Aviation humor

ok thread moved to this forum…. anyways anyone else have any good ones???

Squawks” are problems noted by Air Force pilots and left for maintenance crews to fix before the next flight. Here are some actual maintenance complaints logged by those Air Force pilots and the replies from the maintenance crews.

(P) = Problem
(S) = Solution

(P) Left inside main tire almost needs replacement.
(S) Almost replaced left inside main tire.

(P) Test flight OK, except auto land very rough.
(S) Auto land not installed on this aircraft.

(P) # 2 propeller seeping prop fluid.
(S) # 2 propeller seepage normal – # 1, # 3, and # 4 propellers lack normal seepage.

(P) Something loose in cockpit.
(S) Something tightened in cockpit.

(P) Evidence of leak on right main landing gear.
(S) Evidence removed.

(P) DME volume unbelievably loud.
(S) Volume set to more believable level.

(P) Dead bugs on windshield.
(S) Live bugs on order.

(P) Autopilot in altitude hold mode produces a 200 fpm descent.
(S) Cannot reproduce problems on ground.

(P) IFF inoperative.
(S) IFF always inoperative in OFF mode.

(P) Friction locks cause throttle levers to stick.
(S) That’s what they’re there for.
(P) Number three engine missing.
(S) Engine found on right wing after brief search.

(P) Aircraft handles funny.
(S) Aircraft warned to straighten up, “fly right,” and be
serious.

(P) Target Radar hums.
(S) Reprogrammed Target Radar with the words

RULES OF THE AIR

Every takeoff is optional. Every landing is mandatory.

If you push the stick forward, the houses get bigger. If you pull the stick back, they get smaller. That is, unless you keep pulling the stick all the way back, then they get bigger again.

Flying isn’t dangerous. Crashing is what’s dangerous.

It’s always better to be down here wishing you were up there, than up there wishing you were down here.

The ONLY time you have too much fuel is when you’re on fire.

The propeller is just a big fan in front of the plane used to keep the pilot cool. When it stops, you can actually watch the pilot start sweating.

When in doubt, hold on to your altitude. No one has ever collided with the sky.

A ‘good’ landing is one from which you can walk away. A ‘great’ landing is one after which they can use the plane again.

Learn from the mistakes of others. You won’t live long enough to make all of them yourself.

You know you’ve landed with the wheels up if it takes full power to taxi to the ramp.

The probability of survival is inversely proportional to the angle of arrival. Large angle of arrival, small probability of survival and vice versa.

Never let an aircraft take you somewhere your brain didn’t get to five minutes earlier.

Stay out of clouds. The silver lining everyone keeps talking about might be another aircraft going in the opposite direction. Reliable sources also report that mountains have been known to hide out in clouds.

Always try to keep the number of landings you make equal to the number of takeoffs you’ve made.

There are three simple rules for making a smooth landing. Unfortunately no one knows what they are.

You start with a bag full of luck and an empty bag of experience. The trick is to fill the bag of experience before you empty the bag of luck.

Helicopters can’t fly; they’re just so ugly the earth repels them.

If all you can see out of the window is ground that’s going round and round and all you can hear is commotion coming from the passenger compartment, things are not at all as they should be.

In the ongoing battle between objects made of aluminium going hundreds of miles per hour and the ground going zero miles per hour, the ground has yet to lose.

Good judgement comes from experience. Unfortunately, the experience usually comes from bad judgement.

It’s always a good idea to keep the pointy end going forward as much as possible.

Keep looking around. There’s always something you’ve missed.

Remember, gravity is not just a good idea. It’s the law. And it’s not subject to repeal.

The three most useless things to a pilot are the altitude above you, the runway behind you and a tenth of a second ago.

There are old pilots and there are bold pilots. There are, however, no old bold pilots.

Accidents usually follow the simultaneous combination of running out of airspeed, altitude, and ideas.

ACCIDENT REPORT ON “ICARUS – THE FIRST FLIGHT”

Accident Report (abstract)

Site of accident: 5 miles north west of Crete.

