Arrow vs. Scud

An interesting question is, will Israel attack Iran? Iran has promised that if Israel attempts another ‘Osirak’, they will use their Shahab 3’s in turn to destroy Israel’s nuclear production plant.

The US is too embroiled in Iraq to begin any sort of military actions against Iran, so that leaves it to Israel to go it alone. But on this problem, they don’t have as good intel on the Iranian plant as they did Iraq’s Osirak. So that would require a massive air attack of some kind, which would most definitely lead to all-out war.

Sanctions, will probably not be effective, and sitting on one’s hands is out of the question.

And to tie it into this thread, the Arrow is not mature enough yet to be combat-tested.

Eh? The ARROW is effectively a SAM system, albeit designed to shoot down ballistic missiles. Are they worried the Indians might turn the ARROW into an SSM? The Indians already has long range SSM programs. What is this MTCR concern with the ARROW?

Hi Glenn, some information regarding Arrow and MTCR.

U.S.-Israeli Policy for Exporting Arrow Missile Undecided

Appearing before a subcommittee hearing of the Senate Governmental Affairs Committee July 29, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Vann Van Diepen and Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense Marshall Billingslea broadened Rumsfeld’s statement, explaining that Washington had no position on Arrow exports in general.

Van Diepen informed senators that Arrow is classified as a Category I system under the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), which is a voluntary arrangement of 33 countries, including the United States, aimed at preventing the spread of missiles and related technologies capable of carrying a 500-kilogram payload at least 300 kilometers. MTCR members are expected to maintain a strong presumption of denial on exports of Category I items, which include whole missiles or major subsystems such as rocket engines.

The presumption of denial, however, is not a ban. Members are to weigh five criteria set out in the MTCR guidelines when considering a Category I export. Those criteria include, among other things, evaluating the importer’s intentions for using the export and whether it poses a potential proliferation risk. The United States has made past Category I exports, shipping Tomahawk and Trident missiles to the United Kingdom and transferring items to European and Japanese space launch programs. 😉

Not all theater missile defense systems would necessarily be classified as a Category I item. The U.S. Patriot system is not, and Washington has exported different versions of that missile system to several countries.

Now for the details regarding Category-I items.

MTCR Technology Annex

CATEGORY I

ITEM 1 COMPLETE DELIVERY SYSTEMS

1.A. EQUIPMENT, ASSEMBLIES AND COMPONENTS

1.A.1. Complete rocket systems (including ballistic missile systems, space launch vehicles, and sounding rockets) capable of delivering at least a 500 kg “payload” to a “range” of at least 300 km.

2.A. EQUIPMENT, ASSEMBLIES AND COMPONENTS

2.A.1. Complete subsystems usable in the systems specified in 1.A., as follows:

a. Individual rocket stages usable in the systems specified in 1.A.;

b. Re-entry vehicles, and equipment designed or modified therefor, usable in the systems specified in 1.A., as follows, except as provided in the Note below 2.A.1. for those designed for non-weapon payloads:
1. Heat shields, and components thereof, fabricated of ceramic or ablative materials;
2. Heat sinks and components thereof fabricated of light-weight, high heat capacity materials;
3. Electronic equipment specially designed for re-entry vehicles;

c. Solid propellant rocket motors or liquid propellant rocket engines, usable in the systems specified in 1.A., having a total impulse capacity of 1.1 x 106 Ns (2.5 x 105 lb.s) or greater;

HTH.

Date Posted: 13-Aug-2004

JANE’S DEFENCE WEEKLY – AUGUST 18, 2004

——————————————————————————–

Iran, Israel trade barbs over new missile tests
MICHAEL SIRAK JDW Staff Reporter
Washington, DC
Additional reporting by Alon Ben-David JDW Correspondent
Tel Aviv
and Andrew Koch JDW Bureau Chief
Washington, DC

Tehran on 11 August announced that it had tested an upgraded version of its Shahab-3 medium-range ballistic missile. The test came just two weeks after Israel’s Arrow anti-missile system – designed to negate the Shahab threat – shot down an actual ‘Scud’ missile for the first time in an exercise meant to validate its growing capabilities.

