I’ve just read Deighton’s “Fighter” over the summer break. God knows why I’d never read it before but there you go. The forward is by the very intriguing AJP Taylor and, from what I can tell, the book seems to be generally ackowledged as a well researched account of the BoB. But for me the book raises as many questions as it answers. Make no mistake, I learnt a lot (assuming it’s on the money) but there are some aspects of it I find remarkable and I will test them on this forum. The first is the discussion, in the chapter on ACM Sir Hugh Dowding, about the war cabinet meeting of 15 May 1940.
Deighton notes that on 10 May the great blitzkreig of 1940 began – panzer columns crossed the French borders and headed for the Meuse and; “The French asked the British to employ their heavy bomber force against the German columns”. At the meeting of the War Cabinet on 15 May it was agreed that RAF Bomber Command be authorised to attack and on the same night “the RAF mounted the largest air bombardment the world had yet to see”. But it was directed at various targets in the Ruhr, not the advancing German forces.
He goes on to note that the French argued desperately that air attacks upon the Ruhr would have no effect upon Guderian’s armoured invasion of France. They were right, in fact the attacks had little or no effect at all. Deighton says that the RAF official history admits that the bombers achieved none of their objectives. Industrial damage was negligible. He also says the official history goes on to explain that the greatest benefit expected from this opening shot of the strategic bombing of Germany was [apparently quoting the official history] ‘an informal invitation to the Luftwaffe to bomb London.’ and thereby indirectly support by the French by drawing away some Luftwaffe strength.
Well I’ll be amazed. I know it was war, but it was early days and the UK largely untouched and things were still fairly, shall we say, chivalrous. An invitation by the War cabinet to bomb its own citizens? Any students of RAF Bomber Command and/or the strategic bombing campaign care to discuss?
By: J Boyle - 26th January 2005 at 20:22
You may find I wasn’t being entirely serious.
That’s good…I usually take people fairly seriously unless they use a smilie or two.. 😀 😉 🙂
And thanks for the reply on Hitler’s solution to “the English problem”.
I’d like to see the program.
By: Smith - 26th January 2005 at 19:43
I’m not sure what bias Martin Middlebrook has. I once spent a week pounding the battlefields of Gallipoli with him and he’s quite an unusual character.
He’s got a knack of rubbing most people up the wrong way in the shortest possible time to a degree that I’ve rarely seen. However he is totally sincere in his devotion to veterans of all wars and gets quite emotional about the loss of men in battle.
He’s a great historian and writes from the heart as well as the mind.
I’m not sure he has too much of an axe to grind in favour of the establishment, but I could be wrong there.
Many thanks Andy
My comment re. bias not at al personal, I’ve never met the man. I did write to him once and got a fairly short (both meanings of the word) response – probably the millionth similar question 😉 My observation is more about the perspective he takes which is very supportive of the various decisions taken by Portal, Harris et al – supportive in that he accepts them without seriously critiquing them (in the manner I might have expected a historical author to do). Perhaps on reflection the bias is mine! I may do a spot on navel gazing on that one.
I agree re. the emotional connection and devotion to the task – empathy is perhaps the right term. I very much respect that. And IMHO there is a positive to his non-critiquing narrative style, it results in a simple lay out of the events from which the reader can draw his/her own conclusions.
All the best, Don
By: Andy in Beds - 26th January 2005 at 18:43
In. Your. Face.
😀
Damien,
are you not impressed and dare I say moved by the very gracious way I was able to admit I was less than perfect?????
😉 😉 😉 🙂 🙂 🙂
By: Andy in Beds - 26th January 2005 at 17:44
Hi Don
Yes, I’m very happy that a discussion on the forum has brought me back to Len Deighton’s book.
By questioning it as closely as I have, I’ve got more from it than I would have otherwise if I’d just read it.
I’m still taking the same approach even though I’m more than half way through it now.
You are correct in saying that if I only write about what I disagree with I’ll have a small work load and the points I raise might appear to be nit-picking of the most highly developed kind.
I want to say a few things later but they’re more for discussion than making a critical point.
So, thanks for making me put up-or shut up.
I’m not sure what bias Martin Middlebrook has. I once spent a week pounding the battlefields of Gallipoli with him and he’s quite an unusual character.
He’s got a knack of rubbing most people up the wrong way in the shortest possible time to a degree that I’ve rarely seen. However he is totally sincere in his devotion to veterans of all wars and gets quite emotional about the loss of men in battle.
