Another "What if?" RAF/RN in Vietnam.

Hmmm, you’ve raised doubts in my mind now! I’ll have to look up the article when I get home.

raaf camberra’s were also involved but i havent heard much about sam suseptability but were meant to have served with distiction
paul (b20’s au built b2’s)

The B57, the US version of the Canberra with the tandem cockpit, was heavily involved. But although it was originally a British design, it had been heavily modified by Martin by that time. Started off in the bomber role but was susceptible to SAMs and so was mostly used in the high altitude recce role. There was an article that detailed B57s in SE Asia in last month’s Airforces Monthly, I think, and there’s an article here.

Hunters: Badly and Vs: No.

Sandys 1957 equipped Brits for 3 Cases: 1.MAD (not relevant to this thread); 2. SEADS/iron penetration of WarPac (=US over N Vietnam); 3.Rapid Deployment Force (RAF 38 Gp. Hunter FGA.9) inc. Strike carrier (Bucc, Scim) to Aid an Ally against invasion of modest intensity (Malaysia/Brunei, Konfrontation). We had actually done several in a 4th. Case: low intensity unconventional (CO-IN): Malaya, Kenya, Radfan, where we had made do with Lincoln, Brigand (?offensive Chipmunk?) against merely small arms. France did the same in Algeria, and its own Vietnam War. The only equipment lesson drawn was that choppers could do good in a hostile environment. By 1965 we had accepted that and put SS11 on Scout. Odd, because a US lesson from SEAsia, 1965-73 was to lose >3,000 choppers and still believe in anti-armour rotors.

In 1965 LBJ asked Wilson for token presence – “a band of bagpipers would do”. He declined. Phil/RoK/ANZ came on board, but US chose to use them largely in Case 4 – Junglies, Specials, logistics, where air was little more than transport/recce. US did not need Allies’ horsepower in Case 2, confusing C3I; good for us, as in 1965 we had so few fit-and-well Vulcan/Victor – and had just ceased providing Saceur’s nuclear component with grounding of Valiant – that we could not have risked any on iron in SEAsia.

We might have offered to put Hunter/Scim to CO-IN strafing. They would have found few targets, done little damage, and fatigued crew and structure long before their F-4 replacements arrived. Bucc. S.1 into Hanoi would have been a different matter. 45 Sqdn/Tengah Canberra B.15 was nuke Red Beard-tasked; we could have scratched up some B.6s/crews to work with RAAF B.20, which flew 12,000 SEAsia sorties for loss of 2. What we would not have done in 1965-69 would be to send anything high, North. Our ECM was pretty useless at that time.

The Waddington Wing was second-tasked for FEAF after Jan.1969, but was trained for laydown WE177B penetration of PRC. Again, we would not have put any with iron into a B-52D/Weasel stream, confusing everybody. SAC could do so as they had nothing better to do with these relics, useless against USSR. Our equivalent would have been to retain Waddington Vulcan 1 after their rollover late-66 for Mk.2, dredging crews from desk billets. Wynn’s Official History, RAF Deterrent Forces, P.371 has Jan.61 Airships’ recognition of Valiant vulnerability to MiG-17. I guess Mk.1 Vulcan v. MiG-19 would have been much the same.

As some know the E E Lightning had development potential for ground attack roles, 1000lb bombs, Genie, Matra rocket packs, napalm and even nuclear capability.

All this came to nought as the goverment ended further development but I can only wonder if we had gone to Vietnam then the developments would have been implemented and made a formidable interceptor/ground support aircraft.
Extended range was a posibillity and the use of sidewinders would have made it unbeatable, especially against the Mig-21.

The Hunter would have been a good ground support aircraft I think, bomb loads, napalm and rocket pods would have been on the shopping list but the lack of supersonic dash for escape and evasion may have made it an easy target for Migs.

The goverment of the day in the early to mid sixties strangled the development of a lot of brilliant projects, projects that would no doubt have been implimented if we had gone to war and would have made a very different RAF than the one we have today.

Regards,

John.

By the time of that local Asian skirmish, the sole business of GOV.Co.Uk was contraction, hence odd reports of aircraft flying slowly backwards with startled pilots peering out looking for the local job centres as they past, very doubtful even at that time we could have mounted even a credible token presence as later events were too prove all too well.