ARE the US Navy's super carriers a relic of wars past?

What are the covert sensors that ID and track the target?

Did you even read the example that you quoted? Why would you even be asking this question if you did?!

ESM/Passive acoustic?…they’ll give you a signature covertly sure, but, not at great resolution so no tracking and neither are invulnerable to deception or simple signature masking. So not 100% reliable to track/ID by themselves and are utilised to cue a platform with greater sensor resolution for that reason.

No form of ESM or passive acoustic sensors can provide tracking information? No further comment on that as “it’s not worthy of my ridicule.”

Prairie Masker has pros and cons, one of the biggest cons being that the resulting acoustics are a red-flag indicating the presence of a military vessel.

Surface wave radar is about the best bet for reliable range/resolution – its good for about 400km range top end and about a 4km by 2-3 degrees of arc accuracy. Not hard to track in on surface wave and its emitters are not really so mobile…first target on the list for a saturation TLAM strike in support of theatre entry you might think? You seem to be hellishly fired up about the defenders variance from peacetime to war state…you do seem to have overlooked that the same applies the other way too.

TLAM wasn’t in service in 1982. At least you’ve finally acknowledged the difference between peacetime and wartime, and the threat from OTH sensors. That’s something I suppose.

Anyway bottom line is that you cant, no matter how much you’d like to pretend otherwise, shorten or bypass the kill-chain. Your ‘events’ are meaningless as it doesnt matter what percentage of ‘Force A’ deploys…what matters is whether they know what they are deploying out to meet. You are still making the same mistake of assuming that your ‘Force B’ knows its flying out to a carrier because you know that it IS a carrier.

In reality, with no track or ID, Force B doesnt know that until that information is developed.

The fact that you just confused Force A with Force B twice indicates to me that you didn’t even properly read the example.

Force A does not need to id a carrier in order to fly out to it. Force A only needs to detect a contact. At that point if the detecting sensor is unable to do so, other sensors/platforms are employed to ID, and if necessary, engage the contact.

You are contending that covert sensors can deliver that data but you also highlight the only platform that can actually manage the task….

You clearly did not read, or understand, the example. At all.

That, or you are trying to pretend that it is something that it isn’t because it dismisses your silly “maskirovka is impossible without 100% id of carrier” claim. Which is what the example was for in the first place.

Peacetime or wartime submarines, like any ship, have to refit and repair and, at start of war, there will be units unavailable. Thats just a fact of life…expediting hulls to sea would happen, but, then so would losses and combat damage.

So again, wartime is different than peacetime, and depending on the nature of the crisis/conflict/threat the number of platforms deployed can vary significantly.

You would note that I said 35-40 hulls at sea earlier…which isnt 40% of 60 is it? I was already including hulls on transit and accelerating through workups, that may have combat capability, without being on-station as to discount them would be an inaccuracy.

You had said “40% at sea on station” as if those were the only ones that mattered, hence my reply referring to 40%.

Its still, in PacFlt 82 terms, not a huge number of effective boats spread across that fleets rather large OpArea…

Why would they have to be spread out across the entire Pacific and Indian Oceans? The problem is that you have not defined what the nature of the conflict is (there was none.) Hence, making statements about the size of the “operational area” is meaningless. Deployments would differ dramatically in the event of say, a Korean-war crisis versus regular peacetime activities.

Point 1 Dont be ignorant…I’ve already explained that by saying ‘against the best’ I meant against the most comprehensive capability that has deployed against a carrier.

That capability was never deployed. And you’re calling me ignorant!

Point 2 I’ve answered it several times to you and Leon. You just dont understand the answer. The important part in the kill-chain doesnt depend on a peacetime or war time footing. In fact the value of the detect-ID-track part of the kill-chain is as valuable in peacetime as it is in wartime as it allows for the efficient management of your maritime environment and lowers dependence on costly to run, and numbers-limited, patrol vessels.

No, you haven’t answered it and certainly not several times. If you had a viable answer to it, you would easily be able to counter my list of points which I’ve posted repeatedly. Yet you haven’t. Instead, you’ve now descended to basically claiming that this was the equivalent of a wartime test because the Soviets wanted “to lower dependence on costly to run patrol vessels.” As far as I’m concerned, that topic is finished as I’ve no desire to even quote any more of that sort of nonsense.

