An excellent read

RUSSIA’S ROVING SAMS

From JED Online, by Michal Fiszer and Jerzy Gruszczynsk

The Soviets created the world’s most comprehensive and lethal set of mobile air-defense systems for land forces

Throughout the 1950s, Soviet ground forces basically relied on World War II-era tactics, including their concept of air defense, which consisted of anti-aircraft artillery units with guns of various caliber depending on echelon. In the mid-1950s, these gun units started receiving fire-control radar sets, but the pace of the radar introduction was slow. This changed in 1956, however, when Soviet planners recognized a new danger: potential employment of tactical nuclear weapons by NATO forces, especially those delivered by fast and agile tactical aircraft using “lobbing” tactics to climb rapidly and toss bombs at targets some distance away. This created a deadly danger to land forces that demanded defenses greater than radar-directed anti-aircraft guns.

There were a number of parallel efforts launched aimed at producing mobile anti-aircraft missile systems for forward and rear echelon units, especially the development of the 2K11 Krug (SA-4 Ganef) and the 2K12 Kub (SA-6 Gainful). Conceptually, the Krug and Kub were always functionally complimentary systems, even if development of the individual components was fragmented and tortured. Both systems received “geometric” names: The frontal/army air-defense system was named Krug (circle), while the defense system for armored divisions was named Kub (cube). In the detailed requirements, prepared in 1957 in cooperation with the designers, it was decided that both systems would have a fire-control radar for target track and engagement control for the launchers, all of which would be on tracked chassis. A single battery of both systems would be able to engage only one target a time, but this was deemed sufficient, since it was expected that nuclear strikes would be conducted by a single aircraft or by a pair of aircraft. Such targets would be destroyed by two or three engagement sequences, with each missile launch having an expected kill probability of 70%.

Extreme difficulties encountered during systems engineering and development, however, put these weapons out of immediate reach. Therefore, in 1959 it was decided to temporarily field the S-75 Volkhov (SA-2 Guidline) system to provide frontal-level (army group) air defense. It should be noted that the system previously had been deemed totally inadequate for this role, owing to the fact that the deployment time for S-75 was not less than two hours (and practically 6-8 hours), which was why the Krug and Kub programs had been started in the first place. But there was no choice, and it was hoped that land forces tactics would mitigate the weaknesses. Ground forces intended for a breakthrough operation would be dispersed deeply from the forward edge the battlefield (where, presumably, NATO would refrain from nuking itself). Such dispersed units would not create an appropriate target for nuclear strikes. They would be good targets only in the concentration areas, which would be predetermined, and thus under the umbrella of the semi-static S-75s. The S-75 remained in service with the ground forces until about the mid-1960s, when the Krug finally came online.

Ambling into air defense

The development of the Krug by the NII-20 research institute (today the NPO Antyei consortium, Moscow) was almost a complete failure. While the 1S32 fire-control radar was working properly, the intended missile was a disaster. At one point, it was even decided to use a solid-fuel version of the V750 (SA-2) missile, called V757Kr. Eventually, though, all the problems with the missiles were solved, and the system was directed into production as originally configured. The deployment time was not five minutes, as required, but about 25 minutes, since all the cables had to be re-laid to connect launchers with the fire-control radar. The reload time was long and demanded a crane. Despite this, the Krug was treated as a very valuable system by the land forces when it was at last fielded in October 1964. Krug systems formed frontal air-defense brigades, consisting of three missile battalions apiece. Each battalion consisted of three batteries.

The Krug, however, was not fully satisfactory in operation and was found to have a major shortcoming. Each battery was equipped with a 1S32 H-band fire-control radar on a tracked chassis and three 2P24 two-rail self-propelled launchers. The radar had a target-acquisition range of 110 km and a tracking range of 70 km. It created very narrow beam (1 degree) and thus had to be cued by an external source of target information. Such information could only be provided by the battery’s battalion headquarters, which was equipped with a single 1S12 air-search radar (developed from the P-40 mobile army radar) with a range of 180 km. As the 1S12 was a 2-D radar, it had to cooperate with the PRV-9 (Thin Skin) altitude-finding radar, and the K-1 Krab semi-automatic command and control (C2 ) system then in use limited the battalion headquarters to issuing information on only two targets at a time.

