be any criminal, administrative, or liability issues, he can (and frequently does) convene an “Accident Investigation Board” (or “AIB”). This board is established under legal rules that address many of the same questions, but can also address any other issues that arise, even if they are not directly involved with the accident. Its focus is on criminal and administrative misbehavior, liability issues, and other conduct contrary to administrative and regulatory rules. It is a separate board with separate investigators and separate uses. As opposed to the SIB, an AIB can ask a lot of questions, but the witnesses retain their legal rights under US law and they can decline to answer under the 5th Amendment of the US Constitution (the right not to incriminate yourself). The other big difference is that the AIB can look into anything it turns up, even if it is not directly connected to the accident. In this case, an AIB was initiated a few weeks later. Why is this important? Because in the course of talking to people around the base the SIB discovered that the previous summer, another small group of U-2 pilots flying from Akrotiri were observed engaging in several incidents of poor flight discipline…low flying, “buzzing” the airfield (specifically low passes over the beach near the Ski Club and Sailing Club facilities when returning from sorties), and tighter than necessary turns off of runway 11 to overfly the U-2 hanger (“inside the tower”, but by 2000 feet or so). Although these activities did not result in any damage or harm to people or equipment, they were clearly outside the bounds of existing flight policies. Those questionable flight procedures took place on several occasions and were observed by the RAF tower personnel, but were never formally reported to either the RAF Akrotiri base authorities or the USAF commander. These reports came to the attention of HQ SAC and an AIB was immediately established to investigate them. Because the two boards overlapped by only a few weeks, and were briefed to HQ SAC within a week or two, their individual results tended to be discussed together by individuals on the staff not directly involved in the investigations, leading to assumptions and rumors that the Safety Investigation Board had concluded that operator antics were related to the crash. However, our SIB board never suggested nor reported that operator factor was likely to have played a part in the crash. In fact, we discounted it because there was no evidence that any such infractions had occurred in the months leading up to the accident, and certainly not since Al’s arrival several days earlier. That issue was an AIB-identified finding strictly limited to non-professional behavior the previous summer (seven months earlier), by a totally separate small group of U-2 pilots who were later administratively disciplined for breaking flight rules. I was later informed that some of the RAF flight control/tower personnel were put under review after Al’s crash for not officially reporting the earlier activity but that had nothing to do with the accident. Again that was related to the previous summer’s violations. This unfortunate confluence of investigations caused many people to assume the wrong things about our SIB report.

As the operations investigator for the Safety Investigation Board in 1977, I wrote a good portion of the final SIB report. The conclusion? We could not find any “smoking gun”, with evidence to back it up, that explained why the event occurred. Not only that, we could discount most of the theories that were initially put forward as possible causes. We looked at a lot of things, including pilot misconduct, mechanical issues, medical issues, weather, etc. None of it made much sense and in the end, the board’s conclusion was that there seemed to be only three conceivable causes, but no hard evidence could be found to identify any one of them as a definite or probable cause. The three were: operator error (pilot flew into a condition from which he could not recover), unknown mechanical failure of the flight controls, and an unknown mechanical condition of some other type which led to the crash.

Details: What remained of the flight controls appeared to be in “good” condition with no sign of pre-impact damage, and no other part of the structure appeared to exhibit signs of pre-impact issues. As for operator error, that too was extensively investigated and despite later rumors, was considered very unlikely under the circumstances. Why? Because the takeoff that day was on runway 29. By the time the aircraft had taxied into position for takeoff, it was about 700 feet down the runway (the aircraft taxies to line up on the centerline, then moves forward several hundred feet farther to straighten the pogo wheels for a smooth roll and pogo release. The tower was then about 2400 feet from the aircraft’s starting position. With a max fuel load that day, the takeoff length was about 1800-2000 feet, leaving only about 400-600 feet to a position abeam the tower. Making a turn to pass near the tower was an impossible aerodynamic maneuver from runway 29, especially since the normal liftoff and initial pitch to climb attitude would take several hundred feet more before attempting a turn. Experience told us that a heavy weight turn took several thousand feet (of runway distance) from brake release to get the lateral separation equal to the distance from the runway to the tower. It would have been a suicidal maneuver to attempt, especially for an experienced pilot like Al who knew the handling characteristics of the U-2 very well, requiring a very heavy and sluggish max gross weight aircraft to make a 90 degree turn near stall speed in about 500 feet of travel. No one who looked at the site believed anybody in their right mind would attempt such a maneuver, as it was obviously a suicidal move and Al was known to be a very careful and professional pilot. It is one thing to attempt a maneuver that is possible, then screw it up and crash, but the “turn inside the tower” move from runway 29 was a non-starter for a full gross weight aircraft [An RAF corollary would be if the Red Arrows were to attempt to perform a loop from the takeoff roll without first accelerating after liftoff…simply not enough energy/speed/lift to perform the maneuver]. There were some earlier reported cases of turning inside the tower to fly over the U-2 hanger we were told about, but that was by other pilots on other occasions from runway 11, which gave you an additional 3000-4000 feet to use, involved lightly loaded aircraft that weighed far less, and were easily done with minimal extra banking (note: the tower is not in the middle of the field, but several thousand feet to the west of the center, closer to the runway 29 start point). The accident board concluded that a conscious attempt to turn inside the tower from runway 29 was not a plausible scenario. We also considered that Al had just arrived three days earlier and had not flown since he arrived. Rumors of pilots showing off could not have applied to Al because he hadn’t yet flown, nor could we find any evidence that such maneuvers had been discussed with the current group of pilots on the station. Not only that, but such activities tend to occur when a unit is extremely excited, not under much supervisory observation, and having fun. That was definitely not the case at the time of the accident. In fact, the opposite was true. It was winter, the weather was damp and cool, and entertainment activities were pretty limited. That all tended to eliminate one of the three possible causes. As noted earlier, the board, with help from Lockheed engineers, could not identify any flight control artifacts that indicated problems with the physical linkages and control surfaces, making a flight control issue, while not impossible, unlikely. That only left the “unknown mechanical condition” as a possible cause to consider.

