Been thinking this morning about the influence of a strategic BMD system on MAD stability.
First I assumed, that it only works as organic part of the early-warning – launch-decision – launch vehicle complex, and would have to have the same degree of hardening (in detail and as a sub-system), as it would represent the defensive part of MAD (the offensive part being ICBMs and SSBNs/SLBMs, obviously).
Since the launch areas of all MAD adversaries are out of reach for boost-phase intercepts, the first chance for a BMD would be the mid-course phase. Due to the impossiblity to secure/harden a sea-borne BMD launch platform, a strategic mid-course BMD system would have to rely on ground-based (missiles) and airborne components (mostly laser). An intercept during the terminal phase is possible in principle, but the problems are huge, since a RV is still really really fast up there at terminal intercept altitude, hence the time window from computing impact point of leakers (potentially made harder by maneuvering), to missile start to intercept is tiny. As a consequence the footprint of a terminal phase Sprint-like system is quite small. So a mid-course intercept looked good, and with multiple kill-vehicles on each missile also quite do-able.
Till I came across the problems with early-warning and targeting a BMD system would have against a MAD adversary’s attack, which lies in the impossibility to secure that re-active BMD sub-system, and here especially its sensors, from being blinded or fooled or otherwise degraded, e.g. by a number of orbital nuclear explosions in the the last few moments before a first strike, or in the case of systems like SBIRS and other by stealthy killer sats, or a number of other methods (e.g. airborne lasers). And without information about the incoming stuff, no intercept. (A SDI-approach doesn’t work either, since an attack on that system would have to be interpreted as a general attack, or face degrading or annihilation. And even though it would be challenging, the stealthy parasite killer-sat approach could still severly degrade any orbital constellation).
The fact that orbital nuclear explosions would also take out parts of my own system can be circumvented by a sequence of rapid satellite launches (which do not have to be on a very long-lived orbit) just after the initial stage, and in the moments before and after my ICBM/SLBM first strike, thus regenerating my orbital C3ISR and BDA capability.
As a consequence of this all against a MAD adversary only strictly no-nonsense MAD helps. There are no realistic defensive MAD parts. (So Putin can sleep tight again – he just has to do a little retargeting). So even with a minimum strategic deterrence MAD BMD does not really work, since it is not surviveable in those critial 30 or 40 minutes. And the more important the survivability of the strategic deterrence complex becomes (but that’s another topic).
But then what about sub-MAD adversaries, those the U.S. NMD complex is officially designed against? Here of course all three stages of BMD come into play – boost-, mid-, and terminal phase intercepts, along the line what we see currently developed by the U.S.
Even if it is not MAD deterrence, a strategic deterrence complex composed of an offensive part (ICBM/SLBM) and a defensive part (BMD) still works against a sub-MAD adversary. The question that comes up is of course the threshold for the use of strategic nuclear weapons against such a – possibly loony or martyric – enemy, who does not really care whether parts of his population would receive an instant glazing. Against such people the U.S. NMD concept would probably work. Of course increased survivability through mobility is neccessary, even against a minimum-capability enemy, but in my mind this is only a question of time. What NMD, or any strategic BMD system does, is giving the leadership expanded options in case of an attack, raising the doctrinal threshold for the retaliatory employment of strategic nuclear weapons, and in case saving an enemy country’s population from footing the bill for a rash or rabid leadership or military.
Finally, as a consequence of a sub-MAD strategic defensive capability the minimum strategic deterrence capability against a MAD adversary can be strictly taylored against that one adversary, and does not need to reserve capability against potential sub-MAD adversaries, which lowers the overall offensive strategic arsenal. Which is not a bad thing; I’d say.
Now, besides ballistic missiles there are cruise missiles, and they proliferate really fast these days. And there is a good chance that a sub-MAD adversary would include cruise missiles in his setup. Thus strategic cruise missile defense (CMD) has to receive the same attention as ballistic missile defence (BMD). There is another threat somewhere here about the difficulties of countering a strategic cruise missile attack, once they left their launch platform, and I wondered if there is a chance, that a BMD system, or a system derived from a BMD system, might play a role in that.
Provided the problem of detecting the cruise missiles is solved (mostly through orbital and airborne sensors, I guess), and if the quality of that data allows targeting, might not a GBI derivate help with shooting them down? It might be possible to put a CMD mid-course-defense missile with multiple miniature kill-vehicles onto a suborbital trajectory, have it release the IR-guided KVs, and kill the cruise missiles by a “simple” gravity assisted intercept from above. With, say, 8 or 12 KVs on each CMD missile, a salvo might defeat a mass attack by cruise missiles, raining KVs from above. Key of course would be timely detection.
Such a system could also be used as an ultra long range SAM against formations of aircraft; response time would be an issue, limiting the use to formations of Bears and the like. It would be worth looking at.
Comments/Thoughts?
By: JimmyJ - 14th June 2010 at 00:04
When the entire nukes and missiles are under a central control, a launch would effectively state a fight to finish and be finished [MAD]. And I wonder ever if the BMD would act as a deterrent as with the case of US/Russia owing thousands of nukes and launch vehicles.