While senior Iranian defence officials said the Shahab field exercise – it was not an actual flight test – was meant to assess the performance of new components that engineers have integrated into the missile, they acknowledged that its timing was no accident.

“The Israelis are trying hard to improve the [capability] of their [Arrow] missiles and we are also trying to improve the Shahab-3 in a short time,” said Iranian Defence Minister Rear Adm Ali Shamkhani on 7 August while disclosing the pending test. The improvements to the missile “not only concern its range, but other specifications as well”, he noted.

Regional intelligence sources told JDW that these enhancements include guidance equipment of Chinese origin to improve the missile’s accuracy. US intelligence sources could not confirm this claim as JDW went to press.

The baseline Shahab-3 is believed to have a range approaching 1,300km – enough to strike Israel. There is no information that the improvements include penetration aids that could help the missile evade the Arrow’s interceptors.

The sequence of Arrow-Shahab testing comes amid the backdrop of the continuing crisis over Iran’s alleged clandestine nuclear weapon programme. Iran has said it would strike at Israel with its ballistic missiles if Israel attacks its nuclear facilities.

The spiral has not concluded, as Israel, together with the US, plan to conduct the next Arrow Weapon System (AWS) intercept test before the end of this month.

Like the previous exercise on 29 July, the upcoming event will occur at the Point Mugu sea range off the US west coast. The AWS will go up against a ‘Scud D’ ballistic missile target with a separating warhead, said the sources. The ‘Scud D’, which Syria is believed to possess, has a reported range out to 700km.

Israeli industry sources indicated that this will be an ambitious exercise – perhaps too ambitious for the Arrow programme at this point. Confidence in achieving success this time is not as high as before the previous mission due to the increased sophistication of the target missile, they said.

Israel is working to improve the Arrow’s capabilities under the Arrow System Improvement Programme (ASIP), a joint initiative with the US, so that it remains superior to the more sophisticated threats emerging in the region. Two Arrow batteries are already operational.

“We have today two kinds of threats,” said Arieh Herzog, director of the Israel Missile Defense Organisation (IMDO). While the Syrian missile threat “is mainly in the ‘Scud’ family”, the Iranian threat “is longer range, more sophisticated and more threatening because of the types of warheads that they are developing”, he said earlier this month in Washington, DC, before the Iranian test.

Israel, through ASIP, wants “to be sure that whenever the Iranians have better performance on their side, we will already have our answers,” he said.

The Israelis used an Arrow 2 version M3 interceptor in the 29 July test. Herzog said it contains only Israeli-manufactured components. The next interceptor variant, Arrow 2 version M4, will include components provided by Boeing under a 2002 teaming arrangement with Israel Aircraft Industries (IAI). The first interceptor featuring ASIP improvements is dubbed Arrow 2 version M5, he said.

Boaz Levy, director of the Arrow programme within IAI, said the 29 July test was “very successful” and proved the Arrow’s ability to destroy an actual ‘Scud’. “We know it was a fragmentation kill of the target, followed by a body-on-body collision,” he said.

See ‘Arrow points to change in Middle East balance’ (JDW 4 August 2004)

Interview: ‘Arieh Herzog- Director, Israel Missile Defense Organisation’ (JDW 22 October 2003)

‘Arrow 2’, ‘Scud D’ and ‘Shahab 3/4’ entries (Jane’s Strategic Weapon Systems)

*** FAIR USE NOTICE. This message contains copyrighted material whose use has not been specifically authorized by the copyright owner. It is being made available without profit to those who have expressed a prior interest in receiving the included information in their efforts to advance their understanding of arms trade activities, for non-profit research and educational purposes only. I believe that this constitutes a ‘fair use’ of the copyrighted material as provided for in section 107 of the U.S. Copyright Law. If you wish to use this copyrighted material for purposes of your own that go beyond ‘fair use,’ you must obtain permission from the copyright owner.
For more information go to:
http://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/17/107.shtml

What is the idea behind, fielding a long range Scud-type missile? The CEP does not allow to hit a military target, which is of limited size, even it is an AB.