Up the chain, the brigade headquarters had various radar sets working on different frequencies and was therefore less vulnerable to jamming. Among them were the P-40D (Long Track), P-12 (Spoon Rest – later, P-18 Spoon Rest D), and P-15 (Flat Face – later, P-15M Squat Eye) search radars and the PRV-9 and PRV-11 (Side Net) altitude-finding radars. But this wealth of information could be made available to battalions only via the same K-1 Krab C2 system. The brigade headquarters tracked about 40 targets at a time, but in passing the data down one target at a time, it was found that about 30% of the information was lost in the system. Furthermore, the Krab K-1 had a communications range of 15-20 km, instead of the desired 30-35 km, which limited the distance battalions could be deployed from brigade headquarters and undermined dispersal efforts.

All of these shortcomings limited the brigade’s capabilities by 60%, as assessed by Soviet commanders. This sorry state of affairs finally led to the development of the Polyana-D1 C2 system. The new system could issue information on ten targets detected by brigade headquarters, as well as information on 20 other targets detected by other radar posts (the front-surveillance network). Moreover, Polyana-D1 was a two-way data-exchange system, and proved itself valuable for coordinating air-defense assets (a Krug brigade head-quarters was able to direct fighters over Polyana-D1, for example). The system was accepted to service in 1981, just as the Krug systems were about to be replaced by the new S-300V (SA-12a/b Gladiator/Giant) surface-to-air missile (SAM) system. The Soviet experience with mobile air defense should be considered a primer on how a C2 system can make or break combat effectiveness, even if all required missiles and radars are shining examples of national prowess.

Meanwhile, a separate bureau of developers at OKB-15 GKAT (Moscow) was working on the Kub system. This was intended to equip armored (as opposed to motor-rifle) divisions, which were expected to be able to operate independently in order to exploit the effects of a successful breakthrough. In such a scenario, the armored divisions were to leave the front (army group) and army (corps) air-defense umbrella. The mobile system for armored forces would have a newly designed, semi-active radar-homing system (the Krug was radio-command guided). This decision was based on the design bureau’s preference rather than tactical requirements. Simply, each bureau chose its own way to solve the problem.

The Kub employed the first Soviet air-defense missile powered by solid-fuel rocket motor. As such, the design team quickly ran into problems with the missile engine, and these persisted for many years. Launch trials of the Kub missile system started in 1959, but a successful launch was not conducted until 1961. Soon, the semi-active fire-control system became the source of most of the problems, and the missile seeker was unable to maintain a stable track. Reshuffling the missile and radar teams’ leadership did not help much. As of 1963, out of 83 trial launches, only 11 were successful. Eventually, the missile seeker problems were resolved, but not until early 1964. Trials continued successfully through 1966, and in January 1967, the Kub system was accepted to service.

Kub battery consisted of a 1S91 (Straight Flush) fire-control radar with four 2P25 three-rail launchers. The 1S91 fire-control station actually consisted of two radar sets that were located on the same column but rotated separately. The lower, parabolic antenna belonged to the 1S11 H-band target-acquisition radar, with a range of 275 km for large aircraft targets. The upper antenna belonged to the 1S31 G-band illumination radar, which had a 75-km track range and a 28-km illumination range. A Kub regiment consisted of five batteries and a headquarters with P-12 (later P-18) radar and PRV-9/11 altitude-finding radar. The Kub system was in production from 1967 through 1983, and about 500 batteries were produced (enough for 100 regiments).

Air defense for lower Soviet echelons was not neglected. The goal here was to devise a system on a wheeled chassis that could move rapidly with the maneuver units and engage low-flying targets making conventional attacks below the threshold of the Krug and Kub systems. Such a system for regiments was designed from 1960 to 1962: the Strela-1 (SA-9 Gaskin), with its defining feature being the missile’s infrared-homing seeker. During work on the system, its parameters were increased to keep pace with Western aircraft, and it was able to engage targets at a range of up to 5 km from 50 to 3,000+ m altitude. The maximum target speed was 310 m/s for approaching targets and 230 m/s for chase. The original requirements for an infrared-guided system able to engage targets out to 2 km at altitudes from 50 to 1,500 m evolved along a separate track into the Strela-2 man-portable air-defense system (MANPADS), which spawned a long line of successors.