Finally, let me address the “unknown mechanical condition” that was the third possible cause. The board could find no evidence of any other problem, so that possible avenue was closed. However,over the past several months prior to this accident there were at least three cases of extremely heavy fogging inside the cockpit of the U-2. All of these incidents exhibited very similar symptoms. All occurred on takeoff just as the aircraft reached the liftoff point (about 15-20 seconds after power was applied), all were totally independent of operator input (the setting was on automatic control), all resulted in a condition where the pilot was totally blinded and could not see outside or see the instruments in the cockpit (an actual case of “not being able to see your hand in front of your face”), and all occurred at sea level airfields where high humidity existed (like Akrotiri). These symptoms fit the Akrotiri situation exactly. The first case caused the pilot to over-rotate, climb, then stall, and finally recover from the descending stall about 100 feet off the ground as the system cleared itself and the fog dissipated rapidly. I saw it and it was a close thing. Had the aircraft not maintained a wings level attitude, it probably would not have survived. The second incident resulted in a pilot-initiated abort and overrun excursion when he couldn’t quite stop on the runway. The third case was when I was flying. Having seen the first incident and discussed it with the pilot of the second, I simply released the controls and advised the “mobile” (another pilot in a vehicle on the ground) to let me know if the attitude became dangerous. As with the first case, the condition resolved itself as I passed about 1000 feet and I proceeded on with the mission. We discussed the incidents with the Lockheed engineer on station and our best guess was the 20 minutes or so of low RPM running prior to takeoff caused the air conditioning system to load up with water because it was not running efficiently at idle, then when the engine spooled up for take off the air conditioning became super-efficient and poured large amounts of very cold air through the system. That cold air picked up the excess water, carried it into the cockpit where the air pressure in the system lowered to ambient pressure, and the moisture condensed. Our solution was to push the RPM up a little while holding, then set it to 80% for about 10 seconds prior to break release. The problem disappeared. We advised the rest of the units at home and around the world of the problem and solution, while the Lockheed people back at the Skunk Works were asked to address a permanent solution if it was required (eventually an engineering change to the suspect valve settings was made and the problem disappeared for good). After reviewing the data the board had collected and discussing any other possible mechanical causes, I suggested that the same thing may have happened to Al and, caught by surprise, the aircraft simply lifted off, climbed steeply and stalled, rotated left, stopped flying, and was driven into the ground by the engine thrust. This would explain how the aircraft came to hit near the tower, a situation which the Lockheed engineers said was theoretically impossible from an aerodynamic standpoint. The only possible indication to prove this theory might be a small valve in the air conditioning system which might be set at the wrong place by the automatic controls and not have had time to return to normal by the time of impact. Unfortunately, despite a dedicated search of the crash site, the small and fairly innocuous little piece of piping which contained the valve was never found and we had no way to verify the theory. Because there was no actual evidence to support this theory, it was not supported by the SAC safety staff as a legitimate cause and not briefed to the CINC. The bottom line was that the final report officially concluded that the cause was “Undetermined”. Never-the-less, I personally remain convinced by the similarity to the other incidents that this was probably the actual cause of the mishap.

Other notes:
1) Posts/references to U-2 activities at other UK locations (Alconbury, Weathersfield, Mildenhall, Fairford, etc.) are not in any way related to the Akrotiri accident. The Weathersfield deployment occurred in 1975 for about three months; the TR-1s didn’t arrive at Alconbury until the mid-to-late 1980s; the Mildenhall deployments in the 1970s were there in the fall to support NATO’S annual REFORGER exercises.

2) Reference to a second fatal U-2 accident at Akrotiri is incorrect. There was a second accident several years later when an aircraft suffered a hydraulic failure and landed short of the runway damaging one wing. There was no significant injury to the pilot and the aircraft was transported back to the U.S., repaired, and returned to service several months later.