He’s a great historian and writes from the heart as well as the mind.
I’m not sure he has too much of an axe to grind in favour of the establishment, but I could be wrong there.
John Terraine I never met, although he was president of the Western Front Association. I’ve always found his books to be reliably informative and he wasn’t afraid to disagree with what was the perceived truth.
However I found his at times quite strident defence of Sir Douglas Haig a bit difficult to take, although I know this is isn’t the place to discuss Great War infantry tactics.
Cheers
Andy
PS. I’m out tonight (and tomorrow) so my thoughts on the Junkers 87 in the Spanish Civil War may have to wait until Friday.
By: J Boyle - 26th January 2005 at 02:59
If you insist…
1944. USA reopens trading links with Germany. Russia gets nervous, pushes Westward to create a larger buffer zone. Germany convinces USA of communist threat. German scientists cooperate with US scientists to create nuclear bomb.
1945. First atomic bomb test shocks Russians.
1946. Long range German bombers nuke Moscow. Long range Japanese bombers nuke Pearl Harbour. Nagasaki and Hiroshima destroyed in response. Before any further weapons can be produced, New York is nuked when a U-boat surfaces in the harbour – and explodes shortly afterwards. U-boats surface off LA and other major US cities. USA surrenders to Germany/Japan without a single German or Japanese soldier landing on US soil.
IMHO…I don’t think the US would have had a nuke program…or at least nothing more than a couple of scientists in a lab somewhere…without the US being involved in a war. also, I believe that manyof the atomic scientists were Jewish, and I’m guessing that they would not have worked with, or helped, Germany.
Also, I’m not sure the US would have had a B-29..or anything better than the B-17 to bomb Japan for the same reasons.
Finally, why nuke NYC when it’s the financial capitol of the country? It would be terribly disruptive. It would have made better sense to do a “demonstration” on a less important city.
As far as the US surrendering, I think Germany would have preferred to keep the US neutral because they wouldn’t have enough people to occupy the country and as a source of weapons and material.
Recently a well known novelist published his latest work and one throwaway comment gots lots of media coverage over here (but it wasn’t a main plot of the book) and that was Charles Lindbergh defeated FDR for president in 1940 as an isolationist Republican.
One question? I recently heard that Hitler’s plan for the English people once he invaded was to basically kill the men and use the women for breeding stock. Really. Anyone know if that’s correct?
Fascinating stuff to ponder…Thank God the good guys won.
By: Dave Homewood - 26th January 2005 at 00:40
Exactly, so the attacks on columns must have been via the use of intelligence then
By: Smith - 26th January 2005 at 00:12
I doubt it Dave – it be dark at night. 😎
By: Dave Homewood - 26th January 2005 at 00:03
Clearly at the time Bomber Command’s heavy bombers were barely capable of hitting the right country, never mind armoured columns that would be miles away from their reported positions by the time the bombers got there.
This quoted from Norman Franks’ book Forever Strong – The Story of 75 Squadron RNZAF 1916-1990:
“Two nights later a further three Wellingtons again went to the Ruhr, with three more attacking troop communications in Belgium. What was thought to be a blast furnace was successfully bombed by one of the Ruhr force, and a road convoybombed by the tatter three, even though all aircraft had problems with searchlights.”
Perhaps armoured columns were targets of opportunity? Were they sent out and told “look for German supply lines”?
By: Smith - 25th January 2005 at 23:47
Andy
Very interesting on a number of fronts …
1. That so far you’re finding Deighton reasonably accurate (or informed, or something lke that)
2. Your italics above re. the rationale for the May 15 raid … emphasing Deighton’s point/slant that perhaps the justification for the raid/s came AFTER rather than before .. I have no idea (short of minutes of the War Cabinet) how that could be resolved … all that said Terraine is arguing a similar same thing (encourage = invite the Luftwaffe to bomb England)
3. Middlebrook (in particular) and Everitt have their own biases. They are very pro the strategic bombing campaign and they tend simply to tell the story of what happened, not why. So yes, the May raids were very important, in an event sense – they were the beginning of a major multi-year campaign. But that doesn’t address/question the why.
Is this what I/we want? Frankly yes, but if you’re lucky :rolleyes: you may find that Deighton is sufficiently on the money that your workload will not be large after all !!! 😉 My advice, focus only on significant errors or omissions.
Next up the 109. That’ll be interesting. Deighton makes much of weaknesses in the wings (high wing loading), cannons and of course the big bug-bear ~ fuel capacity=range.