Hit another ship that wasnt decoying you mean…after RN soft-kill had defeated the inbound missile in the first place?

“Defeated”? If the missile was properly defeated it would not have continued on to sink another ship.

RN soft-kill that was anticipated to be successful in defeating MM38/AM39 as we had MM38 in the fleet, as GWS50, and had stalwart assistance from the Aeronavale on transit?.

Funny that you didn’t say anything about that when you were singing the praises of the soft-kill measures, which happened to be one line prior to you lecturing me about failing “to take onboard the rather large advantage” of having your enemies’ weapons. What a HYPOCRITE.

In your rush to be very clever and score points there Wilk you do seem to have argued yourself in a circle!.

YOU posted one of the most blatant examples of double standards I’ve ever seen on this forum. You even managed to do it in two consecutive sentences. The fact that I pointed it out is “scoring points” and being “clever” to you? Whatever.

Wilk

Event 1:
It is peacetime. Force A detects (using oth radar, fixed seabed arrays, aircraft, submarines, whatever) Force B approaching.
As it is peacetime and the danger is minimal, force A sends out only 50% of it’s overt platforms to meet Force B, and these overt platforms id and perform mock attacks on only 50% of Force B. Force A’s covert sensors id 0-100% of Force B (insert whatever number you fancy).
Force B believes that it has been “tested against the best” Force A had to offer and that only 50% of its forces were found.

What are the covert sensors that ID and track the target?. ESM/Passive acoustic?…they’ll give you a signature covertly sure, but, not at great resolution so no tracking and neither are invulnerable to deception or simple signature masking. So not 100% reliable to track/ID by themselves and are utilised to cue a platform with greater sensor resolution for that reason.

What are the covert sensors that detect the covert carrier group in wartime?. Surface wave radar is about the best bet for reliable range/resolution – its good for about 400km range top end and about a 4km by 2-3 degrees of arc accuracy. Not hard to track in on surface wave and its emitters are not really so mobile…first target on the list for a saturation TLAM strike in support of theatre entry you might think?. You seem to be hellishly fired up about the defenders variance from peacetime to war state…you do seem to have overlooked that the same applies the other way too.

Anyway bottom line is that you cant, no matter how much you’d like to pretend otherwise, shorten or bypass the kill-chain. Your ‘events’ are meaningless as it doesnt matter what percentage of ‘Force A’ deploys…what matters is whether they know what they are deploying out to meet. You are still making the same mistake of assuming that your ‘Force B’ knows its flying out to a carrier because you know that it IS a carrier.

In reality, with no track or ID, Force B doesnt know that until that information is developed. You are contending that covert sensors can deliver that data but you also highlight the only platform that can actually manage the task….a hunting submarine (if it is discrete enough to avoid counter-detection of course). What you miss is that, mostly, submarine sensor footprints have been quite modest, especially where sonars are direct-path only and do not possess sensitivity to detect convergence zones, and do not represent an ‘area coverage’ capability. That footprint is on the increase of course and has been for decades, but, hull numbers are decreasing in equal measure!.

Even if we are considering “only” sixty, I hope your carrier crew are saying their Hail Mary’s because their probability of not encountering one of sixty subs (potentially being cued by OTH radar or other sensors) is not good at all.And 40% eh? Are we talking peacetime or wartime? Oh that’s right, you completely ignore that distinction.

Peacetime or wartime submarines, like any ship, have to refit and repair and, at start of war, there will be units unavailable. Thats just a fact of life…expediting hulls to sea would happen, but, then so would losses and combat damage. 30% of a force unavailable at any one time is a fair yardstick. You would note that I said 35-40 hulls at sea earlier…which isnt 40% of 60 is it?. I was already including hulls on transit and accelerating through workups, that may have combat capability, without being on-station as to discount them would be an inaccuracy. Its still, in PacFlt 82 terms, not a huge number of effective boats spread across that fleets rather large OpArea…more so when you consider that more than a dozen would likely be SSK’s offering marginal capabilities even in the 80’s timeframe.

