The ability of Britain’s military thinkers and leaders has been brought many times into question. With notable exceptions, few appear to have measured up to the job of properly shaping Britain’s military tactics and strategy in WW2.
In formulating the tactics for aerial battle during the late 1930’s, the RAF appear to have forgotten completely how the aerial battles of WW1 were fought over the Western Front.
In devising six standard types of aerial fighting; Area Attacks – fighting by numbers, similar to painting by numbers – The RAF negated the supreme advantages of the fighter; agility, speed and fire power combined in a killing machine. Quite how our military thinkers could have arrived at such grievous specifications is beyond my understanding.
The military concept of concentration of force at the point of maximum vulnerability is a well understood concept. The Germans practiced this with success and referred to it as the “Schwerpunkt”. In that particular context, the RAF’s Area Attacks can be understood, but it ends there.
I do not think that our military planners bothered to think about how formation cohesion would be maintained in the heat of a violent aerial melee. It never was and thankfully led to the abandonment of what could accurately be described as ill thought out and unworkable aerial tactics.
There remained however some residue in the shape of the wingman or, No.2. This was the person whose job it was to protect the rear of his leader, come what may. Quite how the No.2 was to protect his own rear while maintaining close formation on his leader has, as far as I know, never been explained. Like the Area Attacks, this practice slid into oblivion.
When one considers the individualistc killing savagery of aerial warfare during the Battle of Britain, attended by closing speeds of 700mph, and the attendant confusion in the midst of the heat of battle, how any one could convince themselves that the most efficient way of dealing with this was to assemble fighters into neat phalanxes of formations is to me, a complete mystery.
By: Arabella-Cox - 9th February 2016 at 15:15
Fair comment John, but I don’t think your opening post really said that.
You referenced the fighting of WWI and went on to imply if not outright state that therefore the British should have simply continued in that vein.
I actually disagree with your characterisation of air combat in the last years of WWI, although it holds true for the early years. In 1917 and 1918 large formations were the norm unlike the lone hunters of the early years. Yes a melee may have developed and maintaining formation integrity have been impossible but it did not mean every man for themselves as you seem to suggest. Fighters would provide cover for other fighters from their own side albeit perhaps not in a formal structured sense.
With regard to the attack formations developed by the RAF I think these actually show that staff officers and others were trying to devise effective tactics to combat large co-ordinated bomber formations that were the expected opposition.
We should remember the RAF didn’t expect to be facing manoeuvrable but shorter ranged fighters based in France when defending Britain in any engagement with Germany.
That the attack formations were ineffective and did indeed negate the principal positive attributes of the British fighters is undoubtedly true, however many of the best ideas have been seen to rather lacking once confronted with reality.
By: John Green - 9th February 2016 at 12:27
I think that some are missing the point. My point of reference was the frantic, frenetic, dog fights over Southern England in 1940. Upwards of three, four or five hundred or more machines engaged in close battle. I do not think that in such circumstances any combatant would have had much regard for the whereabouts of his No.2 or, wingman.
The fight, among other perhaps lesser concerns, was for survival – that ancient instinct. Every action played second fiddle to that. Attack and kill the enemy; for sure, but, short of running away, make sure you did everything necessary to ensure survival. That had to be the first primal instinct.
The German bomber formations were forcibly evicted from their formations. Confusion abounded. It became every man for himself. And then, as so often recounted, the sky, in a trice, became empty. For now the job was done.
Later in the war, with the immediate threat of invasion lifted and the absence of the intense 1940’s style dogfighting, what became the standard battle formation of RAF fighters; the ‘finger four’ with its ready adaptation into two pairs, lent itself more readily to the use of No.2’s. The numerical balance had shifted from the Luftwaffe to the RAF so attack from the Germans was not very likely to arrive simultaneously from all points of the compass.
If you’re in a ‘punch-up’ and severely outnumbered, text book tactics go by the board. They can be saved for better days.
By: Arabella-Cox - 8th February 2016 at 14:13
…but, in the missile age, I’m not sure how well the ‘wingman’ would be able to protect the leaders back?
I think you’ve answered this in the earlier part of your post. It is not that one aircraft is watching over the other whilst the other hunts, both watch over each other and both hunt.
In todays world it could well be that one (or more) of the formation are silent (electronically) and thus harder to detect with one scanning for opposition which can then be attacked by the silent partners with the opposition having little knowledge, until too late, of the (closer?) threat.
By: Arabella-Cox - 8th February 2016 at 14:06
Couple of thoughts.
First the op appears to suggest that fighters in the later stages of WWII and subsequently do not operate in conjunction. A suggestion that for me fly’s in the face of fact. The “wingman” survived throughout WWII and to the present day. The Thatch Weave perhaps being the easiest example to offer.