Many, many thanks Andy, regards Don
By: Andy in Beds - 25th January 2005 at 22:48
The First Instalment
Hi all,
As I said I would, I’m working my way through ‘Fighter’ by Len Deighton and on page 69 I came across the paragraph that originally started this whole thread and my re-visit to Mr Deighton’s work.
As promised I will report back here with my full report on the book, which I have to say is much better than my apparently somewhat flawed memory would have me believe. However the paragraph on the Ruhr Raids of May 15th 1940 still seems somewhat controversial to me and for that reason I want to revive our previous discussion on the paragraph. I’ve reproduced the paragraph in full below in full below.
Mr Deighton says:-
“The French had argued desperately that air attacks upon the Ruhr could have no effect upon Guderian’s armoured invasion of France. The French were entirely right. The RAF official history admits that the bombers ‘achieved none of their objects. Industrial damage was negligible’ and goes on to explain that the greatest benefit expected from this opening shot of the strategic bombing of Germany was ‘an informal invitation to bomb London’. By this means it was hoped to divert the German air offensive away from French ground forces. To what extent this motive was arrived at after the raid failed to be anything better than a provocation, can only be guessed”
The reason I’ve put the last part of the paragraph in italics is that I was a little concerned as to where Mr Deighton sourced this last statement.
The previous sentence is almost direct quotation from the official history but this part isn’t. My question was therefore this. Did Deighton hang a small but significant piece of his own opinion on the end of the paragraph? If he did he planted a seed in the readers mind that might lead one to believe that this was official policy.
My first port of call was ‘The Right of the Line’ by John Terraine (Sceptre Ed. 1988) who quotes Air Marshal Sir Charles Portal who at the time was CIC Bomber Command.
Portal dismissed close support as incapable of affecting this air situation, “whereas the bombing of objectives in Germany was likely, not only to damage the German war machine in general, but to force the Germans to withdraw fighters and flak from the front to the rear, and to divert their bombing offensives to objectives in England”. (AHB/II/117/5(A) , p 278.-Via Terraine The R.O.T.L).
Tonight I’ve also consulted ‘The Bomber Command War Diaries’ by Martin Middlebrook and Chris Everitt (Viking 1985) and they have a slightly different and significant slant on events.
They point out that the German bombing of Rotterdam on May 14th may have had some influence on the decision to attack Germany on the following night and as the reader can see below, this new strategic offensive was short lived.
They do agree that the raid of May 15th was a very significant event in Bomber Command’s war.
“That date, 15th May 1940 was another of the great turning points of Bomber Command’s war. The R.A.F. commanders could finally start implementing their pre-war plans and the true strategic–bombing offensive against Germany began that night when most of the 108 aircraft allocated to operations were sent to industrial targets in Germany; it was the first occasion that more than 100 aircraft were dispatched. But the realities of the situation prevailed and, after only five nights of industrial bombing, the night bombers had to be brought back to attack bridges and communications nearer the battlefront. The full moon period in the second half of May was fully used for this purpose”. (P.40 BCWD.—Middlebrook & Everitt)
Middlebrook and Everitt also point out that the Blenheims of No 2 Group Bomber Command were very active in attacking tactical targets throughout the period.
So in closing for tonight, I can have no real objection to what Len Deighton has to say in his book (up to the point I have read) and have to confess that he seems to be fairly accurate in his telling of events in May 1940 so far.
Tomorrow, was the Stuka very influential in the Spanish Civil War (?) and the failings of the ME109.
Cheers
Andy
PS Gnome, is this the sort of thing you wanted. It’ll take six months at this rate!
By: John C - 21st January 2005 at 00:13
more melvic zen…
tee hee! 🙂
anybody here read John Keegan’s alternative German strategy for defeating the Soviet Union? Attack via the Middle East, in through Syria, up through Iraq and Iran pushing northwards towards the Caucasus securing oilfields as they went…
Which with the UK out of the battle would have been a lot easier.
JC
By: Spamcan - 20th January 2005 at 20:27
more melvic zen…
anybody here read John Keegan’s alternative German strategy for defeating the Soviet Union? Attack via the Middle East, in through Syria, up through Iraq and Iran pushing northwards towards the Caucasus securing oilfields as they went…
Now what recent events does that remind you of?! 😮
By: Smith - 20th January 2005 at 20:19
Silly buggers LOL :rolleyes: Farterland (oops – genuine typo, honest) Fatherland was better.