Date of Accident: Approx 250 BC.

Aircraft Type: Homebuilt, Man-Powered (ultralight class).

Injuries: 1 (fatal).

Investigator: Glutinous Maximus (Head of Air Ops, Mediterranean Sector).

Date of Report: 1/1/0001.

Details of Accident.
Considerable delay has occurred between the accident and the
investigation, so the following notes detail the facts that have been established.
The aircraft was a homebuilt ultra-light of original design, one of two constructed. The aircraft was constructed from a range of novel composite materials. The accident occurred on the first
flight of the type. The pilot was the co-designer of the aircraft, and
at the time of the accident had a total time of 25 minutes (all on
type). At the time of the flight the wind was 180/3kts and cloud cover was 0/10 at all altitudes.

There are no records of the pre-flight inspection, indeed the
indications are that none was performed. On the day of the accident witnesses report the aircraft to have successfully taken off from Crete, the pilot having announced the intention of making for Greece (although no flight-plan had been filed). The flight was in company of another aircraft of the same type flown by the co-designer and father of the pilot. The second aircraft was also on its maiden flight, and its pilot also had no experience on the type prior to the flight. Approximately 25 minutes into the flight, some 5 miles north west of Crete, the aircraft was observed to climb to a considerably higher altitude than its partner. At this point it appeared to suffer a substantial structural
failure followed by a departure from controlled flight; the aircraft
entered a dive from which it did not recover before impact with the sea.
There was no post-impact fire. No search was attempted due to lack of facilities, but the circumstances of the accident suggest that the pilot would have died on impact. The second aircraft proceeded successfully to its destination.

Analysis of Accident
Despite the elapsed time and total absence of surviving physical
evidence it is felt that sufficient information exists to infer the
sequence of events and the cause of the accident.
The novel composite structure of the aircraft was known to be the
subject of physical restrictions on operating temperature. These
restrictions had been carefully explained to the pilot before the
flight. When the pilot climbed to a higher altitude the levels of
ambient solar radiation probably led to these temperature restrictions being exceeded, resulting in a thermal degradation of the basic structure.
A progressive failure would have occurred, initial delamination of the upper skin material would have been be followed by a compressive failure of the upper mainspar. Brazier forces would then have extruded the internal wax core material leading to a catastrophic failure of the entire primary structure. This theory would help to explain why the second aircraft (at a lower altitude) experienced no such failure.

CAA Comment
This accident was clearly caused by an inexperienced pilot paying scant regard for the operational envelope of the airframe. Although the novel materials used in the airframe had strict limitations, these were well documented and explained to the pilot. It is regarded as significant that, despite the known thermal limitations of the materials used, no attempt had been made to protect the structure from infra-red radiation.
A layer of aluminised film over the outside of the structure would
probably have prevented the accident by extending the operational envelope of the airframe. In view of this, and other, design deficiencies in the aircraft it is recommended that Form 100 signatory approval be withdrawn from this manufacturer.
It is further felt that from today (1/1/01) onwards no pilot should be permitted to attempt primary training flights as solo P1 on an
experimental type. If this regulation had been in force at the time, Mr Icarus would probably not have attempted the flight.

EYEWITNESS ACCOUNT
The following eyewitness statement was made by Asticles, who was standing on the beach approximately 10 leagues away at the time of the accident. He reported seeing Greek Fire hit Icarus. Icarus then climbed an additional 150 rods before descending in a ball of fire.
Greek Navy Ship “The Amphora” in the vicinity reported that it was
patrolling the area which is a known route for the Olive Oil smuggling trade. Testacles, the captain of The Amphora reported that ship had nothing to do with the incident and that all Greek Fire projectiles on board were accounted for.