Even in the case of countries with smaller number of nukes ie India and Pakistan, a BMD development in India is now probably countered by an increased rate of nuke production by Pakistan.
I would like to know for whom would it cost more economically, in this case and to what extend the BMD is effective, assuming that fissile material is short?
One case the BMD is good to have would be if the non state elements succeed to make a launch, which has been identified and verified immediately by both government agencies, and need to be shot down without escalating the issue leading to MAD.
By: vanir - 10th June 2010 at 07:44
Russian sentiment is (rightly) that US defence journalist concerns about Iran and North Korea are nothing more than a proxy of continued strategic concerns about the CIS and China. USAF bases in Bulgaria, munitions stockpiling in Romania, and NATO presence in Afghanistan really aren’t helping.
Only in the Star Trek universe does Iran or North Korea conceivably threaten anyone further afield than immediate neighbours in any forseeable future. This point is punctuated by their stoic, isolationalist political cultures. What they are is paranoid, not territorial. So the inherent question is what policies are the US tabling to warrant any possible concerns?
And this is the inherent question of the CIS and China, being any significant expenditure on BMD systems are plainly aimed at they with any other excuse nothing more than a proxy for benefit of political correctness in the eyes of the general public.
So what policies exactly are the US tabling to warrant such fears of international aggression by other major powers?
This is basic stuff. Bush was trying to start the Cold War over again and doing to get at the Caspian table. It would’ve been disastrous, and Obama has a far more level head.
Hopefully he’ll withdraw the USAF Bulgarian bases and Romanian stockpiles because presently that’s a great big slap in the face of the Black Sea region indigenous security protocols and the general national security of Russia.
By: geogen - 23rd May 2010 at 09:17
…of airborne boost-phase BMD for non-MAD adversaries..
I’m curious of any feasibility of an air-launched IRIS-T SL (AAM-intercept) variant – (an air-air variant of the extended-ranged, surface launched TBMD variant, of the standard air-launched IRIS-T missile) and if such a nasty thing has already been proposed, or how plausible it would be if at all?
With enlarged booster, data-link, jettisonable drag-reducing nosecone, although perhaps w/ the base IRIS-T IIR seeker (in lieu of the reported SL’s radar seeker)… such a CMD/BMD (booster phase), plus all around passive guided air intercept missile would appear to be a formidable option? A poor-man’s NCADE with passive-Meteor capability? If not already conceived, I’d propose it as the ‘IRIS-T A-ER’. A for active.
Thanks for any response.
By: Rodolfo - 21st May 2010 at 14:41
Regarding your airborne missile: Yes, once you are up there with a missile armed bomber as first stage your ballistic range is pretty darn impressive. I think I had a thread about that. Not sure I remember correctly, but a THAAD class missile launched up high could go thousands of kilometers ballistically. Offering the same options as the ICBM above it could also be tasked either offensively (with a nuclear warhead), or defensively (boost-phase intercept, plus mid-course intercept, even anti-satellite). Launched from a loitering platform (LO would be optimal) such a platform could prevent an enemy launch via boost-phase intercept, and at the same time launch a retalatory strike against the enemy launch base.
AFAIK, the development of S-300V was motivated not only by the Pershing threat but also by fear to F-111 launched SRAM (just 150 km range). Kh-15 with 300 km range and 1.5+ km/s is touted as an effective Patriot killer even in the west. So, what about extending the range of Kh-15 with newer propellants and a lighter warhead? A 2.000 km range ALBM will need development from scratch but we are no in the 60s anymore and the chance of success will be definitively higher than the Skybolt one. In addition, as it can circumvent the 1987 INF treaty, you can deploy several dozens on Tu-22s to free ICBM targeted at mid-abroad spots (I.e. China, Japan, U.K). Consider also the potential for use as an ABM in face of an hypothetical Chinese or Iranian BM.
Given the money constraints of the Russian defense budget, it looks as a very interesting option. Just an opinion.
By: Distiller - 21st May 2010 at 05:01
I wonder about a simple way to off-set prospective BMD. What about ALBM. I mean a XXI century Skybolt launched from i.e. a Tu-22M3 to fill the hole opened by the INF. Let’s assume, also some Kh-55 replaced by a “Skyboltsky” (with range around 2.000 km) in Tu-160s. A really problematic weapon for the defender.
If one would want to be nasty and confrontational there are a couple of options. One was outlawed in the Prague Treaty now, that is strategic BMD (mid-course with MKV) on the same missile that could also carry a nuclear warhead. Thinking in the 12 to 15 metric tonnes Midgetman class ICBM, such an arrangement would open some interesting possibilities. The same class of missile could also be used to rapid-launch small satellites, e.g. for the purposes I described in the original post (C2, ISR, BDA, …).
