anti-tamper technology for the JSF- costs $1 billion extra

Date Posted: 05-Apr-2004

INTERNATIONAL DEFENSE REVIEW – MAY 01, 2004

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JSF security technology costing up to US$1bn
BILL SWEETMAN

Up to US$1 billion of the projected cost overrun on the Lockheed Martin F-35 Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) is attributable to the development of ‘anti-tamper’ technology to protect stealth features on the JSF, together with a ‘sanitized’ and probably less stealthy export configuration of the fighter. Some of this overrun is reflected in a supplemental contract awarded to Lockheed Martin in November 2003, valued at US$603 million and covering the development of an “international partner version” for the JSF, including “a version of the JSF… that is as common as possible to the US air system within the National Disclosure Policy”.

Building export JSFs with less sensitive – and less effective – low observable (LO) features is practicable because the primary structure of the JSF is conventional, with most of the LO systems being added at the end of the assembly line. The program office has consistently declined to clarify US policy on this issue, and people close to the program have made conflicting statements.

Most recently, however, a JSF program official said that the export versions “would look the same” – implying that materials under the surface might be different. Another source says that “all JSFs will have stealth features” but will not confirm that all of them will be identical in LO performance. The November contract’s reference to an “international partner version” also suggests that such an approach is being taken. The value of the contract would reflect the need to conduct a separate radar cross-section (RCS) validation program (including RCS-range tests of a modified model).

The clear implication is that the ‘international’ JSF would have a larger RCS than the US version, would be easier to detect by hostile radars and would consequently be more susceptible to attack. That, in turn, would have consequences for the overall effectiveness of the fighter. Like other LO aircraft, it does not carry active jamming equipment or a towed decoy, and it cannot use high-off-boresight air-to-air missiles when in stealth mode.

One source close to the JSF program says that the Pentagon’s theater commanders-in-chief (CINCs) have consistently advocated a single JSF configuration, because multiple levels of LO would complicate joint operations. The LO community itself – covering JSF, F-22 and other programs – has opposed this view, fearing technology compromise. “The commanders in the field want coalition allies to have highly capable aircraft – it is the lower level people who don’t want to share the technology,” he says. Post-11 September 2001, with the new administration’s much less positive attitude towards dependence on allies and coalitions, policy appears to have swung against sharing LO technology.

JSF is the first US stealth aircraft to be offered for export. Rules on the export of stealth technologies, as well as of dual-use technologies that are important to stealth, are not made by the JSF program office, but by senior Pentagon leaders, who define disclosure policy with the help of the Low Observables Executive Committee (LO-EXCOM). The EXCOM includes representatives from the services, intelligence agencies and all major stealth programs, including ‘black’ or unacknowledged programs.

The use of less sensitive materials on export JSFs is likely to be accompanied by a range of new anti-tamper (AT) measures, an area that has received increasing attention since 11 September 2001. According to the Fiscal Year 2003 and subsequent Pentagon budgets, the US Air Force is responsible for developing AT technology for electronic hardware – including transmit/receive modules for electronically scanned arrays – software, and radar absorbent material (RAM). The objective is “to protect critical technologies in US weapon systems that may be sold to foreign governments or that could possibly fall into enemy hands”.

This effort is supervised by Dr Marvin Sambur, assistant secretary of the air force for acquisition, and managed by AFRL/XPJ, the special projects division of the USAF Laboratories. Technical support is provided by Sandia National Laboratories in Albuquerque, New Mexico, which is operated by a division of Lockheed Martin.

According to Jeff Hughes, chief of the anti-tamper technology office at AFRL, program offices such as JSF are responsible for selecting specific anti-tamper measures for their programs, developing and qualifying them. Under recent changes to the ‘DoD 5000’ rules, which cover all procurement programs, anti-tamper measures are part of the overall ‘program protection’ package that also includes conventional security. AFRL and Sandia, meanwhile, will work on basic technologies, education and outreach so program managers are aware of their options.

There are two main groups of stealth-related sensitive technologies on JSF: materials and software. Special materials and structures are keys to achieving low radar and infrared signatures. Wide-band absorbent structures are fitted to the wing and tail edges, body chines and other areas. Radar-absorbent coatings and paints are used around apertures and inside cavities. Special topcoats have been developed to reduce the fighter’s infrared signature, and frequency-selective materials and structures are used for antennas and other apertures.

All these materials and components are carefully protected on US stealth programs. The main risk is that an adversary could acquire samples of LO systems, reverse-engineer them and use the technology to create or improve LO aircraft or missiles.

Software on JSF, however, could be a more serious threat. Like the F-22, the JSF’s electronic warfare and mission management system is designed to detect, locate and identify hostile radars and compute their detection range against the JSF at any illumination angle. (Both the JSF and F-22 have their smallest RCS in the nose-on aspect, and a higher RCS from the side.) That information is presented to the pilot in the form of ‘threat circles’ on the tactical display, which expand and contract as the position of the aircraft changes relative to the radar. Given this information, an adversary could plan the location and operation of radars to increase the chances of detecting a JSF.

AT technology for hardware and software exists in the commercial world. One way to protect hardware is to encase components in a material that cannot be removed without destroying the component. Software anti-tamper measures are used to protect confidential data stored on notebook computers or personal digital assistants (PDAs); Lockheed Martin, in fact, is a major client for PDA Defense, which develops such systems. Essentially, the software detects unauthorized access attempts and (in some cases) destroys data with a ‘logic bomb’ if too many attempts are made. AT technology is part of a multilayer security system that partitions software and controls access on a need-to-know basis.

Hughes says that protecting materials is “a tough area – it’s an ongoing investigation as to how much [protection] is good enough. You need reasonable protection, balanced against implementing the weapon”. The goal, he says, is to “slow or prevent” exploitation. For example, there may be parts of the JSF that will not need to be accessed in normal operation – and they may be covered by rules analogous to warnings on consumer electronics that the warranty is void if the user opens the case. “Access detection and denial” is identified as a specific area of effort for the USAF/Sandia project.

Another source suggests that export customers would not necessarily need the ability to repair complex LO materials. The JSF program goal is to have two-level maintenance – flight-line and depot – and to make LO systems so durable that they seldom require maintenance unless they suffer impact damage. “Now, whether you’re going to export the capability of repairing a leading edge, I don’t know,” he says. “You might ship it back and change it for a spare part.” One problem with this approach, though, is that no known LO program has yet achieved its maintainability targets.

A former program official, though, stresses that final decisions about export configurations have not been taken. Export JSF deliveries – beyond the UK – will not start for at least 10 years. “What’s the world going to look like 10 years from now? Nobody knows. The real answer is that as we mature our capabilities, we develop our partners and their ability to control, manage and do the work.”

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