Missile trials for Strela-1 started in 1962, but difficulties with the infrared seeker prolonged the trials through 1967. The system was finally introduced to service in 1968. The system was put on a BRDM armored-car chassis. Four missile containers were mounted on the vehicle, along with an optical sight for the operator (there was no integral air-search radar). It is worth mentioning that Strela-1 was intended to be supplemented by a self-propelled, radar-directed gun system. The latter was designed to a 1960 specification and later fielded as the ZSU-23-4 Shilka. The typical air-defense battery for a regiment consisted of a Strela-1 platoon with four launch vehicles and a command vehicle that were interconnected by radio sets to receive voice information about targets. The second platoon was equipped with ZSU-23-4 Shilkas. In the late 1970s, Strela-1 was modernized to the Strela-1M version with a nitrogen-cooled seeker that increased the system’s sensitivity and slightly expanded the engagement envelope.

If the Krug, Kub, and Strela-1 represented the first generation of Soviet mobile SAMs, then the 9K33 Osa (SA-8 Gecko) system for division-level air-defense would be “generation in between.” A late bloomer, Osa’s requirements were drawn up about the same time as the other systems and called for a more mobile intermediate system for divisional use. Medium-range air-defense systems could provide cover for larger areas and thus could operate from static positions, changed from time to time, to match the deployments of land forces. The divisional system was to be on a wheeled chassis and was to be able to conduct air search while on move. When an air target was detected, the launcher would stop and deploy to be ready to fire within seconds. In practice, the system would more routinely operate from fixed positions, which could be quickly changed (deployment time of five minutes, compared with 20-30 minutes for higher-level systems). Interestingly, the detailed requirements for Osa were based on the American Mauler air-defense system concept that was never actually fielded.

The task of developing the Osa was allocated to the NII-20 design bureau, developer of the Krug system, and again a radio-command guidance method was selected. And again, work did not go smoothly. In late 1962, only seven prototypes of the system were ready, instead of the planned 67. Due to missile engine problems, only four trial launches were conducted through 1964, and these yielded unsatisfying results. The successful trials of a much modernized system, which included input from the NII-2 design bureau that was developing a naval version, were conducted in 1970 and 1971, and the system was then accepted into service. The Osa finally reached field units beginning in 1972 – years behind its intended fielding schedule of 1965-1968. However, it was deemed a highly deadly system. An Osa battery was not vulnerable to being disabled by a single anti-radiation missile (as were all the other contemporary radar-directed systems), because each of the four launcher vehicles had its own complete fire-control system.

As Osa tests sputtered along, work began on modifying and modernizing the Krug and Kub. Some of the later versions came in response to evolving NATO threats, while others were to overcome deficiencies in the fielded systems. For example, the ramjet engine of the Krug missile did not work steadily at lower altitudes and so had a minimum engagement altitude of 3,000 m, even though the fire-control radar allowed a much lower engagement threshold. As soon as the problems with the engine were resolved, a new version of the Krug was fielded – the 2K11A Krug-A. It was accepted to service in 1967. The engagement envelope was increased, with minimum range decreased from 11 to 9 km, while maximum range increased from 45 to 50 km. The minimum altitude was lowered to 250 m. In 1971, the Krug-M was introduced, with the maximum engagement altitude increased to 24,500 m.

In the early 1970s, Soviet ground force planners began to worry seriously about NATO tactical ballistic missiles (TBMs) with nuclear capability. In response, all air-defense systems were tested against TBMs, and most were found unsuitable. Software changes allowed the Krug to engage TBMs to a vertical range up to 150 km out to a distance of 20 km from the launcher. As an additional benefit, the new Krug-M1 had a minimum engagement altitude of 150 m against air-breathing targets. In the 1970s, the Krug-M1 was the only Soviet air-defense system (including country air-defense force systems force systems – see “Castles in the Sky,”JED , February 2002) able to engage TBMs, although the kill probability was not impressive.

In 1967, an improved version of the Kub appeared: the Kub-M1. The basic layout remained unchanged, but the engagement zone was increased from 4 km (minimum) to 23 km (maximum), and the engagement altitude was expanded to cover a lower boundary of 50 m to an upper of 12,000 m. But the most significant change was in the illumination radar, which could be switched off when a Shrike anti-radar missile attack was suspected by the crew and turned on again in enough time for its own missile in flight to re-acquire the illumination signal. Also there were some improvements that made the fire-control radar more resistant to jamming.

Another improved version of the Kub, the Kub M3, was fielded in 1977. Horizontal range was increased to 25 km, while crossing-target range was increased from 15 to 18 km. The engagement ceiling was increased to 14,000 m, while the floor was decreased to 25 m. The system could engage an approaching target moving at up to 700 m/s and a chase target moving up to 300 m/s at altitudes not lower than 1000 m. (The earlier versions of Kub could engage only approaching targets.) In addition, missile agility increased from 4g to 8g, and there were further improvements in jam resistance. The Kub- M3 first equipped army-level air-defense regiments. In the early 1980s, Kub-M3 systems were also introduced to division-level units (armored divisions), replacing the existing Kub-M1.