The question, which I have asked repeatedly and you have repeatedly failed to answer, is how a peacetime response is the equivalent of a wartime test “against the best.”

Point 1 Dont be ignorant…I’ve already explained that by saying ‘against the best’ I meant against the most comprehensive capability that has deployed against a carrier. Point 2 I’ve answered it several times to you and Leon. You just dont understand the answer. The important part in the kill-chain doesnt depend on a peacetime or war time footing. In fact the value of the detect-ID-track part of the kill-chain is as valuable in peacetime as it is in wartime as it allows for the efficient management of your maritime environment and lowers dependence on costly to run, and numbers-limited, patrol vessels. It is that detect-ID-track element that underpins everything else you have written and if that fails, in the absence of the submarine (that Pico notes to be an imponderable), you get the scenario with Midway in 82.

Yeah, save for that little problem of those missiles simply striking another ship… and the fact that not all ships had a chance to deploy decoys before being hit meaning that they weren’t some sort of panacea for the asm problem.

Hit another ship that wasnt decoying you mean…after RN soft-kill had defeated the inbound missile in the first place?. RN soft-kill that was anticipated to be successful in defeating MM38/AM39 as we had MM38 in the fleet, as GWS50, and had stalwart assistance from the Aeronavale on transit?. In your rush to be very clever and score points there Wilk you do seem to have argued yourself in a circle!. The Sheffield didnt hold off on firing chaff because she didnt ‘have time’ to fire it. Sheff had copied Glasgow’s HANDBRAKE call at the same time as everyone else.

Two British ships were hit by air launched Exocets (out of five launched) one missile (hit Sheffield) failed to detonate. Neither ship launched countermeasures (Shef was just …….off.) and Atlantic Conveyor had none. Glamorgan was hit by a land launched MM38 and suffered damage to her hanger and loss of her chopper but continued with her mission. Coventry was hit by good ol iron bombs.

Your points distill down to just one thing though

Really? Really?

“…the article, and your accompanying claims are full of assumptions and omissions, including, but not limited to:

– assuming that a peacetime response is equivalent to a wartime response.
– assuming that the Soviets were utterly stupid and revealed their complete sensor picture to their adversary when they had absolutely no reason to do so.
– assuming that the Soviets were completely incapable of maskirovka.
– assuming that mirror strikes provoke the same response as direct strikes.
– assuming that Soviet forces that did respond were using their equipment to its fullest, instead of peacetime modes.
– assuming that the Soviet forces that did respond were fully networked, instead of being required to operate on their own in order to test the individual units’ capabilities.
– assuming that forces which made a detection, such as submarines, were ordered to reveal or transmit the detection instead of performing a mock attack and retiring.
– omitting or ignoring the presence of subsurface sensors, over-the horizon sensors, etc.
– pretending that the alleged absence of a certain type of sensor is evidence of non-detection.
– assuming that their own sensors were infallible by claiming to know with certainty whether certain Soviet assets were present or not.
– and so on. I’m not going to waste a whole page on this.”

You say that they only boil down to one thing for you because you have zero effective counters to any of them. Hence, you’ve latched onto one of these points – maskirovka – because you (wrongly) believe that you’ve got me on that one point.

To play the deception you credit them with they had to know what the Midway was and be tracking it. Otherwise how do they know what it is to not challenge…you are making the classic mistake of getting the pieces fit the story as you know it to be after the fact and to fit your personal agenda.

Event 1:
It is peacetime. Force A detects (using oth radar, fixed seabed arrays, aircraft, submarines, whatever) Force B approaching.
As it is peacetime and the danger is minimal, force A sends out only 50% of it’s overt platforms to meet Force B, and these overt platforms id and perform mock attacks on only 50% of Force B. Force A’s covert sensors id 0-100% of Force B (insert whatever number you fancy).
Force B believes that it has been “tested against the best” Force A had to offer and that only 50% of its forces were found.

Event 2:
It is wartime. Based on their success during Event 1 in peacetime, Force B approaches again. This time however, Force A utilizes 100% of their assets and consequently 100% of Force B is attacked and destroyed.
The survivors of Force B are bewildered. They cannot believe Force A to be capable of such a fiendishly clever plot. They had been told maskirovka was impossible unless everything was ID’d 100% by an overt platform.