The Scud was never meant to carry anything other than a nuclear or biological warhead in its intended role. It is basically an all weather uninterceptable strike aircraft that is controlled by the army. It has been replaced by much smaller and much more accurate missiles like Tochka-U and Isklander-E… the former also replacing the FROG-7 ballistic rocket.

What is the idea behind, fielding a long range Scud-type missile? The CEP does not allow to hit a military target, which is of limited size, even it is an AB.

It can have several uses:
1. Launching several missiles at a large target such as an airfield. A medium AB is much larger then 2.5 KM. So launching, lets say 20 missiles will surely cause damage.
2. Launching 1 or more Scuds at cities and civilian areas.
3. Arming them with NBC warheads which does not require accuracy.

What is the idea behind, fielding a long range Scud-type missile? The CEP does not allow to hit a military target, which is of limited size, even it is an AB.

The IRBM threat is not the only thing, they have to worry about Katshuya rockets as well i suppose. I swear ive read some place that isreal has a laser system in place that can destroy a Salvo of rockets before they do any harm.

They are working on it, and just like almost all the Israeli projects (including Arrow), Americans are paying.

and Scud is cheaper than Arrow, and god Scud has an acuracy upto what 2.5 km??? now even if Arrow misses Scud, there are high chances Scud will miss its target.

Although India purchased a ‘Green Pine’ radar from Elta in 2001 and has expressed interest in deploying its own battery of Arrow interceptor missiles, U.S. concerns regarding compliance with the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR, an international agreement limiting the proliferation of ballistic missile technology, have effectively halted such plans for the time being.

Eh? The ARROW is effectively a SAM system, albeit designed to shoot down ballistic missiles. Are they worried the Indians might turn the ARROW into an SSM? The Indians already has long range SSM programs. What is this MTCR concern with the ARROW?

First U.S. Test of Arrow Missile Defense System Goes ‘Beautifully’

The skies over the California coastline witnessed history last week, as the U.S. Missile Defense Agency (MDA) and the Israeli Missile Defense Organization (IMDO) successfully conducted the first “real-world” test of the Arrow Weapons System (AWS) interceptor, a joint program between the U.S. and Israel to develop a regional ballistic missile defense system. IMDO Director Arieh Herzog singularly described the test as “beautiful,” noting that the test highlighted four areas of success: governmental and industrial cooperation, logistical support, systems integration and “an important performance milestone [for the AWS.]”

Accepting an offer originally proposed in 2001 by the U.S. MDA, a joint U.S.-Israel team of military operators and industry contractors transported an entire Arrow 2 launch system including a ‘Green Pine’ early-warning and fire-control radar, a ‘Hazelnut Tree’ launch control center and a ‘Citron Tree’ battle management/command and control (BMC2) complex to the U.S. Navy’s Naval Air Weapons Station and Pacific Missile Test Center at Point Mugu, California. Although it took nearly three years to prepare and plan for the test carried out on July 29, the actual process of moving the equipment and personnel from Israel required less than six months.

The test, designed to reflect an operational missile defense system as closely as possible, was operated entirely by the same Israeli Air Force personnel who normally operate Israel’s two operational Arrow batteries. Given little information about the threat, the IDF/AF crew, operating within the BMC2 complex on the oceanfront, tracked an incoming SCUD ballistic missile surrogate and launched a single Arrow 2 interceptor missile from the launcher located 60 miles off the coast on San Nicolas Island. The Arrow missile arced into the sky, guided by telemetry from the ‘Green Pine’ radar and computer guidance from the ‘Citron Tree’ BMC2 facility until the interceptor kill vehicle (IKV) separated from the booster stage, at which time the on-board electro-optical guidance sensor acquired the inbound missile despite a “very small [data] error during the hand-over,” according to Boaz Levy, Israel Aircaft Industries’ Arrow Program Director.

The IKV continued towards the target missile, successfully destroying the incoming missile with the Arrow’s fragmentation warhead, followed milliseconds later by a body-to-body impact of the Arrow kill vehicle and the remnants of the simulated SCUD surrogate missile.