In or about 1973, the Krug and Kub-M1 were provided with TV cameras, allowing crews to engage targets in daytime with missiles in heavy jamming conditions out to a range of 20 km. The Osa and Kub-M3 had the TV camera from their dates of introduction.

Generation II: Getting Real

Work on what can be regarded as the second generation of air-defense systems for ground forces started in 1968. Two factors influenced the concept: First was adoption of the “Flexible Response” strategy by NATO and its emphasis on conventional warfare. While the Soviets welcomed the new concept, believing in their advantage in conventional forces, the air-defense scenario changed radically away from the threat of nuclear-armed strikers coming singly or in pairs. Yet a return to conventional warfare did not mean a return to mass air raids from high altitude, which was painfully confirmed during the Six Day War of 1967 and the first US phase of the Vietnam conflict. There were indeed mass raids, but from low-flying, highly maneuverable aircraft coming in smaller groups with greater frequency. Secondly, there were new categories of threats, such as combat helicopters, cruise missiles, and TBMs (the nuclear card remained in the deck after all). It was decided that the new-generation air-defense systems must be able to counter all of these threats. Air-breathing threats were to be engaged by systems with day/night optical sensors that could overcome heavy electronic jamming.

From the technical point of view, it was decided that the follow-on systems would be built with the use of solid-state and digital-computing technologies. Phased-array antennas were to be employed to the maximum extent possible. The requirements were set so high that the design teams faced enormous problems, solved only through prolonged trials and systems re-engineering. Scheduled dates of initial operational capability slipped by years, into the early 1980s. But when the second generation finally entered service, it created one of the most effective air- defense systems in the world: the dreaded “double-digit” SAMs. For example, the S-300V (SA-12a Gladiator and SA-12b Giant) had at the outset quite effective anti-TBM capabilities and was highly resistant to jamming. In the 1980s, it was certainly better than the Patriot PAC-1 used at that time by the US Army. This situation reversed in the 1990s, though, due to the collapse of the Soviet Union.

The requirements for the S-300V system were not issued in typical Soviet fashion. Actual work on the system started at NII-20 as a “private” venture of the institute called Prizma. The designers prepared two different configurations of the system: ZUR-1 and ZUR-2. ZUR-1 was for countering high-flying aircraft and would have an anti-TBM capability, while ZUR-2 was for engaging low flying aircraft and cruise missiles. Both were to be integrated within one unit. However, the project was endangered by new ideas that appeared from Soviet decision-making centers. One such disastrous red herring was a 1969 directive to design a new, unified (joint) system for the land forces, country air-defense (CAD) forces, and the navy: the S-500U (U from Unifitsirovannyi – unified or joint). The joint system was to consist of a phased-array, multi-function radar (area search, target acquisition, and fire control) with V-500K missiles with radio-command guidance. In the future, V-500R missiles were to be built with semi-active terminal radar homing and radio-command mid-course guidance. The systems were permitted to have certain differences between CAD force and army air-defense versions, mostly in the chassis, but would otherwise be very similar.

Eventually, the S-500U was abandoned in favor of the S-300P as the unified system, designated S-300U. The S-300U was to be able to engage targets traveling up to 3,500 km/h between 6-75 km and at altitudes between 25-25,000 m. Target speed was to be up 3,500 km/h. The missile was to be designed by the MKB Fakel design bureau (the former OKB-2). The CAD system, designated S-300P, was to be integrated by CKB Almaz (the former KB-1 design bureau), while the S-300V army air-defense system was to be developed by NPO Antiey. Both organizations were to cooperate with each other to achieve maximum commonality and to avoid duplicating work.

Needless to say, the Prizma project could hardly withstand the new requirements. In practice, the concept was a complete failure, and both systems ended up having only one thing in common: the S-300 designation. Under the S-300V program, NPO Antiey did not even adopt the V-500 missiles, defying the requirements, and KB Novator (the former OKB-8) instead developed two types of missiles, following the Prizma study. This is not to say that the individual projects didn’t succeed on their own. However, a lot of wasted time, talent, resources, and money were spent pursuing a dead-end joint system. (The S-300P is really a positional, strategic air-defense system and is outside the scope of this article.)