Now down from ‘hundreds’ to ‘about 60’ and importantly remembering that 60 would be, on any given day, roughly 40% at sea on station.

I said the “Soviets operated literally hundreds of subs.” I also said they had hundreds of subsurface platforms when you were talking about passive sonar in general. I didn’t say that they were all based in one area (why would they be?!). Of course if there was a desire to do so many more subs could be deployed to the area; the RN didn’t have half a dozen subs operating around the Falklands in 1981 did they… Even if we are considering “only” sixty, I hope your carrier crew are saying their Hail Mary’s because their probability of not encountering one of sixty subs (potentially being cued by OTH radar or other sensors) is not good at all.

And 40% eh? Are we talking peacetime or wartime? Oh that’s right, you completely ignore that distinction.

First hand account from a trained ISTAR professional?. Verbal first hand accounts from an RN Wasp pilot and the same kind of first hand account from a retired CPOWEA who recounted a tail of tripping over one of the pieces of intel recovered!.

– no credible sources from the Soviet side, who are the ones who would know what they detected, whether they were using their all their resources at their full capacity as they would be in wartime, and that those resources were the best they had, etc. Claims of non-detection from the side who isn’t doing the detecting are untrustworthy at best, and have proven to be false in the past.
– “verbal evidence” in a web forum is utterly meaningless as anyone can pretend to have some. I happen to have authentic “verbal evidence” myself (though sadly not for this particular event) but I only utilize it as a resource to assist me in my arguments.
– The “professional” made a number of glaring assumptions and omissions as I’ve pointed out repeatedly.
– Most importantly, it does not support your claim that they were “tested against the best the Soviets had”, which is what this argument began with in the first place. THAT is the important point. Whether the midway was id’d or not is moot: The question, which I have asked repeatedly and you have repeatedly failed to answer, is how a peacetime response is the equivalent of a wartime test “against the best.”

Oh and the Sheffield and Coventry sinkings…you forgot that Glasgow was alert and decoyed successfully and that no ship, in the task force, that employed expendable countermeasures was struck by an antiship missile.

Yeah, save for that little problem of those missiles simply striking another ship… and the fact that not all ships had a chance to deploy decoys before being hit meaning that they weren’t some sort of panacea for the asm problem.

You also failed to take onboard the rather large advantage it is having your enemies area AAW radar/missile combination to practice against in your own fleet.

Certainly having your opponents’ weapon system is an advantage… Hey wait a second, didn’t you just say:

no ship, in the task force, that employed expendable countermeasures was struck by an antiship missile.

an antiship missile

Oh what missile might that have been? Could it have been… no… it couldn’t have… could it? The Exocet? And what was one of the types of missiles the task force was equipped with? Oh that’s right, the Exocet!

facepalm.gif

You didn’t think this one through at all did you? Or did you hope that no one would point out your obvious double standards?

Hmm let’s see what’s more difficult… sinking an escorted guided missile destroyer with dumb bombs using subsonic aircraft that aren’t even equipped with countermeasures because you might have practiced against one in your fleet (although not against the escort)… or tailoring and testing your countermeasures to defeat the radar-guided ASM both you and your opponent are using while likely being provided detailed information from the manufacturer of those missiles.

Tough one there!

That raises a point; are small carriers more easily cast aside than big carriers?

Britain downsized their fleet from 4 big/medium carriers in 1965 to 2 medium/small carriers in 1980 and then made the decision to dispose of these. Was is a necessary step to make the carriers small before making them obsolete, or could Britain have just scrapped all of its carriers in the 70s and be done with it with no political problems?

Under John Nott’s disastrous plans for the Royal Navy, two CVSs would in fact have been kept, Invincible would have been sold to Australia and Hermes disposed of.

I don’t think the size of the carriers was the issue. Britain lost its fleet carrier capability in 1978 when Ark Royal was decommissioned. The Invincibles were designed as North Atlantic ASW carriers. Their main weapon system was the Sea King, the Sea Harrier was a bonus to help shoot down Soviet LRMP aircraft. The fact that within a year Invincible was forced to act as a de facto light fleet carrier was never foreseen. Unlike Hermes, the Invincibles were never big enough to carry an air group big enough to fulfill the role of a fleet carrier, but we made do with what we had.