This marks the sixth successful test of the complete Arrow system, but the first test conducted outside of Israel in order to capitalize upon the larger test ranges afforded by the geography of the United States. The previous six system-wide tests conducted in Israel (including a 1997 test in which the Arrow warhead failed in a final stage of the intercept process), have been hampered by airspace limitations, forcing the system components to be located in much closer proximity than in real-world conditions and relying upon sub-scale target missiles to be launched from F-15 fighter jets, rather than employing a true ballistic flight path.

Point Mugu, which has been used for more than 50 years by the U.S. Navy to conduct missile tests, afforded a significantly larger test range and the ability to test against a true ‘SCUD-type’ ballistic missile. (Reports that the test employed a captured Iraqi SCUD-C missile have proven untrue, however no official information has been provided as to the source of the “simulated SCUD” used in the test.)

Although IMDO Director Herzog remains tight-lipped about the details of future tests, it is clear that at least one more test of the full system will be conducted at Point Mugu before the end of 2004.

Initiated in 1988 as a joint venture between the United States and Israel to develop an Anti-Tactical Ballistic Missile System (ATBMS), with the first flight occurring in 1990. The substantially-improved and significantly more-capable Arrow 2 program took shape following the Iraqi SCUD attacks against Israel during Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm in 1990 and 1991. The first two Arrow batteries became operational outside of the cities of Tel Aviv and Hadera in early 2000 and 2002, respectively. To date, Israel and the United States have equally split the approximately $1.3 billion cost of the Arrow 2 Development Program, according to Commander Guy Aviram, IDF, Arrow Liason Officer at the Israeli Embassy in Washington, D.C.

The Arrow program is not only a joint venture between the governments of the United States and Israel, but also the aerospace industries of the two nations. While Israel Aircraft Industries serves as the prime contractor, with Israeli firms Elta and Tadiran providing the radar and battle management systems, respectively, Boeing and a host of U.S.-based sub-contractors are providing key components of the most recent Arrow variants, known as A2-vM4 and A2-vM5. However, as stipulated in the Memorandum of Understanding signed by Israel and the U.S. in 1986, no complete missiles or control systems are produced within the United States for shipment to Israel.

Currently, work is underway on the Arrow System Improvement Program (ASIP), a joint effort of the IMDO and the U.S. MDA, as well as IAI and Boeing aimed at providing an evolving capability for the AWS and better systems integration in the future. Having demonstrated the capability of working side-by-side with Israel’s short-range Patriot missile systems and the advanced U.S. Army Patriot PAC-3 batteries during recent Juniper Cobra exercises and during the major combat portion of Operation Iraqi Freedom. According to IMDO Director Herzog, Israel currently plans on fusing the Arrow 2 systems and the shorter-range IDF Patriot PAC-2/GEM+ together with the IDF’s existing national aerospace monitoring systems, to provide a comprehensive and centralized air-defense system, rather than coordinating the actions of individual batteries of Arrow interceptors, separate Patriot missile units and IAF pilots. Herzog envisions a three-tiered system, with Arrow providing defense against MRBMs from Syria and Iran, Patriot providing defense against Short-Range Ballistic Missiles and the Mobile Tactical High-Energy Laser (MTHEL) to protect communities against Katyusha and Qassam rockets.

For the foreseeable future, Israel is likely to be the only nation to field the Arrow Weapons System, although developmental data and operational lessons have played some role in current U.S. efforts aimed at providing National Missile Defense and on the Navy’s ship-based Theater-Wide missile defense system. Although India purchased a ‘Green Pine’ radar from Elta in 2001 and has expressed interest in deploying its own battery of Arrow interceptor missiles, U.S. concerns regarding compliance with the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR, an international agreement limiting the proliferation of ballistic missile technology, have effectively halted such plans for the time being.

A diagram of the July 29, 2004 test, off Point Mugu.

An Israeli Arrow 2 anti-ballistic interceptor lifts-off from San Nicolas Island, Calif. during a test conducted by the Israeli MDO and the U.S. MDA on July 29, 2004.

Linked System of Batteries May Shield Israel in Future

By the end of the decade, Israel hopes to create a national missile defense system by connecting several Arrow anti-missile batteries to a single command-and-control system.