ESTATE OF ICARUS AGAINST DAEDALUS ET AL
(Vince Brannigan)
Complaint in Product Liability , Negligence and Unlawful Detention
Summary.
The deceased, Icarus, was killed while attempting to escape an unlawful imprisonment ergo Defendant King Minos is strictly liable for this death. The deceased was killed flying a defective homemade aircraft, designed and produced by the defendant Daedalus. The defendant’s claim of the plaintiffs causing his own death are not supportable.
The defendant, Daedalus, an expert inventor and engineer, affixed feathers to the wings with heat soluble wax. Alternative glues were known to the builder. Daedalus failed to consider alternative, more heat-tolerant, glues.
The warning given to the operator Icarus, was inadequate given the age of the youth. In particular, the warning claimed to be given was “Icarus, my son, I charge you to keep at a moderate height, for if you fly too low the damp will clog your wings, and if too high the heat will melt them. Keep near me and you will be safe.” This warning is in vague terms and failed to specify that melting the wings would lead to the death of the minor operator. Given the youthful age of the operator, it is critical that a warning be given in the clearest and most explicit language.
The only testimony supporting the claim that an oral warning was given is the self serving testimony of the negligent inventor. In any case a warning is inadequate if a safer non heat sensitive glue is available There was no clear definition of “moderate”, “too high” or “too low” and the operator’s experience was insufficient for him to determine the optimum altitude.
A water landing was a reasonably anticipated outcome of even a
successful flight. No provision was made for a safe water landing. No safety equipment or training was provided.
Sources indicate that, notwithstanding the claim of instant injury,
Icarus in fact drowned, Bullfinch states: While his mouth uttered cries to his father it was submerged in the blue waters of the sea which thenceforth was called by his name. His father cried, “Icarus, Icarus, where are you?” At last he saw the feathers floating on the water, and bitterly lamenting his own arts, he buried the body and called the land Icaria in memory of his child.
The claims that flying higher caused the sun to melt the wax is based on “junk science” inadmissible in this litigation. There is no evidence at all that radian solar energy increases at the heights involved in this matter and if anything the atmosphere cools as the flyer ascends. Given these facts plaintiffs estate demands 1,000,000 gold pieces in damages. If Icarus is proven to be the employer of Daedalus, as well as father to the youth, a further sum may be payable due to Employer’s Liability. There may also have been a breach of the Health and Safety at Work Act.

A few from the files!!!

For all you Ramp Tramps

You might be a freight dog if…
Your aircraft was getting old when you were born.
You have not done a daylight landing in the past six months.
ATC advises you of smoother air at a different altitude, and you don’t care.
When you taxi up to a handling agent they roll out the red carpet, but quickly take it back when they recognise you.
You call the hotel van to pick you up and they don’t understand where you are on the airport.
ATC asks you to “keep the chickens down” so they can hear you talk.
Your aircraft has more than 75,000 cycles.
Your company call sign is “Oil Can”.
The lady at the handling agent locks up the popcorn machine because you plan on “making a meal of it”.
Your aircraft has more than eight faded logos on it.
You wear the same shirt for a week, and no one complains.
ATC mispronounces your call sign more than three times in one flight.
Your D O mysteriously changes your max. takeoff weight during the holiday season.
Every handling agent makes you park out of sight of their building.
You have ever walked barefoot through the handling agents office because you just woke up.
You mark every ramp with engine oil.
Everything you own is in your flight bag and suitcase.

MYRIA

Not all about aviation,the aviation park’s at the end:
this is on a train at 1st:
The train was going along fine
then one of four engines went bust
after the 2nd one did the same
5 mins’ later the 3rd one did
then last the 4th one did and the trains stopped,the driver came up and said “I’ve got some good news and bad news”,”the bad news is all 4 engines on the train has gone bust,the good news is it wasn’t a plane”
and a silly one:
what airline do fleas fly with:
British hair ways!!!!!

dont know his name but i heard it off a fellow spotter at BHX :

AF was en route to SYD flying the A 340 and the control tower said:
have you got a problem you seem to be going pretty slow for a 4 engined aircraft. Are you sure your aircraft is not an A330.
The pilots looked at each other and the pilot said :
” no we are deffinately an A340 because the airline does not have A330’s (at this time)/.
The control tower then came back saying:
” well can you hurry up and turn your other 2 engines on then please”