That raises a point; are small carriers more easily cast aside than big carriers?

Britain downsized their fleet from 4 big/medium carriers in 1965 to 2 medium/small carriers in 1980 and then made the decision to dispose of these. Was is a necessary step to make the carriers small before making them obsolete, or could Britain have just scrapped all of its carriers in the 70s and be done with it with no political problems?

The mission specificity could make smaller carriers more vulnerable to disposal certainly. RN CVS’s, without the Falklands, may have had a struggle surviving the demise of the Atlantic ASW mission. The Cavour might have had a difficult time justifying her existence had F-35B folded.

That is one of many reasons I have listed, which I’m not going to quote yet again. And those reasons individually and more importantly as a whole refute your ludicrous “they were tested against the best the Soviets had” claim. You still haven’t even responded to most of my points, let alone attempted to counter them as a whole…It’s as if you’re pretending that 90% of my points do not exist.

Your points distill down to just one thing though. To play the deception you credit them with they had to know what the Midway was and be tracking it. Otherwise how do they know what it is to not challenge…you are making the classic mistake of getting the pieces fit the story as you know it to be after the fact and to fit your personal agenda.

You are saying that they held two ship targets, that they knew to be carriers, and that they decided to practice mock attacks against the one that was trailing its coat in plain sight, but, decided to let the other play its games unmolested in order to deceive USN intel as to their real capabilities. That is what you mean by “partial response” I think was your term?. Fine. How did they know that the Midway was there and was an aircraft carrier?. We know, from first-hand account, that no platform capable of providing a visual or radar profile ID crossed the radar horizon in the 4-day window detailed. So, apart from a submarine’s passive sonar, what was ID’ing the carrier?.

Unbelievable that you are the one demanding further evidence when you still haven’t supplied a shred of your own. YOU are the one making an extraordinary claim about undetectability and “tests”, and we’re still waiting for you to supply evidence to support it

First hand account from a trained ISTAR professional?. Verbal first hand accounts from an RN Wasp pilot and the same kind of first hand account from a retired CPOWEA who recounted a tail of tripping over one of the pieces of intel recovered!.

I’m not asking anyone to believe any of this Wilk and, frankly, whether you believe it or not concerns me not in the least…I’m telling you this is what happened according to the versions I’ve been told from the men who were present!. If you want to suggest they were wrong, or, are spinning a few….fine. In absence of anything proving otherwise I see no reason to disbelieve the accounts as they have been detailed.

My sources show 20 SSGNs (majority 675 but with a half dozen 670s), 23 SSNs (mostly 671, nine others are 627s and 659s), 19 SSKs (mostly 641s and 651s). That’s over sixty subs based in the local area!

Very similar numbers to the two sources I’ve got. I said about 24 SSGNs mostly E-II’s and some C-I’s, about 10 671’s mostly V-III’s and a few N-class nuke fleet boats on top. Its close enough that the difference is academic.

I just did and the numbers do not support your position in the least.

You wrote:

then you still had hundreds of mobile platforms equipped with cylindrical, flank, etc. arrays, and a small but increasing number with low frequency towed arrays.

Now down from ‘hundreds’ to ‘about 60’ and importantly remembering that 60 would be, on any given day, roughly 40% at sea on station. Then likely another 30% on transit to/from a patrol station or on workups and the remainder in for refit and regeneration. So ‘hundreds of tactical sonars’ becomes more like 35-40, a fair percentage of those diesels with little more than direct path sensor footprint, spread out across the Sea of Japan, Sea of Okhotsk, Pacific basin and Bering Sea. As I said submarines have their limitations too.

Oh and the Sheffield and Coventry sinkings…you forgot that Glasgow was alert and decoyed successfully and that no ship, in the task force, that employed expendable countermeasures was struck by an antiship missile. You also failed to take onboard the rather large advantage it is having your enemies area AAW radar/missile combination to practice against in your own fleet. Same reason you might find today that the PLANAF might do quite well against Indian and Russian escorts equipped with Shtil!.

That raises a point; are small carriers more easily cast aside than big carriers?

