Bf 110s "needed their own escorts" a canard?

Just noticed the synopsis for Vasco’s book Bf-110, c,d,e, an Illustrated Study, from every bookseller on the web contains this passage…
” As a long-range escort fighter the Bf 110C received a disastrous mauling at the hands of the more nimble Hurricane and Spitfire during the “Battle of Britain”.Rather than protecting the bombers under escort, the Bf 110C formations usually found that they were hard put to defend themselves, and the farcical situation developed in which single-seat Bf 109E fighters were having to afford protection to the escort fighters.
The complete failure of the Bf 110C in the role for which it had been conceived led to its eventual withdrawal from the Channel coast but did not result in any reduction in its production priority.”

“What you have failed to provide are any contemporary sources that the Bf 110 was escorted whilst it was used as an escort fighter.
The luftwaffe was not short on absurdities but this is a bit of a stretch.”

This has already been discussed. Do we need to go over it again? In layered escorts the close escorts cover the bombers. The layers of high escorts cover both the bombers and close escorts. 109 did fly high escorts on missions that had 110 as close escorts. The Carinhall meeting in question referenced this process, it is claimed. It would be nice to have a fuller account of that.

I would urge anyone that has access to have a crack at one on the sim.

Hurricane vs Bf 110 then Bf 110 vs Hurricane.

Very interesting exercise.

Irrespective of whether they were ‘escort fighters’ or bombers who became fighters the minute they dropped their bomb loads, the RAF certainly took a liking to them !

Yep.

Just another opinion.

What you have failed to provide are any contemporary sources that the Bf 110 was escorted whilst it was used as an escort fighter.
The luftwaffe was not short on absurdities but this is a bit of a stretch.

What no-one is suggesting is that the Bf 110 was a great dog figher when compared to single engined fighters. Like almost any small twin engined aircraft of the time its survivability rested on speed. Or to put it as an hypothetical: How well would the much celebrated DH Mosquito have fared if it were to escort bombers on daylight raids?

Escorting bombers robbed the 110 of that speed but in the early days of the BoB the luftwaffe lacked anything else that had the necerssary range. As soon as the luftwaffe learned to put external tanks on the 109 why would it then continue to send out 110 as escorts? Surely that is just doubling the work of the 109 pilots?

This is crux of OP’s question.

Yet another opinion. “Spitfire”, by Jon Lewis, page 78, mentions quote: “A manoeuvrable lump of a machine, which would eventually need a fighter escort of its own, the twin engine 110 still packed the gun-punch its nickname ‘Destroyer’ suggested. That escort was the wondrous Me109”.

The evidence stacks up.

An evaluation of the type made by the Air Fighting Development Unit at Duxford, stamped 24 March 1942:

http://www.wwiiaircraftperformance.org/me110/Me-110_Tactical_Trials.pdf

From here: http://www.wwiiaircraftperformance.org/

Paragraph on flying characteristics:

“The aircraft is very pleasant to fly and easy to take off and land. It handles more like a single engined fighter than a twin, the controls being comparatively light at all speeds. It was found that when dived at an indicated airspeed of 340mph thye controls did not stiffen appreciably and the aircraft is still fully manoeuvrable.”

There’s obviously more, so have a read. I would also agree that the Bf 110 has been miscast. There is a lot of incorrect generic information about it that remains as a result of previous publications, particularly around the likes of the prototypes and their configurations. The early Bf 109 Versuchs prototypes are frequently misrepresented as well. There are good books out there that have benefitted from more recent research that help set the record straight, such as Mankau and Petrick’s Bf 110/Me 210/Me 410.

The OP’s original question alludes to what Goring claimed to have said at one of his Carinhall meetings on 18th (?) August 1940. It looks like some writers have slightly differing views on what was actually said there. Are there any existing transcript/minutes available of these meetings? Or do accounts vary slightly due to different persons attending giving their own views of the discussion to later authors?

and by the way, Galland said 109’s used drop tank in spain

I like that. That’s one opinion I trust.

Now I get that the original specification of the 110 includes an escort fighter with longer range, but folk bleat that this is misuse of the type, due to it’s vulnerability ( unless high and fast).

Mr Bungay in his book ‘The Most Dangerous Enemy’ opines that their main attribute as an escort was to offer an easier target than the bombers they were escorting …

I am not going to get involved with some of the above discussions, but an excellent read.(Quick scan)
Duel Under The Stars.
Wilhelm Johnen.

This does not add up at all ….