Regarding your airborne missile: Yes, once you are up there with a missile armed bomber as first stage your ballistic range is pretty darn impressive. I think I had a thread about that. Not sure I remember correctly, but a THAAD class missile launched up high could go thousands of kilometers ballistically. Offering the same options as the ICBM above it could also be tasked either offensively (with a nuclear warhead), or defensively (boost-phase intercept, plus mid-course intercept, even anti-satellite). Launched from a loitering platform (LO would be optimal) such a platform could prevent an enemy launch via boost-phase intercept, and at the same time launch a retalatory strike against the enemy launch base.
By: Rodolfo - 20th May 2010 at 15:24
I wonder about a simple way to off-set prospective BMD. What about ALBM. I mean a XXI century Skybolt launched from i.e. a Tu-22M3 to fill the hole opened by the INF. Let’s assume, also some Kh-55 replaced by a “Skyboltsky” (with range around 2.000 km) in Tu-160s. A really problematic weapon for the defender.
By: Distiller - 20th May 2010 at 12:16
Ah! Digging up old threads! Well, 18 month later it still doesn’t sound all that bad. LOL.
Only thing I might change, or let’s say weigh differently, is the primacy of airborne boost-phase BMD for non-MAD adversaries. But I think back then my scribble was concentrating on the MAD adversary level.
By: MadRat - 18th May 2010 at 18:10
http://www.rand.org/pubs/commercial_books/CB137-1/
http://www.librarything.com/work/314980
Strategy in the Missile Age by Bernard Brodie
It has about every conceivable strategy lain out and in the end when you weigh in all the factors its pretty clear that BMD is a losing strategy. It merely escalates a game that costs too much to play. Somebody has the ear of every administration since the missile age and pushes for bright new shiny BMD toys. Problem is they don’t work, can be too easily circumvented, and you go broke trying to deploy a baseline system. Yes, its expensive to get the least effective level of defense! Obama is carrying on a retarded strategy carried on by the past four administrations. Carter was the only one in the past fifty years that even (smartly) contemplated killing it.
By: obligatory - 18th May 2010 at 15:24
An interesting thread Distiller, and interesting input as always.
Some thoughts:
SBIRS or other general surveillence are totally unlikely to detect a AGM-86C (or similar) launch, much less track it.
Space also has a lot of radiation already, and satellites aren’t that close packed, so i think it will be less of an issue then you anticipate.
By: Austin - 18th May 2010 at 14:40
A Flawed and Dangerous U.S. Missile Defense Plan
George N. Lewis and Theodore A. Postol
By: Distiller - 25th November 2008 at 11:57
By: Distiller - 22nd November 2008 at 19:13
May I ask how a single hit-to-kill interceptor can take out multiple re-entry vehicles, even if they are closely grouped? As I understand it, in order to do that, you would need a massive explosive charge, typically a nuclear device. The use of which in missile defence is of course somewhat shunned these days.
Did I write single-KV vs multi-RV? Too drunk to look through my scribbling …
It’s single interceptor missile with multi-KV taking on a multi-RVs bus.
“Closely grouped” referred to trajectories/orbits, not physical spacing. Coming in a row, sort of.
By: CommanderJB - 22nd November 2008 at 10:49
May I ask how a single hit-to-kill interceptor can take out multiple re-entry vehicles, even if they are closely grouped? As I understand it, in order to do that, you would need a massive explosive charge, typically a nuclear device. The use of which in missile defence is of course somewhat shunned these days.
By: Distiller - 22nd November 2008 at 10:13
Two more things:
(1) — Does the development of multiple kill-vehicle mid-course interceptors degrade the deterrence capability of heavy multi-RV ICBM/SLBM? A missile with, say, 10 RVs (not taking into account treaties here) releases them at some point of the post-boost phase onto a common trajectory, till they start their individual decent. A mid-course BMD able to catch the RVs before their trajectories start to vary too much, could have serious impact on the platform-warhead equation.
As a consequence, would a higher number of medium sized missiles with only a few warheads, but a high number of decoys strengthen deterrence?
Is that something that has to influence the follow-on to Trident designs (both the boats and the missiles)?
(2) — For a strategic mid-course interceptor missile to work in an optimal way, would it have to have a variable impulse (liquid) motor? Reason: Flexibility of intercept trajectories/orbits.
Answers/Comments/Thoughts?
By: bgnewf - 20th November 2008 at 13:54
Interesting thread Distiller. I think that you do an excellent job of presenting your case. I would submit that the one major area of delivery systems that need to be addressed would be the portable or ‘suitcase” style weapon.
Ballistic, sub-ballistic, or even cruise type weapons all have the common characteristis of being potentially detected upon launch or perhaps even intercepted. They also allow the country being targeted to likely know whom hit them in the first place.
The suitcase bomb scenario, especially when tied into assymetric warfare like cyberattacks or 9/11 type events would be arguably the best way for a smaller opponent bent on using nukes to deploy them and maybe get away with it.
By: Rodolfo - 20th November 2008 at 13:34
I wonder how many years will last for the rebirth of FOBS or even multiple re-entry FOBS. Some Russian hardliners advocate the redeployment of such systems to warrant a MAD end in any case.
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November 20, 2008 at 7:54 am