Britain downsized their fleet from 4 big/medium carriers in 1965 to 2 medium/small carriers in 1980 and then made the decision to dispose of these. Was is a necessary step to make the carriers small before making them obsolete, or could Britain have just scrapped all of its carriers in the 70s and be done with it with no political problems?

And probably would not have happened had the British had a big deck CV with AEW.

But a government (Thatcher) focused on tax reductions even wanted to sell the small carriers (Invincible class) back in 1982 – as a government based on the same party (Tories) now decommissioned all remaining aircraft carriers (except of Illustrious converted to a helicopter carrier) and Harriers.

Big deck CVs are not that cheap, which explains why only one navy still operates big carriers… (UK is not the economic superpower anymore it was in the 19th and and early 20th century and therefore could afford to maintain the strongest navy of the world).

And probably would not have happened had the British had a big deck CV with AEW.

Coventry was there together with the Sea Wolf equipped frigate Broadsword – and both systems, Sea Dart and Sea Wolf, failed to stop the last attack on Coventry.

The inability to gain Sea Dart lock in the radar clutter and lack of on-board CIWS meant the Coventry had to manoeuvre to avoid the attack which sunk her. This manoeuvre bought her across the line of fire of Broadsword’s Sea Wolf, which could not fire. Having 2 ships cover one another isn’t quite the same as equipping each ship with it’s its own adequate defences.

Nope. The Soviets were utterly stupid and always revealed their full capabilities despite having absolutely no reason to do so, and always sent out all their aircraft, despite again, having no reason to do so. So proclaimed Jonesy and now John K; therefore, it must be true.

Back to reality…

NATO frequently had exercises well within range of Soviet land-based air, such as in the Norwegian sea. The Soviets’ response to these exercises varied. Sometimes they showed up with MPAs. Sometimes they observed from a distance with frigates. Sometimes the task forces were emitting and the Soviets didn’t overfly them. In at least one instance a Soviet sub surfaced in the middle of the exercise, but strangely enough the Soviets didn’t fly out with swarms of backfires to sink them!

Yet in this thread we’ve actually got posters claiming that since the Soviets didn’t send out aircraft to greet every carrier in peacetime in international waters, that is “proof” that those “carriers were tested against the best the Soviets had”!

So the Soviets shot down some aircraft that were inside their airspace and failed to respond, and “neutral” Swedish aircraft (thirty years earlier too). The US Navy also on occasion shot down aircraft such as Libyan fighters or an Iranian airliner that they deemed a threat. Oddly enough here though they weren’t shooting at the Soviet aircraft that were sent out, and the Soviets weren’t shooting at the US ships and aircraft… I wonder why…

So then, what are you suggesting?

Wilk:

What I am suggesting is that you have put forward a theory which, on the balance of probabilities, I do not find convincing. It is possible that the Soviets knew the Midway battle group was in their back yard, but chose to pretend they did not know, so as to confuse the Americans as to their true surveillance capabilities. However, based on their behaviour, it is unlikely. The USSR was a fiercely militarised society, and any state prepared to shoot down a civilian airliner which had strayed into its airspace seems, in my opinion, to have been unlikely to have been quite so sanguine about a carrier battle group operating so close to their homeland.

That is depending on the economic development – in USA the economy was growing very slowly the last decades (since the 1970s), debts are accumulating and the balance of trade is very negative, i.e. the USA are heavily indebted to other countries (e.g. Japan, China, EU). In contrast China is growing fast and has a positive balance of trade.

But still: today the US spend more then all (or most) of the other countries combined. In the near future it is likely that the US have to reduce their spending on its military.

I agree that economic growth sets the baseline. It is almost certain that China will outstrip American defence spending at some point as its economic base will be significantly larger. But over shorter time scales domestic policies can move to reinforce or oppose the long-term trends. Some of the factors I think will be at work:

United States
— downward pressure on military spending over next decade
— return of Republican hawks to power in 2020s.
— increasing military spending thereafter as United States begins to feel its #1 position threatened,
— this will in turn force the much-delayed showdown between competing visions of American society: empire, taxation, welfare state. Could get very ugly. Emergence of fascism a distant but real possibility.