I get that fans of the 110 think it should have only been used in the (perhaps unrealistic) role of only using high speed, high alt, boom and zoom tactics. Is this not something that the 109 can already do very well? In fact as the better dogfighter the 109 can do that role admirably in addition to performing the 110’s only trick as a day fighter. So given that, what is the actual point of the 110 at all then? It seems just a waste of extra engines, material and aircrew.

Now I get that the original specification of the 110 includes an escort fighter with longer range, but folk bleat that this is misuse of the type, due to it’s vulnerability ( unless high and fast).

So in view of the opening question, the 110 seems wholly redundant. The 109 is better all round and is more easily manufactured.

If the argument IS that the 110 was a good escort, then three pages of opinion have so far shown no evidence of that.

It is silly to even think a twin engined, 2 person “heavy” fighter could match the maneuverability of a single engine fighter (consider a 110 mass and equipment is almost exactly same as 2x 109’s).
Yes, the P-38 was quite maneuverable rivaling some single engines, but is a rare exception. In the end, a 110 is at a maneuver disadvantage to singles.
However, the 110 did enjoy a sound speed advantage over the Hurricane (and most French fighters) and as long as they did not engage in maneuver “dog fight” combat would be competitive. Naturally, against the Spitfire and other faster fighters, the 110 was in a very bad position, largely depended on others to help.

Bottom line: Tactics, fly to strengths.
In short, speed and/or alt advantage, attack, extended and attack again. Never go below a certain speed and alt, maximize team mates.

Most sim games model the 110, and those to fly the sim 110 to strengths often do very well, even excellently.
The faster level speed over Hurricane allows escaping and re-engage when conditions favorable.
The one major issue with using sims to judge the real aircraft and crew is the learning curve. Players have luxury (and safety) of learning and practicing best tactics to win with many failures in process. Not so such option during the war.

Found two more statements from 110 pilots re this period ( Alarmstart by Patrick Erikkson).

Leutnant Hans-Joachim Jabs of ZG76 “I flew the “110” from 10 May 1940 over France, Belgium and later during the Battle of Britain. We were superior to the French and the Belgians with the Me110 irrespective of whether we were opposed by Moranes or Curtis. We were inferior to the Spitfires and Hurricanes over Dunkirk.”

Obeleutnant Victor Molders of ZG1….”The French and British fighters were absolutely superior to the Me110, they were faster and more manoeuvrable. The good armament of the Me110, the four mgs and two cannons, helped little in this regard. The Me 110 was totally inferior to all fighter types and was only suited to attacks on bombers and ground targets. When I, despite all this, was able to shoot down two Moranes and one Hurricane in the French campaign, this was only to be ascribed to the effect of surprise……….Fact: the Me110 is good for night fighting, attacks on bombers and for low-level ground attacks.”

Cheers to you Vintage. If you had not have mentioned it, I would not have searched for it.

So far we seem to have come up with three alternatives for Stepwilk’s original Canard – whether 110s needed their own escorts.

Was it a mix of the three? Is there any account to the link to the phrase to Goring initially? Otherwise I still think the best way to get to the root of it may be to search for the first recorded use of it.

Found this today in Alfred Price’s “The Hardest Day”.

If the Spitfires, Hurricanes and Messerschmitt 109s could be likened to sports cars, however, the Messerschmitt 110 was like a family car and far less nimble than the others. “Because the 110 was so heavy it was difficult to manoeuvre it into a firing position on the enemy fighters,” recalled Leutnant Joachim Koepsell who flew this type with Destroyer Geschwader 26. “So, although we had the heaviest armament of any fighter in the battle, it was very difficult to bring that armament to bear.”

Hi Otis. Yes, that is part of his write-up in “wings of the Luftwaffe”. Cheers

V

I found this online Vintage. Is this what you were referring to? Hermann’s Destroyer By Captain Eric Brown