As to invasions of UK and USSR. IIRC Hitler wanted to defeat Russia (totally). Hated Slavs as he termed them, and Communism. Thought he would have a quick campaign on the back of seemingly invincible 1939 and 1940 blitzkreig experiences. Therefore, inter alia, didn’t equip his forces for a Russian winter (read Beevor – Stalingrad). Also insisted on surrounding and fighting Stalingrad stronghold when he could have bypassed. At that time his northern forces were within (not sure exactly) short distance of pushing on to Moscow. All that said, JDK is bang on with his “we in the West …” point.
As for UK, dear Mr Deighton summing up in the book at the centre of this thread, suggests Hitler would have considered his Western front subdued and under control. No invasion from the UK was viable (for years), the RAF bomber strikes were pinpricks (volume and accuracy), his U-boat force was going to cut off supply and the USA was not involved. Reasonable short-term assertions all. Which is all he needed, the Russian campaign was going to be short (blitzkreig). Ergo …
By: Dave Homewood - 20th January 2005 at 12:37
Hence the ‘huge casualty cost’. It was a hard fight, but eventually the Nazis played dirty, and attacked at tea time on Sunday.
“That’s a typical Nazi trick!” – Captain George Mainwaring, 1940
By: Dave Homewood - 20th January 2005 at 12:14
Come off it Damien, if the Germans had tried to invade, they’d never have gotten past the Walmignton-on-Sea Home Guard!
Actually, have you seen the film The Philadelphia Experiment II. Pretty much rubbish but it i modern day USA after the Germans won and made it a totalitarian state. An interesting concept in a way. All because they took a Stealth back in time and the Gerries got it.
By: John C - 20th January 2005 at 11:20
We (in the west) regularly underestimate the resillience and meatgrinder that was the Russian machine. Not nice.
I still feel that the incompetance of the Soviet leadership in the early part of the campaign alongside the defeat of GB would have led to the fall of Moscow and the possible removal of the Soviet leadership. I do however accept that the total defeat of the USSR would have been a near impossible undertaking – What were Germany’s aims though? Complete control or just taking the Western territories?
JC
By: dhfan - 19th January 2005 at 20:35
If I am wrong I’ll be big enough to say.
Andy
That was never in doubt. I hope you enjoy it, and I hope you change your opinion.
Probably help if I read it again too. I wonder where the **** it is!
By: Andy in Beds - 19th January 2005 at 20:30
“Fighter” is one of the many hundreds of books that are somewhere in the house with nowhere near enough shelves. I haven’t read it for some years now but I doubt AJP Taylor agreed to write the foreword without reading it first.Generally, I have a high opinion of AiB’s views and knowledge but not this time.
It’s looking like you could be in a minority Andy.
Although factually based, I’m always sorry that “Bomber” is a novel. I think it would have been better as a companion to “Fighter”, especially as the titles infer similarity.
I like his novels too.
DH Fan
I’m sorry you don’t agree, however I will put my money where my mouth is and re-read the book. I will also report back here and as Mr JDK stated I will be honest.
As I said I read this book long ago so I might be wrong.
If I am wrong I’ll be big enough to say.
Watch this space as they say.
If Damien brings it Sunday I’ll make a start Monday in my lunch hour.
Cheers
Andy
By: JDK - 19th January 2005 at 20:15
Hi JC,
Don’t blame me, laddie! 😀 There was a fun thread on this topic over on WIX recently. DamienB’s final response was superb (go DB – bring it over) but more seriously, I can’t see Germany having ever beaten Russia. Stalemate or Europeanwide Communism seems to have been the choices. We (in the west) regularly underestimate the resillience and meatgrinder that was the Russian machine. Not nice.
Mike J – Joining the “I don’t like him but I won’t give examples” brigade? C’mon…
By: dhfan - 19th January 2005 at 20:08
“Fighter” is one of the many hundreds of books that are somewhere in the house with nowhere near enough shelves. I haven’t read it for some years now but I doubt AJP Taylor agreed to write the foreword without reading it first.Generally, I have a high opinion of AiB’s views and knowledge but not this time.
It’s looking like you could be in a minority Andy.
Although factually based, I’m always sorry that “Bomber” is a novel. I think it would have been better as a companion to “Fighter”, especially as the titles infer similarity.
I like his novels too.
I’ll get around to it Don, but it could be a couple of days. 🙂
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January 15, 2005 at 9:08 am