Israel is moving from developing a set of discrete Arrow batteries toward a national missile defense system that would include several launchers and radar sites, all linked to a central command-and-control system, Arieh Herzog, director of Israel’s Missile Defense Organization, said Aug. 2 in Washington.

With continuous improvements of the Arrow system under way, Herzog said, it can take on any evolving threat from Syria and Iran — Israel’s most immediate threats. “Whenever the Iranians have an improvement [in their ballistic missiles], we’ll have an answer,” he said.

Herzog briefed reporters Aug. 2 about a July 29 test of the system, held at the Point Mugu Sea Range in California, where the Arrow anti-missile system shot down a Scud-like target. During the test, the interceptor and target launcher were farther apart than in earlier tests conducted in Israel, Herzog said.

The Arrow will be tested in the United States whenever Israeli test ranges impose constraints on tests, Herzog said. The system has undergone seven successful tests to date, he said.

The Arrow is a joint U.S.-Israeli missile defense system that began in the early 1990s. It was conceived as a system to defend against short- and medium-range ballistic missiles on the battlefield, but with additional batteries, it is capable of providing national coverage for a small country like Israel.

Herzog said the current American involvement in the Arrow program is two-fold: Joint tests of the system, and continuing development of Arrow under the Arrow System Improvement Program.

Under a joint production agreement reached last year, Boeing, Chicago, makes subsystems for Arrow interceptors that are then shipped to Israel for final assembly by Israel Aircraft Industries, Beer Yakov, Israel.

http://www.defensenews.com/story.php?F=3115430&C=mideast

Scud B max height is 86000 metre or 282000 feet.

Firing a lot of missiles at the same time is deadly. Not delivering a total blow instantly, it will ashure a response for selfdestruction. North-Korea is the single country I would exspect some kind of suicide behavior from.

SCUD’s fly within the atmosphere the Arrow can attack it at all the way. Other missiles which fly higher and “out of the Atmosphere” will give the Arrow a much shorter reaction time and so effective range.

To this also fooling methods can come, for example if each re-entry vehicle has around 3-5 decoys which are pumped on and towed, with several other real warheads launched at the same time… It can be expected that the Green pine radar detects up to 50 incoming targets which are only attackable in the terminal phase at 30-50km maximum.

With such tactics the Arrow will get great problems in future. Another question is how much cost such a Arrow-2 missile; would it cost less than a SCUD ? How many would Israel acquire ?

Ballistic missiles will remain a threat, especially cheap ones used en masse.

What are Pakistan’s inventory of Nodong and M-11 missiles based on? Are these Scud based? As I recall they do not leave the atmoshpere…

India was looking to buy a couple of Green Pine (already purchased) units coupled with the Arrow.

Good news indeed…

SCUD’s fly within the atmosphere the Arrow can attack it at all the way. Other missiles which fly higher and “out of the Atmosphere” will give the Arrow a much shorter reaction time and so effective range.

To this also fooling methods can come, for example if each re-entry vehicle has around 3-5 decoys which are pumped on and towed, with several other real warheads launched at the same time… It can be expected that the Green pine radar detects up to 50 incoming targets which are only attackable in the terminal phase at 30-50km maximum.

With such tactics the Arrow will get great problems in future. Another question is how much cost such a Arrow-2 missile; would it cost less than a SCUD ? How many would Israel acquire ?

Ballistic missiles will remain a threat, especially cheap ones used en masse.

I seem to recall that the Moscow ABM-shield transitioned to conventional warheads, on the same missiles, during a recent upgrade (2002, 2003?). Atleast I remember comments indicating such a move. I might be wrong though.

The ABM system around Moscow has been tested and upgraded every year it has been operational… tested against ICBMs that is.

Yeah but Garry those ABMs that ring Moscow use nuclear warheads to shatter inbound ICBMs if I am not mistaken. The ARROW, PAC-3, etc., use a bullet-on-bullet hit-to-kill, or conventional close proximity warhead kill method. That kind of technology is still in it’s infancy.

The production number of nuke-warheads, to fit into ABM, is very small in the coming years.