3) Finally, my apologies to “UKdragon”, whose excellent chronicles of the U-2’s history are normally very accurate, but in this instance, he was led astray by the same incorrect rumors that have existed for years. I tried to catch him at an event here near Washington, D.C. last week and we could have discussed this a little, but alas, I missed him. Heck, I was going to buy a copy of his new book!

I was looking for some information on Google last week and ran across this thread. As a former U-2 pilot and member of the Safety Investigation Board for the Akrotiri crash, I was a little dismayed by the amount of bad information in the thread about the Al’s accident. Most of the rumors mentioned are incorrect as they relate to the accident, although they do have a kernal of truth relating to a separate investigation into some events that happened about eight months earlier. Those earlier events came to light during our accident investigation, but were absolutely separate, and investigated by a separate board. Unfortunately, the two boards were “linked” by a common time period and the results improperly joined in conversations, thus beginning a long string of misinformation. I’ll try to write up an explanation and post it in a few days to set the record straight. As an entry…No, Al’s accident was not caused by pilot indiscipline, the board never concluded that, and there was no evidence to support that idea (the opposite in fact). More to follow…

Thank you for putting something together on this dragon.

I was looking for some information on Google last week and ran across this thread. As a former U-2 pilot and member of the Safety Investigation Board for the Akrotiri crash, I was a little dismayed by the amount of bad information in the thread about the Al’s accident. Most of the rumors mentioned are incorrect as they relate to the accident, although they do have a kernal of truth relating to a separate investigation into some events that happened about eight months earlier. Those earlier events came to light during our accident investigation, but were absolutely separate, and investigated by a separate board. Unfortunately, the two boards were “linked” by a common time period and the results improperly joined in conversations, thus beginning a long string of misinformation. I’ll try to write up an explanation and post it in a few days to set the record straight. As an entry…No, Al’s accident was not caused by pilot indiscipline, the board never concluded that, and there was no evidence to support that idea (the opposite in fact). More to follow…

courts martial

Hi,
I posted on this thread previously, but new information has recently come to me which partly relates to this so I thought I’d share.

My dad was in ATC, and may well have been on duty at the time of this accident in which case he would have seen the U2 go past the window of the tower and hit the buildings behind.
Shortly after this he was sent back to the UK for “medical treatment” but I believe that he was actually sent back for legal reasons and having just obtained a copy of his service record I can see a reference to a courts martial but no apparent punishment. I remember that he told me before he died (20yrs ago) that he was aware of the ‘game’ that the US pilots were involved in, trying to get off the ground at the earliest opportunity but he hadn’t informed his superior officers and therefore was partially blamed for not doing something that might have prevented this tragic accident.
I am pretty confident that dad was passed over for promotion to Sqn Ldr as a direct result of this, despite not being officially blamed at the CM.

His retirement from the RAF followed soon after, as did undiagnosed but now obvious PTSD, and then alcoholism and eventually a very premature death which I suspect was at least partially related to this incident at Akr.

Very much obliged, bravo 24, thank you.

Brian

I will send you a copy on Friday i am away from home until then. Advise me if you get the page before then.

Happy landings.

Yup, I’m aware Amazon has copies, but over £30 for the single page in which I’m interested is a bit pricey – hence my request for help.

http://www.amazon.com/Years-U-2-Illustrated-Lockheeds-Legendary/dp/0764323466

Would anyone have a copy of Chris Pocock’s 50 YEARS OF THE U-2, which was published in 2005? I’ve tried to obtain the book through my library (using the Inter-Library Loan service) but no British library appears to hold a copy. The service also tried the Netherlands, but again without success.

All I’m after is a scan of page 286.

TIA

Brian

The other bar is Mom’s bar. It used to be for the higher ranks but you can get invites from them.

I remember well the accident. I worked on TASF at the time and was walking to work when I heard the usual early morning wake up call so stopped by the LOX plant, on the main road to the terminal to watch, (sad, I know, but in them days not a lot happened on Akro)! I had the LOX plant shed in front of me so when the aircraft appeared over the top it was already at 90 deg with the left wing high, (the aircraft was taking off to the east). It cartwheeled over and disappeared behind the shed, from my perspective, followed by a dull thud and a bloody great flame cloud.
When I ran into the control room the shift controller was swearing with his phone in his hand about why EngOps never answer their phone. When I told him what had happened we drove down the drag to see if we could assist, (secondary role), but as the fire section was under the tower everything was going on already. What a mess!

The AAA per se doesn’t exist anymore. There’s another facility over that way now, not sure what it’s called.

The AAA per se doesn’t exist anymore. There’s another facility over that way now, not sure what it’s called.

It happened. I got the details from the pilots and the Rockwell guys….

I imagine more details may be forthcoming when certain people retire from Lockheed…;)