China
— next decade will continue existing trend of economic growth with military budgets proceeding apace.
— thereafter balance will become more delicate as the ‘easy’ wells for large-scale increases in domestic prosperity begin to run dry. As population ages and economic growth slows, government will face pressure for increased domestic spending.
— at the same time, China’s newfound strength will expand its attentions to global horizon, whilst need to confront many simultaneous threats (US, Japan, India, Korea, etc.) will ensure that pressure to maintain defence spending remains high also.
— prognosis for increasingly delicate balancing act, but more of a slow pressure cooker scenario compared to relatively sharp inflection point for US.

Can expect both nations to make extensive use of nationalist propaganda in refocus attention of their citizens from domestic issues to more palatable directions.

So yes. China could potentially overtake American military spending by late 2020s, but in practice I think this is likely to be delayed until perhaps late 2030s, largely on account of increased American military spending amidst reactionary political environment attempting to ‘hold the line’ for liberty and Apple Pie and so forth. If world fails to end (i.e. major conflict, revolutions in either nation, etc.) hysteria will subside and American society and America-China relationship will find new equilibrium by 2040. China I think is unlikely to embark either on crazy spending spree or Euro-style minimalism.

China’s military spending could overtake United States’ by late 2020s, a mere fifteen years from now. I don’t think it actually will, largely because the United States won’t allow it, but certainly outlays will be comparable in a way that they never were during the Cold War.

That is depending on the economic development – in USA the economy was growing very slowly the last decades (since the 1970s), debts are accumulating and the balance of trade is very negative, i.e. the USA are heavily indebted to other countries (e.g. Japan, China, EU). In contrast China is growing fast and has a positive balance of trade.

But still: today the US spend more then all (or most) of the other countries combined. In the near future it is likely that the US have to reduce their spending on its military.

Nor were any British ship using a CIWS like the 1979 Goalkeeper or the 1980 Phalanx, let alone something like the lightweight Sea Wolf. So the Skyhawk/Coventry clash wasn’t so out of place. In fact it was the Exocet/Sheffield clash that was probably more out of place when you look closely.

Coventry was there together with the Sea Wolf equipped frigate Broadsword – and both systems, Sea Dart and Sea Wolf, failed to stop the last attack on Coventry.

The Coventry was sunk by UNGUIDED BOMBS. In 1982. Let me repeat that so that it sinks in: an anti-air guided missile destroyer was sunk by a handful of subsonic aircraft using UNGUIDED BOMBS. So it managed to shoot a few down. What an accomplishment! And an accomplishment it only managed to achieve because those aircraft happened to be equipped with weapons suitable for ww2. Her sister ship wasn’t so lucky as she was attacked by a weapon actually appropriate for the era, and, surprise, surprise, that ship was sunk without managing to shoot anything down.

While the Skyhawk is a 50s plane carrying 50s bombs the Coventry was using a 50s radar, the 965 which was poor at low level and with land to create clutter, rather than the 1022 STIR which was much better in this regard. Nor were any British ship using a CIWS like the 1979 Goalkeeper or the 1980 Phalanx, let alone something like the lightweight Sea Wolf. So the Skyhawk/Coventry clash wasn’t so out of place. In fact it was the Exocet/Sheffield clash that was probably more out of place when you look closely.

Getting back to the “MODERNIZATION” against EMERGING threats case :

Navy: Energy Weapons Ready for Ships

Lasers will go to sea first — starting next year — and electromagnetic railguns may not be too far behind, along with high-powered microwave weapons that are designed to deter and even disable adversaries, but not to kill them.

We do believe they are feasible, both railguns and lasers,” said Robin White, the Navy’s director for surface ship design and systems engineering. Even smaller ships, such as the Littoral Combat Ship, can be made to accommodate energy weapons

But the laser deployment may do much more than simply counter Iran. “Directed energy weapons are going to change the way we think about using naval power,” said Rear Adm. William Leigher, director of warfare integration for information dominance. He called it a “historic opportunity.”

Lasers make their debut as the United States is emerging from two long and costly wars and the defense budget is shrinking. The U.S. military is anxious to find new weapons that are highly effective, yet inexpensive to operate, said Rear Adm. Matthew Klunder, chief of naval research.