The Zerstöer, or destroyer, category of warplane, a term for the strategic fighter as represented by the Messerschmitt Bf 110 borrowed from naval parlance, was particularly favoured by Reichsmarschall Hermann Göing, the Oberbefèhlshaber of the Luftwaffe; the Bf 110-equipped Zerstöergruppen were the elite of the air arm of which he had been the principal architecte German propagandiste had made far-reaching claims for the capabilities of the Bf 110, claims in which the Reichsmarschall undoubtedly believed implicitly, and when first deployed operationally there was every reason to suppose that it would fulfill the most sanguine expectations of its creators.
Over Poland, the Bf 110 enjoyed considérable success in combat with the appreciably more manoeuvrable if slower PZL P11 single-seaters, and the disastrous armed reconnaissance sortie over the Schillig Roads, the Jade Estuary and Wilhelmshaven performed on 18 December 1939 by 24 Wellingtons of the RAF, when nine of the bombers fell victim to the Bf 110 Cs of 1. and 2.Staffeln of Zerstöergeschwader 76, appeared to substantiate the boastful claims made by Reichsmarschall Göing and must have been a great morale-raiser for the crews of the Luftwaffe strategic fighter units.
Thus, the Bf 110 was to enjoy an awe-inspiring reputation by the time it was committed to the “Battle of Britain”. There had not been time to thoroughly analyse the results of combat in French skies during May-June 1940, in which the Zerstöergruppen had encountered relatively modem and reasonably well-armed single-seat fighters, although under conditions of Lufttwaffe aerial supremacy; encounters which had necessitated a reappraisal of the tactics employed by the Zerstöer formations and had revealed some of the weaknesses in the strategic fighter concept. The strategic fighter had to be something of a compromise between conflicting requirements and the Bf 110 was such a compromise, if a remarkably successful one.

The concept demanded heavy firepower and sufficient fuel for long range, which, at that point in time, dictated a relatively large aircraft of twin-engined configuration. It had to possess performance comparable with that of the more specialised défensive fighter by which it was likely to be opposed, and as one of its primary tasks was the defence of bomber formations, a high degree of manoeuvrability was mandatory. Some of these desirable attributes conflicted in their achievement with others, the range requirement with its weight penalty being achieved only at the expense, for example, of manoeuvrability. In the “Battle of Britain” the Bf 110 fell far short of anticipation and its limited success was to lead to a widespread belief that it was an unsuccessful design. This was, in fact, far from the case, for the Messerschmitt strategic fighter was not the indifferent warplane that its showing during the “Battle” led many to believe. It was a very effective warplane but inadequate understanding on the part of the Führungsstab of the limitations of the strategic fighter category led to its incorrect deployment with the result that the Zerstöergruppen suffered some 40 per cent attrition within less than three weeks of the launching of Adlerangriff.
A soundly designed warplane having attempted to present the nationale for the Bf 110’s relatively poor showing in British skies during the summer of 1940, which resulted in this elegant warplane being adjudged unfairly by many aviation historiens as unsuccessfull.

I would make the point that, apart from the debacle of the Zerstöergruppen during the “Battle of Britain”, the Bf 110 served with a fair degree of distinction throughout the whole of WW II as both diurnal and nocturnal interceptor, as an intruder and fighter-bomber, and in a variety of other operational roles, the basic design proving amenable to power plant changes and to accommodating armament, avionics and other equipment far and anything envisaged at the time of its conception. By any standards, therefore, the Bf 110 must be deemed a success, and I was certainly never to meet a German pilot that disliked – an accolade indeed. I had always admired the sleek, business-like appearance of Bf 110, and as soon as I flew this warplane so much vaunted Göing I felt that tingling sensation that I associated with an aircraft of considérable operational competence.

Then later……

It was singularly fortunate for the Luftwaffe that it possessed so tractable an aeroplane, and it is perhaps unfair but understandable that the Bf 110 be associated most widely with the “Battle of Britain” and judged on its showing in that epic conflict. It should be borne in mind, however, that the Führungsstab had never envisaged deploying Hermann’s “Destroyer” other than in conditions of local Luftwaffe superiority if not supremacy; a situation such as that in which the Bf 110 found itself over Southem England had not been foreseen. No designer, however talented, had come up with a magic formula enabling a large and heavy twin-engined long-range fighter to compete in terms of agility with contemporary single-engined short-range single-seaters.
The forward-firing armament of the Bf 110 was certainly lethal but lacking the manoeuvrability of its RAF opponents, it could bring this armament to bear only if it could employ the element of surprise or if it encountered an unwary novioe-a commodity of which admittedly RAF Fighter Command was in no short supply at that stage of the conflict.
Its acceleration and speed were inadéquate to enable it to avoid combat if opposed by superior numbers of interceptons, and its single aft-firing 7,9-mm weapon was inadequate to protect it from attack from astern. But if the Bf 110 received a mauling in the “Battle of Britain” it gave a good account of itself on many battlefronts in the years that followed.

I would also suggest anyone with an interest on this subject might read the complete write up by Captain Eric Brown.

V

The common claim made is that the Bf 110 was unsuatible for skies of the UK and was thus pulled back to other ‘safer’ theatres and later found valuable use as a night fighter.

The unsuitability was how it was used and that had it been utillised in a way that took advantage of its speed then it would have been a very serious threat to RAF pilots without needing its own escort.