When the army air-defense planners finalized their requirements in 1971, they agreed that the Prizma approach was superior to the S-300U concept. A strong emphasis was put on engaging not only short-range TBMs, such as Lance, but also medium-range TBMs, such as Pershing and air-launched Short-Range Attack Missiles (SRAMs) were also mentioned in final requirements. S-300V was from the very beginning destined for the frontal-level brigades. (See below for system description.) However, the army had a different set of requirements in mind for a mobile, medium-range air-defense system for lower echelons.

The requirement for an army-level system was issued in January 1972 as a result of the finalization of the new concept of land-forces air defense the year before. The system, designated as the 9K37 Buk (SA-11 Gadfly), was to be able to engage low- to high-flying targets – including helicopters and cruise missiles – at a range of up to 30 km. It was also to engage short-range (150 km) TBMs. The maximum speed of air-breathing targets was to be 830 m/s, while the system was to be able to engage targets maneuvering up to 10-12 g. The main integrator of the system was to be NKO Phazotron (formerly OKB-15). NII IP (Science Research Institute of Measurement Instruments) designed the 9S18 Kupol (Tube Arm) fire-control radar. The missile itself was designed by SMKB Novator (formerly OKB-8).

In May 1974, it was decided that in order to accelerate work on the Buk program, a hybrid Buk-1 version was to be designed with the launcher able to fire older Kub-M3 missiles. The resulting modified system was called the Kub M-4. A Kub-M4 battery consisted of a single 9S91 fire-control radar (the same as a Kub-M3 battery), a three-missile launcher with its own 9S35 target-illumination radar, and four three-missile launchers without radar. As such, a single battery could engage two targets simultaneously: one illuminated by the 9S91 radar and one by the 9S35 radar. The Kub-M4 was fielded in 1978 in limited numbers, pending delivery of the new Buk system. Buk underwent live-fire trials from late 1977 through mid-1979, after which it was accepted into service. The Buk went into full production in early 1980. (See below for system description.)

For lower echelons, the decision was made in early 1975 to develop a replacement for the Osa and Kub systems in divisional service. In the requirements, the engagement envelope was to be almost the same as for the Osa system, but the new system was to be able to engage a wider range of target types: fixed and rotary-wing aircraft, low-flying cruise missiles, unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), and even air-to-surface stand-off weapons and laser- or TV-guided bombs after launch. The new system was to be integrated into a single vehicle with fully autonomous and man-in-the-loop modes of operation. These requirements evolved into the Tor (SA-15 Gauntlet). The development of the Tor system was prolonged due to a high degree of system complexity. Finally, a year of state trials began in December 1983. After some re-engineering, the Tor was finally accepted to service in March 1986, with fielding starting later that year. (See below for system description.)

The decision to develop a replacement for the Strela-1 – a simple system with limited effectiveness – was made by Soviet planners in July 1969. The system was designated the 9K35 Strela-10SV (SA-13 Gopher). The engagement envelope was to be almost the same as for the Strela-1, but the seeker was to be much more sensitive and capable of all-aspect engagement. It was also to be able to engage highly maneuvering targets and targets with low infrared signatures (including small, piston-engine UAVs). The development of the Strela-10SV was assigned to KB TM (Design Bureau of Precision Machinery, formerly OKB-16), and the system underwent state trials from January 1973 until May 1974. The trials showed that all the requirements were met except for kill probability, which was lower than expected. Despite this, the system was conditionally approved for service in March 1976, with guidelines to improve the system at the earliest possible time. (See below for system description.)

In July 1970, Soviet planners decided to build a replacement for the ZSU-23-4 air-defense gun system. At the beginning, it was to be a gun-only system, with 30mm guns instead of 23mm (to increase the range and lethality), called ZSU-30-4. In order to provide an enhanced target-acquisition capability, it was decided to use two separate radar sets: a surveillance/target- acquisition radar with 360-degree coverage and a fire-control radar. By 1973 it was decided that the new system would be a combined missile-gun type. The reason for the change in requirements was that Soviet intelligence had gathered its first information about the American Hellfire anti-tank missile. It was assessed that a helicopter armed with Hellfire would have the capability to attack targets from a range of 6-8 km, while ZSU-30-4 fire range would be only 5 km (tailored for the existing TOW and HOT missiles used at that time on NATO combat helicopters). To increase the range at which helicopters could be engaged, it was decided to equip the ZSU-30-4 with 3M311 (SA-19 Grison) missiles, and thus the 2S6 Tunguska system was born. The main designer was the KB MOP design bureau. The new system consisted of two double-barrel 2A38 guns, eight 9M311 missiles, a 1L144 (Hot Shot) fire-control radar system consisting of an E-band target-acquisition radar and a J-band target-tracking radar, an optical target-tracking system, a 1A26 digital computer, and the tracked chassis. The armament and fire-control systems were mounted in and on a turret. State trials of the system were conducted from September 1980 until December 1981. The system was accepted to service in September 1982, with fielding beginning early in 1983. The Tunguska was fielded in mixed batteries consisting of a platoon of six Strela-10SV systems and a platoon with six Tunguskas.