Energy weapons could be the answer to high effectiveness at low cost, he said. With lasers it costs “less than a dollar a shot to take down an adversary,” he said.

Railguns are not that cheap to operate, but their projectiles cost in the thousands of dollars compared to the hundreds of thousands or millions for missiles.

What about collateral damage — as when a laser aimed at a drone instead shoots down an aircraft with passengers? “A very deliberate process” must be undertaken to develop rules for using energy weapons, Leigher said.

It’s “not a trivial” matter, Klunder said. “We’ve been working on rules of engagement for months.”

http://www.seapowermagazine.org/sas/stories/20130410-energy-weapons.html

But you have to consider that today there is no country in world which spends anything remotely similar to the amounts the USA spends for its military.

China’s military spending could overtake United States’ by late 2020s, a mere fifteen years from now. I don’t think it actually will, largely because the United States won’t allow it, but certainly outlays will be comparable in a way that they never were during the Cold War.

As for land based strike, in the 60+ years of the jet age the USN has managed about a 3:1 kill ratio in air combat, so presumably for an opponent to defeat a standard (not reinforced with more aircraft) CVW would require the acceptance of the loss of about 100 high end aircraft. I don’t know about what it takes to sink an AGEIS destroyer but the HMS Coventry shot down 3 aircraft before it was sunk so presumably to sink the escorts another 10 or more aircraft would be lost. Now since on 4 air forces in the world have more than 500 combat aircraft: Israel, India, China, Russia I don’t think many could afford to lose the 110 fast jets needed to sink a USN CSG.

The Coventry was sunk by UNGUIDED BOMBS. In 1982. Let me repeat that so that it sinks in: an anti-air guided missile destroyer was sunk by a handful of subsonic aircraft using UNGUIDED BOMBS. So it managed to shoot a few down. What an accomplishment! And an accomplishment it only managed to achieve because those aircraft happened to be equipped with weapons suitable for ww2. Her sister ship wasn’t so lucky as she was attacked by a weapon actually appropriate for the era, and, surprise, surprise, that ship was sunk without managing to shoot anything down.

Your argument re the Midway episode seems to be that the Soviets may have known the Midway battle group was there, but chose to appear not to know, so as to deceive the Americans as to their capabilities. Really?

Nope. The Soviets were utterly stupid and always revealed their full capabilities despite having absolutely no reason to do so, and always sent out all their aircraft, despite again, having no reason to do so. So proclaimed Jonesy and now John K; therefore, it must be true.

Back to reality…

NATO frequently had exercises well within range of Soviet land-based air, such as in the Norwegian sea. The Soviets’ response to these exercises varied. Sometimes they showed up with MPAs. Sometimes they observed from a distance with frigates. Sometimes the task forces were emitting and the Soviets didn’t overfly them. In at least one instance a Soviet sub surfaced in the middle of the exercise, but strangely enough the Soviets didn’t fly out with swarms of backfires to sink them!

Yet in this thread we’ve actually got posters claiming that since the Soviets didn’t send out aircraft to greet every carrier in peacetime in international waters, that is “proof” that those “carriers were tested against the best the Soviets had”!

Consider the history of incursions into Soviet airspace over the years. Korean Airlines flight KAL007 was shot down with all its passengers, merely for encroaching on Soviet airspace. I recall a Swedish Dakota was shot down over international waters in the Baltic with the loss of all on board. Over the years of the Cold War several US intelligence gathering flights were shot down, some in Soviet airspace, some not, again, with the loss of all on board. In short, the Soviets were not at all cool about incursions into or even encroachments upon their air or sea space, and showed the will to deal with such events using lethal force.

So the Soviets shot down some aircraft that were inside their airspace and failed to respond, and “neutral” Swedish aircraft (thirty years earlier too). The US Navy also on occasion shot down aircraft such as Libyan fighters or an Iranian airliner that they deemed a threat. Oddly enough here though they weren’t shooting at the Soviet aircraft that were sent out, and the Soviets weren’t shooting at the US ships and aircraft… I wonder why…

I am not suggesting that they would have attacked the Midway battle group in international waters

So then, what are you suggesting?