I can agree that the tactics for the employment of “wingmen” undoubtedly evolved. The rigid formation keeping as initially employed by the RAF rapidly gave way to more fluid and adaptable formations, in particular the wingman no longer being a secondary or junior partner but both fighters in a pair capable of being the leader or no. 2 as demanded by circumstances. (Admittedly the USAAF and subsequently the USAF did cling onto the lead and no. 2 being there to cover the lead concept for a long time, the USN in contrast has allowed the lead to transfer as appropriate since early WWII.)
Thus the concept of fighters operating together whilst changed remained and remains to this day.
Second, with reference to comments re “old guard” can I urge you to read 1918: A Very British Victory by Peter Hart. Whilst it may be true that British inter war thinking as epitomised by the Fighter Tactics the op notes was strange, at the end of WWI the British Armed Forces were far from the deprived of new ideas and methods and of implementing them.
By: Creaking Door - 8th February 2016 at 13:58
Certainly fewer aircraft involved; the fighter-versus-fighter engagement that I can recall with the most aircraft involved was only between two Sea Harriers and three ‘Daggers’ (Israeli-built Mirage V). The Sea Harriers won, three-nil.
I think by the time of the Falklands the job description of ‘wingman’ had changed a bit. I think the British pilots flew in a formation known by its American name of ‘loose deuce’; two aircraft flying parallel courses, roughly half-a-mile apart, with one, as leader, slightly ahead. Certainly not close enough to have to worry about formation-keeping or collision too much. The advantages were two pairs of eyes, on the radar screen as well as the sky, but, in the missile age, I’m not sure how well the ‘wingman’ would be able to protect the leaders back?
By: John Green - 8th February 2016 at 13:27
I agree. But did the intensity of the air battles over the Falklands come even close to those over Southern England during the period in question ?
A No.2 during the Falklands would, I suggest, have had a much ‘easier’ time of it in protecting his No.1. Time to watch his rear, time to maintain accurate formation, time to be apprised of missiles approaching, time to warn his No.1 and take evasive action.
That luxury of time did not exist in 1940. Too, too many aircraft moving at speed. We know that collision was an ever present threat and reality. I wonder if anyone knows the ‘shot down’ statistics for No.2’s in the Battle ? Would they have presented as a significant blip on a graph ?
I flew from an airfield in Wiltshire where we were lucky to have an enterprising, very capable and enthusiastic CFI. From time to time, using the four or five PA38’s that were on the club strength, we’d assemble and depart for some energetic ‘tail chasing’ over the Wilts contryside.
I much enjoyed this and it was about as close as I was ever likely to come to aerial battle. But, it was exhausting trying to keep track of the whereabouts of every other aircraft and stop them getting on your tail. The simple act of moving your head thru’ 180 degrees constantly was wearing to an extreme. And, we had just four maybe five aircraft up.
I thought then, as I think now, that the No.2’s must have been relatively easy meat!
By: Creaking Door - 8th February 2016 at 13:04
There remained however some residue in the shape of the wingman or, No.2. This was the person whose job it was to protect the rear of his leader, come what may. Quite how the No.2 was to protect his own rear while maintaining close formation on his leader has, as far as I know, never been explained. Like the Area Attacks, this practice slid into oblivion…
Has it? I thought the fighter tactic of the ‘wingman’ was alive and well to this very day.
It certainly was during the Falklands Conflict; Sea Harriers on Combat Air Patrols expecting air-to-air combat simply did not fly during the Falklands without a wingman.
By: Creaking Door - 8th February 2016 at 13:00
No, but I still think it fits perfectly into the remit of the Historic Aviation forum; if you really want an interesting discussion I’d say that was the place to get one.
By: John Green - 8th February 2016 at 12:26
It wasn’t intended to be a comment about historic aircraft – neither is it. It is a comment about the forward thinking abilities of some of our military commanders and planners.
By: paul178 - 8th February 2016 at 12:19
A topic for the Historic Aviation forum surely?
Exactly my sentiment
By: Creaking Door - 8th February 2016 at 12:12
My short answer would be in two parts:
Firstly, the Luftwaffe had some recent experience of more modern air-to-air combat in the Spanish Civil War and later over Poland.
Secondly, because the Germans had lost the First World War their military had experienced much more of an upheaval than that of Britain or France, for example; the ‘old guard’ had been somewhat swept-away, so to speak, so younger leaders with new ideas were much more able to establish themselves. It is the old adage that ‘failure requires investigation but success needs none’.
By: Creaking Door - 8th February 2016 at 12:06
A topic for the Historic Aviation forum surely?
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February 8, 2016 at 11:14 am