Generation Next

After the acceptance of new air-defense systems in 1982-83, the rearming process started with vigor. By the late 1980s, most of the first-generation systems had been replaced by new ones. At the same time, troops received integrated, automated C3 I systems. This development was what would now be called a significant “force multiplier.”

In late July 1977, the Soviet Assembly of Ministers decided to develop a new, fully integrated air-defense command system for ground forces, building on the experience with the 9S468 Polyana D1, which was itself still under development. The new system was to connect all army-level air-defense units and sensors of the radar surveillance network within the front (army group). Development of the system was undertaken by NII of the Ministry of Radio-technical Industry. The new system, called 9S52 Polyana-D4, was introduced to air-defense brigades (S-300V and Buk) and to radar surveillance units of the ground forces. Based on frontal and army air-defense brigade headquarters, the joint air-defense command posts that had been organized since the late 1960s were now fully automated by the Polyana-D4 C3 I system. All of the lower level command posts of air-defense units up to mechanized/armored regiment level received C2 systems that were fully com-patible with Polyana-D4. They were able to receive information about targets, orders, and other commands via automated datalink. They could also upload information about their detected targets, unit status, etc. to a brigade (joint) command center. The chief of frontal air defense was able not only to command his units more effectively, but he could also direct the combat of all subordinate air-defense units within the front. Therefore, all the fire assets could be used very effectively and economically by avoiding having multiple batteries waste missiles on the same target.

Furthermore, a frontal air-defense brigade was able to engage medium-range TBMs, while army air-defense brigades could engage short-range TBMs. The number of targets that could be engaged at one time increased dramatically. For example, an army air-defense brigade (48 launchers) could engage 48 targets at a time, while the former Krug brigade (27 launchers) could engage only nine targets and a Kub regiment (20 launchers) could only engage five targets at a time. At the same time, the variety of targets that could be engaged was widened.

Survivability of the whole system was also much increased. None of the air-defense batteries was dependent on a single fire-control radar any more. Instead, all of the launchers had their own fire-control radars. The units’ mobility was also increased, as each of the launchers received its own geo-reference navigation system and used radio links instead of cables to communicate with the radar and command post. This had the effect of decreasing deployment time to five minutes or less for all systems (no more cables!). The reaction time of all systems, which had previously been about 30-60 seconds, was now de-creased to 5-15 seconds.

The requirements for the second generation of the Soviet – and now, Russian – land forces SAM systems were set so high that in 1979, when work on requirements for follow on systems was set to begin, it was decided that no new “third-generation” systems would be needed in the near future. There were two main justifications for this decision. First of all, the second-generation systems had not yet reached operational units, and there would be benefits from modifying these systems in the years ahead. Second, Soviet planners determined that there would not be dramatic changes in the predicted air-defense scenario for the land battle. Tactical aircraft would use stand-off munitions and would be covered by effective, technically advanced electronic-countermeasures systems. The fighter-bombers would also be capable of engaging ground targets in poor-visibility, day/night conditions using targeting pods. Soviet air-defense planners also projected the increasing role of UAVs and combat helicopters. The TBM threat would remain a challenge.

All of these projections and assessments were remarkably on target. As a result, when the second-generation systems were fielded in numbers in the late 1980s, they provided Soviet and allied land forces with the best mobile air-defense on the planet. The follow-on Russian Federation could (and often did) claim that its mobile air-defense systems were superior to their Western counterparts. Those claims persist to this day, but every year that passes without Soviet levels of research and development risks making them seem hollow.

Following is an outline of the S-300V, Buk, Strela-10 and Tor; i.e. the current generation of the Russian Army’s SAMs (note S-300P is not controlled by the Army).